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The shortage of water as a resource is a threat to which both Ethiopia and England are exposed. 
This vulnerability of the countries necessitates the question of whether existing management 
systems for water resources will promote the sustainability of such resources. With growing 
natural resource insecurity over the last fifty years, the tragedy of the commons and the integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) approach are at the forefront. This study evaluates the 
tragedy of the commons and the IWRM approach to identify key features of effective water 
resource management (WRM) systems. The study also assesses the effectiveness of English and 
Ethiopian systems by reference to their salient features, to explore the extent to which the major 
facets of an effective system are reflected within the countries water policies and laws. The 
evaluation demonstrates that in the case study countries, some such factors have already been 
reflected within their water policies and laws. From the overall UHYLHZRIHDFKFRXQWULHV¶water 
policies, it may be argued that the contemporary policies that are in place generally accommodate 
some of the main attributes of an effective management system for water resources if they are 
accompanied by proper water laws, implementation strategies and institutional remits that are 
designed to promote water security. However, while some key features of an effective WRM 
system can already be seen LQWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV¶ZDWHUODZVWKHLQLWLDWLYHVZKLFKKDYHEHHQ
taken are limited and varied. Particularly, in Ethiopian WRM systems, the progress made to 
incorporate the main elements into binding law were slow. Even if some features have been 
reflected within the water laws of both jurisdictions, theirs scope is limited and incomprehensive. 
Moreover, their implementations are weak and incomplete in both jurisdictions. This study 













Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Backgrounds 
1.1.1 The concept of security 
7KH QRWLRQ RI µsecurity¶ LV QRW D QHZ FRQFHSWon the political and legal agenda; it is an over-used 
notion, which has no common understanding.1Traditionally, the idea was conceived under the threat 
of war and military aggression and dominated by a narrow perspective in relation to conflicts.2The 
notion¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQZDV increasingly limited to war and conflicts. In this context, the concept is 
perceived as a demand for taking counter actions to control the risks of war. 3 This realm of 
conceptualization assumes that there are actual or possible military threats that require a framework 
to regulate them.4Through this perception, security is seen as the capacity of a state to manage 
military threats. The appreciation that is given to managing possible or actual war threats remains 
necessary, even in this day; states may well have actual or potential war threats. Conflict is amongst 
the threats endangering human life and property. Predictably, humans are unsafe when they live in a 
potential or actual conflict zone. 
The problem of this traditional security conceptualization is that it does not encompass the daily 
threats to the lives and wellbeing of most people and ecosystems, and fails to appreciate the 
protection of a range of values.5 Nowadays, various non-military challenges threatening humanity 
and healthy ecosystems are on the rise across the globe. Among these, water security is one of the 
critical challenges. Its LQVHFXULW\µLVDVELJDVPDODULDDVELJDV+,9$,'6,W¶s bigger than tsunamis, 
bigger than earthquakes; more people are affected each year by the water crisis than by all wars in 
any given year. It¶s a crisis as big as we face « Our lack of will to grapple with this issue is 
astonishing and perhaps criminal¶. 6  In1994, a change in institutional arrangements of security 
commenced with the adoption of the UNDP report on µhuman security¶, which outlined security by 
                                                             
1
 6DGLD0XVKWDTµ6HFXULW\SHUFHSWLRQDQRYHUYLHZ¶Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, 1. 
2
 .HQ%RRWKµ6HFXULW\DQGHPDQFLSDWLRQ¶Review of International Studies, 
318<wwjstor.org/stable/20097269> accessed 2 November 2010. 
3
 0D[0DQZDULQJµ7KHQHZJOREDOVHFXULW\ODQGVFDSHWKHURDGDKHDG¶ Low Intensity Conflict & Law 





2008).<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search-full.asp?statID=177> accessed 10 June 2012 
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expanding its traditional landscapes.7At present, the interpretation of security has been increased to 
accommodate a range of threats. The traditional perspective, a narrow interpretation which associated 
security with the military and with conflicts, has changed with the introduction of µnon-traditional 
security challenges¶.    
The bedrock of security was conceived with the notion of the presence of a specific value that is 
exposed to threat. 8 This idea is related to the protection of a given value to provide a stable 
environment.9 Practically, the concept of security may demand relatively favourable conditions that 
provide a sustainable guarantee for the specific value, with regard to its need to receive protection or 
improvement, and provide strategies to mitigate or adapt to the threats. By doing so, security aims to 
avert a risk or limit the impacts of damage, but the failures to take measures are likely to exacerbate 
the impacts of risk. 
In nature, a safe environment is relative±some people or beings prefer to live in an environment in 
which others may not consider as the right place to stay. Beings accept an environment when it fulfils 
some of the requirements that they consider necessary for them to stay, or they adapt to an 
unfavourable environment if they have no choice. Some threats may be fully resolved, and others 
may not. In such instances, the option may be to design strategies that assist in coping with the 
conditions that generate threats or with the threats themselves. 10 Particularly, security demands 
strategies that contribute to preventing, improving or mitigating vulnerability.11 
1.1.2 The concept of water security 
The notion of water security is not as well discussed when compared with µIRRG VHFXULW\¶ DQG
µHQHUJ\ VHFXULW\¶ DOWKRXJK LW LV DW WKH KHDUW RI WKHVH WZR WKUHDWV12Arguably, for instance, in the 
governance of the Nile water resources in Ethiopia, the introduction of a water security model as part 
of water resources management (WRM) is a recent phenomenon. In 2010, the Cooperative 
                                                             
7UNDP,Human Development Report(1994) 1±
136.<http:hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_compelete_nostats.pdf> accessed 16 June 2015. 
8
 Estrela Solidum, Roman Dubsky and Teresita Saldivar-Sali, µ6HFXULW\LQQHZSHUVSHFWLYHV¶Philippine Social 








 Janos Bogardi, David Dudgeon, Richard Lowford, Eva Flinkerbusch, Andrea Meyn, Claudia Phal-Wostel, Konrad 
Vielhauer and Charles Vorosmarty, µ:DWHUVHFurity for planet under pressures: interconnected challenges of changing 
ZRUOGFDOOIRUVXVWDLQDEOHVROXWLRQ¶, (2012) 4(35)Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 43. 
4 
 
Framework Agreement (CFA), setting a shared vision of the equitable utilization of the Nile¶V water, 
LQFRUSRUDWHG WKH SKUDVH µZDWHU VHFXULW\¶ as an alternative approach to resolving the persistent 
contHQWLRQRYHUWKH1LOH¶VZDWHU13 
Water securitization is now becoming a new power that contemporary water hydro-politics assume in 
order to sustain water. The securitization of the Nile¶V water, however, could be considered to 
encourage inequitable water utilization.14 Makonnen notes that the introduction of the securitization 
model within WRM would not itself bring about a positive solution to the contemporary challenges 
to the use of the Nile¶V water. 15  Rather, it would exacerbate inequitable water utilization, by 
supporting the status quo that maintains the behaviour of those countries that are benefiting from 
conventional treaties, and it would encourage the inequitable water utilization already in place to 
remain uncontested. He also argues that equitable water utilization would not materialize through 
mere water securitization. The intervention needed would not be the insertion of water security in the 
water law, but rather the introduction of a set of precise institutional arrangements, which govern the 
ULSDULDQVWDWHV¶behaviour with regard to inequitable water use.16 He concludes that, as a remedy for 
the Nile¶V contemporary ZDWHUFKDOOHQJHVDµFUXFLDO ILUVWVWHp in this regard would be the complete 
UHPRYDO RI WKH KHJHPRQLF EDLW RI ³ZDWHU VHFXULW\´ IURP WKH &RPPRQ )UDPHZRUN $JUHHPHQW
Breaking the sanctioned discourse and bringing, instead, the cardinal question of equitable 
reallocation to centre stage is anotheUWDVNRIQROHVVLPSRUWDQFH¶17 
 
The introduction of water security in the common framework agreement may be seen as coming 
from good intentions, but without developing a comprehensive scheme for implementation, it may 
not sufficiently be supportive to enhance the sustainability of water resources. Water security is 
strongly linked to the state of a set of rules designed to ensure water sustainability. In the Nile water 
usage, existing legislative institutional and management structures are inadequate to ensure 
                                                             
13
 Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (2010), articles 2(f), 3(15) and 14. 
14
 'HUHMH0DNRQQHQµ)URPWHQXRXVOHJDODUJXPHQWWRVHFXULWL]DWLRQDQGEHQHILWVKDULQJKHJHPRQLFREVWLQDF\ ± the 
stumbling block against resolutiRQRIWKH1LOHZDWHUTXHVWLRQ¶ (2010) 4(2) Mizan Law Review, 233±35. 
15
 ibid, 233±34. 
16
 ibid, 235. 
17
 ibid, 257. 
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increasing water shortages.18While the introduction of precise rules for equitable water-sharing laws 
is one of the key aspects for the sustainability of shared water, in the contexts where water shortage 
is becoming a critical challenge, water securitization is important, since its management requires the 
political will of the water-sharing countries.19 
However, not all Nile water challenges will find a solution through the removal of the concept water 
security from existing policy instruments, although the problem is a starting point for introducing a 
set of comprehensive water resource sustainability rules. An introduction of the notion has its own 
importance in setting the urgency level at which the water resource challenges become threatening, 
and curbing the growing water threats may demand more robust measures. Noticeably, the 
underlining bedrock of water securitization is the existence of multifaceted water challenges, but 
sensible institutional arrangements for WRM are required to bring about comprehensive reform. The 
existing Nile water governance system failed to address contemporary challenges. In WRM, 
equitable water sharing alone is not enough to safeguard its sustainability. What is needed, then, is 
the introduction of water security with a comprehensive set of rules at different scales to regulate the 
threats to water sustainability. 
Water security may be seen as a µcatch-box¶, which brings a range of threats under scrutiny. For 
instance, the 2006 UN Human Development Report GHVFULEHVZDWHUVHFXULW\DVµHQVXULQJWKDWHYHU\
person has reliable access to enough safe water at affordable prices to lead a healthy, dignified and 
productive life, while maintaining the ecological systems that provide water and also depend on 
LW¶20Similarly, Gre\DQG6DGRIIGHILQHZDWHUVHFXULW\DVDQµDFFHSWDEOHTXDQWLW\DQGTXDOLW\RIZDWHU
for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production coupled with an acceptable level of water-related 
ULVN WR SHRSOH HQYLURQPHQW DQG HFRQRPLFV¶21 Water resources are threatened when they become 
inaccessible or unsuitable for satisfying the needs of humans and the ecosystem.22When conducting 
an assessment of water security, µZKHWKHURU QRWDGHTXDWH TXDOLW\ ZDWHU [is] available for use, and 
[whether] individuals and eFRV\VWHPV KDYH DFFHVV WR DGHTXDWH ZDWHU¶ DUH LPSRUWDQW
                                                             
18,QWHOOLJHQFH&RPPXQLW\$VVHVVPHQW,&$µ*OREDOZDWHUVHFXULW\¶)HEUXDU\
2012)<www.dni.gov/files/documents/special%20Report> accessed 7 September 2013. 
19
 3DWULFLD:RXWHUVµ7KHUHOHYDQFHDQGUROHRIZDWHUODZLQVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWIURP³+\GURVRYHUHLJQLW\´WR
³+\GURVROLGDULW\´¶Water International (International Water Resources Association), 202±03. 
20





 UNDP (n 20) 3. 
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factors.23However, the quantity of available water alone does not guarantee water security. Rather, 
the available water must be of acceptable quality to meet a range of needs. Inadequate quality or 
quantity of water means that the security of people and ecosystems is under threat. In addition, there 
must be responsive and comprehensive institutional arrangements that control factors contributing to 
water insecurity at different levels. 
1.1.2.1 Water scarcity as a security challenge 
 
Freshwater resources are vulnerable to drought and scarcity. Both these threats are characterized by 
the imbalance of demands with the available water resources in a specific body of water.24 However, 
these threats ± drought and water scarcity ± suggest two different phenomena. Drought is 
experienced when a country or an area experiences a temporarily lower than average amount or 
period of precipitation, causing an imbalance between water demands and available water.25It is an 
on-and-off phenomenon, varying by seasons or years. Drought is an uncertain natural event, often 
characterized by it being impossible to know when it is going to happen and when it will end.26 
In 2007, the European Commission adopted a Communication on water scarcity and droughts. This 
&RPPXQLFDWLRQFRQVLGHUVµGURXJKW¶DVµDWHPSRUDU\GHFUHDVHLQZDWHUDYDLODELOLW\GXHIRULQVWDQFHWR
UDLQIDOO GHILFLHQF\¶ DQG µZDWHU VFDUFLW\¶ DV µZDWHU GHPDQG [that] exceeds the water resources 
H[SORLWDEOH XQGHU VXVWDLQDEOH FRQGLWLRQV¶27 Similarly, in 2010, the European Commission defined   
drought and water security by using as a reference when and how they occur. The European 
Commission referred to GURXJKWDVµDWHPSRUDU\GHFUHDVHLQwater availability, for example, when it 
GRHVQ¶W UDLQ RYHU D ORQJ SHULRG RI WLPH¶.28  On the other hand, it maintained that water security 
µoccurs when demand for water exceeds the available sustainable resources¶. 29 The European 
Commission uses the water exploitation index (WEI) as an indicator of the pressure or stress on 
                                                             
23Patricia Wouters, Water security: global, regional and local challenges(Institute for Public Policy Research 2010) 7. 
24
 /XLV3HUHLUD,DQ&RUGHU\DQG,DFRYRV,DFRYLGHVµ&RSLQJZLWKZDWHUVFDUFLW\¶UNESCO International 
Hydrological Programme, 7. 
25
 ibid, 6.  
26
 (QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\µManaging drought in England and Wales ± UHSRUW¶*(+2%8'--E-E, version 







 European Commission, Water scarcity and drought in the European Union(brochure, August 2010). 
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freshwater resources.30The WEI indicates µthe amount of water abstracted each year as a proportion 
of total long-term freshwater resources¶.31WEI values above 20 per cent means that a water resource 
is under stress, and a value above 40 per cent is considered as severe water stress.32 This suggests 
that in a normal year, the water resources exploitation values are below 20 percent, and such water 
abstraction is sustainable. The WEI of the European Commission attaches the notion of µZDWHU
VFDUFLW\¶to a human problem that leads to long-term water demand and supply imbalances, whereas 
µGURXJKW¶ is associated with a natural attribute. However, human pressures may exacerbate the 
drought problem, which ± though not wholly prevented by water policy and law reforms ±may yet be 
anticipated by legislative mechanisms that are important in taking actions that will minimize its 
impact.33 
Arguably, water scarcity does not have a common meaning that enables the objective interpretation 
RIWKHQRWLRQ7KLVPD\FUHDWHFRQIXVLRQDVWRZKDWH[DFWO\WKHFRQFHSWRIµZDWHUVFDUFLW\¶HQWDLOV; it 
may convey the idea of threats to water security or the designing of proper policy and law. Often, the 
notion LVFRQVLGHUHGDVWKHµORQJ-term «LQVXIILFLHQF\RIZDWHUWRVDWLVI\DYHUDJHGHPDQGV¶34 This 
does not mean that the state of water scarcity within a water body is the same throughout the seasons. 
In nature, the availability of water in a water-scarce zone may change with the levels of rainfall that a 
water body obtains and with the water demands in given areas. Variations in water quantity and 
quality may also influence the availability of water, either positively or negatively. 
Water availability is often measured objectively by using the µ)DONHQPDUN LQGLFDWRU¶RU WKH µZDWHU
VWUHVVLQGH[¶35This index was developed by Malin Falkenmark, a Swedish hydrologist. Through this 
index, the state of the available quantity of water is defined by dividing the total amount of water 
resources that are available for defined water uses ± such as for food and cash crops, for supply and 
industries ± by the population of a country, with the resultant figure shown in terms of what is 
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available per person per year within that country.36 Considering the state of the availability of water, 
through the Falkenmark indicator, countries are classified into four categories: water abundant, water 
stressed, water scarce and under absolute water scarcity. Any country that has over1, 700 cubic 
metres per person per year is considered as water abundant, whereas countries below the threshold of 
1,000 cubic metres per person per year are said to be experiencing water stress.37 
Water stress levels may be characterized by a blue light warning that suggests possible water scarcity 
(red light) unless measures are soon put in place and implemented. A country is exposed to water 
scarcity when the water supplies fall below the threshold of 1,000 cubic metres per person per year; 
and absolute water scarcity is the worst state of water shortage, when water availability drops below 
500 cubic metres per person per year.38 A situation of absolute water scarcity may be equated with 
water resource ruin, in which the recovery of an affected water ecosystem is difficult or even 
impossible. It is projected that, by 2025, 1.8 billion people will live in countries or regions 
H[SHULHQFLQJDEVROXWHZDWHUVFDUFLW\DQGDOPRVWKDOIRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQZLOOEHOLYLQJLQDUHDV
experiencing water stress.39 
The Falkenmark indicator, or water stress index, gives an approximate water quantity level, which 
focuses on an administrative boundary-oriented water availability measurement. It also lacks the 
identification of local variations within a country, and fails to give a clear picture as to how to 
identify water shortages within water bodies that are shared between countries. The availability of 
water may vary even within a single basin. Moreover, it is unclear how this model can accommodate 
water recycling, wise water usage and other related water footprints. The scheme focuses on water 
quantity concerns and ignores whether available water is safe for consumption. It considers all the 
FRXQWU\¶V ZDWHU GHPDQGV at a similar level.40 However, despite these limitations, the Falkenmark 
indicator defines the average state of water availability in a country, and indicates national, regional 
or global implications of water availability. 





 ICA (n 18) 2. 
38Pereira et al. (n 24) 1. 
3981µ:RUOG:DWHU'D\&RSLQJZLWKZDWHUVFDUFLW\FKDOOHQJHRIWKHWZHQW\-ILUVWFHQWXU\¶
<www.unwater.org/downloads/escarcity.pdf>accessed 21 June 2015. 
40
 )UDQN55LMVEHUPDQµ:DWHUVFDUFLW\IDFWRUILFWLRQ"¶80 Agricultural Water Management, 6±8. 
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$QRWKHUVFKHPHXVHGWRGHILQHZDWHUVFDUFLW\LVWKHµFULWLFDOLW\UDWLR¶ZKLFh is µthe ratio of water use 
to water availability in a watershed or country¶.41,WLQFOXGHVWKHVWDWHRIDOOµWKHZDWHUZLWKGUDZDOVIRU
KXPDQ XVH¶ DV D VFKHPH WR GHILQH WKH ZDWHU VFDUFLW\ RI WKH FRXQWU\ 42 The model categorizes a 
country as being under water stress when its total water withdrawals are between 20 and 40 per cent 
and under severe stress when withdrawals exceed 40 per cent.43This approach does not consider 
YDULDWLRQVLQFRXQWULHV¶ZDWHUUHVRXUFHV and focuses on water quantity management. In many parts of 
the globe, an estimated 1.4 billion people now live in river basins where water use exceeds the 
minimum recharge levels or is near to reaching this status.44 Similarly to the previous scheme, this 
model fails to consider water quality and other factors that contribute to water availability threats.  
A third approach classifies water scarcity into two different spectrums, namely economic and 
physical water scarcities. This approach was developed by the International Water Management 
Institute. 45 Through this scheme, a country is under economic water scarcity when the water 
prediction suggests that a country is unable to meet its water demands without the development of 
further infrastructures to increase water supply. This nature of water scarcity is often experienced due 
to a lack of infrastructures and to water mismanagement problems. 46On the other hand, if the 
prediction suggests that a country is unable to meet its demands despite further infrastructures being 
developed, the country is considered to be experiencing physical water scarcity. 47 The physical 
availability of water concerns what exists naturally to provide for the demands of humans and 
ecosystems.48 It is related to the relative lack of sufficient freshwater within nature.49 Globally, some 
 ELOOLRQ SHRSOH DOPRVW RQH ILIWK RI WKH ZRUOG¶V SRSXODWLRQ DUH OLYLQJ LQ DUHDV ZKHUH WKHUH LV
physical water scarcity, and 1.6 billion people are experiencing economic water 
                                                             
41
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42
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scarcity.50Nevertheless, despite the centrality that this approach gives ±with it being wider in its 
scope and in the nature of the threats compared tothe former models ± this approach is not inclusive 
in accommodating a range of water availability threats. 
7KH IRXUWK VFKHPH LV WKH µZDWHU SRYHUW\ LQGH[¶51 This model uses a range of ideas, such as the 
level of access to water, water quantity, water quality and variations, the purposes of water uses, 
and the capacity of WRM.52It demonstrates that uncontrolled and unregulated pollutant discharges 
endanger the availability of water.53Moreover, this approach suggests that over-abstraction of water 
and unregulated water use may generate water insecurity, which exacerbates poverty and 
marginalization for many people, and exposes the environment to severe dangers.54 
 
In 2004, 1.1 billion people in the global community were without access to a water supply, and 2.4 
billion people were without access to improved sanitation facilities.55The 2012 UN-Water fact sheet 
indicated that 783 million people were without access to safe drinking water, and 2.5 billion people 
lacked basic sanitation, such as toilets or latrines. 56 The recent report by the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme noted that 750 million people around the 
world lack access to safe water and 82 per cent of those who lack access to improved water live in 
rural areas, while18 per cent live in urban areas.57Globally, on average, nearly 1,000 of these people 
die every day from diarrhoeal diseases linked to unsafe drinking water. 58 This problem can be 
controlled through providing access to safe water supplies and sanitation.59 
                                                             
50
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Xpdated: 20 March 2015)<www.unicef.org/media/media_81329.html> accessed 17 June 2015. 
59
 UN, µWater, a shared responsibility: the second United Nations world water development report¶ (2006) 18±19 
<www.unesco.org/water/wwap/> accessed 3 February 2013. 
11 
 
Likewise, in developing countries, up to 90 per cent of untreated wastewater flows into water bodies 
and 70 per cent of industrial waste is dumped untreated into waters, where they pollute the usable 
water supplies and threaten health, food security and access to safe drinking and bathing water.60 
These threats have cross-dimensional elements for the safety and wellbeing of humanity, the 
environment and economic development. Through these challenges, humanity and ecosystems are 
H[SRVHG WR D UDQJH RI WKUHDWV 7KH µZDWHU UHVRXUFHV DQG WKH UHODWHG ecosystems that provide and 
sustain them, are under threat from pollution, unsustainable use, land-use changes, climate change 
and many other factors¶.61 Since 1990, half of the world¶s wetlands have been lost because of human 
pressures.62 This vulnerability demonstrates that ± while FRQIOLFWDQGZDUULVNSHRSOH¶VOLYHV ± water 
scarcity endangers the economy and ecosystems, and water contamination also risks the health and 
lives of people. 
Compared with the previous schemes, the water poverty index is more comprehensive and it 
accommodates a range of threats. This index further suggests that water scarcity varies in the context 
within which the definition is applied. This does not mean that the water poverty index alone is 
comprehensive in defining what water scarcity constitutes in real terms, or that the other models are 
unhelpful in defining water scarcity. No single method among the above-mentioned schemes is 
inclusive in defining water scarcity in all contexts, but one model may be complemented by another 
to define the actual water availability in a given water zone.  
As the over-withdrawal of water leads to water scarcity, water pollution also affects the availability 
of water.63Thus, natural water availability, the level of water supply infrastructure and man-made 
pressures affect the state of water availability (see Figure 1). The relative strength of each scheme 
may depend on the nature of the water security threats to which a given country or water body is 
exposed. 
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Figure 1: Factors contributing to water insecurity 
1.1.2.2 The degree of availability of adequate safe water 
 
The earth is covered by around 1.4 billion km3 of water in volume and, from this figure, freshwater 
constitutes only 2.5 per cent.64$URXQG  SHU FHQW RI WKH HDUWK¶V ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV are salty water, 
which cannot be accessible without the process of desalination being carried out. Freshwater 
comprises a small portion of the earth¶s water, but its state of accessibility is constrained by the 
nature of its existence. Only 0.3 per cent of freshwater exists in lakes and rivers that are relatively 
easily available for human use.65 
 
Of the remaining freshwater, 30 per cent is groundwater, while 70 per cent is situated within ice and 
snow cover in mountainous areas.66Freshwater resources are not evenly distributed by place.67 The 
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availability of safe water resources varies regionally, seasonally and annually. 68 Periodic water 
variation affects the availability of suitable water supplies.69Some geographical areas are humid, 
while others are semi-arid or arid; and even in humid zones; water availability varies by place and 
time. In addition, human-induced pressures also threaten the availability of freshwater resources.70 
Water resources are wasted, polluted and mismanaged by users in a way that is unsustainable.71As a 
result, the human-induced pressures reduce water security.72 In particular, when the available water 
resources become scarce, human-induced pressures exacerbate the challenges to water security.73 
Although the precise impacts of climate change vary around the world, it is predicted that climate 
change may cause greater uncertainty in rainfall patterns. Temperatures rising by 2 to 3°C due to 
climate change would expose between 1.1 and 3.2 billion people to water scarcity problems.74 As a 
result, availability of water resources is likely to change significantly. The challenge is likely to 
exacerbate with increasing population growth and climate change.75 With increasing climate change 
challenges µ[t]he greatest vulnerabilities are likely to be in unmanaged water systems and systems 
that are currently stressed and unsustainably managed due to policies that discourage efficient water 
use and protection of water quality, inadequate watershed management, failure to manage variable 
water supply and demand76« In unmanaged systems there are few or no structures in place to buffer 
the effects of hydrological variability on water quality and VXSSO\¶77 
 
The Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states WKDWµin 
unsustainably managed systems, water and land use can add stresses that heighten vulnerability 
to climate change¶. 78 In unmanaged or poorly managed water bodies, unsustainable water 
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exploitation, unsustainable watershed exploitation and other environmental pressures bring 
water resources to the brink of depletion. Increased pressures on water resources result in 
increased vulnerability, whereas introducing many institutional arrangements that reduce the 
pressures will lessen this vulnerability.79 This challenge is likely to exacerbate with increasing 
population growth.80 This demonstrates that more safeguarding measures may be needed to 
enhance water security by reducing human pressures. 
 
1.1.2.3Global trends of water scarcity 
Globally, water scarcity is already threatening the earth.81The global water shortage map, which was 
published by Nature in September 2010, predicts that by 2050, nearly 80 per cent RI WKH ZRUOG¶V
population will be exposed to high levels of water security threat. 82  Water security challenges 
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Map 1: Global water stress and scarcity84 
 
 
Map 1 indicates the extent of the vulnerability of global countries with regard to the threats to their 
water security.85 Many of the global communities are categorized within the water shortage zone. 
This data suggests that water scarcity is among the main challenges that humanity and the 
environment are facing in the twenty-first century across the globe. In many parts of the world, the 
challenges to the security of water resources are expected to become critical.86 
Africa is home to the world¶s longest river, the Nile, and the second largest river by water flow and 
basin size ± the Congo River ± is also situated in Africa. There are many other water bodies on the 
                                                             
84
 Philippe Rekacewicz, µGlobal water stress and scarcity¶February 2006)(FAO, Nations Unies, World Resource 
Institute) <www.grida.no/publications/vg/water2/>accessed 1 February 2013. 
85ibid. 
86Oregon State University, Transboundary freshwater dispute 
database<www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/>accessed 1 February 2013. 
16 
 
continent, and Africa is endowed with abundant freshwater but, paradoxically, the distribution of the 
water resources is uneven, and many African countries are experiencing water scarcity.87 In Africa, a 
considerable quantity of the water used is wasted due to an inefficient governance system.88The 2009 
UN-Water scarcity index has estimated that around three million people per year die due to the lack 
of safe drinking water and sanitation in Africa.89In Africa, DOPRVWDTXDUWHURIWKHUHJLRQ¶VSRSXODWLRQ
lives in a water-stressed country, and the threats will continue to rise unless proper measures are in 
place.90 
In particular, the water security threats are likely to be high in the sub-Saharan African 
countries, 91 with Ethiopia being one of the countries exposed to such threats. 92  In Ethiopia, a 
considerable portion of the population, constituting more than 80 per cent, lives in the rural areas, 
and water shortage through drought is a considerable threat to their livelihoods, and is something that 
could shock the economy of the entire country. 93  A single drought event in 2003 affected 
approximately 12.6 million people.94 This drought resulted in water shortages creating vulnerability 
to the people.95Map 1 above shows that the whole of Ethiopia is categorized under the water scarcity 
zone.96 
Traditionally, water scarcity was understood from the perspectives of semi-arid and arid countries. 
However, now there are water security problems in humid countries as well. 97  Water security 
FKDOOHQJHV DUH µPDWWHUV ZKLFK DUH RI ZLGH JHRJUDSKLFDO FRQFHUQ DQG H[WHQG ZHOO EH\RQG WKH DULG
countries that have previously been seen as most vulnerable to threats of water insecurity¶.98 Water 
                                                             
87Economic Commission for Africa, µState of the environment in Africa¶ECA/FSSDD/01/06/2001) 
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scarcity and drought affect both developed and developing countries, but the impacts are more 
damaging to economically developing countries, which are already experiencing water security 
problems.99The water security threats are likely to be high in countries with low economic levels 
similar to Ethiopia.100 Even in poor countries, the impacts of problems in water security are likely to 
be high on the people who are poor.101 7KRVHSHRSOHZKRKDYH µWKHHFRQRPLFUHVRXUFHVVNLOOVDQG
RSSRUWXQLWLHVWROHDYHWKHLUZDWHUSUREOHPEHKLQG¶102 may have the capacity to change and live in the 
parts of the country where water security challenges are low, or develop infrastructures helping them 
to manage the threats.  
Generally, water use is divided into two groups: consumptive and non-consumptive. The former 
refers to water use whereby very little water is returned to the water sources after consumption, 
compared with non-consumptive water use.103This distinction is made by considering µWKHH[WHQWWR
which water that is used for a particular purpose is returned to the source of supply after use¶.104 
'HVSLWH YDULDWLRQ LQ WKH GHJUHHV µDOO ZDWHU DEVWUDFWLYH XVH LV FRQVXPSWLYH LI PHDVXUHG E\ WKH
proportion of water returned after use as well as the alteration in the quality of water that is returned, 
due to contamination and heating¶. 105  The classification of water use is conducted through 
considering whether µfewer¶RUµPRUH¶SURSRUWLRQVare returned to the water sources after use.  
Globally, agriculture is the biggest water user, with irrigation accounting for 70 per cent from overall 
water withdrawals.106 The remaining percentages, 20 and 10, are consumed by industries and the 
domestic sector, respectively.107 ,QWKHZRUOG¶VOHDVWGHYHORSed countries, agriculture alone accounts 
for more than 90 per cent of water withdrawals.108 The agricultural water consumption is expected to 
increase globally by about 20 percent by 2050.109 Water for agricultural irrigation and for some 
industrial processes may take a position of being µPRUHFRQVXPSWLYH¶IROORZed by the water used for 
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drinking and domestic purposes.110 On the other hand, Howarth placed under the µOHVVFRQVXPSWLYH¶
RUµQRQ-FRQVXPSWLYH¶FODVVLILFDWLRQthe water used in generating hydropower, navigation, supporting 
fisheries and enabling recreational uses.111 The list provided is non-exhaustive, but indicative of a 
range of human pressures that water laws and policies need to consider. The impacts of water use 
significantly vary between consumptive and non-consumptive uses, because the extent of water left 
after use differs. 
 
Of the European countries, nine are listed as being under water stress: Cyprus, Bulgaria, Belgium, 
Spain, Malta, FYR Macedonia, Italy, the UK and Germany.112In Europe, 38 per cent of abstracted 
water is for hydropower and industrial cooling; agriculture accounts for 30 per cent; public water 
supplies account for 18 per cent; and industry (excluding cooling water) accounts for 14 per 
cent. 113 Despite water resources being scarce in many European countries, water wastage is 
prevalent.114 In France, as much as 30 per cent of water is wasted before it reaches consumers, and in 
Spain this is between 24 and 34 per cent.115 
Map 1 above, which indicates global water stress and scarcity, also shows the varying water security 
in different parts of England; in particular, the threat is higher in the south-eastern and eastern parts 
of England, where the level of threat is at the stage of water stress. In south-east England, there is 
less water per person than in arid and semi-arid countries such as Morocco and Egypt.116µFuture 
Water¶, the UK government policy strategy regarding water resources, underlines the alarming 
threats to the availability of water resources in England.117It was suggested that the UK should 
consider water security as a core component of policy making to address threats related to 
unsustainable water use.118This evidence suggests that England is not immune from water insecurity 
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problems. The growing water security challenges in south-eastern parts of England may extend to 
other parts of the country.119In England, there is a considerable degree of human pressure over -
freshwater. South-HDVW DQG HDVWHUQ (QJODQG DUH FDWHJRUL]HG DV DUHDV RI µZDWHU VWUHVV IURP ZDWHU
DEVWUDFWLRQ¶from which more than 22 per cent of freshwater resources are abstracted.120 The threats 
to water availability lie not only in the south-eastern parts of England; rather, many catchments 
experience threats to the water that is available for abstraction.121 Some catchments are exposed to 
over-abstraction and over-licensing.122 
1.1.2.4 Impacts of water scarcity 
 
The sustainable access and availability of safe freshwater is often considered as one of the basic 
requirements needed for sustainable development.123It is a source of life and a natural resource that 
sustains our environments and supports livelihoods. 124 Threats to water resources are cross-
dimensional 125  and may include human health threats, economic crisis and civil strife. 126 Water 
security is at the centre of sustainable development, and it links to the security of humans and healthy 
ecosystems.127Traditionally, water policy and law tended towards protecting human needs; they were 
not centrally aimed at protecting the environment, water ecosystems and other living things that rely 
on water quality and quantity.128 Now such imperatives are progressively changing with the growing 
concerns of human-induced pressures.129 
The concept of HFRV\VWHP LV GHILQHG DV µD G\QDPLF FRPSOH[ RI SODQW DQLPDO DQG PLFUR-organism 
communities and their non-OLYLQJ HQYLURQPHQW LQWHUDFWLQJ DV D IXQFWLRQDO XQLW¶ 130 Similarly, the 
Conference of Parties 5 µConvention on Biological Diversity¶ (CBD) document describes the term 
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µHFRV\VWHP DSSURDFK¶ DV µD VWUDWHJ\ IRU WKH LQWHJUDWHG PDQDJHPHQW RI ODQG ZDWHU DQG OLYLQJ
resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use LQ DQ HTXLWDEOH ZD\¶131 The water eco-
region (water ecosystem) has strong connections with the security of water resources since the 
sustainability of freshwater may partly depend on the continued healthy functioning of water 
ecosystems. All aspects of water quality, quantity and related natural resources management need to 
be addressed, which requires managing water, land and related resources. 132 Change in a given 
ecosystem has an impact on its adjacent ecosystems;133therefore, from the ecosystem point of view, 
any development must take into account any possible impact on its adjacent ecosystems.134 For 
instance, water uses are seen to be subject to natural limits, both to sustain water and to maintain the 
healthy functioning of water ecosystems. Water uses are less damaging to the water ecosystems. 
Ultimately, an µHFRV\VWHPSDUDGLJP¶PD\FRPHWREHVHHQDVUHFRJQLWLRQ for the need of limitations 
on human actions. 
1.1.3The roles of water policy and law in water security management 
Water policy and law shape the behaviour of customers, companies, abstractors, polluters and 
government, and affect the way in which water resources are used. Moreover, water policy and law 
coordinate WRM. To manage water security challenges, introducing proper water policy and law± 
amongst other things ± are at the centre.135 The 2006 UN Human Development Report underlined the 
fact that most water security problems are capable of being solved or at least controlled.136 Gleick 
noted that the water resources crisis is partly the problem of inappropriate management 
systems. 137 Sound WRM institutional arrangements and organizational remits can enhance the 
security of water.138With inefficient institutional arrangements and organizational remits, it may not 
be possible to manage water security challenges effectively.139Rather, they exacerbate the challenges 
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to the security of water resources.140The central issue is: µ+RZFDQDQHIIHFWLYHPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHP
IRUZDWHUVHFXULW\EHGHYHORSHGDQGLPSOHPHQWHG"¶ 
1.1.4 The key research questions 
 
With growing water shortages in both Ethiopia and England, there is a dilemma as to whether 
existing management systems for water resources are fit to enhance the security of water. As part of 
ongoing debates, the focus of this research is to evaluate management systems for water resources 
that are already in place at different scales. Within this view, the existing water resources theories are 
reviewed to identify key features of effective WRMPs, and those of England and Ethiopia are 
assessed to evaluate the extent to which these key features of an effective WRM system are reflected 
under their water policies and laws. The notion of µHIIHFWLYHness¶ LV RQH NH\ FRQFHSW ZLWKLQ WKH
WKHPHVRI WKH WKHVLV7KH WHUP µHIIHFWLYH¶ PD\ EHRQHRI WKose words that most leads to too many 
meanings. At this point it might be supportive to reflect on the meaning of the word. It avoids 
vagueness and illuminates what the concept tries to address in the context of the thesis. Accordingly, 
WKHQRWLRQµHIIHFWLYH¶ LVDERXWIHDWXUHVof water law and policy that can help to enhance the security 
of water. 
Ultimately, this study evaluates the following research questions:  
1. What have natural resource management theorists proposed as key features of an effective 
management system for natural resources, including water resources?  
1.1 How strong are these theories in providing the key features of an effective management 
system for contemporary water security threats?   
1.2 What are the key qualities of an effective management system for water resources? What 
are the main human-induced pressures in the case study countries?  
2. How can water law and policy help to achieve water security? 
2.1 How have water resources been managed in the past and present in the case study 
countries?  




2.2 Are there changes in conventional WRM policy and law to accommodate key features of 
an effective management system for water resources?  
2.3 To what extent are key features of an effective management system for water resources 
reflected in the case VWXG\FRXQWULHV¶ZDWHUSROLFLHVDQGODZV" 
 
1.2Methodologyand data 
1.2.1 Methodology   
 
The main purpose of this study is to identify the qualities of an effective management system for 
water resources and assess the extent to which these key features are reflected in the case study 
countries¶ water policies and laws. The study evaluates the tragedy of the commons and historical 
development of water policy and law, and draws out the main qualities of an effective management 
system for water resources. Then the study assesses the English and Ethiopian systems by reference 
to the yardsticks identified to understand the state of their WRM systems. Understanding evolving 
WRMPs demands assessing research from the perspectives of different countries ± the management 
system for water resources of some countries are more developed than others, and they may vary in 
the schemes they use. In addition, legal developments addressing water security problems may also 
vary within countries. Furthermore, with globalization and democratization, every part of the world 
is interconnected by shared values and shared needs. National jurisdictions may become less 
important in water resource issues, and national water laws are not immune from the influence of the 
water laws and policies of other countries which shape their landscape. This means that no one 
country has a water regime that is best for managing water resource problems. The experiences from 
different parts of the world may help to enhance areas with shortfalls under the existing institutional 
arrangements and practices.  
 
There are numerous reasons to support the selection of the case study countries¶ water policies and 
laws for evaluation. First, the study assesses the evolving jurisprudence of contemporary WRM law 
and policy from the perspective of different jurisdictions. The African countries¶ WRM policies and 
laws, in particular, have been partly influenced by colonial laws. Because of this, it is difficult to 
understand the current water policy and law in Ethiopia without understanding the past and present 
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water jurisprudence in England, which was one of the dominant colonial powers that influenced the 
management system of water resources in Africa. 
 
,WLVORJLFDOWRLQYHVWLJDWH(QJODQG¶VZDWHUSROLFLHVDQGODZVWRXQGHUVWDQGZKHWKHUWKHUHDUHFKDQJHV
to the conventional WRMPs concerned with the security of water resources in England. Notably, by 
assessing English water law and policy along with their counterparts in Ethiopia, the study will gain a 
critical insight into the WRM system in Ethiopia. An assessment via this method allows the 
identification of a broad range of issues and trends in the systems within different countries. 
Therefore, an exclusive study of Ethiopian WRMPs may not provide sufficient understanding of how 
contemporary WRM law and policy are shaping water resource sustainability, in theory and in 
practice. Whilst the WRMPs share some communality in the case study countries, the historical, 
cultural, political and socio-economic contexts or systems of each country affect their WRM.  The 
study does not intend to conduct a µOLNH-with-OLNH¶ comparison; rather, it produces an assessment of 
the operating systems using the key qualities of an effective WRM system as a measure of the 
systems. 
The domestic water policy and law in Ethiopia and England have been influenced and guided by 
international and regional policy and law. Often, water security problems may not only occur 
because of LQGLYLGXDOZDWHUXVHUV¶DFWLRQVUDWKHU, states may engage actions that generate insecurity. 
Such water security challenges require actions at both regional and international levels. Because 
international- and regional-level water policy and law are critical, the assessment of domestic water 
policy and law may not be sufficient enough to understand any particular WRM system.  
Ethiopia has 12 river basins; many of them are international river basins and drain several east 
African countries.141 There are around 80 international river basins in Africa.142 England does not 
have international river basins; however, the EU shares many transboundary river basins with non-
member states. Across Europe, there are 64 transboundary water bodies that connect member states 
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or non-member states. 143  Sustaining the shared water resources requires the introduction of 
international and regional water policy and law, but they may not be practical enough without 
adopting comprehensive domestic water law.  Accordingly, this study reviews water policy and law 
at these levels as a core part of a domestic water security management system. 
1.2.2 Data 
 
Data was collected from a variety of sources. In addition to legal analysis and published literature 
(including academic discussions, interviews and court decisions), published and unpublished reports 
and workshop training materials and related documents were reviewed. Following the review of the 
extensive relevant literature dealing with issues of water security management, the study discusses 
rules and organizational remits. Moreover, the role of the water resources plan in England is 
discussed as part of the WRM system, to review its significance in supporting the security of water.   
As far as the data from Ethiopia was concerned, three months for field data collection was scheduled, 
and data was collected from various institutions and experts starting on 8 July 2011 and ending on 7 
October 2011. The field data collection work aimed to collect primary and secondary data from the 
areas where it was assumed that it might be obtained, in order to assess the state of their WRMPs. 
Before commencing field data collection, the shortage of enough literature on Ethiopian water policy 
and law was noted, so the research sought to conduct interviews with water policy and law 
practitioners in order to hear their views. In order to conduct these interviews, the Socio Legal 
Studies AssRFLDWLRQ¶V µStatement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice¶, the Social Research 
$VVRFLDWLRQ¶VµEthical Guidelines¶ DQGWKH(65&¶VµResearch Ethics Framework¶ were consulted and 
approval was obtained from the University of Kent¶V Research Ethics Advisory Group.  A letter from 
Kent Law School was obtained in advance, explaining the purposes of the research and seeking the 
assistance of potential participants in the research. An access to field data collection was also gained 
through obtaining a letter from the University of Kent Law School. 
From among the institutions listed for data collection in Ethiopia, interviewees were selected from 
the MoWE, Environmental Protection Authority (now the Ministry of Environment and Forest), the 
                                                             




Awash Basin Authority, $FWLRQ 3URIHVVLRQDOV¶ $VVRFLDWLRQ IRU WKH 3HRSOH and other relevant 
stakeholders. The key interviewees were: Ato Fekahmed Negash, Directorate Director of Basins 
Management Administration in the MoWE; Ato Zewdu Tefera, Director Directorate of Legal Affairs, 
Ethiopian MoWE; Ato Mohammed Ali Mohammed, Director of Technology Transfer Program 
Directorate, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Environmental Protection Authority; Ato 
Frewe Abebe, Head of Technical Department in the Awash River Basin Authority, Ambhara; Ato 
Kahsay G/Tensae, Director of National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries Coordinating Directorate, 
Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority; Ato Tigistu G/Meskl, Director Directorate of Rural Land 
Administration and Land Use in the Ministry of Agriculture; and Wongel Abate, Executive Director 
RI$FWLRQ3URIHVVLRQDOV¶$VVRFLDWLRQfor the People. The selection of these interviewees was made on 
the grounds of their direct involvement in the implementation of the water law and policy and the 
positions that the officials were holding in the identified institutions. 
As an interview tool, open-ended questions were framed in advance to collect detailed information 
about existing WRM systems. The main questions included: How is Ethiopian water management 
integrated and what factors are affecting water resources?  How are institutions arranged to conduct 
water resources management?  Who is involved under the river basin management and at what level?  
What are the roles of different actors in the river basin management? How are water resources and 
land management in the basin integrated? Does river basin-based integrated water resources 
management alone prevent water resource problems? What roles do regional states and federal 
government play in river basin management? How are various aspects of water resource uses 
decentralized to enhance the sustainability of WRM? How do their functions coordinate horizontally 
and vertically in the basin (collaboration)? Who is the competent authority for coordinating river 
basin management? How is integrated river basin management actually implemented at the federal 
and regional state levels? How is local people¶V participation ensured in WRM? How is equitable 
water share ensured in the river basin for different users and uses? 
Collecting data through interviews allows the voices of concerned officials to be heard regarding the 
extent of the reflection and implementation of the key qualities of effective WRM systems.  The data 
obtained through interviews is referenced as footnotes under the relevant. The inferences made from 
the interviews were triangulated with the data obtained from different sources. 
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Data collection from the field was not conducted without challenges. During field data collection, 
some government officials were out of their offices for summer leadership training. The problem was 
not expected in advance and it was unusual. This caused delay in access to information in some 
offices. Continuous appointments for access to data collection or to conduct interviews also 
consumed much time during field data collection. Some libraries were not well arranged, which 
meant that it was not easy to find documents quickly.  Moreover, the libraries of the MoWE and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry were closed for the conduction of their yearly inventories. In addition, 
continuous heavy summer rain and traffic disruption consumed much of the time for data collection 
in Addis Ababa. The field visit to the Awash River Basin Authority was also challenging, because of 
its hot temperature. 
1.3 Chapter breakdown 
The overall processes of study are: setting out the research problem and questions; exploring vital 
features of effective water management systems; searching for these in the case study countries¶ 
water policies and laws; and mapping the findings in the conclusion. These are summarized in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2: Study processes 
Set out research problem and 
questions  
Explore  vital features of effective 
water management system  
Evaluate the extent of 
reflection of these qualities 
into the case study 
countries' settings 





The thesis is presented in eight chapters. The introductory chapter provides a general background, 
as well as the overall aspects of the research project, the contexts of water resource challenges in 
the case study countries, and the purposes of the study. The background in the introductory 
chapter examines how the concepts of security and institutional arrangements are understood in 
the context of this study. This may help an in-depth understanding of the core concepts of the 
study. The introduction also provides the research questions, methodology and structure of the 
thesis.  
Chapters Two and Three review the theoretical approach and modern water management 
principles to establish the research framework. These two chapters provide a foundation for the 
thesis as a whole. In Chapter Two, the tragedy of the commons theory is discussed. A critical 
reflection is made to map out key features of an effective WRM system. The third chapter 
discusses the underlying principles of integrated water resources management to complement 
further explanations of the discussions in Chapter Two. 
The fourth chapter assesses the E8¶V water resources policy and law that shape water security 
management. These are discussed as part of England¶V PDQDJHPHQW V\VWHP RI water resources. 
The fifth chapter assesses the WRM system under the national water policy and law of England to 
understand the extent to which the key features of an effective WRMP DUHUHIOHFWHGLQ(QJODQG¶V
system. The chapter examines the trends of water policy and law development in England to 
obtain insights for the assessment of EtKLRSLD¶V WRM system.  
Chapter Six evaluates the WRMPs in the African Union (AU). The main objectives of this review 
are: to understand whether the AU, as a supranational body, has in place effective WRM systems 
to enhance the security of water within the AU; and to evaluate the extent to which key qualities 
of an effective WRMP are reflected within the AU¶V water policies and laws, since it is hardly 
possible to fully understand the Ethiopian management system without having knowledge of the 
$8¶Vsystem. As a member state of the AU, Ethiopia is LQIOXHQFHGE\WKH$8¶Vsystem, and the 
country shares many of its water bodies with other African countries. In particular, a separate 
assessment of the Ethiopian WRM system may not provide sufficient insight to understand its 
strengths or weaknesses. An understanding of the AU¶V WRM system may hence offer an 
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opportunity to understand both regional and national systems. Therefore, this chapter aims to 
evaluate the Ethiopian system IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKH$8¶Vby presenting assessments of the 
development of water policies and laws in the AU. 
In the seventh chapter, the WRM system in Ethiopia is discussed and, with regard to this, a range 
of policies and laws are investigated. The chapter also examines the context of water security in 
Ethiopia. After conducting an assessment of the English and Ethiopian management systems, a 
reflection is provided in the final chapter. Chapter Eight of the thesis also draws the conclusion by 
using the questions that are set out in the introduction, the yardsticks identified as vital features of 
effective WRMPs ±through conducting an evaluation of the theories from Chapters Two and 
Three ± and the assessments made from the English and Ethiopian WRM systems, in order to 
understand the extent to which the key features of an effective management system are reflected in 
English and Ethiopian water policies and laws. 
Chapter Two: The tragedy of the commons 
2.1 Introduction 
Any management system for water resources cannot be introduced or operated in a vacuum. It 
requires theories that shape its formulation and implementation. A clear understanding of these 
theories is imperative, before assessing the WRM systems in the case study countries. With growing 
natural resource insecurity over the last fifty years, a range of theories, including the notion of 
tragedy of the commons, has suggested how to enhance sustainability of natural resources. The 
tragedy of the commons was developed by Garret Hardin and nearly half a century has now passed 
since Hardin developed this theory.  
This chapter examines, inter alia, the literature on the tragedy of the commons in order to identify 
key features of an effective WRMP, to understand its theoretical and practical strengths, and to 
evaluate the applicability of its core ideas to the present day challenges to water security. Where 
natural resources experience little pressure and there are no scarcity problems, regulatory 
intervention may not be so important.144Chapter Two is used as a foundation for the thesis to assess 
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the case study countries¶ WRM systems in the upcoming chapters, with the aim of understanding the 
extent to which the identified key features of an effective system are reflected in their water policies 
and laws.  
The notion of µWUDJHG\¶LQ+DUGLQ¶VWUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQVWKHRU\JLYHVan insight into why scarce 
natural resources are being ruined. Hardin argued that it is understood that open access to pastureland 
may not be problematic for a group of users in situations where pasture is surplus to requirements. 
The danger comes when resources become scarce and the exploitation of natural resources goes 
beyond the carrying capacity of such natural resources, where these resources are left unregulated. 
The theory notes that scarce natural resources are exposed to risks, up to the extent of extinction, 
which Hardin called the µtragedy of the commons¶.  
The theory provides enlightenment as to why such a tragedy is happening and what management 
system for natural resources is effective to prevent the threat of ruin. The theory provides remedies to 
the independent and selfish usage of scarce resources by individual users in a manner affecting 
common interests. The theory of the tragedy of the commons calls for the µcommons¶ to be 
appropriated through establishing property rights over them. The theory also suggests the 
introduction of coercive regulatory intervention, which limits the access to and use of the commons.  
The theory calls for the individual users to have rights in place to use natural resources by allocating 
these resources; however, such utilization is subject to control in order to protect long-term common 
interests. 
From a water resource point of view, tKHLPSOLFDWLRQRI+DUGLQ¶Vremedies is that a lack of coercive 
regulatory instruments and schemes establishing property rights for water demand management is the 
root problem for the water resources tragedy. It is argued that approaching water resource problems 
LQWHUPVRIWKHUHJXODWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOZDWHUXVHUV¶behaviours and establishing property rights may 
have their own positive contribution to enhancing water sustainability, if such management systems 
are comprehensive enough to address a range of water security problems. Property rights can manage 
the water resource on behalf of the owners, but, given the public good nature of water, the wider 
SXEOLFQHHGVDQG WKHLU LQWHUHVWVDUHSURWHFWHG +DUGLQ¶VFRHUFLYH UHJXODWRU\ UHPHG\ IRFXVHVRQ WKH




behaviour control of individual users, by limiting access to and use of scarce resources, which is 
therefore essential. 
This chapter also contends that contemporary water security challenges are diverse by their nature, 
and these problems may not always stem from a lack of schemes allocating water resources or 
enforcing coercive rules. As a result, enhancing water security needs to be approached through 
multiple regulatory and other features ZKLFK DUH EH\RQG WKH UHJXODWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO ZDWHU XVHUV¶
behaviour with regard to riparian states. More importantly, regulatory rules by themselves may not 
bring about change without effective implementation. Considering all these challenges, the central 
argument of this study is that a lack of schemes for water allocation and UXOHV UHJXODWLQJ XVHUV¶
behaviours may be part of the problem for contemporary water security challenges. As contemporary 
water security problems are interconnected and complex, Chapter Two challenges the adequacy and 
effectiveness of coercive regulatory rules and schemes that establish property rights over water 
UHVRXUFHV WR LQGLYLGXDO ZDWHU XVHUV¶ EHKDYLRXU in sustaining water security. The tragedy of the 
commons theory should be reframed to an orientation that understands water security challenges 
from the perspectives of their interconnected and complex problems. 
2.2 The development of the tragedy of commons theory 
Hardin published an article in Science LQ'HFHPEHUHQWLWOHGµThe tragedy of the cRPPRQV¶145 
Since its publication, the article has been widely reprinted in scientific journals and quoted across 
disciplines. 146 The tragedy of the commons suggests how to prevent the open access of scarce 
resources from generating ruin for all.147 The theory is not about preventing the utilization of the 
resources but, rather, it is concerned about the abuse of the commons and their exploitation in a 
manner that affects long-term availability. Similarly, with growing demand on natural resource 
sustainability, since 1987 there have been considerable discussions of the principle of sustainable 
development. The Brundtland Report, formally known as the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, GHILQHV VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW DV µGHYHORSPHQW WKDW PHHWV WKH QHHGV RI WKH
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SUHVHQW ZLWKRXW FRPSURPLVLQJ WKH DELOLW\ RI IXWXUH JHQHUDWLRQV WR PHHW WKHLU RZQ QHHGV¶ 148The 
principle of sustainable development is entrenched with the idea of long-term common interest; 
controlling the threats of natural resources by human misuse, over-taking and mismanagement. The 
definition recognizes that humans must use natural resources for their needs, but it suggests that their 
utilization should also have limitations in order to ensure their sustainability.149As a trustee of present 
and future generations, a government has a duty to safeguard the sustainability of natural 
resources.150 Specifically, the concept of sustainable development suggests the protection of the 
environment to ensure its sustainability, guaranteeing the long-term availability of resources for the 
present as well as future generations. The essence of this definition is closely related to some of the 
ideas encompassed by the tragedy of the commons. 
2.3 The concepts of µWUDJHG\¶DQGµcRPPRQV¶ 
7KHWUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQVWKHRU\HPERGLHVWZRNH\ZRUGVµWUDJHG\¶DQGµFRPPRQV¶ The word 
µWUDJHG\¶ LV QRW VHHQ LQ WKH XVXDO WKHDWULFDO VHQVH +DUGLQ VWDWHG WKDW µ>W@KH essence of dramatic 
tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things¶.151 Until 
the commons are ruined, rational individual users generate the maximum possible benefits, whilst 
ignoring the cost of over-exploitatiRQRIWKHFRPPRQV+DUGLQIXUWKHUXQGHUOLQHGWKHLGHDWKDWµ>W@KLV
inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents which in fact 
involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the 
drama¶.152 
Similarly, +DUGLQ GHVFULEHG µFRPPRQV¶ DV D FRPPRQ SRRO RI UHVRXUFHV ZKHUH DFFHVV WR QDWXUDO
resources is open to all persons.153 These resources are freely available to anyone in the system and 
are unregulated. Crowe also GHILQHG WKH FRQFHSW µFRPPRQV¶ DV µD VRFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQ«VRPH
environmental objects, which have never been, and should never be, exclusively appropriated to any 
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LQGLYLGXDORUJURXSRILQGLYLGXDOV¶154An example that Hardin used is that of open-access pastureland, 
in which no user has the prerogative to exclude others from use, and all users are equally entitled to 
use it without any restriction.  
2.4Public rights  
+DUGLQ¶V QRWLRQ RI WKH FRPPRQV ZDV QRW D QHZ theory. It has often been said that the model of 
management system that governs natural resources determines the sustainable use of such resources. 
The roots of these assumptions are partly related to $ULVWRWOH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVAristotle had stated that 
DQ\WKLQJ WKDW µLV FRPPRQ WR WKH JUHDWHVW QXPEHU KDV WKH OHDVW FDUH EHVWRZHG RQ LW¶155 Aristotle 
observed that the nature of rights over a thing affects its prospects of care; it can either enhance the 
sustainability of resources, or may expose them to depletion and degradation. In those circumstances, 
when the level of care a given thing receives is the least possible, the prospect for those resources 
may be depletion. 
The underlying idea is that when something is under the control of the largest number of people, it 
becomes difficult to provide the maximum possible care that thing deserves. This idea implies that 
holding a thing in common is not by itself problematic; the problem is most likely to be experienced 
when the number of persons who are enjoying a common right over a thing is the largest. The 
contrary rHDGLQJ RI $ULVWRWOH¶V SUHPLVH LPSOLHV WKDW WKH FDUH OHYHO RI VRPHWKLQJ LV WKH PD[LPXP
possible when the number of persons with property rights over the thing is small. 
In contrast to something held in common without appropriation, property rights provide an incentive 
that encourages an owner to value and manage the resources for his or her long-term benefits.156 
However, property rights protect the owner but not necessarily the wider community. An individual 
water use right is a qualified right in order to protect long-term public interest over the water 
resources. Whilst water resources are allocated through a permit system, they are regulated. Long-
established in legal jurisprudence, water is a public resource,157and as a public good it is usually 
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subject to public control to protect common needs.158Water as a public resource is managed by the 
µpublic trust doctrine¶ (PTD) which gives recognition to a special public right over water or natural 
resources159Property right over the water is subject to regulation to protect the public interest. The 
rights allowing water usage and the duties imposed on using the water resources in a sustainable way 
are embedded in the PTD,160and schemes could be offered to limit unsustainable water use.161 For 
instance, the Convention Concerning the Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, 
which was signed in 1909 regarding the Great Lakes, aims to protect the integrity of the quantity and 
quality of the boundary waters, their related ecosystems, and the rights of the public to use those 
shared waters.162Thus, a government does not only create the system allocating water resources, but 
it controls water wastage, pollution and inefficient water utilization practices.163 
2.5 Local participation 
When Hardin demonstrated what he called the tragedy of the commons on pastureland, it was not 
DERXWDµFRPPRQ¶ ± which is collectively owned by a group of users who restrict other users from 
coming outside of the group ± but it was about open-access resources. Hardin used the term 
µFRPPRQV¶ ZKLOVW GHVFULELQJ µRSHQ-DFFHVV¶ RU XQUHJXODWHG UHVRXUFHV, which has been seen as a 
misconception of the term resources.164The main confusion regarding the tragedy of the commons 
may stem from confusing ordinary commons or common-pool resources with open-access resources. 
With the ordinary commons, individual owners can have a range of prerogatives to control access 
and the extent of exploitation to make the resources sustainable. Stevenson noted that common 
property is not open access; the group has rights and duties to limit access and the extent of 
exploitation of its resources.165 Since such property has defined rights and duties upon group users 
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and outsiders, the commons closely resembles private property, which gives the owner the right to 
H[FOXGHRWKHUV¶H[SORLWDWLRQZLWKRXWKLV or her consent.166 
Most of the time, a given thing is held in common by the largest number of people, and the 
government has the authority to control access and the extent of use in order to protect the common 
interest.167 The commons users are expected to abide by the rules that impose duty. 168Dahlman 
contends that the commons has been regulated by quasi-governmental or governmental rules.169 The 
access and use of the resources within a group are limited.170For instance, in England, common 
pastureland has persisted for centuries.171 Such pasturelands were not open access in their nature; 
instead, they were owned by a defined group that excluded any other group from intervention in the 
property rights they had. The local people¶V involvement, in the management of the resources, has 
sustained the resource. Often, the village court, the government or a quasi-government regulated their 
exploitation.172 Similarly, Turkish fisheries have been governed through the rules developed by the 
users, and this system has endured for a long period of time. 173  The fishers themselves have 
developed rules governing the extent of exploitation, to avert possible depletion.174 The government 
has also developed regulatory rules limiting fishing.175 
In many cases in ordinary commons, the number of persons with common rights may be too small, 
whereas in public, it is too large.176 Since a large number of users are involved, the care bestowed on 
WKHUHVRXUFHVLVWKHOHDVWSRVVLEOHXQOHVVWKHUHDUHVFKHPHVWRUHJXODWHXVHUV¶EHKDYLRXU+RZHYHULQ
those contexts where something is owned by a small or large group as co-owners or community, 
there has been care for the resources, since such a group of people would have introduced a self-
regulatory system, or the level of resource use would have been GHWHUPLQHGE\DJRYHUQPHQW¶VUXOHV
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to ensure the sustainability of the resources.177 The co-owning group or community excludes others 
from any intervention that adversely affects their interest.178 In any case, public goods such as water 
may require more regulatory as well as non-regulatory schemes to enhance the sustainability of 
resources.  
Bromley contends that a common becomes an open-access regime for the individuals within the 
group.179 There are no rules limiting individual group members from access and use of the resources. 
However, practice indicates that the traditional common did not entitle the group to exploit the 
resources without restriction. 180  Their exploitation levels are limited by rules developed by 
themselves or the government or both.181 The members in common-pool resources cannot exclude 
their JURXS¶VPHPEHUVWKH\ exclude non-group members from access and use.182 
Elinor Ostrom observed the commons from the perspective of real-world contexts, by carrying out 
empirical research on communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems and farmland. 
She considered open-access resources and common-pool resources as two different concepts. With 
open-access resources, she believed that there is no limit to the access of resources, and it is 
impossible to identify who the users are. 183  Open-access resources are characterized as those 
resources that are free to all users. She described common-pool resources as large enough, where it is 
difficult to define who the users are, but it is not impossible to identify them.184 +DUGLQ¶VH[SODQDWLRQ
of pastureland usage suggests thaWWKHZRUGµFRPPRQV¶UHIHUVWRRSHQ-access resources, in which no 
individual has a claim to any part of the resources used by another user; the commons nature of 
resources allows the use of a portion of it for his/her own benefit, without any limitation from other 
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users. For example, resources like the open sea and the atmosphere are classified as open-access 
resources, whereas rivers and lakes are categorized as common-pool resources.185 
7KH VHFRQG FULWLFLVP DJDLQVW +DUGLQ¶V WKHRU\ is related to the decision-making institutional 
arrangements and organizational structures that he proposed to avert the tragedy of the commons. 
Ostrom argued that, with common-pool resources, users have their own rules, developed to utilize 
the resources and limit outsiders. The tragedy of the commons also does not suggest a management 
role for the users of scarce common resources. It is very vague as to what organizational remit is 
appropriate for enhancing the security of water, and it is unclear which level of government would be 
mandated to provide regulatory rules. Moreover, it seems to fail to recommend options for coercive 
rules. 
+DUGLQ¶VDVVXPSWLRQVDQG WKHVROXWLRQV KHVXJJHVWHG IDLO WRFRQVLGHU WKHFRPPXQLW\DVSDUWRI WKH
management to supplement the coercive regulatory arrangements or natural resources allocation, and 
the theory finally fails to demonstrate the practical and theoretical relevance of community 
management. Ostrom suggested an idea that recognizes, under certain circumstances, the possibility 
of managing natural resources by the community itself. She underlines the fact that, in some 
circumstances, community users formulate the rules that regulate common-pool resources and 
enforce them without any government intervention.186 Her work brings a self-governance system to 
the centre of sustaining scarce natural resources in defined circumstances.  
Ostrom describes the following circumstances that should shape common-pool resource 
management.187 3ULPDULO\ WKH UHVRXUFHV¶ ERXQGDULHV VKRXOG EH GHILQHG DQG WKH XVHUV¶ ULJKWV EH
clearly identified. Moreover, there must be established rules specifying the amount of resources that 
each user is entitled to exploit from the common pool of resources. The third aspect concerns 
collective choice arrangements. Many of the individuals who are affected by the utilization and 
protection of the resources should become involved in the group that makes or modifies the rules 
which govern collective action. The fourth aspect suggests that there must be close monitoring of the 
behaviour of users. This can be done by a body that is at least partially accountable to the users, or it 
can involve the users themselves. The fifth idea involves imposing a graduated sanction on the 
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wrongdoer, based on the context and nature of seriousness. The users or officials accountable to them, 
or both, can impose this sanction. 
Another aspect is that there should be a low-cost system that resolves conflict between users, or 
between users and the officials managing the resources. Furthermore, there is an idea that the users 
are not restricted to having their own institutions to manage resources by the governmental 
authorities. There must be a minimum standard that entitles the users to organize how they manage 
their resources. At the same time, they must be given long-term access to the resources. The final 
aspect is the introduction of multilayer governance for the appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, and conflict resolution and governance activities.  
+DUGLQ¶V WKHRU\ FDOOHG IRU WKH Iurther intervention of more government agencies rather than 
participatory management through developing self-rules.  However, the local users are not the only 
cause of the tragedy of the commons; rather, they come up with solutions that are supportive in 
sustaining the commons. With regard to this, Ostrom demonstrates the possibility of the introduction 
of cooperative arrangements for the commons through collective agreement on how to exploit the 
resources sustainably.188 
The LGHDRI µcommons¶ in the tragedy of the commons, demonstrates that resources are kept open 
access for a larger number of individuals. As the numbers of the commons users are so many, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to adopt such a cooperative system and limit free riders. Often, the 
transaction costs are too high, either to reach an agreement or to implement it.189 This collective 
action problem may limit the introduction of a self-governance system in WRM.  
2VWURP¶V empirical evidence shows the existence of stability in long-lived irrigation communities 
due to the decision-PDNLQJRIWKHXVHUV¶FRPPXQLW\190 However, Ostrom does not entirely rule out 
RUGLVDJUHHZLWK+DUGLQ¶VWKHRU\and neither does she disagree in principle with the inevitability of 
the tragedy of commons in the absence of an institutional arrangement regulating the behaviour of 
users, or in situations where common-pool resources management systems are weak or 
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impractical.191 She maintains the optimality of the use of appropriation and coercive rules as devices 
in different circumstances. The common-pool resources theory only works in exceptional 
circumstances, depending on the context of resources and the behaviour of the users. 
What Ostrom totally rejects is the limited choices of decision-making within the institutional 
DUUDQJHPHQWV WKDW WKH WUDJHG\ RI FRPPRQV WKHRU\ SURSRVHV DQG WKH ZD\ WKDW µFRPPRQV¶ is 
conceptualized. She underlines how government and market alone are not solutions to the threats of 
natural resource pressures. Her ideas were subsequently reinforced by Bosselman, who notes that a 
common-pool resource is not a resource that is available to anyone to exploit. Rather, it is regulated 
by community norms as to how it is used and who participates in the utilization and protection of the 
resource.192 
Another study conducted by Ostrom, in collaboration with other scholars, suggests that there is no 
VLQJOH LQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQW WKDW DYHUWV WKH FKDOOHQJHV RI ZDWHU UHVRXUFH VHFXULW\ 5DWKHU µWKH
bHVW V\VWHP RI FRQWURO LV RQH ZKLFK PHHWV WKH PRVW FULWLFDO FKDOOHQJHV RI WKH VLWXDWLRQ DW KDQG¶193 
7KH\VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHUHDVRQZK\DµFRQWUROV\VWHPVRPHWLPHVVXFFHHGVDQGVRPHWLPHVIDLOVLVWKDW
the challenges of resource management vary: characteristics of the resource users; and the 
environmental, social, economic, and political context of resource use ± most of which change over 
WLPH¶194 This study further suggests that WRM should be context specific, changing with the factors 
that shape the context, and flexible enough to accommodate those changes.  
More empirical research conducted by Ostrom concerning common-pool resource shows that the 
status of some common-pool resources is, at present, better in some areas while the scenario is 
different in other parts of the world.195 The cause for mixed outcomes in common-pool resource 
management is the existence of variation in the contexts. 196  She suggests that the institutional 
arrangements regarding natural resources require updating regularly in the light of the information 
and experience gained.197 They should be framed as change responsive.198 This new orientation in 
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common-pool resources discloses the necessity of modifying institutional arrangements in relation to 
the dynamics of the context. Ostrom also notes the fact that common-pool resources management 
should take into account the interests of users and provide a conflict resolution mechanism.199 
 In this study, she reinforced the idea that common-pool resource management varies according to 
the scope of the area it covers, the number of users and the nature of exploitation. She concluded that 
there is no particular ideal common-pool resource management scheme; rather, it varies with the 
context.200 She went on to argue that common-pool resources may be governed through various 
institutional arrangements, but she grouped these institutional arrangements roughly into three: 
governmental, private and communal institutional arrangements. 201  This range of management 
institutions does not present alternatives; they may only be effective if used with sufficient 
information regarding the context of the common-pool resources problems. None of these policy 
options are free of the disadvantages incurred upon their use; it is wise to choose based on the 
circumstances in question. These institutional arrangements are not the best schemes in all contexts 
and at all times. 
Whilst Ostrom places direct resource users at the centre of decision-making, the initial study of any 
common-pool resource does not provide for the involvement of persons that have a stake in the 
specific natural resources, other than direct users, when the circumstances contended by Ostrom are 
met.202 Accommodating the stakes of non-direct natural resource users is equally important in natural 
resources management, and this was undermined E\2VWURP¶VVWXG\,QSDUWLFXODULQ2VWURP¶VHDUO\
study of common-pool resources WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI WKH RXWVLGHUV¶ FRPPXQLW\ LQWHUHVWV ZDV XQFOHDU
The impression is that the decision-making in common-pool resources was dominated E\WKHXVHUV¶
self-governance system.203 In such situations, it is said that the selfish users may not see far beyond 
their self-interest. 204  It is often said that such natural resources management is a constraint on 
economic development,205 and may undermine the equitable use of natural resources for present and 
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future generations.206 7KHGDQJHUPD\EHFULWLFDOWRµYRLFHOHVV¶VWDNHKROGHUVwho cannot protect their 
interests, such as the water environment.207 
Whilst Hardin is correct in observing that the destiny of unregulated scarce resources is ruin and 
threats to the security of humans and the economy, the remedies he suggested fail to recognize the 
FUHGLWDELOLW\ RI SDUWLFLSDWRU\ QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV PDQDJHPHQW +DUGLQ¶V WKHRU\ VHHPV UHOXFWDQW WR
consider local-level empowerment in the management of scarce natural resources. For Hardin, the 
users of commons are the threat to resource conservation. Natural resources, including water 
resources, need social learning, which requires the involvement of stakeholders in managing natural 
resources.208 +DUGLQ¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WHQGV WR IDYRXU D PRUH FHQWUDOL]HG WKDQ a polycentric decision-
making process in WRM.209 
In the tragedy of the commons theory, issues such as distributional equity, community welfare and 
other social and cultural benefits are undermined.210  Environmental concerns are too important to be 
left solely to the regulators. The involvement of the local citizens is crucial to protect the 
environment. The common users may change their behaviour towards sustainable resource use or 
combat unsustainable resource exploitation by others when they realize that unsustainable resource 
exploitation is already happening ± or is about to start happening. In addition to such hard rules and 
market instruments, persuasion is a soft approach to force users to change their behaviour.211To this 
end, the government engages in a range of activities that inform of the danger and create awareness 
of unsuitable resource exploitation, and educates the users by showing the causes and possible 
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2.6 Problems of unregulated commons for the sustainability of natural resources 
Hardin noted that if the commons are left unregulated and not appropriated, the extent of exploitation 
would rely on the judgement of the users themselves, and he doubted that individual rational users 
would work to sustain the long-term interests of the common users. Apparently, those individuals 
who exploit the commons excessively would leave fewer resources for those users who behave 
responsibly themselves. In the absence of any rules restricting the access and extent of use, such 
resources become open-access resources. 
Ultimately, such exploitation of resources could lead the commons to a tragedy that might even lead 
the resources to the point RIH[WLQFWLRQ)RUVXFKDGYHUVHFRQVHTXHQFHV+DUGLQ¶VWKHRU\FULWLFL]HVWKH
political-economic model of leaving the resources as open access. The tragedy of the commons 
considers as a root cause of environmental challenges the absence of regulatory rules and schemes 
allocating the commons.213The theory assumes not only that the commons is a natural resource held 
by many individuals, but also that the access and extent of the exploitation of its resources is 
unregulated.214The incentive is created since the cost of the exploitation of resources is externalized 
and is borne by the public or future stakeholders at large, whilst rational individual users are 
maximizing short-term economic gain with no cost to pay.215 
Hardin illustrated this problem by using open-access pastureland, whereby each rational herdsman 
makes an effort to maximize the gains from his or her herding in a plot of land.216 In such situations, 
Hardin believed that a rational herdsman would receive most pastureland benefits by adding more 
and more herds whilst, at the same time, these practices would lead the natural resources to ruin: 
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be 
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. 
Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, 
poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying 
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the 
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long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the 
commons remorselessly generates tragedy.217 
The tragedy of the commons theory stresses that natural resources experience possible threats to their 
sustainability if they are left unregulated and are not allocated.218IQµRSHQDFFHVV¶, Hardin contended 
that any user or group of users is unable to limit access and therefore unwisely uses the commons.219 
7KH XVHUV¶ EHKDYLRXU LV XQFRQWUROOHG LQ WHUPV RI SURWHFWLQJ FRPPRQ LQWHUHVWV DQG HQYLURQPHQWDO
sustainability;220 they are free to use the resources to the extent of their need. The threat for such 
resources is, without rules or limitations, people acting less responsibly. 221  The openness (non-
restriction) of the access and use of the resources facilitates the ruin of those resources. As the 
incentives to exploit the use of resources increase, the users are encouraged to exploit the unregulated 
resources more and more.222 Eventually, all users may resort to exploiting as much as their capacities 
allow, rather than reasonable use from what is available and from what the carrying capacity of the 
resources permits: µ)UHHGRPLQDFRPPRQEULQJVUXLQWRDOO¶223 
The main criterion underlining the tragedy of the commons is that if a resource is held in common by 
a large number of people, for use by all without limitation of access and use, and owned by no person 
or group, no one may wish to behave and use the resources in a manner that sustains the resources for 
long-term common use. The users exploit resources in a way that promotes short-term self-benefits 
while ignoring or undermining the long-term benefits. ,QVXFKDVLWXDWLRQµ[t]he result is individually 
rational in the short term ± if the resource will be depleted, you might as well ensure you get your 
share ±but collectively disastrous in the long term¶.224The openness of the commons develops a 
dilemma for its use, whereby µLQGLYLGXDOO\ UDWLRQDO EHKDYLRXU LVFROOHFWLYHO\GHILFLHQW ,QGLYLGXDOV¶
personal incentives work against the best long-term solution¶.225 
In such situations, the theory suggests that rational (self-centred) users face a dilemma of short-term 
self-interest or sustainability of natural resources for common long-term interest. In terms of natural 
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resource usage, rationality may be characterized by any selfish action that would not be carried out 
by a sensible person standing for the common interest. The essence of the theory is that the root 
causes for the possible ruin of commons is the selfish act of individuals. This theory generalizes that 
the rational users do not work for the benefits of the whole community. Rather, they compete to 
benefit unfairly from the open access to natural resources. 
2.7 Introducing sustainable approaches 
Identifying the conditions that lead to ruin does not in itself assure sustainability of the commons. It 
is necessary to find out key features of a management system that can facilitate sustainable resource 
usage. The tragedy of the commons gives an insight into why scarce natural resources are ruined, and 
how to prevent the open access to such scarce resources from generating ruin for all.226The theory 
has identified two important solutions: appropriation and regulation of the commons through 
coercive rules. 
2.7.1 Appropriation of the open-access resource 
Appropriation as a remedy to the tragedy of the commons theory suggests that a government can 
establish rules allocating scarce open-access resources; thereafter, each owner uses his or her natural 
resources in a way that is sustainable. 7KH LPSOLFDWLRQ LV WKDWDµUDWLRQDO LQGLYLGXDO¶GRHVQRWFDXVH
his or her own resources to be ruined by his or her own actions. This may take the form of tradable 
permits(e.g. tradable licence to graze cattle and a permit for water abstraction).By the rights created 
in the form of marketable use, the market shapes the behaviour of users and, eventually, natural 
resources allocation encourages efficient and sustainable use of resources.227Allocation determines 
the exploitation by giving a profit motivation, since it allows users with property rights to sell their 
surplus to others. Salzman and Thompson contend that natural resource allocation encourages the 
development of innovation that is supportive of sustainable resource use:228µ,Q WKHRU\ WKRVH for 
whom grazing is most valuable will pay the highest price to buy the permits from those who value 
WKHPOHVVHQFRXUDJLQJWKDWWKHFRPPRQLVGHGLFDWHGWRWKHPRVWYDOXDEOHPDUNHWXVH¶229 This may 
be so, but it does depend on how many permits (e.g. how many heads of cattle) are issued in the first 
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place±allocation is thus crucial. Permits may not limit the tragedy of natural resources if the number 
and nature of the permits are not responsive enough to address the circumstances of the natural 
resources in question. +DUGLQ¶VDUJXPHQW VXJJHVWLQJDSSURSULDWLRQRI QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV ultimately 
supports the private property right to control XVHUV¶EHKDYLRXU 
2.7.2 Introducing coercive rules 
 
The tragedy of the commons suggests regulated access and use of commons. The rules involve a 
µmutual coercion mutually agreed uSRQ¶230 Hardin believed that it might not be possible to limit the 
WUDJHG\ RI FRPPRQV WKURXJK D PHUH µYHUEDO DSSHDO¶ 7KH WKHRU\ UHFRPPHQGV WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI
coercive rules that limit selfish individuals or groups. As a society, users need to change their 
behaviour towards the over-exploitation of the commons. However, the tragedy of the commons fails 
WR VSHFLI\ WKH QDWXUH RI WKH UXOHV OLPLWLQJ DFFHVV DQG XVH RI WKH FRPPRQV VR DV WR FKDQJH XVHUV¶
behaviours, except through prescriptive regulation. To avert the tragedy of the commons, a range of 
regulatory and non-regulatory schemes have been developed.231For instance, through prescriptive 
regulation, the government may limit access or the extent of the exploitation of resources.232 The 
rules limit the particular types of natural resource usage that a government considers unsustainable, 
and declares which resource uses are permitted. Through this, access to and exploitation of some 
natural resources are limited or stopped. 
The coercive rules are generally developed and administered by outside agents, which necessitates an 
impartial regulator to enforce the rules without bias. This favours a direct top-down natural resources 
management. This type of regulatory instrument is often considered as a command-and-control 
regulation by a government agency, and it is doubtful that it would bring about an effective change in 
the level of resource exploitation.233 Once the users have attained the relevant level of limitation of 
access to or use of the commons, the rule does not offer any incentives to encourage further 
innovation that enhances sustainable resource use.234Because of this, the users may continue to rely 
on traditional and non-innovative regulatory mechanisms. However, some scholars argue that strict 
prescriptive regulation increases sustainable use by encouraging the production process and 
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innovation designs.235 For instance, a government may introduce and limit any water abstraction that 
it considers unsustainable, impose limitations on discharges that affect water quality, and protect the 
extent to which water ecosystems are accessed to avert tragedy. 
2.7.3 Market instruments  
 
Another regulatory means is financial penalties or charges that internalize the costs. This regulatory 
approach discourages unsustainable resource use through imposing fees. 236  It aims to provide 
incentives for each user to shape his or her behaviour. A practical problem for introducing this 
scheme is identifying the appropriate fee, which accommodates the full social and environmental 
cost, since the valuation of the right fee is difficult.237 Introducing and implementing the correct 
internalization of the social and environmental cost is increasingly dependent on the political 
willingness of a given country. For such a scheme to be effective, the fees should be high enough to 
send price signals towards sustainable resource use; however, environmental goods charges often 
tend more towards revenue-raising.238 In contrast to financial penalties, financial payments could 
subsidize those people who use the resources in a beneficial way, in order to encourage their 
sustainable use.239 Both regulation and market instruments are designed to discourage harmful social 
behaviour and encourage beneficial behaviour. In this case, the government does not impose 
penalties or charges; instead, it subsidizes them. From the perspective of regulation and market 
LQVWUXPHQWVWKHJRYHUQPHQWXVHVµKDUG¶UHJXODWRU\LQVWLWXWLRQV240 
2.8 Understanding the context of the threat 
None of these policy options are free of the disadvantages that are incurred upon their use; it is wise 
to choose an option based on the circumstances in question. These institutional arrangements are not 
best in all contexts and at all times. The tragedy of the commons may be addressed more effectively 
through an adaptive governance system that takes into account specific contexts, rather than 
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privatization or government regulation.241 In addition, natural resources have been best governed and 
sustained for centuries through informal institutions, rather than the formal institutions that Hardin 
prescribed.242 However, this is not to generalize that traditional institutions are the best fit in all 
places and contexts; depending on the nature of the problems, the contexts of the natural resources 
and the behaviour of the users, their level of effectiveness varies. 
For instance, transcending water pollution problems, climate change and related challenges that are 
exacerbating the scarcity of natural resources may not be effectively managed through traditional 
institutional arrangements alone, although these have yet to supplement formal institutional 
arrangements.243They may at least require institutions at regional or global level. Many challenges to 
the availability of water resources are local by their nature, but their impacts are transcending. Such 
challenges may require complex, polycentric and more comprehensive institutional arrangements 
that work through collaboration than localized and fragmented or centralized arrangements. 
Moreover, in its initial stage, the common-pool resource theory did not place due focus on how to 
manage the impact of one natural resource utilization on the adjacent water body. In the real world, 
common-pool resources do not exist in isolation; ecosystems are interconnected with their adjacent 
ecosystems. Pressures on the given land resources affect the uses and protection of adjacent water 
resources; the problems of unwise exploitation of land resources may not be limited to those 
resources or users. However, the early orientation of the theory indicates that it did not give adequate 
room for regulating a range of factors, which may contribute to the threat of natural resource scarcity 
except in demand management.  
2.9Some issues in the applicability of the tragedy of the commons to water security challenges 
2.9.1 Water resources as public resource 
 
Unqualified property right is not seen as the right solution for those resources that are widely public 
in their nature.244Following water does affect property rights and makes it different from land. As 
water is a public good, it is not appropriate to apply the traditional concepts of real property.245It 
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exhibits features of property rights that allow resource utilization, but the right is subject to 
regulation. 246Because of this, water is by law exempt from the ordinary rules of real property 
rights.247 
Getches noted that µ>w]ater is legally and historically a public resource. Although private property 
rights can be perfected in the use of water, it remains essentially public; private rights are always 
LQFRPSOHWH DQG VXEMHFW WR WKH SXEOLF¶V FRPPRQ QHHGV¶.248Water as a public resource needs to be 
integrated with PTD. In France, for instance, the Institutes of Justinian declared running water among 
things that could not be owned privately or by a few commons, although it recognized the private 
right to use them in a restricted fashion.249 Similarly, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr 
Justice Holmes noted that a µULYHULVPRUHWKDQDQDPHQLW\LWLVDWUHDVXUH,WRIIHUVDQHFHVVLW\RIOLIH
that must be rationed among those who have power over it¶.250 
Across the globe, public/state control of the water resources in a natural water body is common, 
whereby the largest number of people enjoy public rights whilst many individual users enjoy private 
rights, which entrusts the right to use of the resources. The majority of water laws are established on 
PTD. The beneficiaries do not possess property rights such as over ordinary things. In the United 
States, the federal government regulates the use of rivers and lakes, and controls waste disposal to 
ensure that waterways remain navigable.251 Water resources are VHHQDV WKH µSXEOLFSURSHUW\RI WKH
QDWLRQ¶252 In the United Kingdom, navigable water resources are public property.253 Similarly, in 
Ethiopia, all natural resources, including water resources, are public property; the ownership is 
vested upon the state and the people of Ethiopia.254 This type of property right is not a private or 
ordinary common right by its nature, which confers ownership to a person or specific group without 
restriction. Accordingly, in Ethiopia, the federal government is empowered to regulate the use of 
water resources across the country.255 Under public ownership of water resources, public property 
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rights are imposed against water resource users. 256  This duty affects how water resources are 
exploited.257A permit is commonly required to allocate water resources and this creates some sort of 
right for a permit holder to use the water. 
2.9.2Regulation of water access and use 
 
Owing to the special characteristics accommodated by freshwater, a significant public intervention is 
inevitable. 258 In many countries, although not open access, water resources are not held under 
exclusive private or co-ownership. No individual or group can claim exclusive ownership over water 
resources. Similarly, in a transboundary water body, no country has exclusive rights over water 
resources. According to the tragedy of the commons theory, with regards to freshwater resources, 
tragedy happens in two ways: the unregulated over-taking of water; and putting pollutants into the 
water body. Consequently, the theory suggests the use of government rules to control the over-taking 
of water resources and the discharge of pollutants into the water body, in order to protect water 
resources. It also suggests water allocation through a property rights system introduced by the 
government. Where there are no proper rules UHJXODWLQJXVHUV¶ EHKDYLRXU the exploitation of water 
resources as a commons is not free from the dilemma of individual water users. The rules limit the 
particular types of water usage that a government considers unsustainable, and declare which water 
uses are permitted. Through this, access to and exploitation of some water resources are limited or 
stopped. 
To implement such a regulation, standards may be set out with penalties imposed for non-compliance. 
In particular, the water resources are exposed to tragedy when water resources are unregulated in 
terms of over-abstraction, water wastage and point source water pollution. Water pricing, water 
metering and developing responsive permit systems for water abstraction may limit the over-use of 
water. Similarly, introducing regulatory rules and market instruments regulating water exploitation 
may enhance water availability. 
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In addition to water demand management, water security naturally requires pollution control of water 
systems. This suggests that achieving water security does not only require introducing rules 
regulating the over-exploitation of water resources, but that first, it may require comprehensive rules 
for both water quantity(demand) and quality management. From a pollutant-management point of 
view, the theory focuses on the point source at which pollution is discharged into a water body. A 
theory is unlikely to address contemporary diffuse pollution challenges. 
As discussed elsewhere, natural causes are one of the threats to water security.259Yet the tragedy of 
the commons theory does not consider physical water shortage as constituting one of the major 
threats to water security. The theory also fails to propose aspects relating to water supply 
management. Practically, it may not be possible to provide a proper solution to natural water security 
challenges by opting to manage water demand alone at all times and places. The central idea of 
+DUGLQ¶VWKHRU\LQYROYHVUHJXODWLQJXVHUVRIVSHFLILFUHVRXUFHs through coercive rules, but this seems 
inadequate in its discussion of the regulation of those people who whilst not using the resource 
themselves-are still affecting the availability of the resource. It excludes them from regulatory scope, 
which is equally important for enhancing the wise use of water resources. 
2.9.3 Capacity to develop and implement rules 
 
The discussion surrounding the tragedy of the commons widely focuses on the creation system 
allocating the resources and regulating resource use. Through these, the maximum possible cares for 
the resources are achieved, since individual users do not rationally strive to maximize short-term 
economic gain against their own property. The tragedy of the commons increasingly focuses on the 
non-availability of rules rather than the strength of existing rules to reshape the exploitation of 
unsustainable commons. Undoubtedly, the availability of rules regulating natural resources is 
decisive for the sustainability of the commons; however, this may not address the root cause. The 
economic development, the nature of the resources themselves and related factors matter in defining 
comprehensive rules and implementing them effectively. A given country cannot introduce and 
implement the rules without costs.260 
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In many cases, a lack of regulatory institutional arrangements and the capacity to implement them are 
root problems for natural resource degradation and unsustainable use. Within countries, the capacity 
to introduce such institutional arrangements and their implementation varies.261 In the member states 
of the AU, including Ethiopia, the capacity to develop institutional arrangements for water security is 
low compared with developed countries.262 The economic capacity and related problems adversely 
affect the pace of the introduction and implementation of a WRM system;263the ultimate cause of 
environmental problems does not only stem from a lack of regulatory institutional arrangements.264 
Defining such arrangements is too costly, 265  so the challenge lies in the economic capacity to 
introduce an effective WRMP and to develop strategies that facilitate implementation.266The central 
example that Hardin cited to demonstrate the tragedy of the commons is pastureland used in common. 
7KLV LPSOLHVWKDW+DUGLQ¶VWKHRU\ LVYHU\WUDGLWLRQDODQGFRQVLGHUVUHVRXUFHSUREOHPV within a very 
limited space.  
2.9.4 Collaborative institutional arrangements 
The tragedy of the commons suggests government regulation towards individual behaviours, but it 
does not consider the impacts of government failures which may lead to the ruin of shared water 
resources. The theory is very vague about what organizational remit is appropriate for enhancing the 
security of water and the level of government that would be mandated to provide institutional 
arrangements. Thus, the theory does not include the government among the parties and factors that 
can contribute to the ruin of water resources. Even if the tragedy of the commons theory puts the 
government inside its theoretical ambit, it may be unlikely that the government could impartially 
regulate its behaviour through rules formulated by itself, particularly if that government is also part 
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of the problem of natural resource over-use or quality deterioration. In shared water resources, 
tensions between governments are among the threats in sustaining the resources.267 
Notably, today, there are challenges in managing water resources in a way that is sustainable, 
because of the actions of governments for their short-term interests, rather than for long-term riparian 
common interests. A government may also run many large development projects that significantly 
affect the availability of water and, as a government¶V term of office is not long, short-term benefit-
seeking by governments may be more problematic than that by individuals. They may also compete 
to control the uses of water resources for their own governmental interests, considering biased short-
term benefits rather than the long-term riparian interests. 
 A water body is a complex system, thereby making it difficult to determine a proper boundary, 
which requires taking into account the interconnectedness of the water system beyond the usual 
administrative boundaries and linkages.268There is usually a mismatch between water resources and 
administrative boundaries. As the result, action on one affects the other.269 The people at the local 
OHYHO µDUH FORVHU WR WKH SUREOHPV RIWHQ XQGHUVWDQG WKHP EHWWHU DQG KDYH WR OLYH ZLWK WKH
consequences of the environmental policy. At the same time, if the problem is one of transboundary 
pollution, the locals do not live with the consequences of their pollution. Those downstream do¶.270In 
nature, exploitation of water resources in parts of the water system affects the water users in other 
parts. Many of the water challenges are interconnected and interrelated and the world is currently 
encountering changing realities to which traditional institutional arrangements that focus on water 
quantity might not be adequately responsive.271 
With regards to transboundary water, institutional arrangements developed by a single country or 
level may not differ from the unregulated individual behaviour that can lead to the ruin of resources. 
Each level or government acting in an isolated manner may tend to over-use and misuse the 
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resources in an inequitable manner. These levels formulate and render decisions independently, 
unless there are schemes to harmonize their actions. The tragedy of the commons theory considers 
the government as a single body (that can regulate individual resource users) and does not envisage 
the regulation of government actions by supranational bodies. It thus undermines the significance of 
a multilevel governance approach (through regional and global bodies) in shaping institutional 
arrangements for water resources. While water and its ecosystems should not be seen in isolation, the 
tragedy of commons overlooks such linkages. The theory is more localized to the commons problems, 
rather than considering wider opportunities. 
 
Water security challenges, whether local, national or global, are inextricably linked. 272  In such 
contexts, the institutional arrangements need to accommodate a range of factors contributing to water 
insecurity. 273  In particular, water security can not only be achieved through institutional 
DUUDQJHPHQWVLQWURGXFHGDWDQDWLRQDOOHYHOWRUHJXODWHZDWHUXVHUV¶behaviour; but also, it conversely 
requires comprehensive policy and law at various levels.274 In climate change, for instance, it is 
FRQWHQGHG WKDW µ>W@KH OLQNDJH DPRQJ ORFDO UHJLRQDO DQG JOREDO HQYLURQPHQWDO LVVXHV DQG WKHLU
relationship to meeting human needs, offer opportunities to capture synergies in developing response 
options and reducing vulnerability to climate, although trade-off between issues may exist¶.275The 
climate change impacts on water resources are a transcending and shared problem, which adversely 
affects the global community.276 
2.10 Conclusion of chapter 
 
As a foundation for the thesis as a whole, this chapter examined the theory of the tragedy of the 
commons to draw out the key features of an effective WRM system that avoid the tragedy. The 
Hardin theory suggests two different ways of dealing with the commons: property rights and 
regulation, since the water user¶V right is subject to coercive regulation. Whilst property rights and 
regulation can and do co-exist, owners are subject to the law. A property right can manage the water 
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resources well on behalf of the owners, but given the public good nature of water, the wider public 
needs and their interests are protected through coercive rules. 
In both remedies of the tragedy of the commons, the role of government agencies is decisive. In the 
context of water resources, the remedies suggested by the theory require the introduction of 
regulation, developing schemes that establish public rights that restrict access to and use of water 
resources, whilst introducing property rights. The government may introduce a permit system that 
allocates water resource use, in that the permit holder utilizes water resources by adhering to 
conditions that are set out to ensure the sustainability of such resources. By and large, with regard to 
water resource security, the core issue is coercive rules. Sustainability of water resources may require 
water demand regulation at a local level. However, regulatory institutional arrangements for water 
demand alone may not sustain water resources because the challenges may involve a range of water 
pressures. In addition to well defined and coercive regulatory institutional arrangements, water 
security may require non-coercive regulatory rules and effective implementation mechanisms. 
The discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that water resources have distinct characteristics 
from many other types of resource. This is mainly because water resource boundaries are usually 
large, the resources are uneven, uses and users are diverse and the resources are transboundary within 
a range of scales. Moreover, water availability is adversely affected not only by unsustainable water 
resource exploitation but also by water quality failures and water systems degradation. This is 
attributable to the interconnectedness of natural water systems with other ecosystems. In many cases, 
the impact of water pressures is not limited within a specific scale, and WRM cannot be effectively 
addressed in an isolated fashion. Actions in adjacent environments or even in locations further away, 
may impact upon the availability of water. An isolated view of natural resource problems solely 
WKURXJKWKHUHJXODWLRQRIXVHUV¶GHPDQGVH[FOXGHVDUDQJHRIZDWHUSUHVVXUHV The theory therefore 
fails to propose comprehensive key features of an effective WRM system. Discussion of the tragedy 
of the commons theory maps out the context and supply and demand management as the key features 
of an effective WRMP. The findings in this chapter demonstrate that +DUGLQ¶V WKHRU\ of water 
resource challenges was, and is, of great importance; but the theory was written in 1968 and much 




Chapter Three: Historical development of integrated water resources management  
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the need to introduce and use a watershed boundary-based IWRM 
approach has been advocated widely and globally, with respect to the growing concerns of water 
resource problems. At present, the institutional architecture of this type of WRM is increasingly 
shaping it as a whole; the water laws and policies are evolving in both developing and developed 
countries to manage water resources in an integrated fashion at the river basin level. This chapter 
reviews the concept of IWRM and discusses the historical development of international water law 
and policy to explore modern water management principles that are related to IWRM. The main 
focus of the chapter is on exploring the key features of an effective WRM system that are supportive 
to the sustainability of water. 
3.2 The concepts of river basin management and IWRM 
The notion of a µriver basin¶ is not a new concept; although the exact date of its origin is still 
disputed.277Barrow noted that it probably first originated in 1752, and has been more widely used 
since the 1930s.278The European Union¶V Water Framework Directive (WFD) GHILQHVWKHWHUPµULYHU
EDVLQ¶DVµWKHDUHDRIODQGIURPZKLFKDOOVXUIDFHUXQ-off flows through a sequence of streams, rivers 
DQGSRVVLEO\ ODNHVLQWRWKHVHDDWDVLQJOHULYHUPRXWKHVWXDU\RUGHOWD¶279This definition indicates 
that the boundary demarcation of a river basin lies with the areas of drainage coverage, 
encompassing the totality of the land areas that are naturally drained by a watershed. Traditionally, 
river basin management was water-centred and lacked ingratiated management of land and related 
resources.280 The notion supported coordinated development of water resources at a hydrological 
boundary; often this boundary is not the same as political boundaries.281 The concept was often 
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focused on exploitation of water resources for economic development, although it took the river 
basin boundary as a demarcation for water development.282 This approach was widely used in the 
1960s and 1970s and viewed the basin µDVDUHVRXUFHV\VWHPZKRVHZDWHUVZHUHWREHH[SORLWHGIRU
economic development¶.283 
On the other hand, ,:50ZDVµDSURGXFWRI the environmental movement of the 1970s, questioned 
the single (and multi-) objective approach and its strong development emphasis.¶284The notion of an 
µLQWHJUDWHG¶ WRM may be seen as an umbrella term encompassing a range of integrated activities 
which contribute to the activities of the overall sustainability of water resources. IWRM considers 
ULYHU EDVLQV DV µODUJH FRPSOH[ LQWHJUDWHG HFRORJLFDO EDVLQV¶. 285  As a river basin favours the 
coordinated development of water resources, IWRM favours taking the watershed boundary as an 
appropriate scale for managing water resources, but it suggests an integrated approach rather than 
mere coordination.286IWRM recognizes the ULYHUEDVLQOHYHODVµWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHWRRO¶WRGHOLYHU
an integrated management system.287It considers river basins or catchment areas as a level for 
managing water resources. This physical unit is justified as follows: 
Water flows according to natural characteristics and does not respect administrative 
boundaries ± therefore the question arises: should water be managed and management 
structure defined according to existing administrative boundaries or according to natural 
boundaries, usually taken to be river basins? From a pure water resources point of view 
there might be much logic to adopting a river basin approach, or at least considering the 
river basin as a logical planning unit.288 
 
The idea of IWRM is therefore closely connected with river basin management. In both approaches, 
the natural drainage boundary division is used to identify an area of boundary demarcation, but these 
concepts are not the same. 
As an approach, IWRM has received both criticism and praise. With respect to the criticisms, the 
approach is said to have found favour without much reflection on the likelihood of actually 
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integrating WRM. 289 Because of this, the notion is often said to be vague, nominal and non-
practical.290 7KHDSSURDFKDFFRPPRGDWHVGLIIHUHQWYLHZVEXW LVGLIILFXOW WRXQGHUVWDQGµLQWHUPVRI
ZKDW LWDFWXDOO\PHDQV¶291 It is considered to not be operational and is vague in terms of being put 
into practice.292Converting the approach into practice is often said to be difficult and leaves the 
impression that the concept has largely tended to be a blueprint, rather than a workable approach to 
assist in water security challenges effectively. 
It is said that IWRM is attractive regardless of differences in disciplines.293 The term is used in many 
synonymous ways, owing to the involvement of different disciplines.294 Practically, the concept is 
understood and implemented in various ways.295 However, the IWRM approach provides a general 
legal or policy framework for WRM, 296and owing to their nature, differences in interpretation are an 
unavoidable phenomenon within the context of water bodies. The existence of variations in 
understanding of the IWRM concept may provide a window of opportunity for specific legal and 
policy solutions. It may also avoid too many narrow interpretations. In fact, there are possible 
variations, even within the same river basin, that require different management perspectives.  
3.3. Definition and core elements of IWRM 
3.3.1 Definition  
 
The widely used Global Water Partnership (GWP) policy document defines IWRM DVµDSURFHVVWKDW
promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in 
order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
FRPSURPLVLQJ WKH VXVWDLQDELOLW\ RI YLWDO HFRV\VWHPV¶. 297 Integrated river basin management and 
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IWRM are related concepts.298 Similarly, by adapting the GWP definition of IWRM, the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) defines integrated river basin management as:  
the process of coordinating conservation, management and development of water, land and 
related resources across sectors within a given river basin, in order to maximize the economic 
and social benefits derived from water resources in an equitable manner while preserving and, 
where necessary, restoring freshwater ecosystems. 299 
 
3.3.2 Core elements  
 
To understand the strengths and weakness of IWRM, in-depth evaluation of its core elements are 
imperative.   
3.3.2.1 Process 
 
One of the key elements of IWRM LV µSURFHVV¶, which can be understood as continuous reform in 
WRM.300 As a process, IWRM recognizes the fact that WRM reform is not an overnight function; 
rather, it is learned from experience over periods of time and changes with the context of specific 
river basins. Its legal landscapes and implementation practices are worked out on a step-by-step basis, 
and require updates with dynamism concerning water resources. There is no possibility of finding a 
perfect IWRM that is workable for all contexts.  
The water resource pressures and security challenges are not identical in different countries, and even 
vary within the same river basin in different areas. This may suggest that countries could 
imaginatively design appropriate institutional arrangements within the context of the water bodies. 
Water policies and laws require adjustment to adapt to changes. Therefore, the responsiveness of the 
institutional arrangements is one of the key dimensions that IWRM aims to achieve. 
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Integration is one of the key words that is attached to the integrated river basin management 
approach. The concept of integration is generally well received; it is desirable for different aspects of 
human life and performance ± attractive, inspiring and affirming ± but expansive enough to allow for 
different interpretations.301However, tKHZRUGµLQWHJUDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQDQIWRM approach, has lacked a 
clear meaning. Biswas describes WKLVXQFHUWDLQW\E\VWDWLQJ WKDW µ>H@YHU\RQH LV IRU LQWHJUDWHGZDWHU
resources management; no matter what it means, no matter whether it can be implemented, or no 
matter whether it would actually improve water management processes¶.302Watson notes that the idea 
of integrated river basin management is widely interpreted and understood as an improved 
FRRUGLQDWLRQ µDPRQJ SODQQLQJ DQd management organizations without any fundamental reforms in 
H[LVWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGV\VWHPVRIJRYHUQDQFHIRUODQGDQGZDWHU¶303 He argues that 
mere improved coordination among conventional institutional arrangements will not bring a change. 
The success of integrated river basin management is dependent upon collaborative institutional 
arrangements and decision-making, rather than simply improved coordination.304 
 
In collaboration, persons with a stake must be involved in managing water resources through 
partnerships. A lack of collaboration among levels of decision-makers and actors negatively affects 
the sustainability of water resources. 305  Collaboration is a non-hierarchical, polycentric natural 
resources management;306 the levels and actors integrate their functions without differences in their 
responsibilities. This scheme is believed to avoid or minimize fragmentation and overlapping efforts 
in WRM. 307  Collaborative management may include stakeholders from government institutions, 
private companies, non-governmental organizations and interest groups, as well as individuals who 
have a stake in the development and protection of water resources, unlike the conventional 
technocratic-focused WRM.308 Collaborative WRM involves context-specific and problem-focused 
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decision-making. This makes collaborative decision-making a social learning process.309 It provides 
legitimacy for these persons and institutions to be able to participate in and influence the decision-
making process. Collaboration also enhances the provision of equitable and fair decisions by 
allowing a range of perspectives and interests to be paid attention to. As Biswas describes, water 
resource problems: 
 
are becoming increasingly more and more interconnected and intertwined with other 
development-related issues, and also with social, economic, environmental, legal and 
political considerations, at local and national levels, and sometimes even at regional and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHYHOV«ZDWHU SUREOHPV KDG EHFRPH PXOWL-dimensional, multi-sectoral and 
multi-regional, and were enmeshed with multi-interests, multi-agendas and multi-causes, 
which could be resolved only through an appropriate multidisciplinary, multi-institutional 
and multi-stakeholders coordination.310 
 
For instance, in the United States, different federal states work together within WRM through 
interstate compacts ± agreements that are made between, or among, states that share water resources 
to coordinate water resource use and development. 311  The compact scheme is used to enhance 
collaboration between different administrative states to ensure equitable water resource use, and aims 
to sustain water resources. This scheme is believed to enhance coordinated interstate WRM, beyond 
the administrative boundary demarcations. 312  Once it obtains federal government approval, the 
agreement is a legally enforceable contract.313 
Furthermore, the essence of the compact indicates that the sharing of water resources is not only in 
the interest of federal states (local levels), but also of those states that do not share the water body. 
The higher level (national government) has a stake in determining the management, as the local-level 
DJUHHPHQW FDQQRW DIIHFW WKH ZKROH QDWLRQ¶V LQWHUHVW LQ WKH ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV XQGHU FRQFHUQ ,Q WKH
absence of the involvement of the federal government, the local levels may attempt to share water 
resources for their own local interest, at the cost of the national interest. This may increase water 
resource diversions and unsustainable utilization of water resources. The compact enables both 
central and local government bodies to establish a vertical and horizontal relationship, and it 
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enhances fair water resource use for the whole nation. This makes ensuring the equitable utilization 
of water resources the mandate of both the higher and lower levels. The involvement of both higher 
and lower levels is thus equally important; neither the decentralization nor the centralization of 
authority to a given level is an end in itself. 
Moreover, because the earth is one interconnected hydrological system, the use and protection of 
local-level water resources may not be merely local in their nature. Rather, they have national and 
global dimensions. Therefore, the local challenges do not remain within that specific level; they 
extend and have larger implications at higher levels. The existence of this interconnection means, 
that WRM is not undertaken at one specific level in isolation or by a single sector with regard to an 
individual function. Instead, different levels of decision-making and regulators are involved. This 
suggests that a positive outcome in water security management is dependent on the shared 
responsibility and functioning of different levels at the scale of decision-making and the 
organizations within that level.314 
 
The overall goal of integration in WRM seems to be to minimize the risk of over-exploitation that 
endangers the sustainability of water resources. The essence of integration is that fragmented WRM 
is unlikely to bring about a change in the over-exploitation of water resources, and it aims to 
minimize the risk of unsustainable water resource use by decision-making, without a trade-off to 
mitigate the multiple needs of water resources. Importantly, the effectiveness of collaborative river 
basin management depends upon the effective technical solutions that enable cooperation among the 
concerned stakeholders; politics provide an enabling environment for WRM and implementing laws 
and institutions.315 None of these elements stands by itself in the absence of the other two elements. 
The weakness of one of these elements affects the strength of collaboration in WRM. In shared water 
resources in particular, managing them without coordination by the countries sharing those resources 
is challenging. To avert a tragedy involving water resource, it is widely suggested that the riparian 
countries manage water resources in a coordinated manner.316 A lack of coordination between states 
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creates water insecurity.317 
 
However, collaborative WRM does not arise out of dilemmas. Both proponents and opponents of 
collaborative environmental management, including of water resources, use traditional centralized 
decision-making as a base for reference, to either advocate or challenge the collaborative approach. 
For example, Orts doubts that a centralized government acting alone can attain a suitable 
environmental solution. 318  He contends that, in many situations, centralized environmental 
management is less trustworthy when compared with collaborative environmental management.319 
He favours a collaborative environmental management scheme that involves different stakeholders; 
this is a more trustworthy, democratic management approach than traditional centralized 
environmental management. He further suggests that, in some situations, traditional centralized 
environmental management is preferable to the collaborative approach.320 He adds that collaborative 
environmental management is not able to replace the traditional centralized environmental approach, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRVRPHRIWKHFRPSOH[LVVXHVWKDWUHTXLUHVROXWLRQVIURPµELJJRYHUQPHQW¶
rather than collaborative schemes. 
 
2UWVDQG&RJOLDQH¶VVWXG\VXJJHVWVWKDWFRPSOH[HQYLURQPHQWDOSUREOHPVILQGDVROXWLRQIURPDµELJ
JRYHUQPHQW¶, but GRHV QRW GHILQH ZKDW D µELJ JRYHUQPHQW¶ RU µFRPSOH[¶ LVVXHV DFWXDOO\ DUH +HUH
environmental problems ± whether complex or small ± may need stakeholders¶ efforts and local-level 
involvement. For instance, pollution issues with regard to transboundary water resources may be best 
managed through the collaboration of the stakeholders for different levels, who have an interest in 
addressing the big problems through collaboration, rather through than a centralized approach. The 
problem becomes large and complicated if it does not find solutions at the local level with the 
involvement of the stakeholders. A lack or ineffectiveness of stakeholder collaboration in WRM may 
affect the sustainability of water resources. The lack of common goals and collaboration leads each 
stakeholder to make decisions in the way he or she pleases. 
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2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG &RJOLDQHVH DUJXHV WKDW FROODERUDWLYH HQYLURQPHQWDO PDQDJHPHQW LV µQRW DW DOO
feasible for environmental public decision-making in real-ZRUOGGHFLVLRQV¶321  He further underlines 
the idea that collaborative environmental management is costlier than the traditional approach. In 
1995, the US government adopted a policy document on environmental law that clearly advocates 
collaborative environmental management as being more cost-effective than the conventional 
approach. The policy document states that: 
 
It is time to draw upon the lessons we have learned over the last 25 years to reinvent 
environmental protection for the 21st century. We have learned that the American people 
are deeply committed to a healthy environment for their children and communities. We have 
learned that pollution is often a sign of economic inefficiency and business can improve 
profits by preventing it. We have learned that better decisions result from a collaborative 
process with people working together rather than from an adversarial one that pits them 
against each other. And we have learned that regulations that provide flexibility ± but 
require accountability ± can provide greater protection at a lower cost.322 
 
&RJOLDQHVH¶V DUJXPHQW RYHUORRNV H[LVWLQJ IDFWV DERXW FROODERUDWLYH HQYLURQPHQWDO PDQDJHPHQW
when he considers the collaborative approach as infeasible, costly and time-consuming, not least 
because the notion of feasibility is relative. 323  Collaborative environmental management is a 
preferable scheme for harmonizing interests. It assists in building a common platform that imposes 
obligations on each stakeholder as to how to use and protect the relevant natural resources, rather 
than exploiting or managing them in isolation, in a manner that may harm the interests of other 
stakeholders or cause overlapping efforts. Collaborative environmental decision-making is an 
appropriate tool for regulating environmental problems that are particularly sophisticated in nature, 
and these problems often have many conflicts of interest. Collaboration among the levels and key 
actors facilitates and helps to find a balanced solution, if they take part in the negotiation process in a 
democratic manner. It may also help to minimize or avoid unnecessary contention and boost a 
healthy relationship. A collaborative environmental WRM platform also provides an opportunity for 
the stakeholders to be involved, share their views, learn experiences and enhance transparency. 
 
The perception that assumes the collaborative approach is costly and time-consuming is an over-
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exaggeration for the following reasons. Firstly, most environmental problems are not commercialized 
or valued in economic terms. Secondly, the price of a solution that is attained through collaborative 
environmental management may not be valued in economic terms. Here, it is argued that the cost of 
collaborative WRM is necessary if collaboration is conducted at the level appropriate to regulate a 
given environmental problem, and the time it consumes is rational if the solution that is achieved 
harmonizes conflicting interests among stakeholders. A collaboration scheme, as a management 
scheme, is a crucial tool for uniting isolated efforts and enabling them to handle issues that are not 
solved effectively by a single government institution or level. It is believed that collaborative 
management enhances equitable and reasonable use, and imposes obligations that prevent the 




Water resource problems are complex:325 users are diverse;326 the dynamics of water resources are 
uncertain;327 the ecosystem is interconnected; and sources of problems are not specific. Therefore, 
providing one solution may not solve all ongoing water resource problems.328 Sometimes, a given 
action may trigger other unexpected problems.329 A government institution may not have all the 
necessary information and experts to manage natural resources, and stakeholder participation 
enhances natural resource management by sharing experiences.330 Thus, water resource problems 
may not find all their solutions from governments or single levels or institutions; rather, public and 
stakeholder participation is needed.331 
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:LWKLQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI LQWHJUDWHG ULYHU EDVLQ PDQDJHPHQW µWKH FRRUGLQDWHG development and 
PDQDJHPHQW RI ZDWHU¶ LV LQFRUSRUDWHG DV D PDMRU WRM direction.332 The concept of coordination 
attempts to address the involvement of diverse stakeholders within WRM. This means participation 
is one of the core elements of integrated river management, which requires involving all relevant 
levels and citizens, providing access to information and giving the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making.333 3DUWLFLSDWLRQLVGHVFULEHGDVµDOHJDOSURFHGXUHWRJLYHFLWL]HQVDFKDQFHWRJLYH
their opinLRQ DERXW SURMHFWV DQG GHFLVLRQV¶334The modes of participation may be categorized into 
rights to participation, access to information and access to justice in environmental matters.335 The 
idea of the right to participation entitles concerned persons, community members or non-
governmental organizations to influence public authorities in their decision-making processes. 
Moreover, the right of access to information and participation gives WKH SXEOLF WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ µWR
DVVHUW WKH ULJKW WR OLYH LQDQHQYLURQPHQWDGHTXDWH IRUDSHUVRQ¶VKXPDQ KHDOWKDQGZHOO-EHLQJ¶336 
The right to access to information in environmental matters provides the public with space to 
challenge the fairness of development projects, thereby accommodating social equity, environmental 
sustainability and economic efficiency concerns. It imposes an obligation on the relevant government 
body to provide access to information to the applicant regarding those administrative decisions that 
impact on the environment, human health and safety.337 
 
3.3.2.3.1 Significance of participation 
 
The significance of public and stakeholder involvement in environmental decision-making is 
inevitable. It is often said that such involvement enhances the validity and legitimacy of government 
decisions;338 limits the discretion of administrative authorities, by giving the public and stakeholders 
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the opportunity to exert their influence on public authorities to render negotiated or mitigated 
decisions; 339  and enhances the public acceptance of decisions that are made by government 
authorities.340 Stakeholder participation is also characterized as: a platform used to weigh conflicting 
interests and decision-making through the broader consideration of water resource use; the protecting 
of social interests, UDWKHU WKDQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ QHHGV, through balancing these interests; and a tool for 
conflict prevention and resolution among water resource users.341 In situations where the government 
is part of the problem of unsustainable water resource use or exploitation, a participatory WRM 
model is one of the key schemes for regulating government behaviours. Participation creates a forum 
that helps to discuss and provide solutions that can mitigate the interests of different people.342 Birnie 
and Boyle note that participatory decision-making promotes environmental justice and sustainable 
use of natural resources, as well as balancing the development and protection of natural resources.343 
3.3.2.3.2 Drawbacks of participation 
 
Public participation and stakeholder involvement in water resources may not be without drawbacks. 
The cost of participation is often regarded as disadvantageous. The people who have stakes in water 
use are too many; stakeholder participation demands a high cost if a stakeholder forum is actually 
needed to operate effectively, when compared with traditionally centralized schemes of natural 
resources management.344 The proper utilization of water resources may need relatively complex 
negotiation, which consumes time and money, in order for balanced solutions to be found. In 
particular, if countries are economically weak, with chronic water scarcity, it is not easy in practice 
to change stakeholder participation in WRM.  
 
Obviously, competition between needs arises, and this makes it difficult for members of large groups 
to take part in the decision-making. This disadvantage may be managed through a representative 
mode of participation that involves some persons or groups who share interests, rather than involving 
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the whole group.345The problems with participatory decision-making may not end simply by using a 
representative mode of participation, because there must be the right representation of stakeholders 
and fully vibrant participants. It has been noticed that, in the context where the environment is 
voiceless, nature may be in peril and the interest of future generations may not be protected.346 The 
voiceless interests are ignored, and the outcome for the environment is precarious. Those short-
sighted and self-interested users continue benefiting until the water resources are ruined.347 Moreover, 
participants in natural resources management may not be in equal positions to influence and provide 
fair and balanced decisions, as a result of which, the dominant groups continue to generate their 
benefits through the disguise of participation.348 
 
Furthermore, the selection process of participants may not be impartial, and the decision-making 
processes may allow some groups to impose their wishes on the other groups and public interests. 
Held states that: µ,W LV QRW WKH VLQJOH LVRODWHG LQGLYLGXDO ZKR LV DFWLYH LQ KLVWRULFDO DQG SROLWLFDO
processes, but rather human beings who live in definite relations with others and whose nature is 
defined througK WKHVH UHODWLRQV¶349  Such participatory decision-making is neither negotiated nor 
democratic by its nature; rather, it serves the interests of a few individuals at the expense of public 
interest.350Participation legitimizes local interest in the utilization of water resources. However, this 
must be subject to limitations to secure the protection of resources and to safeguard the interests of 
the whole nation. On the other hand, a completely decentralized participatory decision-making 
process is unorganized when it comes to protecting common interests.351 The danger of this type of 
decision-making may not differ too much from the tragedy of the commons, which leads to 
uncontrolled resources being ruined by self-interested individuals. 
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Participation favours decentralized natural resources management. The decentralization of power to 
WKH ORZHVW DSSURSULDWH OHYHO LV MXVWLILHG EHFDXVH µWKH FORVHU PDQDJHPHQW LV WR WKH HFRV\VWHP WKH
greater the responsibility, ownership, accountability, partLFLSDWLRQ DQG XVH RI ORFDO NQRZOHGJH¶352 
The use of local knowledge is also assumed to be a tool that could enhance a more effective local 
steering by reducing transaction costs, helping stakeholders to learn from their experiences, and 
using traditional knowledge for maximizing natural resource conservation efforts.353 Participatory 
decision-making is a locally-led process that brings society to the centre of decision-making. 
Stakeholder participation is characterized as: a platform used to weigh conflicting interests and 
decision-making through the broader consideration of water resources use; for protecting of social 
LQWHUHVWV UDWKHU WKDQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ QHHGV WKURXJK EDODQFLQJ WKHVH LQWHUHVWV DQG XVHG DV D WRRO IRU
conflict prevention and resolution among water resources users.354 Participants go through various 
experiences and find out information about water resources to uncover solutions for water resources 
problems.355 
 
The concept of subsidiarity is synonymous with the idea of devolving or decentralizing authority to a 
lower level.356 It aims for a transfer of functions from a higher to a lower level, and the idea embeds 
itself in the existence of multilevel in decision-making. 357  The concept is also considered as a 
constitutional principle used to defend higher-level interventions.358 The lower levels use the concept 
as a shield to defend intervention from higher levels, and it gives relative autonomy to the former to 
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choose and render decisions; however, it also recognizes the legitimacy of the higher levels to 
intervene when an issue is assumed to be best handled at the higher levels.359 
For instance, subsidiarity legitimizes an EU (supranational level) takeover of decision-making from 
member states, or it can empower member states to maintain jurisdiction in a given matter.360Owing 
WR WKHVH PL[HG IHDWXUHV VXEVLGLDULW\ LV FRQVLGHUHG WR EH D µGRXEOH-HGJHG¶ VZRUG361 Subsidiarity as 
decentralization aims to transfer power to the level that is located closest to the public, to enhance 
democracy, build trust and reduce higher levels of intervention, which are often considered 
unpopular by the public. Its wide recognition is supported by the idea that decentralization of power 
to a subordinate level improves governance.362 It considers the national level or above as too remote 
to address local needs and interests within administrative decision-making. 
The decentralized environmental management approach has been widely practised as a contemporary 
managerial model in the governance of natural resources, including water resources, through 
involving local people at the lowest possible level. 363  Decentralization of power enables 
organizations at the lowest possible level to have the power, freedom and resources to discharge the 
duties imposed on them.364 It enhances stakeholder involvement in natural resources management, 
and the involvement of the public as partners is assumed to boost the success of natural resources 
conservation, through enhancing the enforcement of rules that are enacted for the sustainable use of a 
resource.365 It has often been said that the decentralized model of natural resources helps to include 
the needs and aspirations of different stakeholders. Subsidiarity favours decision-making at the level 
closest to the people.  
Many development projects are determined at a local administrative level in water resource decision-
making; land resource management is also local in its nature, and its proper involvement in water 
resources is an important aspect of the regulatory framework to consider. Notably, centralization may 
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impede the bringing of local people, the public and stakeholders to the centre of decision-making.366 
Decentralization of WRM WRWKHORFDOOHYHOµZLOOSURYLGHDFOHDUHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHLVVXHVLQWKH
catchment, and involves local communities in decision-making by sharing evidence, listening to their 
ideas, working out priorities for action and seeking to deliver integrated actions that address local 
LVVXHVLQDFRVWHIIHFWLYHZD\DQGSURWHFWWKHORFDOUHVRXUFHV¶367 
Traditionally, the focus of WRM law was at national or river basin level, except for some forms of 
cooperation to regulate the behaviours of states in international water courses. 368  There was no 
comprehensive water law that regulated in a coherent way the ranges of water threats. That meant 
that water security management had to be seen from national or river basin perspectives. The national 
level, however, is still considerably valid as an area for WRM, since states are the principal actors 
within regional and international politics.369 
By reviewing the water security challenges faced by south-east England, for example, Rodda argues 
against the significance of the river basin approach in enhancing the security of water.370 Rodda 
contends against the decentralization of WRM to the river basin level. He believes that the constraint 
on water transfer in England is not a cost of infrastructure development, EXW WKDW µSUREDEO\ PRUH
serious was the attitude that a regional or river basin approach rather than a national one was the 
DSSURSULDWHZD\WRWDFNOHWKHQDWLRQ¶VXWLOL]DWLRQRILWVZDWHUUHVRXUFH¶.371 5RGGD¶VDUJXPHQWIDYRXUV
a more holistic WRM at a national level. Managing water supplies at the regional or river basin level 
enhances the control of water resources by the water companies in a fragmented manner. 
His critical evaluation suggests the need to reshape the WRM system towards a national orientation, 
so as to overcome local resistance. The introduction of a flexible scheme allowing water transfer is 
an important aspect of WRM in the context of water scarcity, to enhance the balanced utilization of 
water resources; however, supply management may not be a primary management approach to water 
scarcity problems. Rodda attaches too much focus on water supply management through transfer 
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from river basins, where water resources are abundant, to river basins with a deficit; but abundance 
of water resources in the basins is relative, and the stability of the same quantity is uncertain with 
climate change. There may not be the same amount of water resources in the future.  
WRM in scarce river basins primarily requires managing unsustainable water demand. Demand 
management may not be practical without the involvement of water resource users and companies 
involved in water abstraction in valuing water and using water resources efficiently. The impression 
is that this idea allows less possibility for national-level intervention in water supply management, by 
maintaining the river basin approach. If holistic WRM is to benefit in an equitable manner, the local 
SHRSOHZLWKLQ WKH ULYHUEDVLQ PXVWEH LQIRUPHGDERXW WKHZDWHU WUDQVIHU¶VSRWHQWLDO LPSDFWRQWKHLU
lives; their interests must not be ignored and they must be brought to the centre of water supply 
decision-making. Nationalizing decision-making about water supplies should not occur at the 
H[SHQVHRI ULYHU EDVLQSHRSOH¶V LQWHUHVWV UDWKHU LW VKRXOGJLYHGXH LPSRUtance to the protection of 
ORFDO SHRSOH¶V LQWHUHVWV DOWKRXJK WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUHVWV RI SHRSOH DQG FRPPXQLWLHV OLYLQJ
outside the river basin areas is equally important.   
This is why it is said that integrated river basin management may not happen out of political choice 
in ways that affect how water resources are developed and managed.372 Depending on the context of 
the water resource challenges, water security may not be achieved in the real world simply by 
managing water resources within the river basin boundary demarcation. The endeavour to achieve 
social equity, economic efficiency and a healthy ecosystem that functions for the people who live 
within and outside the river basin level requires inclusive WRM, which takes into account competing 
interests. If integrated river basin management is understood as an approach for developing and 
protecting water resources for the people and ecosystems residing within the river basin, it is a 
disintegrative approach that reinforces the fragmentation in managing interests from outside the river 
basin, or limits the balanced utilization of the water resources of different river basins. 
However, as WRM is distant from the local level, the real involvement of local people cannot be 
ensured, and sharing local experiences is hence limited. In particular, it undermines receptiveness to 
ORFDO SHRSOH¶V LGHDV, and poses a difficulty in integrating their interests in WRM. Moreover, it 
impedes the provision of context-specific solutions. 373  However, the decentralization of WRM 
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authority does not mean that solutions for all water resource problems can be obtained at the local or 
river basin level; some water resource solutions may be obtained from the national or international 
level. Water resource problems are dynamic,374 and decision-making levels change with time and 
place. 
In addition, localized WRM also underestimates the interconnectedness of natural resources among 
both human and non-human communities. In particular, given the present climate changes, socio-
economic development and diverse factors related to water resources quality and quantity, water 
resource decision-making needs a flexible management system. Some measures supporting local 
efforts can be supplemented from national or regional levels, or beyond these levels, based on the 
nature of the water resource problems. That makes the nature of the problem critical in determining 
the level where water resources are managed. Generally, national or supranational levels may 
provide a broad framework for the development and protection of water resources. 375  At the 
grassroots level, water resource users and local communities are given a wider power to engage in 
decision-making, particularly on issues of a day-to-day nature.376 Regardless of the nature of the 
water resource problems, local-level involvement is inevitable ± it provides legitimacy for local-level 
resource users. Ultimately, the outcomes of decisions at different levels add and contribute positive 
impacts and improvement to the sustainability of water resources. 
Ecologically, there is no isolation between the beings within ecosystems merely through the river 
basin drainage divide. It is supposed that: 
all living things exist in interrelated systems; nothing exists in isolation. The water 
environment system is web-like; to pluck one strand is to cause all to vibrate; whatever 
happens to one part has ramifications for all the rest. Our actions are not individual but social; 
they reverberate throughout the whole ecosystem.377 
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7KDW LV ZK\ µRYHU WKH ODVW WZR GHFDGHV SUREOHPV DW QDWLRQDO DQG EDVLQ OHYHO KDYH HPHUJHG
prominently within a global context¶.378Climate change may impact upon the availability of water 
beyond national administrative boundaries, and this creates doubt that isolated actions of states will 
ensure water availability:379 
 
In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country¶s self interest that all 
of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by 
broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among states. Such cooperation is possible if 
every country¶s policies take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the 
needs of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone¶s interests but also 
recognizes our common humanity.380 
 
Practically, it may not be possible to ensure water security by isolated national water policy and 
law. 381  Rather, water security management demands significant involvement and inclusion of 
different dimensions that affect availability of water at national, regional and international levels.382  
The existence of diverse interests in water resource development suggests the need to reform water 
law to facilitate public participation at all levels of WRM. People and ecosystems benefit if 
integrated river management is understood as an interconnecting idea beyond the watershed in the 
context of water scarcity. In this way, the coordination of local, national, regional and international 
levels is enhanced, and mutual interests are sustained. 
3.3.2.5 Managing land and related resources 
 
Another key element of IWRM is the scope of the issues that are involved; water resources are not 
the only management matter that needs addressing. Rather, management issues also encompass land 
and other related resources,383which are interconnected with water resources. This is because the 
quality and quantity of water resources are affected by land-use practices; water sustainability first 
depends upon land use. Thus water resource conservation may not be successful without taking into 
consideration the major ecosystem factors that contribute to water degradation. For instance, diffuse 
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VRXUFH SROOXWDQWV µHQWHU RXU ZDWHUV RYHU EURDG H[SDQVHV RI ODQGUDWKHU WKDQ IURP D discrete and 
LGHQWLILDEOH SRLQW VXFK DV D SLSH RU GLWFK¶ DQG WKLV QHHGV GLYHUVH DQG FRPSUHKHQVLYH LQWHJUDWHG
strategies.384 These strategies require land practice management, land zoning, planning and other 
diverse pollutant-management schemes.385 
Generally, there are two interpretations regarding integration in WRM.386 The first of these considers 
that all connections and components of water resources and their ecosystems must be taken into 
account comprehensively. The other way of interpretation assumes the selective integration of major 
components and interconnections from existing linkages. This second approach is considered the 
practical construal of WRM,387for it is not easy to manage all components of an ecosystem to protect 
and develop water resources. 
 
3.3.2.6 Sustainable use 
 
WRM is not merely an economic or environmental construct; it is also a social construct.388 Upon 
water resource use and development, a given country needs to consider all possible consequences of 
unsustainable resource exploitation. 7KH ,:50 GHILQLWLRQ DFFRPPRGDWHV WKH SKUDVH µGHYHORSPHQW
which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs¶. This idea supports balanced use of water resources in a way that secures long-term 
benefits for both present and future generations. 
,:50DLPVµWRPD[LPL]HWKHUHVXOWDQWHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOZHOIDUHLQDQHTXLWDEOH PDQQHU¶; it is a 
tool for achieving increased sustainability, leading towards sustainable development. Water 
development decision-PDNLQJGRHVQRWFRPSURPLVHWKHµVXVWDLQDELOLW\RIYLWDOHFRV\VWHPV¶RIZDWHU
resources. More specifically, WRM must be inclusive enough to address environmental, social and 
HFRQRPLFQHHGV7KLVVXJJHVWVWKHQHHGWRDGGUHVVZDWHUXVHUV¶LQWHUHVWVDQG the protection of vital 
ecosystems, as water management is also about vital ecosystem use. This proposes a change from 
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traditional utilitarian-oriented water management; in particular, WRM must not be anthropocentric-
oriented. It suggests that human water development is not unsustainable.  $µULJKW¶ WRXVHZDWHU is 
subject to limitation to ensure the sustainability of water and its ecosystems. More specifically, 
furthering sustainability of water must require the use of water resources within environmental limits. 
IWRM recognizes both long-term water resource availability, and the right to use water subject to a 
limitation that qualifies the right. This suggests that IWRM prevents unsustainable water use 
practices and requires proper systems that minimize human impacts on the water environment, 
through regulation of water use and development. This may be done through regulatory demand 
rather than by enhancing the water supply. Unsustainable water use practices could be controlled to 
make water use less damaging to the water environment. The IWRM approach supposes that when 
the degree of integration of water management is greatest, the aggregated environmental, social and 
economic benefits increase. 
3.4 Efforts to introduce IWRM at national and international levels 
 
Effective IWRM requires both national and international measures. Water resources rarely respect 
administrative boundaries. 389  In transboundary watercourses, administrative boundary-oriented 
IWRM schemes alone may not guarantee the enhancement of water resource security; importantly, 
mechanisms for regulating the behaviours of riparian states are required. In this respect, the 
introduction of comprehensive national, regional and international water policies and laws, as well as 
their coherent implementation, is imperative. 
3.4.1 International efforts to introduce IWRM at national level 
 
Primarily, the IWRM approach is an empirical concept, which has been developed from practice.390 
In 1977, the UN Conference on Water was held in Mar del Plata, Argentina. The main goals of this 
conference was to assess the status of water resources; to ensure that an adequate supply of quality 
ZDWHUZDVDYDLODEOHWRPHHWWKHSODQHW¶VVRFLR-economic needs; to increase water use efficiency; and 
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to promote preparedness, nationally and internationally, so as to avoid a water crisis. 391  This 
international water conference explicitly addressed the need for a coordinated management of water 
resources. It drew up an action plan which stated WKDW µLQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV DGRSWHG E\ HDFK
country should ensure that the development and management of water resources takes place in the 
context of national planning and that there is real coordination among all bodies responsible for the 
investigation, development and management¶.392 Mar del Plata was seen as one of the important 
events in the development of IWRM, but the coordinated WRM was largely seen as the duty of 
national governments, despite the fact that they might need support from international donors.393The 
Mar del Plata plan did not address explicitly the issue of transboundary WRM. 
Subsequently, the Rio Earth Summit, which was convened in June 1992, promulgated the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21. In this summit, IWRM again gained 
international recognition. The Earth Summit underlined that fragmented water resources 
development and management were continuing to impede the sustainability of water, despite the Mar 
del Plata recommendations advocating the need for an IWRM at national level.394As explicitly 
noted at the Rio summit, the problem was that µ>W@KH IUDJPHQWDWLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV IRU ZDWHU
resources development among sectoral agencies, is, however, proving to be an even greater 
impediment to promoting integrated water resources management than had been anticipated¶.395 It 
further underlined the need to coordinate WRM, seeing µ>W@KHKROLVWLFPDQDJHPHQWRIIUHVKZDWHUDVD
finite and vulnerable resource, and the integration of sectoral water plans and programmes within the 
framework of national economic and social policy, are of paramount  importance for the 1990s and 
beyond¶.396Most specifically, cKDSWHU  RI $JHQGD  SURYLGHV WKDW µ7KH ZLGHVSUHDG VFDUFLW\
gradual destruction and aggravated pollution of freshwater resources in many world regions, along 
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with the progressive encroachment of incompatible activities, demand integrated water resources 
SODQQLQJDQGPDQDJHPHQW¶397 
Agenda 21 further describes the rationales for IWRM: 
Integrated water resources management is based on the perception of water as an integral 
part of the ecosystem, a natural resource and a social and economic good, whose quantity 
and quality determines the nature of utilization. To this end, water resources have to be 
protected, taking into account the functioning of aquatic ecosystems and the perenniality of 
the resource, in order to satisfy and reconcile needs for water in human activities.398 
 
The essence of the rationales for IWRM in Agenda 21 suggests that the river basin is a complex and 
interconnected ecological system and, in terms of its water resources, there is a need to address water 
quality and quantity management and protection of water ecosystems. The 1992 Dublin Conference 
was also seen as one of the key historical events that encouraged IWRM.399 Most specifically, the 
Dublin Conference mapped out the prioritized concerns relating to freshwater resources management, 
and provided recommendations for these. 400  Among four principles formulated by the Dublin 
Statement, the first principle states that: 
Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and 
environment. Since water sustains life, effective management of water resources demands a 
holistic approach, linking social and economic development with protection of natural 
ecosystems. Effective management links land and water uses across the whole of a 
catchment area or groundwater area.401 
 
Whereupon the development and protection of ecosystems, the context continuously changes, and 
WRM also needs changing in order to adapt to such dynamism. Such events need to be 
accommodated through the continuous revising of a regulatory approach within the dynamic context 
of the ecosystems. 402  Therefore, the ecosystem approach recognizes that there is no single best 
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institutional arrangement to handle unsustainable natural resource use. Water resources planning and 
management are shaped with the changes in the context of such water resources.403 WRM is a social 
learning process, where experiences can be learnt by stakeholders using a platform.404 
3.4.2 Transboundary water law and international norms 
 
Internationally, there are a range of efforts to manage transboundary water resources in coordinated 
ways. However, in terms of the evolution of international water laws, these vary with the issues 
under concern during different periods. 
The early development of a water law commenced with international water regulation concerning 
navigation and the use of hydropower.405 In 1921, the µConvention and statute on the regime of 
navigable waterways of international concern¶ ± or the Barcelona Convention± introduced rules 
regulating the navigational use of water.406The concern that was raised by this Convention was 
limited to the use of an international river for navigation. Two years later, in 1923, the second 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOZDWHUFRQYHQWLRQNQRZQDV WKH µ&RQYHQWLRQ relative to the development of hydraulic 
power affecting more than one sWDWH¶, or the Geneva Convention, was adopted. 407  Whilst this 
Convention considered non-navigational use as a legal concern of international affairs, its scope was 
limited in terms of the regulation of the use of Transboundary Rivers for hydraulic power. Both the 
above-mentioned conventions are concerned with specific water use regulations. These conventions 
did not give coordinated management of diverse water resource uses. 
Under transboundary water resources utilization, there are principles that are considered to be unfair 
and inequitable±namely, absolute territorial sovereignty, territorial integrity and prior 
appropriation. 408  Absolute territorial sovereignty is commonly called the Harmon Doctrine. The 
origin of the doctrine was related to the Rio Grande River dispute between the US and Mexico. The 
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Harmon Doctrine was named after Judson Harmon, who was the Attorney General of the United 
States of America, and who gave his opinion in 1895. The Rio Grande has its source in the US, in the 
state of Colorado, through which it flows to New Mexico. The dispute between the US and Mexico 
rose when the US diverted the water from the river in 1895. In this transboundary water dispute, 
Mexico contended that the US water diversion was inconsistent with international law and the treaty 
that was concluded between the two countries in 1848.409However, Attorney General Harmon, who 
advised the Secretary of State, argued that:  
 
The rules of international law imposed upon the United States no duty to deny to its 
inhabitants the use of the water of that part of the Rio Grande lying wholly within the 
United States, although such use resulted in reducing the volume of water in the river 
below the point where it ceased to be entirely within the United States, the supposition 




RUREOLJDWLRQRQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶411 He thought that the jurisdiction of the nation within its own 
territory was exclusive. He assumed that states are not liable to water resource exploitation within 
their administrative boundaries, despite such water use causing a significant damage on other riparian 
countries. This thinking failed to consider equity and fairness upon users of water resources. The 
doctrine subsisted for decades despite there being contention between Mexico and the US. However, 
in 1942, the US changed its reliance on this theory to exploit transboundary water shared with 
Mexico. For instance, in the negotiation between the US and Mexico concerning the Colorado River, 
the US Legal Advisor of the Department of State stated that: 
 
The rights of the United States and Mexico in this situation cannot be determined by the 
simple criterion that the water has its source in the United States and may be utilized in this 
country. Such a rule, if sound or if applied, would derive all subjacent States of the normal 
and natural benefits of streams the world over. Our purpose should be to find a reasonable 
equation by which rights to the water may be equitably distributed.412 
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Subsequently, Mexico and the US concluded the treaty aiming to end transboundary surface water 
disputes in 1944.413 
 
The absolute territorial sovereignty principle advocates that upstream states use the water resources 
within their jurisdiction without any limitation. 414  This traditional principle understands that 
upstream users have an absolute right to serve their own interest, despite the use being harmful for 
those riparian users and their ecosystems that share the water resources. Similar to the theory of the 
tragedy of the commons, some of the riparian water use is unregulated in terms of promoting the 
common interests of water-sharing countries or communities or ecosystems. The idea is upstream-
centric, rather than promoting the equitable use of water resources to enhance the security of water. 
Because of this, the absolute territorial sovereignty principle has been criticized as fundamentally 
unsound in enhancing the equitable use of water resources.415 
The second principle is that of territorial integrity, which is the opposite of the former rule, and 
establishes the rights of a downstream state by imposing an obligation on upstream states to respect 
the continuation of the natural flow of shared international water resources.416 Territorial integrity 
restricts upstream states from affecting the natural flow of river water, and limits them with regard to 
equitable utilization. The third principle is called the µprior appropriation¶ principle.417 This principle 
HVWDEOLVKHV WKH ULJKW WR ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV H[SORLWDWLRQ RQ WKH UDWLRQDOH RI µILUVW-come, first-VHUYHG¶
where the country that first started the development of shared water resources should continue to 
enjoy the same quality and quantity of such water resources. Inequitable water use may not only be 
H[HPSOLILHGE\ULSDULDQVWDWHV¶XQUHJXODWHGRUXQIDLUZDWHUUHVRXUFHVKDULQJ; it may happen within a 
country. For example, the traditional water abstraction permits in England gave perpetual rights for 
licences. The owner or possessor of the permit continues to enjoy their quantity of water according to 
what the permit allows.418 This model is unlikely to consider water security or subsequent needs,419 
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as the permit system is focused on protecting permit owners rather than enhancing the security of 
water resources. 
 
3.4.2.1 The Helsinki Rules 
 
Subsequently, in 1966, a development was observed in international water law. The International 
Law Association, a scholarly non-governmental organization, adopted the Helsinki Rules. The 
Helsinki Rules recognize a river basin as an indivisible hydrologic unit420and provided international 
rules that help to manage all waters in the entire international basin, for both navigational and non-
navigational water; and they brought the principles of equitable and reasonable use of water and the 
obligation not to cause significant harm to the fore.421The Helsinki Rules reflected the idea that every 
riparian state in an international drainage basin has the right to the reasonable use of the waters, but 
rejected unlimited sovereignty positions, such as absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute river 
integrity principles. The Rules adopted a principle that makes a riparian state¶V right to use water a 
qualified right, in order to protect common interest. In addition to providing a rule for water quantity 
management, they also introduced rules regulating failures in water quality. They imposed an 
obligation on the river basin VWDWHVWRµSUHYHQWDQ\QHZIRUPRIZDWHUSROOXWLRQRUDQ\LQFUHDVHLQWKH
degree of existing water pollution... which cause substantial injury in the territory of co-basin 
states¶.422The set of rules embodied in the Helsinki Rules are supportive in addressing fragmented 
water utilization; however, they do not address coordinated management of land and related 
resources to enhance sustainability of water. Ultimately, they do not recognize the protection of the 
water environment.  
3.4.2.2 The Stockholm Action Plan for international cooperation and related resolutions  
One of the important events for the introduction of a coordinated management of shared natural 
resources was the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which was held in 
Stockholm on 16 June 1972. The Conference aimed to protect and improve human environment. This 
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event introduced the Declaration that accommodated a range of principles and recommendations 
which were designed to influence and shape the behaviours of states. One of the products of the 
Stockholm Conference was the µ6WRFNKROP$FWLRQ3ODQ¶, which identified environmental issues that 
required international cooperation. One of these issues was WRM. The Declaration of the 
&RQIHUHQFHXUJHVWKHVWDWHVWRFRQGXFWµcareful planning or management water resources¶.423 
Under principle 21, states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources, but they have a 
duty to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states.424 This suggests that the government¶V right in shared natural resources 
is a qualified right, in order to protect the common interests. As mechanisms to avoid fragmented 
utilization affecting the common interests, the states are expected to cooperate.425 Such cooperation 
can be established through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means, which 
are seen as an essential tool in order to µHIIHFWLYHO\ FRQWURO SUHYHQW UHGXFH DQG HOLPLQDWH DGYHUVH
environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres; in such a way that due 
account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all states¶.426 Regarding shared water resources, it 
recommends that the µgovernments concerned consider the creation of river-basin commissions or 
other appropriate machinery for cooperation between interested states for water resources common to 
more than one jurisdiction¶.427 Through cooperation, the interests of all states on shared resources 
development are taken into account; and fragmented resource utilization, which leads to 
unsustainable resources management, is controlled.428 
Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly formulated a number of resolutions reaffirming 
coordinated management of the environment concerning the natural resources shared by two or more 
states. For instance, UN Assembly Resolution 3129 (XXVIII) reaffirms the states¶ cooperation in the 
field of the environment concerning natural resources shared by two or more states.429 Furthermore, 
this Resolution suggests the introduction of a management system for the conservation and 
harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more states; and it gives the right of 
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concerned states to provide specific solutions through bilateral or regional arrangements.430Similarly, 
the 1979 UN General Assembly Resolution promotes effective cooperation among states regarding 
the conservation and harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more states.431 It 
also recognizes the right of states to provide specific solutions on a bilateral or regional basis, and 
recalls that the principles have been drawn up for the guidance of states in the conservation and 
harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more states.432 
3.4.2.3 The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
 
With growing tension between the water resource-sharing countries, the international community 
adopted the Convention which was designed to comprehensively regulate the behaviours of states 
with regard to non-navigational uses of international water courses.433The Convention embodied 
many principles that were shaping conventional thinking. Among its core rules, the principle of 
equitable utilization is at the forefront. The Convention underlines the idea that µZDWHUFRXUVHVWDWHV
VKDOOLQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHWHUULWRULHVXWLOL]HDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOZDWHUFRXUVHLQDQ³equitable and UHDVRQDEOH´ 
manner¶.434 
7KLVSULQFLSOHFOHDUO\ UHFRJQL]HV ULSDULDQVWDWHV¶ ULJKWVRYHUZDWHU UHVRXUFHVZLWKLQ WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH
national boundaries. However, this right is conditioned by a respective duty that helps to control the 
SRVVLEOHLPSDFWVRIRQHVWDWH¶VZDWHUXWLOL]DWLRQRQDQRWKHUULSDULDQVWDWH7KHVDPHSURYLVLRQRIWKH
Convention, in the second statement, importantly added the right of riparian states to use and develop 
VKDUHG ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV µZLWK D YLHZ WR DWWDLQLQJ RSWLPDO DQG VXVWDLQDEOH XWLOL]DWLRQ WKHUHRI DQG
benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the watercourse states concerned, consistent 
with adequate protection of the watercourse¶.435 This statement indicates that the right to use and 
develop shared water is relative to safeguarding the common interests of riparian states.  
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The Convention further provides that the duty of watercourse states to cooperate encoPSDVVHV µWKH
use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner¶.436 The underlining idea of the legislation is that cooperation regarding the utilization of 
water resources may not ensure the sustainability of water resources unless there is also cooperation 
with regard to its protection. Undoubtedly, the equitable utilization and protection of shared water 
demand comprehensive regional and national water policies and laws, whilst international law can 
provide guiding principles and a framework.  
By bringing the equitable reallocation of shared water to the centre of the stage, the Convention 
introduced non-exhaustive lists of indicators that riparian states should follow. These lists provide 
core indicators to direct the determination of equitability, but the riparian states might consider 
further issues that they assume to be important in establishing reasonable water sharing within their 
specific circumstances. The visible drawback of this listing modality is that the riparian states may 
buy time to implement the Convention by contending the addition of more and more indicators for 
the reallocation of shared water. One of the central challenges to enforcing this, however, is 
quantifying equitable and reasonable water utilization in practical terms.437 It is fair to argue that 
equitability of water sharing may not be determined by the listings of the Convention alone. Further 
indicators may be developed at the regional and river basin levels.  
 
According to the Convention, the non-exhaustive lists of indicators encompass: geographic, 
hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural nature; the social and 
economic needs of the watercourse states; the population dependent on the watercourse in the 
watercourse state; the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse state on other 
watercourse states; the existing and potential uses of the watercourse; the conservation, protection, 
development and economy of the water resources of the watercourse, and the cost of measures taken 
to that effect; and the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or 
existing use.438 
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8SRQ GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV D UHDVRQDEOH DQG HTXLWDEOH XVH µDOO UHOHYDQW IDFWRUV DUH WR EH
considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole¶.439No one part of the list 
prevails over another. However, when there is conflict between a range of water uses, special priority 
LVJLYHQWRWKHµWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIYLWDOKXPDQQHHGV¶± LQRWKHUZRUGVµsufficient water to sustain 
human life, including both drinking water and water required for the production of food in order to 
prevent starvation¶.440Thus, each list of indicators is equally important in judging equitable water 
utilization.  
 
The inclusion of these elements in water allocation suggests that riparian states are guided to make 
water sharing equitable rather than equal. Moreover, the new concepts to be taken into account in 
water allocation ± prior and potential use and related aspects ± have arguably changed the widely 
FRQWHVWHGµKLVWRULFULJKW¶RUµQDWXUDOULJKW¶RYHUVKDUHGZDWHUXWLOL]DWLRQ6LPLODUO\DQXPEHURILGHDV
accommodated suggest that neither the conventional Harmon theory nor absolute territorial 
sovereignty is valid in water utilization. These new ideals in the Convention are fundamentally 
changing the status quo, maintaining the behaviours RI ULSDULDQ VWDWHV RQ WKH JURXQGV RI µKLVWRULF 
ULJKW¶RUµVRYHUHLJQULJKW¶ WRXVHZDWHUUHVRXUFHVZLWKLQWHUULWRULDOERundaries. The indicators under 
the Convention are changing with time and context. The Convention intended that the allocation of 
water resources between riparian states observes changes in specific watercourses, so that no water 
allocation can be applied for over an unlimited period; rather, it needs regular negotiations to address 
emerging challenges.  
 
Another core principle embodied under the Convention is the µno significant harm¶ rule. This 
SULQFLSOH VWDWHV WKDW µwatercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse states¶. 441  This principle attempts to provide a regulatory scheme, in case the 
transcending nature of water utilization in one state has a significant impact on another riparian state. 
In fact, the principle explicitly recognizes that the states should utilize shared water in a way that 
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does not cause significant harm to co-ULSDULDQVWDWHV7KHLGHDIXUWKHUVXJJHVWVWKHVWDWH¶VULJKWWRXVH
water in a manner that is sustainable.442 
 
Protective measures for water resources, including water system conservation, are critically 
important in maintaining or enhancing available water. In addition to regulatory principles regarding 
water quantity, this Convention further incorporates rules for the protection of water systems.443 
These tasks may not be implemented by a single riparian state; cooperation between riparian states is 
unquestionable. The CRQYHQWLRQ SURYLGHV WKDW µwatercourse states, shall individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses¶.444It therefore 
incorporates the concept of sustainable development;445and the inclusion of this notion suggests the 
need to conserve water resources whilst using them for socio-economic development and 
environmental protection. 
 
The Convention also UHTXLUHV µWKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI a joint management mechanism which will 
provide mutual benefits for all the states¶.446 These provisions imply that further steps are needed by 
the riparian states to implement the principles of the Convention. As a means of cooperative 
arrangements, the Convention imposes the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions on 
member states; the regular exchange of data and information; and the notification of states sharing an 
international watercourse regarding planned measures to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
project.447 They obligate further organizational arrangements that facilitate implementation. These 
obligations include the protection and preservation of ecosystems; the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.448 The inclusion 
of these obligations demonstrates the importance of engaging in measures enhancing water resources 
through protecting against water quality failure, as well as the protection and conservation of their 
ecosystems.  
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The principles incorporated under the Convention are imperative in supporting the security of 
freshwater resources. The difficulty remains in the instruments for making it enforceable. More than 
a decade passed since the adoption of the Convention at a draft level, and it was not entered into 
force for nearly two decades.449The Convention finally entered into force after Vietnam became the 
thirty-fifth signatory on 17 August 2014. This demonstrates that the international legal response to 
water security remains slow. 
Despite this imperative contribution displayed by its rules, the full implementation of the principles 
embodied under the Convention required regional and national readiness and willingness to 
implement them, through establishing joint arrangements or incorporating the principles within 
national and regional water policy and law. Changing the Convention to handle real water security 
challenges demands the formulation of appropriate water and environmental policies at national and 
regional levels, which themselves need to be translated into action through the development of 
comprehensive national and regional water laws and the setting of standards; through the 
development of action plans for their implementation; and through continuous monitoring of the 
impacts achieved. However, many states do not sign or ratify the Convention, and its full 
implementation remains a problem. 
3.5 UNEP and OECD non-binding rules  
 
At international level, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has played a crucial role 
in the development of water law. One of the prime examples was the 1978 UNEP µDraft principles of 
conduct in the field of the environment for the guidance of states in the conservation and harmonious 
utilization of natural resources shared by two or more states¶.450 These provided the guidance in the 
conservation and harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more states.451 This 
guidance recognized that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources, but they have 
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a duty to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states.452 Regarding shared natural resources, principle 1 addresses the need: 
for States to co-operate in the field of the environment concerning the conservation and 
harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more States. Accordingly, it is 
necessary that consistent with the concept of equitable utilization of shared natural 
resources, States co-operate with a view to controlling, preventing, reducing or eliminating 
adverse environmental effects which may result from the utilization of such resources. Such 
co-operation is to take place on an equal footing and taking into account the sovereignty, 
rights and interests of the States concerned.453 
Similarly, WKH 81(3 JXLGHOLQH XQGHU SULQFLSOH  XQGHUOLQHG WKH QHHG µWR HQVXUH HIIHFWLYH
international co-operation in the field of the environment concerning the conservation and 
harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more States, States sharing such natural 
resources should endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements between or among 
themselves¶.454It also suggests that states apply the guidelines in as legally binding a manner as 
necessary.455 At its twelfth plenary meeting, on 19 May 1978, the Governing Council UNEP adopted 
E\FRQVHQVXVGHFLVLRQHQWLWOHGµ&RRSHUDWLRQLQWKHILHOGRIWKHHQYLronment concerning natural 
resources shared by two or more states¶. By this decision the Council also invited the General 
Assembly to adopt the principles. Subsequently, on 18 December 1979, the General Assembly 
adopted, without a vote, Resolution 34/186, HQWLWOHG µ&R-operation in the field of the environment 
concerning natural resources shared by two or more states¶.456 
At the regional level, in Europe, the OECD adopted a number of non-binding recommendations. 
Some of these recommendations are related to the coordinated management of water resources. Most 
specifically, the OECD adopted the recommendations on coordinated management of trans-frontier 
pollution, 457 diffuse pollution causing eutrophication 458 and water management policies and 
instruments. 459 The OECD recommendations provide comprehensive rules on WRM; most 
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specifically, it recommends that member countries, in their national ± and where possible, 












3.6 Case laws  
 
7KH6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDORI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVKDVH[SUHVVHG WKHYLHZ WKDW µ>W@KHUHKDV EHHQJHQHUDO
recognition of the rule that a State must not permit the use of its territory for purposes injurious to the 
LQWHUHVW RI RWKHU 6WDWHV LQ D PDQQHU FRQWUDU\ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ 461 As argued in this chapter, 
international water law and norms impose limitations upon the actions that one state may take, which 
could cause harm in the territory of another riparian state.  
Traditionally, absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute river integrity principles would play a role 
to protect an interest of specific riparian states. Arguably, now, these principles do not ensure 
riparian states¶ common interests. In any transboundary watercourse, riparian states ± whether they 
are situated on the upstream or downstream parts of a water body ± need to use water resources in a 
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way that promotes common interests. A riparian country has the right to use water resources; 
however, this right is qualified to protect interests of other riparian states. The riparian state must 
respect the rules of limitations.  This was clearly observed from the arbitral tribunal decision of the 
Lac Lanoux case of 1957. In the early 1950s, France proposed to develop a hydroelectric project by 
diverting water from the Lanoux Lake into the Ariège River.462 Lanoux drains into the Font-Vivre 
stream, one of the tributaries of the Carol River. However, the Carol River crosses the Spanish±
French border and becomes a tributary of the Segre. Traditionally, Spain used the Carol River waters 
for irrigation.463 When France proposed the Lac Lanoux project, Spain objected its construction, and 
France agreed to offer monetary compensation and modify the project by returning to the Carol the 
same amount of water that was extracted for the reservoir. However, Spain rejected the offers that 
were made by the French.464 
A dispute then broke out between the countries and the case was brought to the arbitral tribunal. In 
the arbitration process, upstream France claimed that it had a right to divert and use water, whereas 
downstream Spain objected on the grounds that the diversion damaged its right over a water 
resource. After investigating the claims of the parties, the arbitration tribunal passed a ruling which 
reflected the rights to reasonably use the waters of a transboundary river. The arbitration tribunal 
XQGHUOLQHGWKHLGHDWKDWµ)UDQFHLVHQtitled to exercise her rights; she cannot ignore Spanish interests... 
Spain is entitled to demand that her rights be respected and that her interests be taken into 
consideration¶.465 This decision demonstrated that equitable and reasonable utilization is imperative 
with regard to shared water. Eventually, the arbitral decision made possible the 1958 Lac Lanoux 
treaty, in which France and Spain agreed that water could be diverted out of the Carol River for 
French hydropower generation in the Lac Lanoux project, but a similar quantity of water had to be 
returned before the stream reached Spanish territory. 
The most recent case that relates to transboundary water was a dispute over Danube River water 
utilization, often called the µGabþíkovo±Nagymaros case¶. The case was between Hungary and 
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Czechoslovakia (at a later stage, Slovakia, as a successor state of Czechoslovakia).466 The story was 
that, in 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered into the bilateral treaty to construct a range of 
water development projects, such as hydropower generation and improved navigation, flood and ice 
control on the Danube River. Subsequently, the contracting parties (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) 
commenced the Gabþíkovo±Nagymaros project jointly. Hungary started to contend that the project 
completion would entail grave risks to the Hungarian environment and Budapest¶s water supply. In 
1989, Hungary suspended itself from involvement in the project implementation, 467 while 
&]HFKRVORYDNLD GLVDYRZHG +XQJDU\¶V XQLODWHUDO WHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH DJUHement as ineffective, 
insisting that Hungary comply with the obligations of the bilateral treaty. Ultimately, Czechoslovakia 
alone continued to construct the Gabþíkovo±Nagymaros project over the Danube without the 
involvement of Hungary. In 1993, the contending parties submitted the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.468On the one hand, Hungary contended that Czechoslovakia had 
no right to exploit the Danube water unilaterally. It argued that the diversion of water by 
Czechoslovakia had ecological dangers, and that Czechoslovakia had violated the principle of 
equitable utilization and the principle of prohibiting causing significant harm.469 On the other hand, 
Slovakia denied, citing µHFRORJLFDO VWDWH RI QHFHVVLW\¶, +XQJDU\¶V FODLP to terminate the treaty; 
contended that it was unilaterally implementing WKHWUHDW\ZLWKRXW+XQJDU\¶VLQYROYHPHQW; and 
that the water diversion, which caused a reduction in the flow of the Danube, was foreseen by the 
treaty. 470 %\ LQYHVWLJDWLQJ WKH SDUWLHV¶ FODLPV WKH ,&- DFNQRZOHGJHG the concerns expressed by 
Hungary for its natural environment, and held that Hungary had a µEDVLF ULJKW¶ WRDQHTXLWDEOHDQG
reasonable share of the resources of an international watercourse.471 It aOVRGHFLGHG WKDW+XQJDU\¶V 
WHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH WUHDW\ ZDV LQHIIHFWLYH DQG 6ORYDNLD¶V DFWLRQV should consider sustainable water 
development.472 The Court also held that the contending parties adjust the Gabþíkovo±Nagymaros 
project to tackle environmental issues. The Court noted that there had been development in 
international environmental law since the 1977 Hungary and Czechoslovakia treaty, which was 
supportive of environmental protection and equitable and reasonable utilization of international 
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watercourses.473 The Court also pointed out that newly developed norms of environmental law were 
relevant for the implementation of the 1977 treaty and that the parties could, by agreement, 
incorporate them. The parties needed to develop a joint contractual plan, in carrying out their 
obligations of 1977, to ensure that the quality of water in the Danube was not impaired and that 
nature was protected, taking new environmental norms into consideration. By inserting these 
evolving provisions in the treaty, the parties recognized the potential necessity to adapt the project. 
Consequently, the treaty was not static, and was open to adaptation with emerging norms.474 This 
court decision suggests that past and future water development treaties need to address 
environmental protection and common interests of the riparian countries. As was clearly stated 
within the ICJ decision on the dispute between Botswana and Namibia, a number of the principles of 
the 1997 UN Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses has 
HYROYHGDVµSDUWRIWKHcorpus RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶HYHQEHIRUHWKHConvention came into force.475 
3.7 Clean water and sanitation: a human right 
 
Access to adequate clean water is a prerequisite for human wellbeing.  It may not be possible to 
realize rules on human rights protection without ensuring the sustainable availability of adequate safe 
water. The 1992 Dublin Statement (principle 4) VWDWHV WKDW µZDWHU KDV DQ HFRQRPLF YDOXH LQ DOO LWV
competing uses and should be seen as an economic good¶.476 The principle declares water as an 
economic good; all users pay its costs.  For this effect, the water services costs need to be 
LQWHUQDOL]HG:LWKLQ WKLVSULQFLSOH KRZHYHU µWKHEDVLF ULJKWRIDOO KXPDn beings to have access to 
FOHDQZDWHUDQGVDQLWDWLRQDWDIIRUGDEOHSULFH¶LVUHFRJQLzed. Full cost-recovery may not be a proper 
solution for those people who cannot afford to pay. Water is not purely an economic good; rather, it 
has social dimensions. Water cost internalization needs to address the interests of the people who 
cannot afford to pay full water service costs. Under the Dublin principles, the right to water is not 
explicitly acknowledged as a human right. Instead, the principles implicitly recognize the human 
right to water since they explicitly recognize the need for access to adequate safe water. Ensuring 
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access to adequate clean water is a prerequisite for realizing many of human rights which have 
already been enshrined in national, regional and international laws. The widely recognized human 
rights such as the right to life, health and development may not be fully attained without realizing 
access to adequate safe water. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under Article 11 recognizes the 
right to an adequate standard of living. The same Covenant under Article 12 declares the right to 
health. Regarding the interpretation of these rights, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights adopted General Comment no. 15.477 7KLV81RIILFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDIILUPVWKDWµWKH
human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and 
affordable water for personal and domestic uses¶. GC15 further provides thaW µWKH KXPDQ ULJKW WR
water is indispensable for leading a life human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other 
human rights¶. It also addresses the sufficiency of water: an adequate quantity must be available 
between 15 and 25 litters in the water of rural communities in developing countries; safety and water 
must meet a standard set out for specific water uses (for instance, drinking water); and according to 
the WHO drinking water guidelines third edition water must be physically accessible within a 
reasonable distance and with affordability of price. Regarding obligations, GC15 underlines that 
µ6WDWHV KDYH D FRQVWDQW DQG FRQWLQXLQJ GXW\ WR PRYH DV H[SHGLWLRXVO\ DQG HIIHFWLYHO\ DV SRVVLEOH
towards the full realization of the right to water¶. Moreover, it urges states to take steps to ensure that 
no individual or groups of people are discriminated against, in terms of them securing safe water and 
sanitation. This comment makes it clear that states are the key actors to deliver adequate clean water.  
The year 2010 saw another important remarkable event that brought authoritative confirmation of the 
human right to water and sanitation. On 28 July 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 
64/292, which explicitly recognizHV µWKH ULJKW WR safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a 
human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights¶.478 This resolution 
was passed by a vote of 122 in favour, none against and 41 abstentions.479Within the same year, the 
Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 15/9 of September 2010, which further confirms access to 
safe water and sanitation as a human right. 480   The challenge that remains, however, is 
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implementation. For instance, the Independent Expert reporting to the General Assembly underlines 
that the recognition given to water as human right is a breakthrough development, but it is only a 
step.481 The real challenge is to implement the right and to change the lives of µELOOLRQVRISHRSOHZKR
still lack access to water and sanitation¶.482 
The millennium development goals (MDGs) also set out the role of water in human development 
under Target 7C.  The target aimed to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. This target focused on improving access to clean 
water and sanitation. Setting out this target in the MDGs brought significant improvements to the 
access to clean water and sanitation,483which focused the MDGs on helping human development.484 
However, the United Nations World Water Development Report of 2012 indicated that pressures 
over water resources have increased considerably during the past decades; water withdrawals have 
tripled over the last 50 years, and the demand for water has dramatically increased across the 
globe.485The Report also identified three main water consuming sectors: agriculture, industry and 
households, respectively. 486 Human use and pollution are threatening the sustainability of water 
resources.487These pressures will potentially limit sustainable development.488 This suggests that the 
focus on unsustainable water use practices should not be neglected if access to clean water and 
sanitation is to be achieved and sustainable development realized in the future. Yet, the MDGs do not 
explicitly accommodate specific goals and targets for the sustainability of water.  
In the sustainable development goals¶ (SDGs) drafting process, water was identified as a crucial 
LVVXH 81(6&2¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +\GURORJLFDO 3URJUDPPH ,+3 UHFRPPHQGV WKDW µ>L@Q DGGLWLRQ WR
fulfilling the human needs of clean water and sanitation, issues of overexploitation of freshwater 
resources, the growing water pollution problems worldwide and water-related risks should be taken 
into account in a post-2015 vision in order to reach global sustainable development¶. 489 It 
                                                             
481
 Independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
at 60th Session of General Assembly, 25 October 2010 <www.ohchr.org/EN/New>. 
482ibid. 
483
 ibid, 2±3. 
484
 UNESCO International Hydrological Programme, µWater in the post-2015 development agenda and sustainable 
development goals. Water: a key for sustainable development¶Discussion paper) 2. 
485
 WWAP, µThe United Nations World Water Development Report 4: managing water under uncertainty and 
risk¶UNESCO 2012). 
486
 UNEP, µState-and-trends of the environment: 1987±2007¶Sp. 25-54 
487ibid. 
488




recommended that post-2015SDGs should provide a framework for the management of water 
resources beyond the MDGs that focused on access to clean water and sanitation.490 This suggests 
that water sustainability and sustainable development are interlinked, and that the SDGs needed to 
broaden the goals and targets for sustainable development in order to address water sustainability. 
Accordingly, UNESCO-IHP proposed a special goal to manage water resources, which it FDOOHGµ>D@
global water goal: Ensure Water Security for Sustainable Development¶.491 











The SDGs follow the MDGs, but aim to expand on the MDGs to address IWRM in order to ensure 
sustainable development. The draft SDG recommendations in WRM suggest there is a close link 
between water development and management; the right to clean water and sanitation may not be 
achieved without IWRM. Most specifically, the draft water security goal and its targets in the SDGs 
suggest introducing more IWRM than the MDGs, which focus on water supply to ensure access to 





 UNESCO International Hydrological Programme, µWater in the post-2015 development agenda and sustainable 
development goals. Water in the post-2015 development agenda: UNESCO-IHP proposal for a global goal on water 
in the SDGs framework¶2014) 3±6. 
x Target 1: Achieve, by 2030, universal access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
for all 
x Target 2: By 2030, reduce the water use in agricultural irrigation by 20%, 
industrial water use by 20%, and domestic water use by 15% and increase water 
productivity by 50% in all sectors, by adopting the water demand management 
approach, reducing water use 
x Target 3: By 2030, increase by 50% the number of countries that have adopted and 
implemented policies and programmes for the public registration of water rights 
based on the IWRM approach 
x Target 4: By 2030, reduce water pollution from main sources by 30% at the 
country level, by increasing wastewater collection and treatment in cities to at least 
80%, increasing industrial wastewater treatment to at least 95%, reducing pollution 
x Target 5: By 2030, reduce by half the loss of human life and property from water-
related disasters, by improving the resilience of nations 
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clean water and sanitation. The draft SDG recommendations advocating access to safe water and 
sanitation would be increased; water demand would be reduced; pollution would be controlled; and 
water resources would be efficiently used and WRM would be taken up at an appropriate level by 
following the IWRM approach. These ideas propose sustainable approaches, for integration, the clear 
allocation of rights and liabilities, for subsidiarity and local participation.  
3.8 Conclusion of chapter 
 
This chapter examined the notion of IWRM, international water law, case laws and human rights law 
in relation to access to clean water and sanitation, including MDGs. This study evaluated the post-
2015 SDGs to understand the current positions at the international level. The main aim of the chapter 
was to explore key features of an effective management system for water resources.  
The examination of the historical development of international water policy and law indicated that 
there have been evolutions in international policy and law, which were designed to manage national 
and transboundary water resources. The early international water laws focused on coordinating the 
development of transboundary water for specific uses; particularly, water uses for navigation and 
hydroelectric power developments. Mar del Plata brought remarkable development in WRM laws; 
and explicitly introduced the need for coordinated management of all water resources at national 
level. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 re-recognized IWRM.  
The Declaration underlined the need for a coordinated WRM, while Agenda 21 further emphasizes 
integrated water resources planning and management; that is, an integrated water system 
management and water quantity and quality regulations.493Effective management links land and 
water uses across the whole of a catchment area or groundwater area.  
Subsequent international water law development (the Helsinki Rules) recognizes a river basin as an 
indivisible hydrologic unit, managing all waters in the entire international basin for both navigational 
and non-navigational uses. It brought to the forefront, the principles of equitable and reasonable use 
of water and the obligation not to cause significant harm. This informs a riparian state¶V right to use 
water is a qualified right, in order to protect the common interest. The Helsinki Rules provides 
guidelines for water quantity and water quality management.  
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The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm (16 June 1972) 
introduced a declaration that accommodated a range of principles and recommendations designed to 
influence and shape the behaviours of states. The Stockholm Action Plan identified environmental 
issues that required international cooperation. This action plan under principle 21 recognises the 
government¶V right in shared natural resources is a qualified right and it suggests States are expected 
to cooperate through establishing multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means. 
Similarly, the UN Assembly Resolution 3129 (XXVIII) reaffirms the states¶ cooperation in the field 
of the environment concerning natural resources shared by two or more states.494 The 1979 UN 
General Assembly Resolution reaffirms the need for effective cooperation among the states regarding 
to shared water resources by two or more states. The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational uses of International Watercourses (which was designed to comprehensively regulate 
the behaviours of states with regard to non-navigational uses of international water courses) 
embodied many principles that were shaping traditional thinking. Among the core rules embodied in 
the Convention were the principles of equitable and reasonable use and WKHµQRVLJQLILFDQWKDUP¶UXOH
Protective measures for water resources, including water system conservation, are critically 
important in maintaining or enhancing available water. The Convention also incorporates the concept 
of sustainable development. 
At international level, UNEP also played a crucial role in the development of water law. One of the 
prime examples was the 1978 µDraft principles of conduct in the field of the environment for the 
guidance of states in the conservation and harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two 
or more states¶. Accordingly, states cooperate with a view to controlling, preventing, reducing or 
eliminating adverse environmental effects which may result from the utilization of such resources. At 
the regional level, in Europe, OECD adopted a number of non-binding recommendations which 
provided comprehensive rules on WRM. Its recommendations informs water resources should be 
managed on the basis of long-term plans, and should address all relevant aspects of water quantity 
and quality, abstraction and discharge, supply and protection. The authorities should promote the 
rational and equitable allocation of water resources among all users and apply appropriate regulatory 
and economic instruments. Moreover, the OECD recommends river basin-oriented management 
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should be encouraged, and where advisable, this should be considered in an international framework. 
It also requires strict regulatory, economic and technical controls to be enforced for certain categories 
of hazardous pollutants; and that authorities should facilitate public information and participation to 
promote more informed decision-making and to enlist public support for proposed activities. 
 
The evaluation of the arbitration tribunal¶V decision about the Lac Lanoux transboundary water 
dispute between France and Spain demonstrated that riparian states are entitled to exercise their 
rights ZLWKRXW LJQRULQJ RWKHU ULSDULDQ VWDWHV¶ interests. The decision suggests that equitable and 
reasonable utilization is imperative with regard to shared water. The Gabþíkovo±Nagymaros case, 
which involved Hungary and Czechoslovakia, indicated how the contending parties had to adjust the 
Gabþíkovo±Nagymaros project to tackle environmental issues. The Court decision in this case noted 
that there were developments in international environmental law, which were supportive of 
environmental protection and equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse. 
The Court also suggested out that newly developed norms of environmental law were relevant for the 
implementation of the 1977 treaty and that the parties could, by agreement, incorporate them.  
Another important development in international law came in the year 2010, which brought 
authoritative confirmation of the human right to water and sanitation. On 28 July 2010, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 64/292. The Resolution explicitly recognizes the right to safe 
and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life 
and all human rights. The MDGs also set out the role of water in human development under Target 
7C.  The target intended to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation. The United Nations World Water Development Report of 
2012 indicated that pressures over water resources have increased considerably. Particularly, the 
water withdrawals have tripled over the last 50 years, and the demand for water has dramatically 
increased across the globe.495The Report suggests that unsustainable water use practices should not be 
neglected if access to clean water and sanitation is to be achieved and sustainable development 
realized.  
In the SDG drafting process, the sustainability of water was identified as a crucial issue. The analysis 
in this chapter suggests that the SDGs follow the MDGs, but aim to expand on the MDGs to address 
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IWRM in order to ensure sustainable development. The draft SDG recommendations in WRM 
advocate there is a close link between water development and management; the right to clean water 
and sanitation may not be achieved without IWRM. Its recommendations imply that access to safe 
water and sanitation should be increased; water demand should be reduced; pollution should be 
controlled; and water resources should be efficiently used and WRM taken up at an appropriate level 
by following the IWRM approach. These ideas propose sustainable approaches, for integration, the 
clear allocation of rights and liabilities, for subsidiarity and local participation. 
The investigation of the water literature in this chapter has drawn up, as key features of an effective 
management system for water resource quality protection and quantity management, collaboration, 
participation, subsidiarity and water system management are core elements of the notion. The 
investigation on modern water policy has also identified as key features equitable and reasonable use, 





Chapter Four: WRM policy and law in the European Union 
4.1 Introduction 
Europe is considered as being endowed with adequate water resources, in terms of the status of their 
availability.496 However, the EU is not safe from water scarcity or drought threats. In 2003, over 100 
PLOOLRQ RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ DQG D WKLUG RI (XURSH¶V WHUULWRULDO FRYHUDJH ZHUH H[SRVHG WR GURXJKW497 
Similarly, in 2011 and 2012, large parts of southern, western and northern Europe were exposed to 
drought.498 
 
In those years, the rainfall was too low when it is compared with a normal year. In addition to 
droughts, water scarcity is becoming a widespread phenomenon in the EU. The WEI of the European 
&RPPLVVLRQ DWWDFKHV µZDWHU VFDUFLW\¶ to a human problem.499In normal year, the water resources 
exploitation values are below 20 percent and as such, water abstraction is considered sustainable.500It 
has EHHQHVWLPDWHGWKDWDWOHDVWSHUFHQWRI(XURSH¶VSRSXODWLRQDQGSHUFHQWof territorial areas 
are experiencing water scarcity problems. Across the EU, water scarcity has begun to extend to areas 
that were not affected previously.501 Unless action is taken quickly, up to half of the EU¶s river 
basins will be affected by water scarcity and stress by 2030. 502A long-term imbalance between 
demand and supply is becoming more marked in the EU.503Predictions over the future of water 
indicate escalating water scarcity, which is frightening unless responsive measures are introduced, 
updated and implemented quickly and effectively. 
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This vulnerability has forced the EU to consider how to tackle both temporary water availability 
problems due to drought and long-term water demand and supply imbalances. Over the last three 
decades, the EU has adopted a range of water resources laws and policies that have set institutional 
arrangements and established organizational structures. Many of the conventional water law and 
policy had focused on non-water-security issues and were fragmented, but a significant shift in the 
management system for water resources was introduced with the adoption of the WFD and with the 
subsequently introduced Communications within the EU.504In 2000, the EU introduced a WFD 
which was more progressive and comprehensive than its predecessors.505 More awareness in water 
politics has been observed since the 2003 drought; this can be observed from the introduction of 
water policy options for drought and water scarcity. In 2007, the European Commission adopted a 
Communication on water scarcity and droughts, which accommodated water policy options, and set 
the priorities for managing water scarcity and drought challenges. 506 The Communication was 
accompanied by three follow-up reports, which indicated achievements and yearly progress.507In 
2012, the European Commission extensively analysed the WFD implementation within the EU and 
also assessed a µbOXHSULQW¶ for EU water law reform.  
 
The main objectives of the assessment in this chapter are to understand whether the EU, as a 
supranational body, has in place an effective management system for the sustainability of water 
resources, and to assess the extent to which the key features of an effective WRM system are 
reflected in the (8¶Vwater policy and law. Moreover, the insights from the discussion in this chapter 
provide inputs to assess the A8¶Vown WRMPs. Similarly, the English WRM system partly derives 
from laws and policy formulated by the EU. It cannot be possible to understand the English system 
without understanding the EU system. Accordingly, the discussion in this chapter reviews the water 
resources policy and law, which are designed to make water sustainably available, for water supply 
purposes within the EU. To understand the development in the water law of the EU, the first section 
of the chapter reviews both past and present water policy and law and specifically, the earlier water 
laws can be compared with the WFD. Finally, the discussion will draw inferences from water 
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resources policy and law and the extent to which they reflect the key features of an effective 
management system for water resources. 
4.2 Early EU management system for water resources 
4.2.1 Substantive rules 
To explore the new development under the WFD, it is useful to examine the past water laws of the 
EU. Historically, EU water legislation has developed in three stages. 508 Early European water 
legislation began with a surface water directive in 1975; that is, the directive that formulated 
standards for those rivers and lakes used for drinking water abstraction.509The first Drinking Water 
Quality Directive was adopted in 1980, with binding quality targets for drinking water. 510 7KHµILUVW
ZDYH¶ LQWURGXFHGTXDOLW\REMHFWLYHs on bathing waters511 and for waters used in harvesting fish and 
shellfish.512 The main aim of this water policy phase was to protect public health and combat market 
distortions. 513 7KLV VWDJH¶V PDLQ HPLVVLRQ FRQWURO HOHPHQW ZDV WKH 'DQJHURXV 6XEVWDQFHV
Directive, 514   In 1976, the Community introduced the Dangerous Substances Control Directive, 
which was designed to regulate pollution of water by dangerous substances. 515  Through this 
Directive, pollutants are classified into lists I and II. For chemical substances under List I, the 
Directive introduced the setting of a fixed discharge level of pollutants in the given surface water 
bodies which could be discharged by obtaining authorization from the member state concerned.516For 
the List II substances, the Directive imposed an obligation on member states to adopt programmes 
that reduced the discharge of these pollutants into any surface water. 517 The legislation allows 
member states to create programmes with measures for this list of chemicals. The control of 
discharge of List I substances into groundwater is stricter than into surface water, as they must be 
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prevented from reaching ground water. For List II pollutants, the obligation upon the member states 
is the same as for surface waters.518 
In 1988, the Frankfurt ministerial seminar on water reviewed the existing water laws, and identified 
gaps that needed to be filled.519 This resulted in the development of a second generation of water 
legislation.520For instance, in 1991, two water laws ± the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 
(UWWTD) and the Nitrates Directive ± addressing water pollution by nitrates from agriculture were 
introduced. The UWWTD aimed to regulate µFROOHFWLRQ WUHDWPHQW DQG GLVFKDUJH RI XUEDQ ZDVWH
ZDWHU DQG WKH WUHDWPHQW DQG GLVFKDUJH RI ZDVWH ZDWHU IURP FHUWDLQ LQGXVWULDO VHFWRUV¶521 The main 
objective of the urban waste treatment directive waV µWR SURWHFW WKH HQYLURQPHQW IURP WKH DGYHUVH
HIIHFWVRIXUEDQZDVWHZDWHUGLVFKDUJHV¶522The UWWTD was designed to control human wastewater. 
To implement this Directive, member states were obliged to develop the necessary infrastructure to 
control urban waste management.523 
The Agricultural Nitrates Directive, on the other hand, was adopted to control water pollution from 
DJULFXOWXUDOµUXQ-RII¶524  This was a new development in the EU water law.  Before the enactment of 
this legislation, EU water law did not focus on managing diffuse source pollution, which deteriorates 
the quality of water resources and their availability. The Nitrates Directive aimed to protect ground 
and surface waters from diffuse source pollution caused by the use of nitrogen (nitrates) through 
establishing best agricultural practice.525 The Directive required each member state to: designate the 
nitrate vulnerable zones of all land draining to waters that were affected by nitrate pollution; 
establish a voluntary code of good agricultural practice to be followed by all farmers throughout the 
country; and establish a mandatory action programme of measures for the purposes of tackling nitrate 
loss from agriculture.526 This action programme was to be applied either within nitrate vulnerable 
                                                             
518 *LRUJRV .DOOLV DQG 3HWHU 1LMNDPS µ(YROXWLRQ RI (8 ZDWHU SROLF\ D FULWLFDO DVVHVVPHQW DQG D KRSHIXO
SHUVSHFWLYH¶6HULHResearch Memorandum, 
 p.3<http://degree.ubvu.vu.nl/repec/vua/wpaper/pdf/19990027.pdf >accessed on 21 May 2015 
519
 European Commission (n 509). 
520
 ibid. 
521Council Directive 91/271 concerning urban waste ±water treatment OJL135/40. 
522
 ibid, article 11. 
523ibid. 
524Council Directive 91/676concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural 
sources, OJL 375/1, article 3. 
525
 ibid, article 4. 
526
 ibid, article 3. 
103 
 
zones or throughout the whole country. Interestingly, this legislation brought to attention the impact 
of agricultural land-use practices on water resources quality. However, the implementation of these 
directives depended upon the member states affected by the pollution.527Despite the spill-over effect 
beyond the political boundary coverage, water quality management was national boundary-oriented 
and decision-making was fragmented.528 
 
As the discussion in this section demonstrated, the early Community water laws focused on water 
quality management. Moreover, these water regimes from suffered weaknesses, including 
incoherence.529The water laws were piecemeal, scattered among a range of legislations. Owing to 
these problems, in the middle of 1995 the EU began to rethink its past approach to WRM.  The 
rationales for this reform are:  
 
Whilst EU actions of the past such as the Drinking Water Directive and the Urban Waste Water 
Directive can duly be considered milestones, European Water Policy has to address the 
increasing awareness of citizens and other involved parties for their water. At the same time 
water policy and water management are to address problems in a coherent way.530 
 
Reliance on incoherent and dated water laws was not seen as an effective solution to conserving the 
water resources.531The essence of the need for legislative reform was to take comprehensive action to 
tackle water resource challenges. 
4.2.2 Subsidiarity in environmental management 
 
Water resources are one of many environmental media. The EU, in its first Environmental Action 
Programme, identifies five different levels: local, regional, national, Community and international. 
Among these levels, the Action Programme emphasizes that environmental decisions need to be 
WDNHQDWWKHOHYHOµEHVWVXLWHGWRWKHW\SHRISROOXWLRQDQGWRWKHJHRJUDSKLFDO]RQHWREHSURWHFWHG¶532  
The environmental mandate is dependent on the specific environmental problem. The idea clearly 
limits arbitrary environmental decision-making concerning function allocation. Similarly, the third 
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Environmental Action ProgramPH DVVHUWV µWKH &RPPXQLW\ OHYHO VKRXOG EH UHVHUYHG IRU WKRVH
PHDVXUHVZKLFKFDQEHPRVWHIIHFWLYHWKHUH¶533 The Action Programme suggests that the Community 
should handle some environmental problems that are reserved for it to implement. Such 
environmental issues are directly handled by the Community rather than member states and the 
Action Programme makes clear the need for a shared competence over environmental matters. 
 
In subsequent Community legislation, the Community is empowered to takeover some environmental 
mandates if best suited to the level. The Single European Act states that the µ&RPPXQLW\VKDOOWDNH
action relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives...can be attained better at 
Community level than at the level of individual member states¶.534  A similar phrase is included 
within the Maastricht Treaty. It provides that the Community handles environmental issues in the 
µDUHDVZKLFKGRQRWIDOOZLWKLQ LWVH[FOXVLYHFRPSHWHQFHRQO\ LIDQG LQVRIDUDVWKHREMHFWLYHVRI
the proposed action cannot sufficiently be achieved by the member states¶.535The EU¶V PDQGDWH LV
clearly limited to handling defined issues.  The Maastricht Treaty also declares that environmental 
GHFLVLRQVDUHWREHWDNHQµDVFORVHDVSRVVLEOHWRWKHFLWL]HQV¶536 
 
Generally, the Community environmental regimes favour determination of decision-making level on 
a case-by-case basis unless specific issues are exclusively given to the Community level. This gives a 
considerable degree of flexibility for the Community and member states. They enable the EU to take 
environmental decision-making jurisdiction at any time if that specific environmental objective is 
best achieved at EU level rather than by the member states. This discretion in mandate allocation 
may allow the Community to take over environmental decision-making jurisdictions from the 
member states. On the other hand, it may also allow the member states to challenge such takeover if 
they can achieve better results at the national level. 
 
More importantly, all the above-mentioned EU environmental legal and policy documents, in 
principle, favour environmental decision-making at the member state level, except those functions 
exclusively entrusted on the Community. They support decentralization of natural resources 
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management. However, in matters falling to the jurisdiction of the member states, the environmental 
regimes were OHIW WR WKHLU GLVFUHWLRQ WR GHFLGH WKH VSHFLILF OHYHO WKDW LV µEHWWHU¶ RU µEHVW VXLWHG¶ WR
handle an environmental concern. Naturally, these regimes favour decentralization of environmental 
management depending on the nature of the problem. Arguably, the Community environmental laws 
do not focus on integrated environmental management. By their nature, however, some 
environmental problems may need the coordinated involvement at local, national, Community and 
international levels. 537  The use of a single level may not provide sound solutions for some 
environmental problems.538 
4.3 Introduction of the EU Water Framework Directive 
IWRM favours a holistic approach to manage water across the river basin.539At the EU level, the 
WFD is the key legal instrument for water security management, which introduced the principles of 
IWRM and planned WRDFKLHYHµJRRGVWDWXV¶ LQall the European water bodies by 2015. In contrast, 
traditional EU water legislation, achieving good status under the WFD, is applied to all waters across 
river basins.5408QGHUWKH:)'µJRRGVWDWXV¶LVDJHQHUDOUHTXLUHPHQWIRUDOOVXUIDFHZDWHUVWRPHHW
they are expected to meet both ecological protection and general minimum chemical standards, 
introduced to manage water resources pressures within a defined period of time.541  
To enhance the sustainability of water through protection against pollution, the WFD set the water 
quality objectives that member states are expected to achieve. With regard to surface water, the 
PHPEHUVWDWHVPXVWDFKLHYHWKHWDUJHWFKHPLFDOFRQFHQWUDWLRQVWDWXV:)'GLYLGHVZDWHULQWRµJRRG¶
RU µIDLOLQJ¶ FKHPLFDO VWDWXV542 Surface water meets a good chemical status if the concentration of 
pollutants listed as priority substances does not exceed the required environmental quality 
standards.543 Similarly, the good chemical status of groundwater is examined in a similar fashion to 
surface water with regard to chemical concentration; however, the member states are obligated to 
take necessary measures that limit or prevent the discharge of pollutants into the groundwater.544  In 
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principle, direct chemical discharge into groundwater is prohibited. The exception arises if the laws 
expressly give the right to the state to discharge chemicals into groundwater for specific purposes.545  
The rationale for this strict regulation may lie with the difficulty of cleaning once the chemical enters 
the groundwater. Good status under the WFD is not only about water quality; it is also about water 
flow, water ecology and its morphology. The WFD objective of good status is necessary to ensure 
long-term availability of sufficient water of good quality. Achieving good status for all waters within 
the EU will enhance healthy water ecosystems. This legalization aimed to protect the interests of 
both humans and healthy water ecosystems. WFD is an IWRM instrument; it requires the member 
states to manage water resources at river basin scale. 
WFD was intended to create an overall framework for water resources across the EU. It developed 
coherent and integrated water policy and law that would have applicability throughout the EU¶V
member states. The WFD was transposed into the member states¶ legislation and implemented within 
a defined period of time. This framework directive is an invaluable legal instrument for harmonizing 
WRMPs of the member states. The WFD has also consolidated a number of fragmented WRM 
regimes.546This legislation accommodates various changes in the WRM systems and organizational 
remits of WRM law which have brought a remarkable shift when compared with the first and second 
phases of water regimes. Similarly, in 2007, the Communication from the Commission to the EU 
Parliament issued policy options for water sustainability.547 Under this Communication, institutional 
arrangements for water efficiency management were assumed to be at the heart of sustaining water 
resources, whilst supply management was supported as a last resort when demand aspects are used 
exhaustively.548 
4.3.1 Management system for regulating sustainability of water resources 
4.3.1.1 EU intervention in water quantity management before the WFD 
 
A clear legal basis for water resource policies and law-making is key to understanding the level of 
the EU¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ IRUPXODWLQJ UXOHV harmonizing WRM. Under the treaty establishing the 
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European Economic Community (EEC), there was no precise provision that had given legal 
competence for the EEC to take legislative measures in environmental matters.549 As part of the 
environmental media, water resources had experienced this problem. In those days, it was supposed 
that environmental concerns were not a priority for the EEC.550 It is only since the 1960s and 1970s 
that environmental concerns began to receivHWKH((&¶VDWWHQWLRQ551 
This does not mean that in the early days, the EEC had not taken any legislative measures with 
regard to environmental issues. Practice indicated that, often, environmental legislation could be 
adopted under general articles.552 The EEC used a flexible approach ± either ex Article 100 (now 
Article 94 EC) or ex Article 235 (now Article 308 EC) or a combination of the two ± to take 
legislative measures.553 Accordingly, the EEC used establishing and monitoring the common market 
as a legal basis of its competence iQHQYLURQPHQWDOPDWWHUVRUµLIDFWLRQE\WKH&RPPXQLW\VKRXOG
prove necessary to attain, in the course of operation of the common market, one of objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take 
WKHDSSURSULDWHPHDVXUHV¶554 
With the entering into force of the Single European Act in 1987, the legal basis of the environmental 
policy issues was inserted into the Treaty. 555  Similarly, the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) accommodates legal competence ± that the EU can take legislative 
measures to protect the environment, according to the aims under concern. TFEU contains a number 
of provisions for the protection of the environment. For instance, Article 3(3) calls on the EU to 
promote a high level of protection and improvement to the quality of the environment. Similarly, 
Article 11 directs that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the (8¶V policies and activities ± in particular, with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.  
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Now, WKH OHJDO EDVLV IRU WKH (8¶V DFWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ DOO HQYLURQPHQWDO LVVXes is Article 192 of the 
TFEU. 556  Since water is one form of environmental media, the competence to take legislative 
measures regarding environmental concerns includes WRM. Under Article 192, there are two 
different procedures that the EU follows in environmental decision-making, depending on the nature 
of the relevant concerns. The legal competence of the EU under Article 192 UHTXLUHV µWKHRUGLQDU\
OHJLVODWLYHSURFHGXUH¶ LQYROYLQJ MRLQWO\WKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWDQGWKH&RXQFLORI WKH(8PRVWO\
acting by qualified majority but, in cases of certain defined issues, requiring µVSHFLDO OHJLVODWLYH
SURFHGXUH¶ RI XQDQLPous voting in the Council.557 There were differences in the interpretations of 
this provision in practice. This left uncertainty regarding the legal basis of the EU to bring forward 
legislative measures on WRM.558 
This difference, however, found an answer from the decision of the Court of Justice.559 Specifically, 
the Court of Justice rendered guidance in the dispute Spain v Council that could be followed in the 
future.560  Both parties contended the scope of application of the phrase µmanagement of water 
resource¶. The Council viewed it with a narrow interpretation, whereas Spain viewed the phrase 
through an expanded interpretation, encompassing every aspect of WRM. In particular, Spain 
contended that an approval of the conclusion of the Convention on cooperation for the protection and 
sustainable use of the River Danube should have been adopted by unanimous voting, since the 
Convention was related to the management of water resources.561 On the other hand, the Council 
argued that the measures should have been adopted by a qualified majority.562 The Court of Justice 
investigated different versions of languages used to implement the phrase, and finally determined the 
scope of application of unanimous voting in WRM DV OLPLWHGWRWKDWRIµWKHTXDQWLWDWLYHDVSHFWVRI
the use of those resources, or in other words, measures related to the management of limited 
resources in its quantitative aspects and not those concerning the improvement and the protection of 
WKHTXDOLW\RIWKRVHUHVRXUFHV¶563 
                                                             
556
 Ludwig Kramer, EU environmental law (7thedn, Sweet& Maxwell 2011) 252. 
557TFEU, Article 192(2). 
558
 Kramer, (n 556) 252. 
559




 ibid. Spain based its argument under ex Article 130s(2) (now Article 175(2)) and the second sentence of ex Article 
228(2) or the TFEU, Article 192(2). 
562
 Ibid. The Council based its argument under ex Article 130s(1)(now Article 175(1)) and the first sentence of ex 
Article 228(2). 
563ibid, para.52 of judgment. 
109 
 
7KH FRUH VWDWHPHQWV RI WKH &RXUW RI -XVWLFH¶V RSLQLRQ LQ WKH GLspute underlined the idea that the 
management RI ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV GRHV QRW FRYHU µHYHU\ PHDVXUH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK ZDWHU EXW FRYHUV
only measures concerning the regulation of the use of water and the management of water in its 
TXDQWLWDWLYHDVSHFWV¶564 It concluded that the principal purpose of the Convention on cooperation for 
the protection and sustainable use of the River Danube was the protection and improvement of water 
quality, and the Council was right to adopt measures through a qualified majority. In all legislative 
measures that principally focus on non-quantitative WRM, the EU does not require unanimous 
voting. 
7KH &RXUW RI -XVWLFH¶V SRVLWLRQ ZDV VXEVHTXHQWO\ FRQILUPHG XQGHU WKH 7UHDW\ RI 1LFH ZKLFK ZDV
signed in 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003. This Treaty listed some measures to pass 
WKURXJK XQDQLPLW\ LQ &RXQFLO $PRQJ WKH OLVW RI LVVXHV WKH µTXDQWLWDWLYH PDQDJHPHQW RI ZDWHU
UHVRXUFHVRUDIIHFWLQJGLUHFWO\RU LQGLUHFWO\ WKHDYDLODELOLW\RI WKRVH UHVRXUFHV¶ Uequired unanimity 
by the Council and consultation with the EU Parliament prior to adoption. 565  When tKH (8¶V
measures principally affect quantitative aspects of water resources, the measures must be 
unanimously adopted under Article 175(1), whereas in all other cases, qualified majority voting of 
the Council under Article 175(2) is required. 
The Nice Treaty has made two things clear: firstly, it limited the unanimous voting for aspects of 
water quantity; and secondly, it does not encompass all water quantity concerns, but rather those 
measures that DUH µDIIHFWLQJ¶ ZDWHU TXDQWLW\ 566  The introduction of a measure regulating water 
quantity, therefore, would require the unanimous consent of all member states. This implies that the 
member states have more interest in controlling community measures on those water quantity 
measures that affect their national interests regarding the water resources. The availability of the 
unanimity procedure gives the member state the power to veto whenever the EU attempts to 
introduce such measures that would principally affect water quantity.567This suggests that the WFD 
affects quantity, but is principally about quality.  
7KHUHDGLQJRIWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶VGHFLVLRQDQGWKH7UHDW\RI1LFHGHPRQVWUDWHs that the unanimity 
procedure is required in measures principally designed to harmonize water allocation and water 
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transfer rules, but that those measures that do not relate to water quantity management, directly or 
indirectly, follow the ordinary procedure of qualified majority. As a matter of WRM, water quantity 
management is at the centre of enhancing water security, in addition to water quality and water 
system management. 
The implication of the strict procedures regarding water quantity measures as the legal basis for the 
(8¶VUHPLWLVWKDWits role in water allocation is limited to water quality management; there may be a 
fear among member states of fully passing their power regarding water allocation determination to 
the EU. The unanimity may allow member states to control any move by the EU to adopt legal 
measures principally related to water quantity management. Certainly, it empowers the member 
states to play more roles, and permits states to resist measures affecting their national interests. This 
issue may give rise to doubt about the role of the EU in introducing water quantity management rules, 
although it may be argued that the Treaty does not limit water quantity management to those 
measures that do not affect the availability of water resources, since it allows all measures protecting 
and improving the availability of water resources to follow qualified majority voting. The unanimity 
voting is fundamentally limited to legislative measures focusing on water quantity management.  
7KLVZD\RIWKLQNLQJLVFOHDUO\GHPRQVWUDWHGXQGHUWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKH(8¶V:)'The purpose 
RI WKH :)' LV µSULPDULO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH TXDOLW\ RI WKH ZDWHUV FRQFHUQHG¶568 7KH µFRQWURO RI
quantity is an ancillary element in securing good water quality and therefore measures on quantity, 
VHUYLQJWKHREMHFWLYHRIHQVXULQJJRRGTXDOLW\VKRXOGDOVREHHVWDEOLVKHG¶569 The quotes suggest that 
water quantity management under the WFD is widely seen from the point of view of water quality 
management. For instancH WKH:)'XQGHUOLQHVWKH LGHDWKDWµJRRGZDWHUTXDOLW\ZLOO FRQWULEXWHWR
VHFXULQJWKHGULQNLQJZDWHUVXSSO\¶570 
This does not mean that the Directive does not regulate water quantity aspects. It encompasses 
quantitative water measures as an ancillary purpose.571 For instance, the WFD provides rules for 
ZDWHU DEVWUDFWLRQ UHJXODWLRQ LQ WKDW µWKH RYHUDOO SULQFLSOHV VKRXOG EH ODLG GRZQ IRU FRQWURO RQ WKH
abstractions and impoundment in order to ensure the environmental sustainability of affected water 
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systePV¶572 ,Q ZDWHU DEVWUDFWLRQ µquantitative sWDWXV¶ LV GHILQHG DV µDQ H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH GHJUHH WR
ZKLFKDERG\RIJURXQGZDWHU LVDIIHFWHGE\GLUHFWDQG LQGLUHFWDEVWUDFWLRQV¶573No single provision 
was introduced under the WFD that fundamentally addresses the concern of water allocation or water 
transfer. This is why the WFD was adopted through qualified majority rather than unanimity.574 
The problem in the future implementation of WRM within the EU lies when the competent authority 
of the river basin comes to manage water resources; there will be a clear challenge in implementing 
IWRM unless there are special schemes for water quantity management within each river basin for 
that effect. However, despite the EU having legal competence to adopt measures regulating or 
harmonizing the WRM rules of EU member states, it may not be practically possible to bring 
FRPSOHWHKDUPRQL]DWLRQZLWKLQDOOWKH(8¶VWRM. 
,QPDQ\LQVWDQFHVWKHZDWHUUHVRXUFHVPD\WUDQVFHQGWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶DGPLQLVWUDWLYHERXQGDULHV
and be shared by non-member states. Although the EU may influence non-member states or regions 
to create supportive water policies and laws, this involvement depends on the existing WRM treaties 
or cooperative arrangements. Often, regions and countries may have their own priorities and agendas. 
7KLV PD\ EH DQRWKHU FKDOOHQJH WKDW WKH (8¶V WRM has to face. Obviously, this demonstrates the 
importance at an international level to provide sound water policies and laws to shape national and 
regional water laws. 
4.3.1.2 Water cost-recovery as a mechanism for WRM 
 
Institutional arrangements for water efficiency are considered as the primary focus for reducing 
water wastage leading to water security threats. 575 Water security management in the EU is 
approached by using a range of schemes. The major institutional arrangements use water demand and 
supply management, but water demand management comes first, and the water supply option follows 
when demand management has been used exhaustively.576Efficient water utilization makes a positive 
contribution towards enhancing water security.577 
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For efficient water utilization, water pricing is seen as a key economic regulatory scheme for 
incentivizing water users. It assists in controlling water consumption.5787KHµULJKW price-tag¶ on water 
services accommodates the full cost of such services.579Pricing may not be a crucial tool for the users 
and the companies that generate unregulated short-term benefits from water resources.580 It shapes 
their utilizing of water in a way that contributes to common interests. 
 
In water politics, internalizing the costs of water services and resources is disputed. Solanes notes 
that water is a special natural resource that makes it difficult for market forces such as demand and 
supply to regulate and allocate for its users.581Likewise, Bach considers water as a heritage which 
must be protected through internalizing the costs of water services.582Unregulated natural resources 
exploitation exacerbates over-exploitation, leading to ruin.583 Water cost internalization helps to curb 
the tragedy of the commons.584A resistance to water cost internalization seems to emanate from the 
social dimension of access to water resources. The basic assumption of internalizing the water 
service costs is an economic premise that seeks to fully internalize prices of services and water 
resources, thereby pushing up prices ±as a result of which, demand will go down. The more the cost 
of water increases, the more consumption drops, since water is a price-elastic economic good.585 
Under-pricing will lead to the over-exploitation of water resources by failing to provide a responsive 
incentive that shapes the behaviours of water users.586 
 
In December 2008, the first follow-up report to the Communication was adopted.587 Whilst this 
follow-up report identified some encouraging progress at the EU and national levels, it suggested that 
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there was more to do if water security is to be achieved within the EU.588There are ranges of water 
uses in Europe. Amongst the types of water uses, on average, 44 per cent of total water abstraction is 
used for agriculture; 40 per cent for industry and energy production; and 15 per cent for the public 
water supply.589 Drinking water demand is the lowest in water consumption when compared with 
other sectors. 
In the EU, some countries have a long tradition of water services pricing.590The water supply costs 
were not being covered effectively591and because of this, the introduction of water pricing schemes 
was highly debated and faced resistance when the WFD was adopted in 2000.592However, the WFD 
introduced a rule for water pricing. Under the WFD, member states are under an obligation to 
develop water pricing as a requirement.593Member VWDWHVKDYH WR µWDNHDFFRXQWRI¶ WKHSULQFLSOHRI
recovery of costs of water services and to ensure the adequate contribution of water users to the cost 
of water as an economic regulatory tool.594In cost-recovery, the WFD did not come with rules that 
support strong applicability throughout the (8¶V member states. However, the full cost-recovery 
aspiration was curtailed by incorporating the vague requirement µWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHSULQFLSOHRI
UHFRYHU\ RI FRVW¶, thereby giving wide room for discretion. The member states¶ duty is not to 
implement cost-recovery; it is limited to taking into account the principle, meaning that its 
implementation is dependent on the willingness of each member state to act. The member states are 
obliged to internalize the costs of water services, including the environmental and resource costs.595 
The practice has shown that within the water bodies of the EU, cost internalization is not 
materialized effectively.596For the purpose of cost internalization, the scope of water services is often 
limited to drinking water and waste water treatment; this excludes regulation of major water 
consuming sectors, including water abstraction for agriculture. 597 As an economic incentive, the 
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scope of the application of water pricing needs to accommodate the realm of non-drinking water, and 
it also needs to accommodate environmental and resources costs.598 
Within the EU, there is no common definition of water services; member states define it in their own 
way, using a narrowing conceptualization.599 With regard to water consumption by the agricultural 
sector in the (8 µRSHUDWLRQDO FRVWV IRU WKH SURYLVLRQ RI ZDWHU DUH RQO\ SDUWO\ UHFRYHUHG IRU 
member states and capital costs are often subsidized. An important share of water abstractions for 
agriculture in the EU is not priced, even in water stress areas, and there is no financial mechanism for 
recovering the environmental and resource costs of individual abstractions or for giving incentives to 
using water morHHIILFLHQWO\¶600 
 
Although water services require the inclusion of environmental and resource costs, both types are left 
unconsidered;601 drinking water facilities are not financially strong enough to ensure water efficiency. 
This makes the setting of water prices ineffective in enhancing the sustainability of water. In the EU, 
water pricing is not widely used and is hardly implemented beyond the sectors of drinking water 
supply and waste water treatment.602 Water cost internalization policies do not generally take into 
account the level of sensitivity of water security challenges.603 Even with regard to drinking water, 
some member states have a long tradition of free drinking water provision. This has left major water 
usages not being properly regulated through water pricing. Lack of proper water pricing for non-
drinking water may likely encourage inefficient water utilization, leading to water wastage.   
 
The third follow-up report to the Communication on water scarcity and droughts in the EU indicated 
that in many of the EU member states, including the UK, water tariffs have been introduced recently 
or are under development in order to ensure water services¶ cost-recovery.604Compliance with water 
cost-recovery pricing remains a problem. Under the EU, the Commission is responsible for ensuring 
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implementation of the European legislation.605 When a member state fails to comply with the EU law, 
the Commission has authority to take action for non-compliance, either by taking its own measures 
or referring the case to the European Court of Justice. 
 
In water cost-recovery non-compliance, there have been many instances in which the Commission 
has taken actions against member states. The Commission either sends a reasoned opinion to ask a 
member state to comply, or refers the case to the Court of Justice for the non-compliance.606 In 2012, 
the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to ask Austria to comply with the principle of cost-recovery 
for water services.607 In 2011, similar action had been taken against Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden for incorrectly implementing the concept of water services. 608 In 2012, the 
Commission referred Germany to the Court over incomplete cost-recovery for water services. Whilst 
Germany was of the opinion that water cost-UHFRYHU\ µVKRXOGDSSO\RQO\ WRWKH VXSSO\RIGULQNLQJ
water and the disposal and treatment of wastewater, the Commission considers that Germany's 
exclusion of other relevant activities such as hydropower from the definition of water services 
hinders the full and correct application of the Water Framework Directive¶. 609The case was sent to 
the European Court of Justice in 2012.%\ LWV DFWLRQ WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ FODLPHG WKDW µWKH
Federal Republic of Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations under the WFD, and in particular 
under Article 2(38) and Article 9thereof, by excluding certain services (for example, impoundment 
for the purposes of hydroelectric power generation, navigation and flood protection, abstraction for 
the purposes of irrigation and for industrial purposes, as well as personal consumption) from the 
concepWRIµZDWHUVHUYLFHV¶610 The Court underlined that the Commission based its action around the 
interpretation to be given, in its view, rather than providing the Court with the evidence to allow the 
alleged failure to fulfil obligations to be established, and thus it dismissed the action as 
inadmissible.611 
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The WFD member states have the obligation to conduct an economic analysis of water use.612Each 
member state, within its national boundary demarcation, conducts economic analysis by using 
technical specifications.613The WFD favours water cost internalization within the political boundary 
demarcation of each member state, even if the water resources are shared between member states. 
Member states feel that economic regulation beyond the administrative boundary hampers their 
national sovereignty.614 
Localized water pricing is supposed to assist in accommodating local variations, and encourages the 
inclusion of socio-economic development and environmental sustainability policies. 615  National 
boundary demarcation-oriented water pricing was intended to accommodate variations within 
member states.616 For water pricing, the member states may consider social, environmental and 
economic effects.617 However, the localized nature of water pricing contradicts the idea of WRM at 
the basin level. The principle of a hydro-boundary-based WRM is watered down when it comes to 
core demand management. This means that the same water body can be subjected to different water 
pricing. 
As each member state has discretion with regard to its water pricing, some progressive states may 
use effective water pricing, whereas others may not. For instance, implementation of cost 
internalization varies within a shared river basin. The nature of this water pricing is patchy in terms 
of implementation. The policy priorities of a country affect water pricing and may create difficulty in 
holding accountable member states¶ failure to introduce proper water pricing. The outcome of water 
pricing within the basin is unlikely to be effective in shared basins, unless they have at least some 
common criteria to guide them in setting up water pricing within their jurisdictions. 
Translating intent into action is fundamental to make effective water policy and law within the EU 
scope. The differences across countries and the disparities of their institutional and economic 
capacities may lead to unbalanced implementation of the (8¶V water policy and law. These 
challenges to implementation can often be overcome by introducing the EU-level implementation 
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strategies. In the WFD, the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) is seen as a scheme to enhance 
common understanding between member states upon the implementation of WFD rules; the rules 
under CIS are soft guidelines, rather than providing binding rules.618 
 
Despite the CIS potentially playing a positive role in the implementation of coherent water pricing in 
shared water bodies, its effectiveness was doubted.619 The implementation of the soft rules developed 
by the CIS through member states is not a substitute for the role of the EU in engaging in 
enforcement through the Commission.620 CIS does not have the status of binding legislation.621 It 
may be necessary for legislation to enhance the CIS guidelines to make them obligatory; 622 in 
particular, the soft rules of CIS need care to avoid misinterpretation of its original intentions within 
water law through the guise of developing common ground for implementation. 
 
Development of water pricing policies that provide adequate incentives for users to utilize water 
efficiently is a key measure of the WFD.623 However, the progress made by the member states was 
not promising.624In some member states, metering of water consumption is not fully implemented 
within some sectors; for instance, in agriculture in many areas, water is charged only to a limited 
extent.625 Despite cost-recovery being implemented to a greater or lesser extent in households and 
industry, very few member states have implemented a transparent recovery of environmental and 
resource costs.626 
 
Another problem related to water efficiency is leakage management. For instance, water leakage 
problems within the EU member states vary between 7 per cent to 70 per cent ± or more.627 Although 
it may not be possible to avoid leakage altogether, introducing schemes that minimize water wastage 
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through leakage within the EU may contribute to reducing water security challenges. The idea of 
sustainable economic leakage levels is considered to mitigate such leakage problems within member 
states. 628  Despite the benefits of this scheme within member states and water bodies, its 
implementation may not be realized without setting out compliance mechanisms that regulate the 
efficiency of the infrastructures that are used in water development. 
4.3.1.3 Water abstraction 
 
Over-abstraction of water is one of the threats to the sustainability of water resources.629 The WFD 
incorporated a rule designed to control water abstraction,630as well as a rule that regulates the off-
take of quantities of groundwater. The rule demands that member states must take into account a 
long-term average water recharge level for groundwater, to limit or prevent over-exploitation that 
affects the sustainability of water quantity in a given river body.631 This legal limitation attempts to 
balance the abstraction of water resources. To this end, the quantitative status of groundwater is 
judged by using the water abstraction and recharge data of a given groundwater body. By this 
analysis, groundwater can be considered as poor if the exploitation exceeds the long-term average 
rate of its recharge. 632 The WFD therefore requires groundwater abstraction control. 
 
Despite the WFD¶V introduction of WKHLGHDRIWKHZDWHUZLWKLQDULYHUEDVLQDFKLHYLQJDµJRRGVWDWXV¶
in terms of its quantity and quality, it lacks a consistent application scheme for regulating surface 
water over-abstraction ± although flow must be sufficient to enable good ecological status, as defined 
in the WFD. However, in England, around 50 per cent of surface waters are subject to morphological 
pressures.633 In the EU, around 15 per cent of surface water bodies are in unknown ecological 
status.634 In some member states, more than 50 per cent of surface water bodies are in unknown 
ecological status.635 
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The WFD does not provide clear guidance on the levels of surface water flows.636 There is not yet a 
common definition for the surface water flow within the EU, although there is some EU-wide inter-
calibration.637There had been progress in the development and application of assessment methods of 
µJRRG ecological¶VWDWXV within EU member states, but some countries showed important gaps.638For 
instance, in England, the availability of water resources for abstraction is assessed through the 
Catchment Abstraction Management Strategy approach.639 This may help to determine how much 
water is sustainably available for protecting ecological flow. However, there has been a lack of 
coherent measures on water flow within the EU.640 
Moreover, the implementation of water abstraction requires metering, or registering and pricing. An 
efficient abstraction requires measuring the volume of water used.641The flat rate tariff settings 
hardly provide an incentive for the sustainability of water. In some EU member states, µin some 
sectors, such as agriculture or households, metering of water consumption is not fully 
implemented¶.642Through properly unmetered water exploitation, setting prices may or may not 
DFKLHYHµWKHULJKW price-WDJ¶IRUFRVW-recovery. Properly unmetered and unregistered water utilization 
may not ensure efficient allocation and fairwater usage, and the likely danger is that water consumers 
exploit water as much as they can without worrying about common interests. The quantity of water 
utilization is not well regulated by economic instruments and the price imposed is an estimate that 
may not reflect the actual price of water usage.  
Over-abstraction of water is a significant problem in many water bodies.643The failure to use proper 
ZDWHU SULFLQJ LV UHJDUGHG DV µDQ HQYLURQPHQWDOO\-KDUPIXO VXEVLG\¶ ZKLFK SRWHQWLDOO\ exacerbates 
water insecurity.644 For instance, water abstraction for agriculture is inefficiently regulated within the 
EU.645 There is an over-estimation problem in existing water bodies which opens the way for over-
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abstraction.646 In practice, member states that control water abstraction effectively are rare in number. 
However, there are some progressive states in terms of implementing water abstraction control. For 
LQVWDQFH LQ )UDQFH µLUULJDWRUV KDYH WR EH HTXLSSHG ZLWK ZDWHU PHters whenever they go beyond 
abstraction thresholds. In the period 2000±2003, the level of equipment rose from 54% up to 71%, 
representing 85% of the overall irrigated land¶. 647 In England, there are comprehensive water 
abstraction control mechanisms. 648  Any person who abstracts more than 20 cubic metres 
(approximately 4,400 gallons) a day needs an abstraction licence.649Large direct users are metered 
and charged by the volume of water they abstract. Abstraction is charged in agricultural, domestic 
and public water supplies, and in industrial and energy production.650But these good practices may 
not protect the water in shared water bodies unless other riparian countries take similar measures. 
Effective water abstraction control requires the commitment of all riparian member states. 
4.3.1.4Protecting water bodies and regulating land use 
 
The protection of water resources also requires the protection of their ecosystems.651 Human-induced 
pressures on the water ecosystems affect the sustainability of water resources. For instance, the 
Berlin Conference Report XQGHUOLQHV µZDWHUV DV SDUWV RI HFRV\VWHPV WKDW FDQQRW EH PDQDJHG
effectively except by giving careful attention to the intimate interconnections of the parts of the 
system¶.652 Porter notes WKDWµWKe quantity of water resource begins on the land. Hence water use first 
depends upon land uses¶. 653  Similarly, Fisher notes that protection of water resources requires 
protection of their ecosystems.654 He suggests that sustainable water resources cannot be achieved 
only through the conservation of water. 
 
The WFD provides detailed criteria to achieve good ecological status of surface water under Annex 
V. This approach gives recognition to the protection of the water environment as part of water 
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protection. Based on their ecological condition, surface waters are generally classified into high, 
good, moderate, poor and bad.655 The ecological quality of Dµgood¶ status within the river basin can 
be determined by examining anthropogenic impacts on the aquatic environment. Surface water 
acquires good ecological status if the modification on the biological community in the watershed is 
only slight, when compared with areas of the biological community that would be expected to have 
conditions of minimal human impact.656 For this purpose, the diversity and abundance of fauna and 
flora are used as main elements to categorize the extent of the modification of surface water 
ecosystems.657 As a parameter, the legislation provides the use of present day conditions of biological 
diversity within a river basin level and the past conditions in the absence of anthropogenic impacts 
within a river basin level.658 
 
Achievement of the ecological objectives of the Directive is one of the key aspects for enhancing the 
sustainability of water resources. Moreover, the WFD obligates the member states to designate and 
make a register of protected areas.659 This model recognizes the management of water systems, 
which had received little or no attention in the conventional Union water laws. Water resources under 
the category of surface or groundwater are given special protection; such areas are designated for: the 
use of human consumption; protection of economically significant aquatic species; recreational 
importance; their nutrient sensitivity; and the protection of habitats or species where the maintenance 
or improvement of the status of water is an important factor in their protection, including relevant 
Natural 2000 sites.660 
 
Designation of protected areas protects water from pollution or human-induced pressures. This 
enhances the availability of water resources by reducing the cost of water treatment; for instance, in 
England and Wales, water pollution is one of the causes that increase the cost of treatment.661 As the 
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water resources are exposed to human pressures, it may be unsafe for habitats or species that need 
special protection. The environmental objectives of protected areas are the same as those for surface 
water and groundwater, unless the member state concerned adopts stringent standards and objectives. 
The same deadline for river basin planning and implementation applies to the protected areas as for 
other categories of river basins, unless the Community legislation specifies a special period,662 or the 
state is granted an extension due to exceptional circumstances.663 
 
Land-use practices have impacts on the quantity and quality of water resources.664 Adapting activities 
that demand water quantity to that of available water resources remains problematic ± this suggests 
the need to introduce land-use regulation that takes into account the context of the water body.665 As 
land uses are unregulated, this exacerbates threats to water security.666 Regulated and planned land 
use enhances the efficiency of water use. It helps to mitigate water allocation and to balance land use 
with the available water resources.667  The implication of land use on water efficiency suggests 
pushing the boundaries of the conventional thinking which attempts to regulate water resources 
through water policies and law separately. In the (8 µPRUH WKDQ  of the RBMPs [river basin 
management plans] assessed indicate that agriculture is a significant pressure in the basin, including 
diffuse or point source pollution by organic matter, nutrients, pesticides and hydromorphological 
impacts¶.668 However, the RBMPs developed by the member states do not accommodate determined 
measures to address agriculture land-use pressures.669 This suggests land-use management is a key to 
the sustainability of water. 
4.3.1.5Pollution regulation 
In addition to water quantity challenges, a situation of water scarcity can also arise from water 
quality failures due to diffuse or point source pollutions.670 These reduce the availability of safe 
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water. 671 Pollution is one of the human-induced causes that affects the sustainability of water 
resources in the world.672 It increases the cost of water treatment and puts constraints on availability 
of water. 673  As water pollution and pressures impacting on water quality are minimized, the 
availability of clean water resources is increased for human and non-human consumption.  
Water law is progressive in the EU.674Pre-WFD, the water law established rules that regulated 
pollutant emissions and human waste water discharge.675 BHIRUHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKH(8¶V:)'D
range of fragmented laws had been adopted to regulate diffuse and point source pollution. The WFD 
may be seen as a key instrument of the IWRM that introduced comprehensive pollution control 
mechanisms. To achieve the objectives of water quality, the WFD accommodated rules regulating 
both point and diffuse sources of pollution.676Concerning point source surface water pollution, the 
legislation requires member states to ensure the protection of water from pollution by controlling 
emissions and setting environmental quality standards for pollutants, which limit their discharge, 
with periodic reviews and updates.677 The emission controls must be carried out by adopting the best 
available techniques that are available on the market, and a technology that is cost-efficient.678By 
2008, the EU identified thirty-three chemical substances, in addition to eight chemical substances 
previously identified under past water laws, to be regulated in terms of their discharge 
levels.679Moreover, each effluent discharger must act according to the terms and obligations of their 
discharge permit certificate. The Directive also enforces control of diffuse source water pollution that 
emanates from the uncontrolled use of fertilizers, pesticides and other pollutants through adopting 
best agricultural practices, input control and land-use management.680However, the assessment report 
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on industrial pollution implementation success, carried out in 2012, indicated that there were too 
many permits that had emission limit values that were not in line with best available techniques.681 
'HVSLWHWKH:)'REOLJLQJZDWHUERGLHVWRDFKLHYHDµJRRG¶FKHPLFDOVWDWXVWKHFKHPLFDOVWDWXVRIa 
considerable number of water bodies is unknown.682In the EU, around 40 per cent of surface water 
bodies are of unknown chemical status.683 In some member states, more than 50 per cent of their 
ZDWHU ERGLHV¶ FKHPLFDO status is unknown, and chemical monitoring is insufficient in many other 
states.684The monitoring and assessment of chemical status remains inefficient in a considerable 
number of member states.685There are significant pollution pressures within the EU and, often, 
implementation is a key challenging factor in many water bodies.686Around 38 per cent and 22 per 
cent of water bodies in the EU are still under threat of point and diffuse pollution, respectively.687 
The pollution regulation rules fail to bring about the effective protection of water resources. More 
than 90 per cent of the RBMPs assessed within the EU indicated that agriculture is a significant 
pressure in the basin, including contributing to diffuse or point source pollution.688 However, in 
general, the RBMPs do not accommodate determined action upon these pressures. 689 The 
implementation of the Nitrates Directive is relatively advanced in the old EU member states, but 
significantly less in those that have joined the EU since 2004.690Furthermore, the Nitrate Directive is 
variably applied within old and new member states.691 The implication is that existing laws to 
regulate diffuse pollution need the robust actions of all member states. 
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4.3.2 Collaboration in WRM 
4.3.2.1 Introduction of the river basin management approach 
 
At the EU level, there was no water law designed to manage transboundary water resources between 
member states before the adoption of the WFD. The laws and organizational structures were 
administrative boundary-oriented and fragmented, other than the ones that had been governed by the 
treaties agreed between states sharing a water body.692 The EU WFD has brought considerable change in 
the conventional WRM organizational structural architecture of the EU; it places WRM at the river 
basin boundary level.693 Through the river basin arrangement, the WFD has arguably brought WRM into 
the limits of the natural geographical and hydrological unit-watershed boundary. The river basin is a 
system of natural resource pools, where water resources are interconnected with the land and related 
resources. It is a physical unit, with various interactions and competing interests that put pressure on the 
water environment. These rationales, under the EU WFD, have shaped the traditional administrative 
boundary-oriented WRM towards a watershed-oriented WRM. Upon completion of the first cycle of the 
WFD implementation period, however, the river basin approach was criticized for its inability to 
accommodate local needs in the planning process of water resources.694 
 
Markedly, river basin-based water resources planning and management were contested for their failure 
WR DFFRPPRGDWH µORFDO LVVXHV DQG ORFDOO\ SODQQHG DFWLRQ¶ 695 It is believed that the EU river basin 
PDQDJHPHQWDSSURDFKµVKLIWHGWKHPDLQUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUORFDOZDWHULVVXHVIURPWKHPXQLFLSDOOHYHOWR
the regional or supra-UHJLRQDO OHYHOV¶696 However, the WFD VWUHVVHVWKHQHFHVVLW\WRLQYROYHµGLIIHUHQW
decision-making levels that influence water resources and water status be it local, regional or national, 
IRUDQHIIHFWLYHPDQDJHPHQWRIDOOZDWHUV¶697 This Directive considers the possibility of involving the 
levels below and beyond the river basin in WRM. The WFD underlines that the µVXFFHVV RI WKLV
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Directive relies on close cooperation and coherent action at Community, Member State and local 
OHYHO¶698 
 
Water resources planning and management at the river basin stage may not mean that all WRM needs to 
be handled by a single river basin institution. Instead, it favours the establishment of a competent 
authority which facilitates coordinated WRM. Similarly, the WFD emphasizes that member states must 
take measures related to WRM DQGSROOXWLRQFRQWUROµDVFORVHDVSRVVLEOHWRWKHORFDWLRQVZKHUHZDWHULV
DIIHFWHGRUXVHG¶699 The levels of water resource decision-making can be decided case by case; however, 
it must be at the closest appropriate level to handle the specific water challenge. The idea of cooperation 
in the WFD assumes the necessity of multilevel governance, through vertical links between the levels 
affecting water resources, and horizontal links between the countries sharing a water body. No one 
single institutional arrangement can effectively manage all water resource problems. The competent 
authority facilitates the coordinated WRM; and for this purpose, each member state must designate or 
establish a competent authority responsible for coordinating the implementation of obligations which are 
stipulated under the WFD.700 
 
Upon the planning and management of water resources, each member state must consider the 
implications beyond its national boundary limits. Through this orientation, the WFD harmonizes the 
water policy and law of member states. They are expected to manage water resources on the geographic 
boundary of their water drainage area coverage, which can vary among river basins. Arguably, the 
whole ULYHU EDVLQ DUHD¶V FRYHUDJH FDQ EH PDQDJHG LQ FRRUGLQDWLRQ, as if within the national 
administrative boundary demarcation. Under the WFD, water classified as µgood¶ RU LQ a non-
deterioration status is not judged simply by considering the river basin status ZLWKLQHDFKPHPEHUVWDWH¶V
national jurisdiction. Pollution, water over-use or degradation of the aquatic environment by one of the 
VWDWHVVKDULQJDEDVLQPD\DIIHFWDOORWKHUVWDWHV$QLQGLYLGXDOVWDWH¶VVXFFHVVLQVKDUHGWRM may not 
resolve the degradation of water resources, unless all riparian states engage in coordinated management 
and water resource use. The WFD therefore imposes the obligation on member states to manage shared 
water through coordination.701 
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Across Europe, there are 64 transboundary water bodies that connect member states or non-member 
states.702 The EU shares many transboundary river basins with non-member states. The problems may 
be more complex when the water resources are shared with a non-EU member state. In instances where 
a river basin crosses a boundary of a non-(8 PHPEHU VWDWH WKH (8 PHPEHU VWDWH¶V REOLJDWLRQ LV WR
endeavour to secure cooperation through bilateral agreements. 703  Such cooperation is increasingly 
dependent on the willingness of the non-EU member state and the nature of their agreement. Regarding 
water resources shared between member states, the political boundary demarcation is of little concern in 
shared WRM between such member states. The obligation of cooperation in shared WRM between 
member states is relatively strict, in comparison with cooperation with non-member states.704  The 
member states must cooperate with each other in designating river basins and assigning competent 
authorities. 705 This obligation is indispensable in the enhancement of integrated water resources 
protection and development. 
 
Arguably, EU hydro-politics has created a new geographic decision-making level that stands 
independent of administrative boundaries. Both internationally, and with regard to water resources 
shared between member states, the failure of cooperation between states that share a river basin may not 
be an excuse to implement a WFD obligation, and a member state may implement this obligation within 
its administrative boundary of coverage, a sub-unit of a river basin.706 To this end, the Directive requires 
PHPEHU VWDWHV WR LGHQWLI\ WKH ULYHU EDVLQ¶V QDWLRQDO UHJLRQDO RU LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHYHO DQG VHW XS
appropriate administrative structures for its governance.707 The EU WFD hence requires each member 
state to establish the river basin district within its own jurisdiction, or via a coordinated management for 
the water bodies that transcend national boundaries.708 
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4.3.2.2 Stakeholder involvement in the WFD 
 
Participation is a key tool that gives the public the opportunity to challenge the fairness of 
development projects accommodating social equity, environmental sustainability and economic 
efficiency concerns.709The WFD underlines how the success of sustainability of water resources 
depends on participatory decision-making.710It provides two classes of participants in river basin 
management: interested parties and the public.711 The Directive does not give a definition that assists 
in identifying interested parties from the members of the public; hRZHYHU WKH :)'¶V &,6 XVHV
µEURDGSXEOLF¶DVWKHWHUPIRUthe public or general public, defining WKHFRQFHSWDVµPHPEHUVRIWKH
SXEOLF ZLWK RQO\ D OLPLWHG LQWHUHVW LQ WKH LVVXH FRQFHUQHG DQG LQIOXHQFH RQ LWV RXWFRPH¶ 712 This 
definition adds further confusion by defining µthe public¶ on the EDVLVRI µD OLPLWHG LQWHUHVW¶ LQ WKH
issue.713 
 
To avoid this vagueness, the CIS provides general guidelines to help when selecting stakeholders. 
These factors include: the specific issue concerning water management, which the stakeholder 
represents; stakeholder involvement as part of a government body; users and victims of possible 
measures; capacity of engagement of stakeholders; and VWDNHKROGHUV¶ representation in political, 
social and environmental contexts.714 Similarly, WKH$DUKXV &RQYHQWLRQ GHILQHV µpXEOLF¶ DV µRQH RU
more natural or legal persons and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their 
DVVRFLDWLRQV RUJDQLVDWLRQV RU JURXSV¶ 715  It comprises any persons, natural or legal, or groups, 
organizations or associations that can be determined only through national legislation or practice.   
 
The Aarhus &RQYHQWLRQGHILQHVµSXEOLFFRQFHUQHG¶DVµWKHSXEOLFDIIHFWHGRUOLNHO\WREHDIIHFWHGE\
or having an interest in the environmental decision-PDNLQJ¶ 716  This description considers non-
governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and any person meeting 
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requirements set under a given national law as an organization or person with an interest.717However, 
the above definition does not provide a detailed description of the roles of participants. Generally, the 
FRQFHSW RI SDUWLFLSDWLRQ UHIHUV WR WKRVH SXEOLF µDFWLYLWLHV WKDW DUH PRUH RU OHVV GLUHFWO\DLPHG DW
LQIOXHQFLQJWKHDFWLRQV¶WKDWa government takes in its decision-making process.718 From the IWRM 
point of view, public participation is an action of the public or stakeholder taken to influence the 
decision-PDNLQJRIDFRPSHWHQWDXWKRULW\,WLVQRWµFHUHPRQLDO¶RUVLPSO\WRµVXSSRUW¶DJRYHUQPHQW
agenda; instead, it is aimed at challenging water resources decisions.719 
 
Commonly, stakeholder selection and participation is based on people and organizations that have a 
stake in their socio-economic development and environmental protection. 720  The philosophical 
underpinning for participation of the stakeholder is that participation must contribute to balancing the 
diverse environmental, economic and social interests, and so enhance sustainable water resources 
utilization.721 Under the CIS, all stakeholders are divided into professionals, authorities, local groups, 
non-professional organized entities and individual citizens, farmers and companies. 722Under the 
WFD, each member state has an obligation to encourage the active involvement of all interested 
parties in the implementation of the Directive and the development of RBMPs.723 The involvement 
of stakeholders may start from the initial planning to the overall implementation process. The level of 
their involvement is not limited and is at the discretion of member states. Once they have been 
identified, stakeholders are involved throughout the implementation process; however, the WFD 
does not set out the specific roles that interested parties are expected to play. Rather, the vague term 
of µactive involvement¶ is used and it is not specified how such active involvement is practically 
reflected. 7KH&,6GRFXPHQWGLVFORVHVWKDW LQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHV¶ LQYROYHPHQWLV OLPLWHGWRDQDGYLVRU\
role.724 
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In the case of public participation, member states are obliged to ensure that competent bodies inform 
and consult the public, including water users, regarding the timetable and work programme for the 
production of RBMPs and updates. 725  To this end, each member state must publish and make 
available draft river basin plans and, before these are finalized, they are required to gain opinions and 
comments from the general public. This suggests that participatory resource management can be 
meaningful in the water resources governance only if governments release accurate, timely and 
usable information to the public.  The scope of participation is limited to providing written comments 
and opinions on the draft river basin plan and its update documents.726 Public participation is limited 
to information provision or consultation regarding river basin planning. It is unclear whether 
potential participants are involved in other implementation processes. The obligation of the member 
state is limited and soft;727member states can implement as they see fit, using subsidiarity, and can 
give interested parties a stronger role if they wish. The :)'¶VCIS document extends the scope of 
consultation to the provision of written comments, possibly including dialogues with the public in 
workshops and in a wide range of meetings.728  The CIS suggests public participation to allow people 
to influence the outcome of plans and the working process.729 
4.4 Conclusion of chapter 
 
This chapter makes an assessment of the extent to which the key features of an effective management 
system for water resources are reflected in the EU¶V water policy and law. The discussion in this 
chapter has revealed the genesis and development of the WRM regime in the EU, and has also 
indicated the significant intervention of the EU in the development of water policy and law.  
The WFD is a piece of legislation that has the potential to enhance sustainability of water resources in 
the EU. It can be seen as comprehensive, accommodating many of IWRM features. The WFD sets out 
an overall framework for water management in the EU, and the main tools that it has designed for its 
implementation are the RBMPs and their associated programme of measures. Likewise, the EU 
introduced the CIS to minimize the incoherent implementation of the :)'WKURXJKRXWPHPEHUVWDWHV¶
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water bodies. The drought in 2003 also initiated more concerns surrounding water politics; this can be 
observed from the introduction of water policy options for drought and water scarcity. In 2007, the 
European Commission adopted a Communication on water scarcity and droughts, which 
accommodates water policy options. It sets out the priorities for managing water scarcity and drought 
challenges. The Communication, which is supportive of the WFD, was accompanied by three follow-
up reports to indicate achievements and yearly progress. 
 
The review in this chapter identified those key features of an effective management system for water 
resources that are reflected in the EU¶V WFD and soft laws. These key features include: taking account 
of the context of specific water resource threats; water quality protection; reasonable water abstraction; 
water demand and supply management; integration; water cost internalization; subsidiarity; 
participation; collaboration and the CIS. Clearly, these key features and the RBMP activities within 
the EU have triggered the member states into bringing substantial reforms in WRM. However, its 
ultimate success will depend on the extent of implementation. The investigation of these key 
implementation features in this chapter suggests that the outcomes within member states are mixed; 
some member states perform better than others. 
Over the last three decades, the EU as a supranational body has adopted a range of water resources 
policy and law that aim to reform WRMPs. In the EU, water law development is progressive and can 
be divided into three generations. Many of the first and second generation water laws were focused 
on quality issues. They were characterized by providing standards for different types of water use, 
controlling industrial emissions and regulating human waste water discharges, with the objective of 
protecting market distortion and ensuring public health. At these two stages, whilst the EU provided 
binding water legislation concerned with the regulation of quality problems, the level of the (8¶V
intervention in WRM was not significant enough to address the current water sustainability 
challenges; that is, the scope of intervention was too narrow to manage multifaceted water security 
challenges. The range of key features of an effective WRM system, which was mapped out in 
Chapters Two and Three of this thesis, was not reflected within these stages of the water law. The 
water policy and law were fragmented, and water quality protection measures lay within 
administrative boundaries, unless there were treaties that governed shared WRM.   
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Subsequently, the EU has revised the water law and has attempted to reflect in it some of the key 
features of an effective WRMP. More specifically, in 2000 the EU introduced the WFD, a more 
progressive and comprehensive directive than its predecessors. While quality regulation has been a 
core part of EU water law since the 1970s,the WFD introduced an overall objective that the member 
states needed to achieve D µgood¶ status in all water bodies. The WFD affects water quantity but is 
principally about quality: it provides rules on water pollution regulations from different sources; from 
point source pollution regulation through to emissions regulation and the use of best available 
techniques; for diffuse pollution awareness creation schemes; chemical use control; and expanding 
best agricultural practices. It also obligates member states to designate protected areas regarding water 
resources that are used for particular purposes. Nevertheless, the key features controlling water quality 
challenges ± that is, WKH µIXOO FRPSOLDQFH¶ WR WKH :)'¶V pollution protection rules ± has not been 
achieved; implementation is therefore a key challenge within the EU. 
Good status is not just about pollution affecting the quality of water, but it is also about flow and 
ecology and morphology. However, the WFD does not provide a definition for µflow¶± which must be 
sufficient to enable good status ± and it instead puts into place water abstraction control. The WFD 
incorporates a rule that regulates the off-take of quantities of groundwater. Upon water abstraction, the 
member states must take into account a long-term average water recharge level for groundwater, in 
order to regulate over-abstraction. The practices within member states suggest that water abstraction 
regulation is inefficient. There is an over-estimation problem in existing water bodies, which opens the 
way for over-abstraction. The legislation also aims to protect healthy water ecosystems and the 
sustainability of water resources. It intends to control human impacts on the water and its ecosystem. 
Achieving good status under the WFD requires good ecological status, but practices indicate that 
agricultural land-use management remains a problem within the EU in terms of water resources 
sustainability. Ultimately, the RBMPs do not address agricultural land-use pressures effectively. 
As a market instrument, the WFD introduced a rule for water pricing. However, the full cost-recovery 
aspiration was weakened by incorporating the YDJXHUHTXLUHPHQWµWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHSULQFLSOHRI
UHFRYHU\ RI FRVW¶ WKHUHE\ giving too much room for discretion for each member state. Some 
progressive states may use effective water pricing, whereas others may not; and implementation of 
cost internalization varies within shared river basins. The discussion in this chapter on water pricing 
rule implementations has also shown that cost internalization has not materialized effectively. The 
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notion µwater services¶ is interpreted differently within member states, by the exclusion of regulation 
of major water consuming sectors. Since many member states have failed to transpose the WFD 
effectively, the Commission has taken its own actions for non-compliance and has referred each case 
to the European Court of Justice. 
Another key feature under WFD is participation. Upon RBMP preparations, the WFD requires the 
participation of stakeholders as a crucial tool in WRM. Under the WFD, the scope of participation is 
limited to providing written comments and opinions on the draft RBMPs. TKH:)'¶VCIS document 
extends the scope of consultation to the provision of written comments. The CIS suggests public 
participation to allow people to influence the outcome of plans and the working process. However, it is 
unclear whether potential participants are actually involved in the implementation processes. Likewise, 
the participatory implementation was criticized for its inability to address local needs in the process of 
RBMP development. 
Generally, in early water policy, the water resource problems were seen as administrative boundary-
oriented. As the environmental policies discussed in this chapter reveal, WRM policies allow decision-
making at the lowest appropriate level unless the mandate is exclusively given to the EU level. In 
principle, decision-making is determined on a case-by-case basis. The EU discharges the mandates 
that are exclusively given to it. In most cases, determining the level best suited for water resources 
decision-making is left to the respective member state. Water as a medium of the environment shares 
the same approach to management. One of the basic shifts brought by the WFD within the EU was 
that the water resources should no longer be administered along political or administrative boundaries 
alone; rather, the management plans were set out and implemented on the boundaries of river basins. 
The WFD obliges member states to manage water resources at the river basin level in a coordinated 
fashion, in both transboundary and non-transboundary water bodies, although different levels are 
involved in WRM. The RBMP is used as a tool to address water resource challenges across a basin, 
and allows water resources to be managed on different scales in a coordinated fashion. This also 
suggests that enhancing water security may not be achieved through an isolated, fragmented and 
incoherent management system within political boundaries; although, when designing the institutional 
arrangements, the context of the country or region to which such institutional arrangements are 
introduced may need to be taken into account. 
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Chapter Five: The WRM system in England 
5.1 Introduction 
 
7KH(8:)'VHWVDWDUJHWWRDFKLHYHDWOHDVWµJRRGVWDWXV¶LQDOOZDWHUERGLHVE\, while in some 
cases the achievement of good status may be delayed until 2021 or 2027. The WFD includes 
requirements for both RBMPs and stakeholders in water planning. The WFD stipulates that µ0HPEHU
States shall encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation of this 
Directive, in particular in the production, review and updating of the river basin management 
plans¶.730,QWHUHVWHG SDUWLHV DUH GHILQHG DV µDQ\ SHUVRQ JURXS RU RUJDQL]DWLRQ ZLWK DQ LQWHUHVW RU
³stake´ in an issue, either because they will be directly affected or because they may have some 
influence on its outcome...Essential to active involvement is the potential for participants to influence 
the process¶.731The EU member states were also expected to transpose the WFD into their water law 
and implement its programme measures within a defined period of time. In the UK, the EUWFD 
obligation to set out RBMPs was implemented by the Water Environment (WFD England and Wales) 
Regulations 2003. This suggests that the WFD is also SDUWDQGSDUFHORI(QJODQG¶VZDWHUODZ 
 
In Chapter Four, discussion of the EU water law focused on examination of the part of the WFD 
which uses the RBMPs as a key tool. The RBMPs provide the framework to understand and manage 
water security pressures in an integrated way. 732 They are decisive devices for protecting and 
improving the water environment to meet the good status objective under WFD.733 The RBMPs were 
published for the water bodies of England and Wales in December 2009. The publication showed 
WKDWSHUFHQWRIZDWHUERGLHV LQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHVZHUHDWµJRRG¶VWDWXVDQGVHWRXWPHDVXUHV
proposed to bring improvement to 32 per cent by 2015.734 
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WRM and water services are two different concerns. The former is concerned with water resource 
issues such as water quantity, quality and ecosystem. On the other hand, water services management 
is related to water provision services. Despite these two issues being governed by different areas of 
law, the management systems share common features in supporting the sustainability of water. In 
England, about 10 per cent of freshwater resources are abstracted (excluding abstraction to support 
power generation), although there are variations in the level of withdrawals in different parts of the 
country.735 For instance, in south-east and eastern England, more than 22 per cent of water resources 
are abstracted.736 From this amount, almost half per cent is abstracted by the water companies.737 
This demonstrates that a high percentage of total consumption is delivered by the water companies. 
In England and Wales, water companies abstract almost half of the total amount taken from non-tidal 
waters. 738  The water companies are also major dischargers. They set out the services and 
improvements they intend to provide for better sewage treatment and to reduce the impact of water 
abstraction. 739 Accordingly, the water companies play a most important role in river basin 
management planning under the WFD, since they are vertically integrated and are major abstractors 
and dischargers. They are counted amongst the crucial stakeholders in delivering the necessary 
improvements in water bodies within the RBMP programmes of measures; they are involved µLQWKH
management and protection of the water environment¶740 and they play a significant role in WFD 
implementation. 741 This chapter discusses what the service providers are doing to enhance the 
sustainability of water. More specifically, the chapter investigates the roles of the water companies 
and in this context, assesses the extent to which the key features of an effective WRM system are 
reflected in England¶V water policy and law. 
With these objectives in mind, the themes of the chapter are organized into three main sections. To 
understand the context of water resources in England, the first section assesses the availability of such 
resources. The section reviews the natural availability of water and the human-induced factors 
affecting the security of water. In the second section, the traditional water services provision 
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institutional arrangements are investigated to explore the development of WRM law. The third section 
assesses contemporary water services and resource management institutional arrangements. Finally, 
inferences are drawn to form a conclusion on the extent to which the key features of an effective WRM 
system are reflected in English water policy and law. 
5.2 WRM institutional arrangements in England 
5.2.1 Water resources availability and human pressures in England 
 
The UK ± a union of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland ± is one of the EU member states. 
7KHMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUPDWWHUV LQWKH8.LVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DµFHQWUDOL]HGXQLWDU\VWDWHDOWKRXJKWKHUH
KDV EHHQ GHYROXWLRQ RI MXULVGLFWLRQV¶ ZLWK UHJDUG WR GLIIHUHQW LVVXHV VLQFH  742  Under the 
devolution framework, key matters are reserved for handling by the central government, while others 
are transferred to the Assembly of Wales/Northern Ireland and the Scottish Parliament. 743  The 
devolution of power, however, is not given to the same degree in Scotland, Northern Ireland or 
Wales;744for instance, there was more devolution in Scotland compared with other administrations.745 
In England there is no devolution over its arrangements except for some devolution to the Greater 
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England is not immune from water security challenges. Map 2 shows that most of south-east and 
eastern England suffers from serious water stress. Among water stress zones, the Thames, Southern 
Water, Cambridge Water, Portsmouth Water and Mid Kent Water are mentionable. Parts of the south 
wHVW DQG D QXPEHU RI FHQWUDO (QJODQG¶V UHJLRQs aUH GHVLJQDWHG DV XQGHU µPRGHUDWH¶ ZDWHU VWUHVV
These parts of England might need responsive solutions. The map also informs us that only a small 
number of water zones are under low water stress.  
 
In 2013, each water body was re-designated based on the status of its available water.748  This 
resource zone water stress classification explains how Thames Water, Southern Water and some 
other areas are now under serious water stress. 749 Water resources are not evenly distributed 
throughout England.750 The country is characterized by a very wet west and a drier eastern half of the 
country.751 For instance, the Thames River basin district is one of the driest river basins in the UK, 
and its rainfall level is below the national average.752 The river basin suffers from severe water 
shortages, particularly in dry or drought periods. In addition to uneven distribution and drought 
problems in England, water bodies are exposed to human-induced pressures.753 
  
In England, human-induced water pressures come from over-abstraction and pollution. 754  For 
instance, in the Thames River basin district during drought periods, approximately 80 percent of its 
water flow is abstracted.755 The human-induced water quality failures are caused by point and diffuse 
pollution sources.756Point source pollution can be handled by using regulatory mechanisms that 
shape the behaviour of firms, industries and people. Point source pollution control is believed to be 
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more effective in comparison with the management of diffuse pollution.757As the categories indicate, 
diffuse source pollution comes from diverse unidentifiable sources, whereas point source comes from  
a specific, identifiable source that can be easily traced. Diffuse pollution comes from diverse sites of 
land use, particularly from agricultural purposes. Diffuse source pollution is challenging to regulate, 
as it is due to the cumulative effect of pollution arising from day-to-day activities over a large area 
and from not one source. No one farmer is responsible, and many are committed to protecting and 
enhancing the environment.758 It is not easy to manage by government regulation; its sources are 
difficult to find; and it requires a huge expense to manage the problem.759 Diffuse pollution is one of 
the major threats to water quality in England;760it may deteriorate groundwater quality; create long-
term water reduction; and increase the costs of the drinking water supply in England.761 
 
Another cause for water shortfalls is an increase in the number of the population. In England, the 
increase in population adds extra demand for water.  For instance, in England and Wales since 1970, 
there has been a 30percent increase in the number of households.762By 2016, an increase in extra 
households is projected that will lead to a significant rise in water demand.763 It is expected that two 
million new homes will be constructed to meet such population increases; within this number, 
approximately 375,000 homes will be constructed in the Thames River basin district, where water 
resources are already under stress.764 Based on present groundwater assessments, the Thames River 
basin district groundwater is fully exploited throughout its watershed.765 The UK Water White Paper 
describes how water resources are already under pressure; there is likely to be less water available for 
people, businesses and the environment.766 In future, water shortages will not be limited to the south 
and east of England;767rather, it is likely that there will be water resource shortages in the other parts 
of the country. 
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5.2.2 Traditional WRMPs 
5.2.2.1 Fragmented and decentralized WRM 
 
The WRM in England is not a new trend. There have been considerable developments in WRM 
policy and legal frameworks since the early nineteenth century. However, the evolution of water 
XWLOLWLHV¶ management law has not shown straightforward development from public to private, or 
from private to public, control. Historically, late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the water 
industries were predominantly owned by private firms.768 In 1831 and 1832, during the Industrial 
Revolution, a massive epidemic of cholera broke out in Britain in major industrial cities.769 Many 
people, particularly the urban poor, were exposed to dangers to their health.  
At the time, it was difficult to hold anyone responsible. There was confusion in finding out the main 
source of the problem and thus making it liable, whether this was a factory or a city, with regard to 
the pollution of streams.770 This disastrous social problem, coupled with a lack of accountability, 
attracted Edwin Chadwick to undertake a study. The study subsequently showed that environmental 
deterioration and poor sanitation were responsible for the ongoing social and health 
problems.771&KDGZLFN¶V study also proposed that central government should take responsibility for 
ensuring a healthy environment, and that a single local administrative body should be responsible for 
water supplies, sewerage and other related sanitation issues and problems.772 
Subsequently, the Public Health Act 1848, which emphasized social and environmental concerns, 
was introduced; and the taking over of private sector water supplies by the municipalities was 
justified on the grounds of public health.773 Through this law, the elected local boards were entrusted 
                                                             
768
 William Maloney and Jeremy Richard, Managing policy change in Britain: the politics of water (Edinburgh 
University Press 1995) 7. 
769
 Elizabeth Fee and 7KHRGRUH%URZQµ3XEOLF+HDOWK$FWRI¶(November 2005) 83(1) Bulletin of the World 





773Greg Barrett and Margaret Wallaceµ$Qinstitutional economics perspective: the impact of water providing on 
ZDWHUFRQVHUYDWLRQLQ(QJODQGDQG$XVWUDOLD¶Water Resources Management, 1328. 
141 
 
with a range of responsibilities within their districts.774 At this stage, it seemed the government 
lacked confidence in private water firms to be able to make a greater contribution to the social 
problems. Through public health initiatives, almost 81 per cent of the water industry was brought 
under the control of local authorities by 1905. 775  The public sectors dominated water service 
provision from the mid-nineteenth century. However, this Public Health Act was not successful. The 
QRWHGFDXVHIRU LWV IDLOXUHZDVWKH ODFNRIµHIIHFWLYHPHDQVRIPonitoring pollution and specialized 
PHFKDQLVPIRUHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHODZ¶776 
5.2.2.2 Commencement of integration  
 
The Local Government Act of 1858 was introduced and extended the authority of local boards to 
construct sewerage works outside their districts if that was deemed necessary for appropriate 
sewerage removal.777This law interconnected the localities. In 1945, the Water Act further introduced 
the rule that called for the amalgamation of scattered and inefficient statutory or non-statutory water 
undertakings through mergers, either with the consent of the firms or compulsorily.778 Through this 
:DWHU$FW WKH µVWDWXWRU\ZDWHUXQGHUWDNHUV¶ FRQVLVWLQJRI ORFDODXWKRULWies and the statutory water 
companies, undertook the responsibility to supply water.779At this stage, the mandates for local 
authorities to provide water originated from different legislation, and this lacked coherence. In 
addition to this, a lack of ministerial supervision to ensure proper implementation of this water law 
also made it unsuccessful.780 
It was found that the water supply facilities were too small and fragmented and, being more 
decentralized, were more susceptible to insecure water supplies.781 More fragmented water service 
facilities lead to unbalanced water utilization, which is unsustainable.782 At the time, the scattered 
water sectors failed to provide improved water for the growing demands.783 One aim of the water 
ILUPV¶PHUJHUVZDVWRLQWHUFRQnect the water service of one locality with another. The unwise use of 
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water by a given group or individual had impacts on other water resource users. In addition, 
development of efficient water resources needed efficient water facilities and, operationally, it was 
not easy to regulate fragmented water facilities. The Act introduced a bigger supply zone to water 
services through merging the small utilities.  
7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKHZDWHULQGXVWULHV¶PHUJHUZDVWKDWLWODFNHGDGHILQLWLRQ for large and efficient 
water services localities. However, the small utilities merger to establish a bigger supply zone did not 
mean a cross-basin transfer, although the Act did not stipulate the scope of the merger. 
Until the enactment of the River Board Act 1948, water pollution concerns were managed in a 
fragmented manner. In the case of inter-county rivers, each county council might be involved in 
regulating pollution within its district, but this did not provide assurance of the protection against 
water pollution.784 This necessitated in reducing the number of local authorities by replacing them 
with river boards. Through the River Board Act, responsibility was conferred to the river boards to 
control pollution at the watershed of the river.785 
The Water Act 1963 brought further reform within the water industry. Through this Act, the primary 
responsibility for water services was assigned to the 29 river authorities and local authorities, private 
companies and the Water Resources Board.786 The Minister of Public Health and the Minister of 
Housing and Local Government were jointly entrusted with policy matters regarding the proper use 
of water resources and their conservation.787 The Act entrusted the river authorities with the power to 
handle the regulatory functions of both water supply and sewerage facilities, whereas local 
authorities were made responsible for the operational aspects of water supply and sewerage, although 
private companies remained as operators of water supply facilities. Meanwhile, the Water Resources 
Board was entrusted with the responsibility of advising central government and the main water 
agencies.788 
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5.2.2.3 Introduction of watershed boundary-oriented water utilities management 
 
Before the introduction of the Water Act 1973 in England and Wales, there were 29 river authorities; 
98 different water undertakings, including 64 local authorities; 101 joint water boards consisting of 
groupings of local authorities and 33 private statutory water supply companies, with over 1,300 
county boroughs and county district councils; and 24 joint sewerage boards that were involved in 
water and sewerage management.789 The wide distribution of water resource responsibilities led to 
the over- or under-utilization of water resources, and this endangered the security of water.790Along 
with the intention of integrating these fragmented water and sewerage organizations and functions, 
the Water Act 1973 also brought more consolidation and reorganization of the structures.791  It 
established ten regional water authorities and entrusted these with diverse regulatory and operational 
functions.792 The Act allowed local authorities to work as agents for the regional water authorities.793 
The new organizational structure has been characterized as changing the administrative boundaries 
and localized water supply and sewerage systems into a regionalized, river basin boundary-oriented 
approach.794 
This Act brought two noble developments with regard to WRM: firstly, it reduced its administrative 
fragmentation; and secondly, it introduced WRM within watershed boundary demarcations. 795 
However, the legislation was criticized for conferring a broad range of regulatory and operational 
IXQFWLRQV µ[t]o the extent, the fundamental problem of conflicts of interests was recognized in the 
$FW¶796 7KH UHJLRQDOZDWHUDXWKRULWLHVZHUH µDEVWUDFWRUVDQGGLVFKDUJHUV UHJXODWLRQHQIRUFHUV
and service providers, polluters and environmental guardians¶.797Because of this, regional water 
authorities were characterized as being ERWKDµpRDFKHUDQGJDPHNHHSHU¶which made it difficult for 
them to act properly. Whilst regionalization has been a beneficial approach in minimizing the 
fragmentation of WRM, it might have undermined local concerns. For instance, with water 
regionalization, the local authorities and river authorities lost their responsibilities. Subsequently, the 
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Water Act 1989 divided regulatory responsibilities and the water supply and sewerage services. It 
then entrusted regulatory responsibilities to the National River Authority, and the water and sewerage 
services to private water companies. 798 The water companies have a statutory duty to maintain 
adequate supplies of wholesome water, whereas regulatory functions are entrusted to various 
government institutions.799 
 
5.2.3Introduction of water utilities divestiture and sustainable approaches 
5.2.3.1 Utilities divestiture  
 
In England, upon the full divestiture of the water industry in 1989, the transfer of the water industry 
was criticized for being driven by ideology rather than the aim of enhancing water security.800The 
transfer of ten public regional water authorities through divestiture (sale of assets) was grounded in 
the idea that the private sector would be more efficient ±that private companies would be better able 
to finance the large investments needed ± and divestiture would create competition. There was also a 
perception that divestiture might assist to mobilize private capital when the government was facing a 
budget shortage. 
The paradox, however, is that competitiveness is restricted because water supply is a natural 
monopoly. Likewise, inter-basin water transfers have environmental and political consequences, and 
pumping water is expensive relative to its unit price; so usually, it is not economically sensible. 
Private water companies could not therefore have the room for competition. The water sector was 
under a natural monopoly during public and private controls, and divestiture did not bring a change 
to this monopoly. Because of this, the water sector divestiture has been characterized under the idiom 
RIµ7KDWFKHULVP¶)RULQVWDQFH+DVVDQ notes that the drives for water sector divestiture were for both 
ideological and economic reasons.801 
Another problem following water utility divestiture was that public participation became limited. It 
was argued that information that was once available to the public was transferred to the private 
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companies and handled by them. Moreover, water divestiture is blamed for giving water companies 
the opportunity to limit information and reduce the involvement of consumers.802 On the other hand, 
supporters justify water divestiture by citing state failure, water scarcity and the lack of capital to 
provide secure water to its users.803 The future may not be the same as the past, and new institutional 
arrangements are required to develop strategies to enhance the security of water.804Divestiture was 
viewed as a tool to enhance the security of water and to improve the water supply for growing water 
demands. A water industry owned by the public is highly subsidized by tax, rather than a fair cost 
that reflects its services.805 Although the private companies are not primarily aiming for social equity, 
the internalization of water costs is seen as enhancing water security.  
For instance, (QJODQG¶V1989 water divestiture has been justified on the following grounds. First, the 
difficulty in financing an improved quality of water to a growing number of people, and the 
obligation of EU member states to comply with the high quality standards of drinking water, were 
factors that contributed to the full divestiture of the water industry.806Second, as Bakker also notes, 
the regional water authorities were incapable of providing the expected improved quality of water 
supply and sewerage management. Public-owned water utilities were challenged by limited budgets, 
the inability to raise capital and competing government priorities. Third, the ageing water and waste 
water infrastructures could neither meet the growing demands, nor comply with the commitment of 
the new water quality standards that the country was expected to meet.807The argument of Bakker 
hence highlights the problem of water cost-internationalization challenges. However, this does not 
mean that public water utility ownership is free. For instance, the water utilities in Scotland are in a 
public system, but the water services are not free. In England, there is full cost-recovery for piped 
water services, leaving aside a resource cost. There are separate charging schemes that provide cross-
subsidy to enhance affordability. The water and sewerage undertakers are obliged to accommodate 
social tariffs; they reduce charges for individuals who would otherwise have difficulty in paying their 
full water services costs.808This demonstrates that (QJODQG¶VZDWHU ODZVFOHDUO\DOORZFURVV-subsidy 
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in the water cost-internalization process, although they do not allow for a direct subsidy from 
taxation. 
Debates for and against water divestiture have shown powerful arguments on both sides. However, 
demanding to exploit water resources as free resources, or without paying fair prices, may take us 
back to the tragedy of the commons.809 On the other hand, it may be unwise to develop a framework 
that considers water resources as a purely commercial commodity, governed by market forces such 
as demand and supply. If water resources are a pure commodity, their access depends upon the 
capacity to pay, and the water service payments would hence depend on the willingness to pay.  
5.2.3.2 Separation of regulatory and utilities service provision  
 
The private water industry may not want to manage demand; so, to reduce demand would increase 
the cost of the water supply, thus reducing revenue.810 As watHULVH[SRVHGWRµVWDWHIDLOXUH¶LWLVDOVR
equally H[SRVHG WR µPDUNHW IDLOXUH¶811 Neither water divestiture nor public control is a panacea for 
sustaining water resources. In such contexts, the key concerns are how to mediate and strike a 
balance to ensure the security of water resources in both public and private water services companies. 
This leads to questions of how the economic, social and environmental issues are reflected in the 
institutional arrangements of WRM, and how they are regulated upon fully privatizing the water 
industry in England.  
This necessitates an evaluation of how the regulatory and operational responsibilities were allocated 
after the full divestiture of the water industry, and how the private water industry would be controlled 
to mitigate overriding commercial interests. It was noted by Howarth and McGillivray that primarily, 
DQGWRµDJUHDWH[WHQWXQGHUIXQGLQJDQGODFNRIFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVZHUHSHUFHLYHGWREHWKHSUREOHPV
and private sector styles of management were perceived to be solutions¶.812 As discussed elsewhere, 
the regional water authorities were entrusted with both regulatory and water services responsibilities 
under the 1973 Water Act;813but these responsibilities were conflicting in their nature.  
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In 1986, a full water industry divestiture agenda was sought.814 The White Paper prepared for this 
purpose stated that divestiture ZRXOGHQFRXUDJHWKHZDWHUVHUYLFHVFRPSDQLHVµWRFRPSHWHHIIHFWLYHO\
in fields where they can do so. Where this is not practical the gRYHUQPHQW¶V DLP LV WR LQWURGXFH D
system of regulation which will stimulate a competitive approach. Profit is a more effective incentive 
than Government controls¶.815  Initially, privatization was sought to include the regulatory functions 
of WRM. In response to the proposal of the privatization of the water industries, a fear was 
subsequently expressed regarding the regulatory aspects.816 In relation to this fear, Howarth contends 
WKDWµ[a]lthough integrated management of the water cycle within the public sector had allowed water 
utilities to undertake full control over water supply, sewerage treatment and a diverse range of other 
water functions, the model rise to disquiet when applied a entity privatized water industry¶.817 In 
addition to the concerns of law enforcement, the designation of regulatory functions to the private 
sector was feared to generate a possible conflict of interests.818 
Moreover, objections were raised regarding regulation of the aquatic environments that were of 
significance to (XURSHDQ &RPPXQLW\ LQWHUHVWV DQG WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU¶V FDSDFLW\ WR DFW DV D
µFRPSHWHQW DXWKRULW\¶ WR implement the EU directives. 819  Subsequently, the operational and 
regulatory functions were separated, and regulatory functions remained under government 
organizations, whereas operational utility functions were transferred through divestiture. 820 As a 
consequence, WRM functions were divided into two parts: the water supply and sewerage services 
on the one hand, and regulatory and law enforcement functions on the other. 821  After that, the 
regulatory functions remained under public control, and diverse statutory regulatory bodies were 
established to mitigate conflicting interests, whereas the water and sewerage services became fully 
privatized.822 This reform brought a clear separation between regulatory and operational functions, 
whilst favouring full divestiture of the water utility sector with strong public control. 
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5.2.4 The roles of regulatory bodies, water undertakers and other stakeholders in WRM 
 
To protect consumers and the environment from overriding monopolized economic interests and to 
ensure sustainable water resource utilization, a diverse range of regulatory mechanisms were 
designed to control the functions of the private water and sewerage companies in England. The major 
bodies involved in the management include the water undertaker, the Secretary of State for the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Environment Agency, the Water 
Services Regulation Authority (WSRA), the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) and the Consumer 
Council for Water (CCWater). The roles of these organizations and institutional arrangements are 
indispensable and supportive, because a weakness in any institution or organization may affect the 
sustainability of water.  
Particularly, in the WRMP preparation, publication and implementation stages, Defra, the water 
resource regulators and other stakeholders shape the plan into an efficient system to secure water 
resources in England. Even in Scotland, where water services remain within the public water sector, 
the regulatory framework is similar to that of England. For instance, the Water Industry Commission 
of Scotland acts as an economic regulator, the Drinking Water Regulator acts as a water quality 
watchdog, and the Environment Agency regulates the environmental aspects of water companies.823 
The implication is that the nature of the water supply controlled by the public may not be guaranteed 
a proper WRM in the absence of appropriate regulatory schemes. As there is tragedy in unregulated 
water services in private utilities, there is tragedy also in unregulated public utilities. 
5.2.4.1 The water undertakers 
5.2.4.1.1 Water abstraction and discharges  
 
As for other water users, the abstraction regime also applies to the water companies. When water 
companies abstract water from their resource zones, they have statutory obligations to comply with. 
All water undertakers must comply with the terms of water abstraction in their licences.824 Regarding 
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water conservation, the water undertakers have a statutory duty to conserve water825 and to promote 
the efficient use of water by its customers.826 A water undertaker reviews the impacts of its water 
abstraction and discusses Natura 2000 sites with the Environment Agency.827 Water undertakers also 
have the obligation to protect against the impacts of water abstraction on biodiversity.828 They have a 
statutory obligation to restrict or ban specific water uses, which they supply temporarily when there 
is a drought.829 
 
5.2.4.1.2 Developing long-term WRMPs 
 
The WRMPs are key tools to secure the long-term resilience of waWHUXQGHUWDNHUV¶VXSSO\V\VWHPV, 
since they help the undertakers to take steps for the purpose of enabling them to meet, in the long 
term, the need for the supply of water to consumers. As the plans accommodate a range of measures 
to manage water resources in sustainable ways, and to increase efficiency in the use of water and 
reduce its demand so as to reduce pressure on water resources, they provide key tools for the 
implementation of RBMP ideals. They are crucial in controlling pressures on the water resources. 
This reflects how the WRMPs are relevant to both water resources planning and to water security. 
 
On the other hand, as elsewhere discussed, the water companies in England are private commercial 
bodies that, alongside water supply duties, are allowed to organize their affairs to secure DµIDLUUHWXUQ¶
upon capital investment, subject to the scrutiny of prices by the WSRA Ofwat (Office of Water 
Services). This commercial context for meeting public obligations is a key operational aspect of 
(QJODQG¶VSULYDWLzed water structure. Under the Water Industry Act 1991, water companies have a 
statutory duty to maintain adequate supplies of wholesome water for purposes such as drinking, 
cooking or food preparation, or for use in premises in which food is produced.830 To meet this duty, 
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the water undertakers are expected to develop an efficient and economic system for water supplies.831 
They must comply with the conditions set out upon their appointments.832 
As a statutory requirement, specifically, the water undertakers must prepare and publicize their 
WRMPs µWREHDEOHDQGFRQWLQXHWREHDEOHWRPHHWLWVVWDWXWRU\REOLJDWLRQ¶833 The WRMs are the 
ZDWHUFRPSDQLHV¶ ORQJ-term assessments indicating the vulnerability of water resources, which help 
companies to make sure that they can respond flexibly to future uncertainties, such as the impacts of 
climate change, population growth and changes in demand.834 The WRMPs are made through taking 
assessments of specific water resources zones and availability to meet the ranges of demands.835 The 
ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV]RQH LVXQGHUVWRRGDV µDQDUHDZLWKLQZKLFK WKH PDQDJHPHQWRIZDWHU VXSSO\DQG
demand is largely self-contained (apart from agreed bulk transfers of water)¶.836 As their parameter, 
the water companies take into account schemes to meet water demand and VXSSO\ EDODQFHV µDW WKH
period during which water resources zone supply balances at their lowest¶.837 
The implication is that the water companies must prepare and maintain their WRMPs, and their strict 
obligation to follow suggestions that within: 
the privatized water industry that exists in England and Wales, there is an intricate balance of 
responsibilities involved in securing that objective. The µoptions¶ available to water supply 
companies for reducing demand and enhancing supply are far from being matters of purely 
discretionary commercial judgment on their part.838 
Through a WRMP WKH ZDWHU FRPSDQLHV VKRXOG VKRZ µKRZ WKH\ LQWHQG WR PDLQWDLQ WKH EDODQFH
EHWZHHQGHPDQGIRUZDWHUDQGLWVVXSSO\¶839 Private water companies should predict the availability 
of water and ensure a sustainable water supply.840 The WRMP is considered as the main scheme for 
regulating water security challenges in England.841 Generally, the water companies are expected to 
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use a µtwin-track¶ approach, which encompasses diverse options from both demand and supply 
management schemes, such as leakage management, water metering, infrastructure development, 
recycling, desalination and establishiQJLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVZLWKLQWKHZDWHUFRPSDQ\¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHV
zone and beyond its geographic boundary demarcation.842 
In 2007, the Water Resources Management Plan Direction introduced detailed rules, which specified 
that a WRM should address the following: demand and supply forecast in relation to climate change; 
implications of population growth on water demand in its supply area; restrictions on, or prohibition 
of, water supplies during drought periods; and water metering.843 Moreover, the water companies are 
obliged to prepare a drought plan to complement their WRMP.844 This Plan accommodates the 
options and measures that water companies consider for short-term water availability challenges 
when there is a drought,845 and includes temporary measures that they use to prohibit or restrict 
specific water uses.846 The water undertakers are also obliged to provide reasons for their choice of 
specific measures among others.847 
In its WRMP, a water undertaker estimates the quantity of water required to meet water demands; the 
measures to take, or to continue to take, for water supply purposes; the timing for implementing the 
specified measures; and other concerns specified by the Secretary of State.848 The water undertakers 
µFRQVLGHUDOORSWLRQV IRUPHHWLQJ WKHLU VXSSO\ DQGGemand balance when preparing water resources 
PDQDJHPHQW SODQV RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU WUDGLQJ ZDWHU RU RWKHU FURVV ERXQGDU\ VROXWLRQV¶ 849 In the 
beginning, the water company lists all the options for its water resources zone to meet the demand for 
the planned period, including water deficit or surplus. In particular, a water company identifies 
unconstrained lists of options, then feasible lists and then, finally, it must determine preferred lists of 
options to supply secure water for the planned period.850 The preIHUUHGRSWLRQVDUHXVHGDVWKHµILQDO
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SODQQLQJ VROXWLRQ¶ IRU D VSHFLILF ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV ]RQH 851  This option should then be justified 
economically, socially and environmentally.852 
Upon preparing the water resources plan, the water companies pass through a long process consisting 
of 18 stages.853 Further details on the consultation process and requirements were introduced under 
the Water Resources Management Plan Regulations 2007. 854  In the early stages of the WRMP 
preparation, the water undertaker must consult the Environment Agency, the WSRA, the Secretary of 
State and licensed water suppliers.855 The regulatory bodies, policy providers and the Secretary of 
State play advisory roles at this stage to shape the WRMP. The water undertakers also obtain 
directions on any matter, as well as a prescription on the format and the issues that should be 
included in the WRMPs from the Secretary of State.856 
Once the water companies finish the draft plan, they state whether any information contained in the 
draft document is, or might be, commercially confidential, and they send it to the Secretary of State 
to determine the exclusions. 857  The Secretary of State then decides on the matters that are 
commercial or confidential and any information that they consider may affect national interest if it is 
publicized.858 Afterwards, the water undertaker publishes the draft plan in the way prescribed by the 
Secretary of State or, if there is no such prescription, brings it to the attention of those persons likely 
to be affected by inviting representations.859 
Following this, a water undertaker provides a statement of reply to the representations, and it may 
amend its draft plan accordingly. However, in the instances when the Secretary of State is 
dissatisfied with regard to a draft plan meeting the criteria, this may result in an inquiry or public 
hearing. 860  Finally, after incorporating the issues raised from publication of the draft plan and 
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complying with any directions given by the Secretary of State, through obtaining permission from 
the Secretary of State, the water undertaker publishes the final version of its WRMP.861 
Obtaining permission and publishing the WRMP are considered as an indication that a company has 
met its statutory requirements in preparing and maintaining a WRMP.862 However, the preparation of 
this plan may not be an end to securing water resources availability. It is increasingly dependent 
upon the implementation of the plan by the water undertakers and other stakeholders. The water 
regimes do not provide clear statutory obligations regarding meeting water sustainability objectives 
that are enforceable against water companies, except in the procedural requirement to develop a 
WRMP. Howarth records his reservations on the implementation of the water resources plan as 
follows: 
The approach that has been provided for is entirely procedural in character and it should be 
noted that having a plan in place, by itself, does nothing to address water security concerns. 
Everything depends upon the specific implementing actions taken by water supply companies 
in furtherance of those plans. Much the same reservations that have been expressed about the 
reluctance of companies to plan for actions which are contrary to their commercial interests 
arise in relation to disincentives actually to undertake the actions set out in a plan. The 
peculiarity of the water resources planning system is that implementation of plans seems to be 
placed in a legal void.863 
Once the final version of the WRMP is publicized, it is effective for the period it was prepared for. 
However, the WRMP may be revised before the time to which it relates expires. 864  The water 
companies carry out a revision annually. In particular, when there is a fundamental change in the 
circumstances that the plan is proposing to address, the water undertaker is directed by the Secretary 
of State; or, if other events arise, the WRMP will be revised.865 This makes the water resources plan 
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5.2.4.2 The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
  
In WRM, discretion can be avoidable, since there is a range of mixed objectives that water resources 
regulators and governments are striving to achieve. This makes discretion critical; and while 
discretion itself is not problematic, its abuse can affect the sustainability of water.  
Water resources abstraction in parts of England is unsustainable.866 In some parts of the country, the 
water stress level is moderate or serious.867 England¶V water policy considers intervention in water 
security challenges through the use of an intertwined approach; that is, water demand and supply 
management to achieve the sustainability of water resources whilst protecting against water quality 
failures.868 There are no clear schemes developed to internalize cost regarding non-drinking water 
usage. The WRMP¶V obligation is limited to drinking water. Water cost internalization is one of the 
instruments for the management of water demand; however, it is not effective in England since water 
metering is not a compulsory requirement, except in those areas where resources are in stress.869 
To implement water security policy and law, Defra has a range of responsibilities within WRM. 
Defra delivers its responsibilities by itself or through its regulatory agencies, such as the DWI and 
the Environment Agency, which regulate the safety of water quality for human consumption and 
protect water resource environments, respectively. In principle, the authority to regulate drinking 
water quality rests upon the Secretary of State, but this duty is exercised through the Chief Drinking 
Water Inspector.870 
Regulators are not political appointees that handle some politically sensitive issues in WRM; in some 
instances, the water resources regulators may be conferred with regulatory responsibilities with many 
objectives. Managing these concerns in water resources regulation needs an understanding of the 
diverse interests to enable a balancing of the interests involved.871The government (i.e. Defra) gives 
guidance and directions to the regulators and water undertakers. Through these schemes, Defra plays 
DPHGLDWLQJUROHµEHWZHHQWKHZDWHUFRPSDQLHVFRQVXPHUV regulators, politicians and the European 
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8QLRQ¶ 872  For water companies, the provision of guidance enhances consistency and common 
understanding in the implementation of their statutory obligations. 873 Defra also plays a role in 
DXGLWLQJWKHZDWHUFRPSDQLHV¶capabilities of meeting emergency management.874 'HIUD¶VWRM role, 
therefore, must ensure the balance of the overall goals expected to enhance sustainable development.  
Moreover, the Secretary of State has the statutory mandate to give policy guidance and issue 
directions to all the regulators. For instance, they provide policy guidance for both water undertakers 
and the WSRA on social tariffs to allow special treatment for those water customers who may not be 
able to afford to pay the cost of water services; but everyone else is charged with full cost-recovery 
for all the capital and operational costs.875This role implicates that price internalization, in services 
provision, is not an end in itself. It aims to contribute to sustainable development.876 To make price 
internalization responsive, the Secretary of State provides policy guidance to the WSRA with regard 
to social and environmental concerns.877 The Flood and Water Resources Management Act 2010 
incorporates a similar statutory obligation for Defra to perform.878 This role is closely related to the 
above-mentioned role with regard to issuing social and environmental guidance.879 The provision of 
this guidance allows the water undertakers to consider special arrangements for social groups or 
people who cannot afford to pay. Through this guidance, the Secretary of State shapes the delivery of 
WKH DXWKRULW\¶V ZDWHU SULFH UHYLHZ WR FRQWULEXWH WRZDUGV HQYLURQPHQWDO and social policy 
aspirations.880 
In principle, all water services customers are expected to pay fair prices for the water services they 
are obtaining.881 However, in England, only 30 per cent RIKRXVHKROGV¶ZDWHUVHUYLFHVDUHILWWHGZLWK
meters.882 It is believed that a 10 per cent reduction in water use has been observed by fitting water 
meters.883 At the current time, except in those areas where resources are under stress, introducing 
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metering is not a compulsory requirement for water companies.884Because of this, it is difficult to say 
whether water customers are paying a fair price for what they are using. There is the possibility of 
under- or over-payment for the water services they are receiving. This makes it doubtful whether 
water resources¶ institutional arrangements, in relation to cost internalization, are responsive enough 
to shape the behaviours of unwise water customers. However, the water companies pay the price for 
the volume of water they abstract. As one of the major water abstractors, each company pays a 
charge, which is volume-related, to the Environment Agency, and it will have to meter its abstraction 
for the Environment Agency as a license condition. 
In addition to policy guidance, Defra appoints or replaces water undertakers, and they are expected to 
carry out their duties according to the conditions in their appointment or replacement regarding how 
they exercise their functions.885 The Secretary of State may pass an enforcement order to secure 
compliance if water companies contravene statutory or other requirements.886 The implication of this 
mandate is that the Secretary of State has an influential power over water companies to hold them 
accountable when they fail conditions set out under their appointment or statutory obligations.  
In practice, however, there is no clear implication that Defra itself is involved directly in regulating 
the behaviours of water companies. The present Defra roles seem to tend more towards policy 
formulation and provision of guidance in order to direct the water regulators and companies. Direct 
regulatory roles are played by the water regulators. For instance, a water undertaker is a company 
that is appointed by the Secretary of State, or by the Director General of Ofwat with the consent or 
authorization of the Secretary of State, to carry out water services in specific areas.887 Once a water 
undertaker is appointed, its obligations emanate from the appointment document and the law.888 
When water is under stress due to drought, Defra has a mandate to issue a drought order. It 
implements the laws and policies of WRM that relate to hosepipe bans for non-domestic water use.889 
For instance, in 2010, when many parts of England experienced drought, Defra issued an order 
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banning a diverse range of non-domestic water uses.890 Such an order affects both water undertakers 
and water users until it is lifted. They must respect the ban when they are exercising their rights and 
obligations. 
To conserve water resources, Defra has the power to designate protected areas for water resources.891 
It has a mandate to protect available water resources from human-induced impacts that can lead to 
water quality failure. Water undertakers have an obligation to conserve water892 and protect the water 
environment893 and biodiversity.894 When water abstractions are damaging water resources and their 
environment, the Secretary of State may order abstraction licences to be curtailed by the 
Environment Agency without any payment or compensation.895 
 
5.2.4. 3 The Environment Agency 
 
As its name indicates, the Environment Agency is a guardian and watchdog to ensure that water 
utilization does not harm the environment. 896  The Environment Agency was created by the 
Environment Act 1995 to protect or enhance the environment and promote sustainable 
GHYHORSPHQW¶ 897 The Environment Agency is conferred with responsibility to protect the 
environment from unregulated human actions,898while the local authorities regulate issues designated 
to them to protect water quality. 899  The mandate allocation has made clear the roles of the 
Environment Agency and the local authority. A single regulator handles the specific, regulated 
facilities of all activities through a single permit, if such facilities are engaged in different regulated 
activities. The regulators (the Environment Agency and local authority) take steps to remove the risk 
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and charge back the cost to the operator.900 This implies that the rule allows the regulators to take 
early measures against regulated facilities.  
 
The Environment Agency is entrusted with regulatory roles to ensure the sustainability of water 
resources, and it is required to conserve water from over-abstraction and to prevent pollution.901 It 
regulates all persons and institutions, including water undertakers that engage in or are already 
involved in the abstraction of water resources. The Environment Agency has a regulatory duty to 
ensure that water abstractions are dealt with effectively to enhance the sustainability of water. When 
water abstractions are damaging to Natura 2000 sites 902  or to biodiversity, 903  or are seriously 
damaging water levels, the Environment Agency may modify or revoke water abstraction 
licences.904It WDNHV PHDVXUHV DJDLQVW ZDWHU DEVWUDFWRUV µLQ WKH LQWHUHVWV RI JUHDWHU HIILFLHQF\¶ ZLWK
regard to the use of water resources.905 
5.2.4.3.1 Responsive water allocation 
 
Through the Water Act 2003, the Environment Agency is entrusted with a duty to enter into 
arrangements with permit holders to enhance the proper utilization of water resources.906 These 
arrangements may set the revocation or variation of water abstraction.907This measure is invaluable 
in regulating the behaviour of water abstractors. The Environment Agency also takes measures 
necessary to limit drought problems.908The Water Act 2003 introduced three schemes for dealing 
with drought situations: drought permits, ordinary drought orders and emergency drought 
orders.909The drought orders from the Secretary of State and drought permits from the Environment 
Agency affect the water FRPSDQLHV¶ domestic water supplies differently from other 
abstractors.910The restrictions on water abstraction focus to non-domestic water uses, which are 
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called µhosepipe bans¶.911This suggests the primacy given to the domestic water supply. The Water 
Act 2003 also introduced a statutory requirement for water companies to prepare, maintain and 
publish drought plans.912The drought plans are crucial to both water resources planning and to water 
security. They set out how the Environment Agency will manage water resources for the 
environment and people during drought periods. It accommodates a range of actions necessary for 
responding against a drought. More specifically, the plans set out how a water company will 
continue to meet its duties to supplying water. 
 
Developing responsive permit systems for water abstraction that may limit the over-use of water is 
one of the tools for sustaining water. Traditionally, in England, the water abstraction permits were 
designed to protect the economic interests of permit holders WKURXJK D µILUVW-come, first-VHUYHG¶
principle.913 The water regime was designed when water resources in England were perceived to be 
in surplus, and the population number was considerably smaller.914 In England and Wales, at present, 
the Environment Agency nationally administers more than 50,000 licences that are obtained by 
different sectors.915 From this number, more than 80 per cent of these permits are without a time 
limit.916  These licences are not sufficiently responsive to take immediate measures when water 
resources availability is at risk, unless compensation is paid for the permit owners or possessors,917 as 
they grant a historic right to the permit owner or possessor. The system did not accommodate the 
contemporary pressing water shortage concerns.918 
 
Therefore, water law in England was traditionally based on protecting private rights, which gave 
perpetual rights over water to those who held permits. This system is not appropriate to respond to 
current water shortage problems. The Water Act of 2003 introduced a time-bound permit system.919  
This new system requires permits to be issued on a time-limited basis, starting from July 2012. In 
effect, the permit holders will no longer be entitled to claim compensation for any changes in their 
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water abstraction permits under the circumstances determined by law.920 The introduction of the new 
water abstraction system has many implications. Firstly, it shows that despite the water property 
rights of permit holders over specific volumes of water, water permits need to be seen differently 
from other property rights. Secondly, public interests in the environment prevail over the property 
rights of individual licence holders. The reform brought a shift in focus from private rights to public 
rights, and made it clear that water is a public good, and that there is a necessity to control water on 
the grounds of environmental protection.921 
 
The new water regime provides abstraction permits which normally expire after 12 years from their 
issuance with a common end date.922 The Environment Agency updates permits by considering the 
level of water resources in the catchment at any time.923 However, the Water Act of 2003 does not 
fully shape the old permit system automatically. Changing this traditional permit system is due in the 
next Parliament, to take effect in the 2020s.924  Until then, the Water White Paper promises to make 
better use of existing tools, while attempting to handle complex contemporary water resources 
problems. 
5.2.4.3.2 Water quality protection 
 
Water pollution increases the cost of water treatment and constrains the availability of water.925For 
instance, it has been estimated that water pollution alone costs England and Wales up to £1.3 billion 
per year. 926 In addition to water abstraction regulation, the Environment Agency controls water 
pollution. Generally, water pollution comes from two sources: point and diffuse sources. The former 
type of pollution comes from a particular identifiable source, including factories, storm sewers or 
pollutant discharges in discrete sites. In contrast, diffuse source pollution comes from multiple 
dispersed sites.927A regulatory system may not easily control diffuse pollution unlike point source 
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pollution.928One measure to manage diffuse source pollution is the creation of awareness amongst 
farmers of the best farming practices. In England and Wales, the Catchment Sensitive Farming 
Project, which is voluntary in nature, is seeking to tackle agricultural diffuse pollution.929 In this 
project, the farmers are voluntarily engaged in gaining advice and receiving incentives. This 
approach does not use coercive regulation to tackle diffuse pollution problems; instead, it gives 
emphasis to actions taken at the grassroots level and integrates with other catchment delivery 
mechanisms. For instance, the example of the Wessex Catchment in England shows how the 
Catchment Sensitive Farming Project has been conducted at a very local level within small areas to 
control the nitrate problem.930 7KHSURMHFWDLPVµD ORZFRVWVXVWDLQDEOH VROXWLRQWRWKHSROOXWLRQRI
drinking water¶.931 Naturally, however, the lower level catchment (or below) is seen as appropriate to 
manage diffuse pollution problems. 
 
In addition to direct pollution control and awareness creation, designations of protected zones are 
used to protect water resources from pollution.932 The Environment Agency may ask the Secretary of 
State to designate areas as water protection zones.933 For instance, in 1999, a water protection zone 
was designated in the River Dee. 934  Moreover, a code of good agricultural practices has been 
developed and is used in the protected zones.935 
 
Waters are also affected by waste from different sources. Water quality failures from sewage 
discharges and urban waste water may be addressed by issuing standards and introducing a permit 
system. Discharge authorizations DUHUHIHUUHGWRDVµ(QYLURQPHQWDO3HUPLWV¶LQ(QJODQG. They set out 
standards to minimize the adverse effects of waste water on the receiving environment. In other 
words, they are the regulatory schemes for controlling waste water discharge into the environment. 
The waste water treatment aims to return much cleaner waste water, thereby protecting the 
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environment and human health from the adverse effects of the discharge of waste water.936The 
Environment Agency issues discharge consent and permit systems.937Through the permit system, the 
Environment Agency can control water quality failures, and the water companies are mainly 
involved in water quality management by using this scheme. The Environment Agency is entrusted 
with the responsibility to regulate water quality deterioration through pollution, effluent discharge or 
sewerage. 938 The ten English and Welsh sewerage companies are responsible for waste water 
treatment from sewage, and are the main waste water treatment service providers.939 
 
5.2.4.4The Water Services Regulation Authority 
 
Through the Water Act 1989, the Director General of Water Services was appointed by the Secretary 
of State.940 The Secretary of State, through the Director General (who worked as a regulatory arm for 
the Secretary of State), conducted the economic regulation of water services.941 Subsequently, on 1 
April 2006,the WSRA ± a regulatory body replacing the Director General of Water Services ± was 
established.942 
Under an existing arrangement, the WSRA has its own board, including chairman, chief executive, 
two executive directors and four non-executive directors.943 Under the arrangements provided for by 
the Water Act 2003, the accountability of the regulator was transferred to the board, to oversee how 
the WSRA carried out its functions and effectively met its statutory requirements.944 The WSRA is a 
non-ministerial government department, accountable to Parliament, although it reports annually to 
the Secretary of State. 945  While the WSRA is independent from direct ministerial department 
                                                             
936
 'HIUDµ:DVWHZDWHUWUHDWPHQWLQthe United Kingdom ± 2012 implementation of the European Union Urban Waste 
Water Treatment Directive¶ 91/271/EEC (2012) 19. 
937
 Water Resources Act 1991, s.89. 
938
 Water Resources Act 1991, s.84; Environment Act 1995 ss. 2(ii), 5. 
939
 Defra (n 936) 4. 
940
 Water Act 1989, s. 5(1) 
941
 Water Act 1989, ss.4±5, s.7; see also s.2(2) Water Industry Act 1991. 
942
 Water Industry Act 1991 s.1A; see also s.34(1)Water Act 2003. 
943






control,946 it obtains the guidance of Defra with regard to social and environmental matters.947 The 
independence of Ofwat seems qualified to allow government to intervene in its regulatory remit, to 
ensure a range of interests that the government aspires to achieve from economic regulation. 
5.2.4.4.1 The remit of the WSRA 
 
Ofwat is the principal economic regulator, although it is expected to meet the requirements of the 
Environment Agency when setting prices. The WSRA is entrusted with many economic regulator 
powers and responsibilities. Amongst its main responsibilities are: protecting the interests of 
consumers; promoting effective competition, wherever appropriate; ensuring that the functions of 
water companies are properly carried out, and that the water companies are able to finance their 
functions by providing a reasonable rate of return on their capital; and ensuring that companies with 
water supply licences properly carry out their functions. 948  The WSRA discharges its statutory 
obligation through the use of different schemes.  
 
To regulate the costs of drinking water services, it reviews water service prices every five years and 
sets a maximum price and economic leakage targets, and ensures that companies provide water for a 
long period.949 Its regulatory functions aim for a sustainable water service delivery, with high quality 
water services management, and to develop innovative water industries that enhance the security of 
water resources.950 In particular, price setting has the following three objectives. Firstly, it ensures 
the sustainability of finance to provide the services; it gives an opportunity for the water companies 
to be inspected as to whether they have sufficient capital to run the water services.951 Secondly, it 
protects customers from the abuse of water companies imposing unfair prices using their monopoly 
position.952 Thirdly, it ensures that customers are paying a fair price to the water services as an 
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incentive to reduce water wastage.953 The Ofwat statutory remits are fully limited to the regulation of 
the water companies. 
In addition to price setting, regulation by the WSRA ensures that the companies plan ahead to 
minimize the risk of water insecurity in their areas, and to consider how to meet challenges. Thus the 
regulatory functions of the Authority would seem to have the obligation to balance the interests of 
consumers ± by regulating fair prices ± and companies, by reviewing the maximum price limit for the 
water companies to return a fair profit that sustains their investment.  
To meet the interests of both water consumers and water companies, the WSRA needs to carry out a 
genuine investigation of social and economic demands. In the absence of economic regulation, 
private water companies may focus on supply management through infrastructure development, 
rather than demand management. To avoid such a perception, the Authority set up leakage targets 
and an obligation for the companies to create awareness of valuing water. For instance, the water 
companies are expected to meet economic leakage targets set for 2010±2015. 954  The statutory 
obligation, ZKLFKVWDWHVWKDWµSURWHFWLQJ the interests of consumers; wherever appropriate, promoting 
HIIHFWLYH FRPSHWLWLRQ¶,955 suggests that the primary aim of the Ofwat regulatory role seems more 
focused on protecting consumers by regulating the water companies that abuse their natural 
monopoly position. 
5.2.4.4.2 Procedural obligation 
7KURXJK WKH :DWHU $FW  WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI WKH ZDWHU VHUYLFHV¶ HFRQRPLF UHJXODWRU ZDV
redefined by the introduction of consumer-focused regulation. Under this Act, the interpretation of 
the concept of µFRQVXPHU¶ ZDV H[WHQGHG WR LQFOXGH ERWK H[LVWLQJ DQG IXWXUH ZDWHU XVHUV¶956The 
WSRA is thus expected to consider present and future water users¶ interests upon exercising its 
regulatory functions. Moreover, the Water Act 2003 introduced another duty that the Authority 
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follows when exercising its economic regulatory functions ± to perform regulatory functions in a 
manner that contributes to the achievement of sustainable development.957 
With the introduction of this idea, the WSRA is obliged to take into account diverse interests, in 
order to achieve mixed objectives. Whenever the Authority takes regulatory measures relating to 
price review, it has the duty to exercise its regulatory functions in order to contribute to sustainable 
development, and its regulatory functions must balance economic efficiency, 958  social equity 
(affordability and fairness)959 and environmental sustainability.960 The economic regulator itself must 
ensure that its primary regulatory functions are performed through a trade-off with the non-economic 
interests of water services. Failure to strike the balance may entail the regulatory body being held 
liable for its performance. In this regulatory model that has been introduced, the economic regulator 
must ± upon setting water prices ± take into account the social and environmental consequences of 
the price review. 
The danger, however, may be that the Water Act 2003 creates overlapping regulatory objectives, 
which makes it difficult to hold an economic regulator accountable. There is the possibility that the 
WSRA may justify any of the actions it takes by referring to its mixed regulator objectives. This may 
FUHDWHXQFHUWDLQW\DQG LQFRQVLVWHQF\ LQ WKH$XWKRULW\¶V UHJXODWRU\GHFLVLRQV, even in similar issues. 
Another concern that one may observe from the regulatory functions of the Authority is the question 
over whose responsibility it is to ensure sustainable development. Although the inclusion of the idea 
of sustainable development as a principle to guide economic regulators is novel in itself, the regulator 
has a wide discretion to shape decisions it thinks ensure µVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶ 
It is necessary to examine how statutory schemes have EHHQGHVLJQHGWRLPSOHPHQWWKH$XWKRULW\¶V
regulatory roles in a consistent manner and what mechanisms are available on how to prioritize 
regulatory objectives. The Water Act 2003 imposed the duty upon the Secretary of State to issue 
policy guidance on social and environmental matters and to review this policy guidance to allow the 
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WSRA to handle diverse regulatory objectives through trade-off.961 This policy guidance may assist 
the Authority¶V economic regulatory remit to balance a range of competing interests. Moreover, 
Defra, by providing the guidance on the social and environment concerns, may determine how 
politically sensitive issues are to be handled by the Authority.  
The WSRA must also be expected to exercise its regulatory functions by taking into account the 
principles of best practices and that activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, 
consistent and targeted.962 However, there was reservation in the Authority¶V economic regulatory 
performance in following these guiding principles. For instance, the stakeholders¶ comment under 
the independent review, which had been conducted with the sponsorship of Defra, indicates that the 
Authority¶V decision-making lacked transparency; it haV µUHPRWH RUJDQLVDWLRQ YLHZV RQ WKH
companies, often without adequate explanation, through the price control process¶.963 
5.2.4.4. 3. New development on the roles of the WSRA 
 
On 27 June 2013, the Water Bill was introduced into the House of Commons, and received Royal 
Assent on 14 May 2014. The Water Act 2014 brought some significant reform to the management 
system of water resources in England by focusing on some specific issues. The Water Act 1991 was 
amended in 2014, with the driving forces for the reform being climate change, a growing population 
and changes in the behaviour of water customers. The Water White Paper declared the need to 
µUHIRUP WKH DVSHFWV RI WKH FXUUHQW V\VWHP ZKLFK LQVWLWXWLRQDOLze short-term thinking and make it 
difficult to adopt solutions which would deliver a more joined-up, resilient water resources 
system¶.964 The Strategic Policy Statement also declared that the water law reforms needed to secure 
the long-term resilience of the systems (including the natural systems) on which our essential water 
and sewerage services rely. The water law also needed to promote action to respond effectively to 
pressures on the environment ± including climate change, population growth and changes in 
behaviour, as mentioned above. The law brought change in the ways of addressing present and future 
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challenges. While the Water Act 2014 does not give a definition for the term µresilience¶ Defra 
GHILQHVWKHQRWLRQDVµWKHDELOLW\RIDV\VWHPWRZLWKVWDQGVKRFNVDQGFRQWLQXHWRIXQFWLRQ¶.965 
Under the Water Act 2014, one key reform is the introduction of new statutory duties for Ofwat, 
ZKLFKLPSRVHDSULPDU\GXW\WRIXUWKHUWKHµUHVLOLHQFHREMHFWLYH¶7KH$FWDLPVWRGHYHORSDUHVLOLHQW
sustainable and customer-focused management system for water resources. Section 2 of the Water 
Industry Act 1991 (the general duties with respect to the water industry) has been reformed as a 
primary duty to secure resilience for Ofwat. The Water Act 2014 has also reformed the regulatory 
responsibility of Ofwat fundamentally. The law brought resilience as a key objective of Ofwat, and 
this new primary duty of resilience will require Ofwat to secure the long-term resilience of the 
systems (including the natural systems) on which our essential water and sewerage services rely; to 
promote actions to respond effectively to pressures on the environment (including climate change), 
population growth and changes in behaviour; to ensure long-term planning (25 years) and investment; 
to promote measures to manage water sustainably; and to reduce demand and therefore pressure on 
water resources.966 This water law reform changed the duration of the WRM planning system that 
had tended to focus on short-term planning (that is, a five-yearly periodic planning).   
5.2.4.5 The Consumer Council for Water 
 
The Customer Service Committees were established by the Water Act 1989 with the intent of 
protecting consumers following the divestiture of water services in England. Each Customer Service 
Committee had its own chair and ten to 20 public members.967 The chair of the Committee was 
appointed by the Director General (Ofwat).968 The Customer Service Committees were seen as a 
µZDWHUYRLFH¶WRSURWHFWFRQVXPHUV969 Their mandate emanated from the law or order of the Director 
General.970The introduction of this institutional arrangement reflected the need to give consumers a 
voice in service provision (i.e. standards and prices). 
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The Customer Service Committees represented the interests of all the customers in the water 
supply.971 As discussed elsewhere, public participation in privatized or publicly owned industries 
might be important for enhancing the involvement of water resource users in WRM,972 but the 
&RPPLWWHHV¶ IXQFWLRQLQJ UROHVZHQWEH\RQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ7KH&RPPLWWHHVZKRZHUH UHSUHVHQWLQJ
the interests of the users, became consumer guardians and privatized water industry regulators. 
Practically, although the Committees were not influential actors in decision-making, 973  their 
functions extended to complaint hearings against water companies. This system introduced a user-
oriented regulation which, it was often said, might affect the sustainability of resources by focusing 
on XVHUV¶ interests.974 
Through the Water Act 2003, the Consumer Service Committees were replaced by the CCWater.975 
Under the direction of the Secretary of State, the Council has the authority to establish committees 
for relevant water companies and to alter these if it is considered appropriate.976The Council acts as a 
µYRLFHRIZDWHU¶DQGis DµUHVHDUFK-EDVHG¶FRQVXPHUDGYRFDF\ERG\977The CCWater is entrusted with 
diverse functions: it establishes committees that provide advice and information on matters affecting 
consumers in relation to water services; 978 it prepares proposals, and also provides advice and 
information about consumer matters to the Secretary of State; 979 and it investigates complaints 
regarding matters which appear to affect the interests of consumers.980 
In the traditional arrangement of Consumer Service Committees, there was the perception that due 
concern was not given to environmental aspects or economic concerns. 981  To avoid such 
misunderstandings, under the Council mandates, the Water Act 2003 introduced a new approach, 
which imposes upon the Council a duty to perform its obligations in accordance with the principle of 
µVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶982 With this arrangement, the CCWater has the duty to ensure sustainable 
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development under its framework of decision-making, and to follow the policy guidance and 
directions given by the Secretary of State. The Council should take into account the present 
µFRQVXPHUV¶ DQG WKH IXWXUH ZDWHU XVHUV LQ WKH DUHDV 7KURXJK WKLV WKLQNLQJ the CCWater¶V
responsibility is modified to consider WRM beyond the present water consumers. Moreover, the 
Council is expected to consider some social groups who need special protection to enhance their 
access to water.983It is also under the obligation to respect legal obligations; as it is under the 
supervision of the Secretary of State, it should therefore follow its policy guidance and directions. 
The Council must discharge its functions by following the government objectives of sustainable 
development and, at the same time, it must protect FRQVXPHUV¶LQWHUHVWV. The CCWater must exercise 
its functions by encompassing the ideals of environmental or economic interests. 
The paradox is that now, strictly speaking; the CCWater is not a body that solely protects consumer 
interests. Rather, it has obligations to protect economic efficiency and the sustainability of water 
resources. This indicates that although a primary function of the Council is motivated by consumer 
protection, it must also be expected to ensure protection of social, environmental and economic 
interests. The problems for the CCWater in implementing its functions are numerous; there are 
possible conflicts among these underpinning pillars. The protection of the environment requires the 
full internalization of costs, which will raise water prices. Arguably, the protection of consumer 
interests means enhanced access to clean water by limiting the increase of prices. On the other hand, 
sustainable development may require high quality water, which costs more to supply. The consumer 
protection power is under scrutiny for rendering proper judgements to ensure the sustainability of 
water and social equity, whilst policing water companies for consumer and economic interests. 
Unless there is clear policy guidance on how the Council should perform this multifaceted role, the 
discretion allowed enables it to make inefficient provisions, which will not enable it to realize any of 
its objectives. Perhaps, it may be difficult for the CCWater to know how to prioritize these 
incompatible objectives.  
To avoid isolated consumer protection functions, the CCWater works in coordination with the 
WSRA and the Secretary of State.984 Through this coordination, the Council shares information to 
enhance the effectiveness of its functions.985 The Water Act 2003 imposes an obligation that requires 
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the Council to enter into a memorandum of understanding with the above-mentioned regulatory and 
policy-making bodies.986 This indicates that, although the water services regulators need to exercise 
their respective functions, the nature of water problems needs a coordinated approach, requiring the 
CCWater and the regulators to work in partnership with regard to matters common to all of them. 
The memorandum of understanding may help to mediate the conflict of roles within the regulatory 
functions.987However, the CCWater and its predecessors are mainly concerned with price and service 
standards for consumers, whilst the wider aspects of regulation lie with Ofwat and the Environment 
Agency.  
The CCWater protects consumers, but this may not necessarily be considered as participation. 
However, in its Price Review 2014, Ofwat introduced a new system called Consumer Challenge 
Groups(CCGs), with the aim of enhancing engagement with customers.988 The CCGs are drawn from 
local groups of customer representatives and other stakeholders. 989 The members of the groups 
include businesses, local authority organizations representing customers with specific needs (for 
example, Age UK or Citizens Advice), the Environment Agency, Natural England and the 
DWI. 990CCGs were established with the SXUSRVH RI FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH ZDWHU FRPSDQLHV¶ EXVLQHVV
plans. 991  7KLV QHZ VFKHPH HQKDQFHV WKH FXVWRPHUV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV DQG VWDNHKROGHUV powers to 
challenge and shape the water comSDQ\¶VRYHUDOOEXVLQHVVSODQ 
5.2.4.6The Drinking Water Inspectorate 
 
Under the Water Industry Act of 1991, the Secretary of State has the responsibility for prescribing 
the standards for water that is used for different purposes.992 Regulation of drinking water supplies is 
given special attention. Under the water legislation, water companies have the statutory duty to 
supply wholesome water for purposes such as drinking, cooking or food preparation, or for use in 
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premises in which food is produced.993 The supply of a wholesome quality of water is expected when 
the water company supplies it to consumers.994 
 
µ:KROHVRPHQHVV¶LVGHILQHGE\XVLQJVWDQGDUGVWKDWVHWRXWhow the water quality should be safe for 
human health.995 In particular, water for the specified human demands must not contain excessive 
concentrations or values of particular properties, elements, organisms or substances.996 The standards 
are derived from the EU Drinking Water Directive.997 The Annex under this Directive provides a 
detailed account of the biological, chemical and physical parameters that drinking water must 
fulfil.998 The EU member states are accountable for achieving their drinking water quality standards. 
 
As mentioned, under the privatized water industry in England, the Secretary of State is entrusted with 
ensuring that water companies are providing wholesome drinking water.999 The Secretary of State 
discharges the duty of regulating drinking water quality through the DWI.1000 The Water Act 2003 
gives the authority to the Secretary of State to designate the Chief Inspector of Drinking Water.1001 
At present, on behalf of the Secretary of State, the DWI has the responsibility to ensure that the water 
companies are meeting drinking water quality standards;1002it ascertains the quality and sufficiency 
of drinking water supplied by them.1003 
 
Initially, the water companies themselves carry out testing to ensure that the water they are supplying 
complies with quality standards. Through this regulatory scheme, the water companies play a µVHOI-
PRQLWRULQJ¶ UROH7KH\ PXVWPDNHDOO WKH UHVXOWVRI WKHLU WHVWLQJDYDLODEOH WR WKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFYLD
their public record. One of the main responsibilities of the DWI is in providing reassurance about the 
quality of drinking water and that water companies are meeting all statutory water quality 
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obligations. Moreover, the water companies must notify the Secretary of State or the Chief Drinking 
Water Inspector of events may affect the quality or sufficiency of the drinking water they are 
supplying.1004  The Chief Inspector investigates each event and where necessary, he or she may 
institute proceedings for non-compliance against the water companies.1005 
 
The duties imposed upon the companies with regard to drinking water indicate that they are expected 
to supply high quality water. This obligation requires the water companies to increase their water 
production costs. The high costs for the companies in supplying good quality drinking water means 
that the water consumers must be expected to pay a higher price for their drinking water. The 
companies have the obligation to internalize the water supply cost. Practically, while there is the 
impression that the water companies are intensely regulated, this intense regulation is heading water 
companies towards beinJ µFRPPXQLW\ PXWXDO¶ RU µQRQ-SURILW ERGLHV¶ 1006 However, economic 
regulation is a key tool for internalization of water costs: consumers need to pay fair prices for their 
water services, and to receive high quality water.1007 Broadly speaking, the WSRA, the CCWater and 
the DWI share some objectives, although they have their own different mandates in protecting 
FXVWRPHUV¶LQWHUHVWVUltimately, they need to create a relationship that enhances the implementation 
of these common objectives whilst still allowing each party to discharge its responsibilities. 
5.3 The roles of government and regulators in WRMPs 
On the development and implementation of water resource plans, Defra, the Environment Agency 
and the WSRA play invaluable roles, although the responsibilities of each of them vary. Defra may 
direct the water companies with regard to what measures and options they may include, and format 
the WRMPs that are followed.1008 In the early stages of WRMP preparation, Defra is one of the 
bodies that plays an advisory role with regard to the regulators.1009 Once the water undertaker has 
finished a draft WRMP, Defra determines the exclusion of matters that appear commercial or 
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confidential, as well as those that might affect national security if they are publicized.1010 Following 
the publication of the draft WRMP, interested groups send representations to the Secretary of State 
and they are then forwarded to a water company.1011 Defra will consider each ZDWHUFRPSDQ\¶VSODQ
and statement of response to determine whether there should be a public hearing or an inquiry.1012 
The Secretary of State may direct companies to make changes or to publish a new plan.1013 However, 
the role of Defra in the implementation stage is unclear once the final version of the WRMP is 
published; although has a government body, the mandates of Defra shape the WRMPs to meet 
government policy aspirations.  
The Environment Agency is involved in the WRM development process in its very early stages. At 
the pre-consultation stage of the draft WRMP, the Environment Agency is consulted by the water 
companies with regard to the substance of the plan.1014 Specifically, a water company should work 
closely with the Environment Agency local to the water resources zone where the plan is going to be 
applied. 1015 The Agency provides advice to the water companies, through the water resources 
planning guidelines that assist water companies in being aware of what they are expected to 
accommodate to meet the terms of their statutory requirements for WRMP preparation and 
publication.1016 Following the publication of the draft WRMP, the Environment Agency may make 
representations regarding the substance of the plan. 1017  Through this representation, the Agency 
challenges the water resources plan in accommodating the water resources zone context, considers 
the area that the plan covers, and identifies whether the plan provides appropriate predictions to 
ensure a balance between the needs of customers and the environment. 1018  This allows the 
Environment Agency to play a key regulatory role in influencing water companies to take maximum 
care to include options that enhance the security of water resources. In particular, the Environment 
Agency provides advice to the Secretary of State when there is a need for the water companies to 
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prepare a drought plan or a revised WRMP.1019 When the WRMP needs a hearing or inquiry, the 
Environment Agency represents the view of the government.1020 
In cases where water abstraction is damaging to the environment, the Environment Agency requires 
WKHZDWHUFRPSDQ\µWRILQGDQGLPSOHPHQWVROXWLRQVDQGQRWLI\ZKDWFKDQJHV¶DUHUHTXLUHGWRDYRLG
unsustainable water abstraction.1021 While a pre-consultation with the Environment Agency and other 
regulators with regard to WRMPs is preferred, to avoid the possibility of needing a draft WRMP 
inquiry ± which incurs more costs ± providing consultancy and regulating water companies are seen 
as two conflicting roles.1022 The Environment Agency is both an advisor to the water companies at 
the pre-consultation stage, and an opponent at the inquiry stage, as well as a campaigner and 
regulator in WRM; these roles make its function in the WRMP confusing.1023 The view of the water 
companies, as noted by Davies and Daykin, suggests that they are increasingly doubtful as to 
whether pre-consultation with the Environment Agency adds value to their WRMPs.1024 
Another regulator involved in the water resource plan development and implementation is the WSRA. 
Prior to the preparation of a draft WRMP, the water companies consult the WSRA.1025 Through this 
early stage involvement, the Authority provides advice on matters that are going to be incorporated 
to balance water demand and supply, as per the updated water resources planning guidelines.1026 
Following the publication of the draft WRMP, the WSRA, as an interested regulator, may make 
representations to the Secretary of State, as well as challenges with regard to the content of the draft 
plan.1027 It will scrutinize whether the WRMPs has taken into:  
account the opportunities to share resources with neighbouring water companies; fully and 
consistently explored options to manage demand; enabled third parties to propose options 
to balance supply and demand and assessed these options consistently with other options; 
taken account of the views of customers in producing their plans; estimated fully the costs 
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and benefits of the range of options considered; determined the best value solutions to 
balance supply and demand, taking account of climate change and the need for 
sustainability and resilience.1028 
Once the final version of the WRMP is published, its implementation needs funding. At this stage, 
the role of the Authority is decisive. Through its price review regulatory role, the WSRA allows a 
water company to secure a fair return for its investment.1029 In practice, however, there has been a 
tendency for the Authority to fail to allow the water companies to finance the measures identified and 
agreed with government. For instance, in 2010, an independent review commissioned by the 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Welsh Ministers assessed that the 
WSRA was fit for the purpose in light of future challenges.1030 In this review, South East Water 
commented on its frustration with the Authority, and that:  
2IZDW¶V VWDQFH ZDV to separate itself from this process and to decide independently the best 
solutions. This has left a number of companies in the somewhat perplexing situation of having 
a WRMP signed off and agreed by the Secretary of State but unfunded in its price 
determination.  It is unclear whether this is an issue of process or one of conflicting duties in 
terms of setting policy but nevertheless it is one that should not be repeated in the future price 
setting reviews.1031 
In England, water leakage is one of the concerns in respect of water availability. Grekos notes that 
the water companies need to do more to reduce leakage and that the companies should make best use 
of existing resources.1032 Moreover, the UK government has set out its water security aspirations for 
2030 regarding how to meet the water consumption reduction to 130 litres per person per day; and 
while some water companies have incorporated leakage reduction options to meet this target through 
their WRMPVLWZDVQRWHGWKDWµ2IZDWGLGQRWFRQVLGHUWKHRXWFRPHVDVVWDWXWRU\REOLJDWLRQVZKHQ
LWFRPHVWRIXQGLQJGHFLVLRQV¶1033 The inclusion of options under the WRMP itself is not guaranteed 
to secure water resources unless there is funding for the justified and preferred options. However, the 
2014 price review process changed much of the process, in part as a response to criticisms of Ofwat. 
1034Similarly, the Water Act 2014 brought fundamental reform to 2IZDW¶V GXWLHV  2IZDW KDV D
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SULPDU\GXW\WRIXUWKHUWKHµUHVLOLHQFHREMHFWLYH¶ and it must discharge its regulatory functions in a 
manner that develops a resilient, sustainable and customer-focused management system.1035 
As has been VXJJHVWHG E\ WKH µUHYLHZ RI 2IZDW DQG FRQVXPHU UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ WKH ZDWHU VHFWRU¶
Ofwat needs to set out a sensible price review that minimizes the burden on water undertakers in 
carrying out the measures that they are planning for discharging their statutory obligation through the 
WRMP.1036 Setting out detailed options within the WRMP by itself may not bring a solution to water 
resource problems, unless there is funding for the preferred options that is justified by the water 
companies and other regulators in securing water resources. In those areas where the Environment 
Agency has not yet covered sustainable abstraction programmes, the water companies voluntarily 
take measures to reduce harm to the environment. 1037  For their reduction of environmentally 
unsustainable abstraction, the water companies will obtain an incentive from Ofwat through the 
abstraction incentive mechanism. 1038  There is no punitive measure from Ofwat to the water 
companies if their abstraction is environmentally harmful in the above-mentioned areas.1039 The 
implication is that the water companies may not behave to achieve sustainable abstraction if the 
benefits they obtain from non-compliance are more than the incentives they obtain from Ofwat to 
reduce unsustainable abstractions in such areas. 
Under the WRMP preparation process, the involvement of the CCWater is unclear compared with 
other regulators¶ involvement in the early stages of plan development, although it may be argued that 
the Council may express its voice during WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ VWDJH $V µWKH consumer vRLFH¶, its 
involvement in the water resources planning may help the water undertakers to incorporate the 
interests of consumers. The involvement of the CCWater forms an inception of the WRMPs that may 
enhance implementation of the plans.    
5.4Collaboration between government, regulators and regulated water companies 
WRM is not performed by a single person or organization; rather it needs different stakeholders to 
work together. 1040  As discussed in this section, in England¶V WRM, there are a number of 
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stakeholders (government, regulators, water companies and consumer representatives). The WSRA is 
entrusted with economic regulation, and the DWI and the Environment Agency are entrusted with 
the responsibility of drinking water and environmental quality, respectively. 1041  Defra (the 
JRYHUQPHQW GHSDUWPHQW SURYLGHV JXLGDQFH WKDW GLUHFWV WKH UHJXODWRUV¶ IXQFWLRQV $OWKRXJK WKHVH
regulatory functions differ in their nature, they have increasing interrelated goals in ensuring water 
sustainability. Through the Water Act 2003, the water regulators (the Secretary of State, Welsh 
Ministers, the WSRA and the Environment Agency) have a statutory duty to exercise and coordinate 
their functions to make arrangements for promoting cooperation, the exchange of information 
between them, and consistency of treatment of matters which affect them all.1042 
In 2010, an independent review was commissioned by Defra to assess Ofwat and consumer 
representation in the water sector. In this review, Northumbrian Water criticized the isolated 
decision-making of the regulators, particularly Ofwat. It stated that: 
It is not acceptable for companies to be placed in the position where the regulator can 
enforce delivery of an output but another regulator will not allow the company to recover 
the cost of so-doing. Most issues are managed with good faith but greater clarity on the 
respective roles of the various regulators would be helpful. For instance, is the DWI the 
final arbiter of drinking water quality requirements or is it legitimate for Ofwat to constrain 
requirements to meet affordability objectives.1043 
 
The findings of the review showed that there was an implication of separated functioning among 
regulators. In particular, the findings further underlined that changes are needed in the way that 
Ofwat behaves; Ofwat needs to engage more constructively and effectively with the full range of 
stakeholders in the sector and to be more transparent in its decision-making.1044 As an economic 
regulator, independence is a key value to Ofwat; however, independence in decision-making does not 
necessarily mean that each regulator should act in isolation. 1045 The regulated water companies, 
government and other regulators share the objective of enhancing water security, although each body 
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has been conferred with different statutory obligations. Ofwat and other regulators should therefore 
work jointly with other stakeholders to achieve their regulatory objectives.1046 
Similarly, the recent review carried out regarding the WRM process noted that there is a hurdle in 
developing the WRMP process through the involvement of the Environment Agency and Ofwat.1047 
The water companies expressed their dissatisfaction, µZKHUHWKH$JHQF\DJUHHGWRVXSSRUWDQRSWLRQ
it considered to be environmentally beneficial while Ofwat then appeared to challenge it ± in 
GLDORJXHDVSDUWRIWKH:503SURFHVV¶.1048 The expressed view against Ofwat indicates that there is 
a lack of common interpretation or understanding between regulators in achieving the sustainability 
of water. Although each water regulator has its own statutory obligation that it strives to achieve, the 
outcome of water sustainability may not be achieved without an appropriate trade-off between 
competing interests. However, the 2014 Ofwat price review and the Water Act 2014 exist in part to 
respond to criticisms of Ofwat.1049They introduced new systems for Ofwat to work in collaboration 
with other stakeholders to realize resilience building. 
Effective WRM needs collaboration among stakeholders,1050which LVYLHZHGDVµDPHDQVRIVROYLQJ
shared problems, where parties get together to define the problem, establish an agenda and 
LPSOHPHQWDVROXWLRQ¶1051 Collaboration is also a key device in bringing diverse interest groups to an 
understanding.1052 The existence of clear statutory roles by itself may not guarantee the enhancement 
of the security of water resources. Rather, it requires a clear system that creates a working 
relationship between diverse stakeholders.  
At present, water security and sustainability are major concerns in England.1053 The UK government 
has expressed this concern in its Future Water policy document.1054 The government has a role in 
creating a system that establishes a relationship between regulators and the regulated to tackle the 
water security threats. The above-mentioned isolated functioning of regulators 1055  may not be 
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improved without appropriate guidance from the government to shape the behaviour of stakeholders. 
It may need appropriate guidance from the government to ensure collaboration, which may bring 
cohesion between the different policy regulators (social, environmental and economic) 
and legal frameworks. However, collaboration in WRM does not mean working through agreements 
WRLPSOHPHQWDOOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV6WDNHKROGHUV¶FROODERUDWLRQQHHGVFDXWLRQWRDOORZHDFKUHJXODWRUy 
body to meet its responsibilities.1056 
5.5 River basin management plans in England 
The WFD requires its member states to establish programmes of measures that are designed to 
reduce pressures and achieve good water status by 2015.1057The initial implementation phase of 
WFD began in 2000 and ended in 2015. The member states are compelled to conduct an evaluation   
of the human pressures and impact analysis of each river basin district.1058 The Environment Agency 
µE\VXFKGDWHDVWKHDSSURSULDWHDXWKRULW\PD\GLUHFW, prepare and submit to the appropriate authority 
a river basin management plan for each river basin district¶. 1059 The RBMPs contain detailed 
assessments of water quality, quantity status and the human pressures and risks on water 
resources.1060 RBMPs consist of a process by which water resource pressures are understood and 
managed in an integrated manner across a river basin district. 1061  In 2009, the RBMPs were 
published for the river basin district in England.  In England and Wales, there are 11 river basin 
districts.1062 
Under English law, the river basin district is defined as µan area identified by regulation 4(1), being 
the main unit for the management of river basins for the purposes of the Directive and being made up 
of a river basin or neighbouring river basins, together with associated groundwater, transitional 
waters and coastal water¶.1063The identification of these districts means that management decisions 
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regarding water resources would not be made in a fragmented manner. The RBMPs are designed to 
ensure the management of an entire river basin district. Since March 2011, an integrated catchment-
based approach has been under development in England, which enhances RBMP 
implementations. 1064 The integrated catchment management approach integrates quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of water pressures, and addresses all water uses and pressures in an integrated 
manner. 7KHFDWFKPHQWVFDOH µLV ODUJHHQRXJKWRDGGYDOXHDWDVWUDWHJLF OHYHOEXW small enough to 
encourage local scale engagement and action¶.1065The integrated catchment management approach 
helps to bridge the management of water resources on local and river basin district scales.1066 In 2014, 
the government issued statutory guidance on the practical implementation of the WFD to be set in 
England. 1067  This guidance gives an increased emphasis on the catchment-based approach to 
WRM.1068 Managing water resources at local level is considered to help local stakeholders to identify 
context-specific problems and to set out their solutions.1069This approach enhances understanding of 
water pressures of a specific catchment.  
The successful implementation of RBMPs for water scarcity problems relies on the effective 
participation of stakeholders. Participation is one key element for a successful river basin 
management planning process.13 The WFD requires the member states to take measures to promote 
µDFWLYH LQYROYHPHQWRI DOO SDUWLHV¶ LQ the planning process.1070 In England, the Water Environment 
(Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2003 requires public participation 
upon preparing RBMPs. 1071  In 2009, England established RBMPs for a number of river basin 
districts. During the preparation of these RBMPs, the Environment Agency carried out consultations 
with a diverse range of stakeholders. Among these, the water, energy and industrial companies, 
charities, local government, non-governmental organizations, wildlife groups and the public are 
mentionable.1072 In England and Wales, to ensure public participation, river basin district liaison 
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panels were set up at the regional and national levels.1073 Stakeholder meetings and workshops were 
also held. 1074 In England, the catchment-based approach has been established to facilitate local 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQDWJUDVVURRWVOHYHO1075 
The recent assessment on the implementation of RBMPs in England shows that in terms of surface 
waters, there are some water bodies that are subject to significant pressures, although there have been 
some improvements on their status.1076 These pressures include pollution from point and diffuse 
sources, abstraction and hydromorphological alterations.1077In almost all river basin districts, there 
were significant pressures of diffuse source pollution, point source pressures and over-abstraction.1078 
The assessment report also shows that, in England and Wales, the information collected does show a 
split between pollutions emanating from diffuse and point sources.1079 This has made it difficult to 
determine µZKLFKVHFWRUVDUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUZKLFKSUHVVXUHV¶.1080 
5.6 Conclusion of chapter 
 
This chapter H[DPLQHG(QJODQG¶VZDWHUSROLF\DQGODZin order to understand the extent to which the 
salient features for an effective WRMP DUH UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V ZDWHU SROLF\ DQG ODZ The 
discussion in this chapter, on the context of water resources, has demonstrated that water resources 
are not evenly distributed in the country. Some parts of the country are humid, whereas other parts 
are not. In some parts of England, the water stress level is moderate or serious. There is no self-
sufficiency in availability of water resources according to place and time. The evaluation in this 
chapter has shown that some river basin water resources are already over-abstracted; there is likely to 
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be less water available for people, businesses and the environment. 1081 The evaluation has also 
demonstrated that water resources abstraction, in some parts of England, is unsustainable. The 
discussion in this chapter focused on the water companies and their roles, since they are major 
abstractors and dischargers; and the chapter also evaluated other issues relevant to enhancing water 
security. Accordingly, water companies are a key stakeholder with a major role in carrying out the 
programme measures of RBMPs, which are described under the EU WFD.  
In England, addressing water security is not strictly a new concern, but is rather becoming a more 
important issue with the growing water shortage. The WRM policy and law are changing 
considerably, and are moving towards preparedness and resilience building with the development of 
WRM and drought plans. The recent Water Act 2014 also introduced new statutory duties for Ofwat, 
including imposing DSULPDU\GXW\ WR IXUWKHU WKHµUHVLOLHQFHREMHFWLYH¶ The development of WRM 
and drought plans address two fundamental issues: whether water of adequate quality will be 
available to sustain the wellbeing of society; and whether society is adequately protected from 
extreme droughts through the development of different plans, which proactively address the water 
shortage challenges.  
In addition, the evaluation in this chapter has shown that each water undertaker has a statutory 
requirement to prepare and publicize the WRMP and µWREHDEOHDQGFRQWLQXHWREHDEOHWRPHHWLWV
VWDWXWRU\ REOLJDWLRQ¶ RI GULQNLQJ ZDWHU1082Water undertakers are obliged to prepare the WRMPs, 
which help companies to make sure that they can respond flexibly to future uncertainties. The plans 
are made through long-term assessments of specific water resource zones and the availability of 
water resources to meet a range of demands.1083Upon developing the WRMPs, the water undertakers 
DUH REOLJHG WR FRQVLGHU D µWZLQ-WUDFN¶ DSSURDFK ZKLFK HQFRPSDVVHV GLYHUVH RSWLRQV IURP ERWK
demand and supply management schemes, including establishing interconnections between the 
involved ZDWHUFRPSDQ\¶VZDWHU UHVRXUFHV]RQe and beyond its geographic boundary demarcation. 
This indicates the use of bulk water transfer as one element of WRM to tackle water security 
challenges. However, the preparation of WRMPs may not be an end to securing water resources 
availability. Achieving water security is increasingly dependent upon the implementation of the plan; 
but while the WRMP is central in enhancing the security of water, it is ultimately a procedural 
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requirement. The water law does not set out a clear rule that imposes an obligation on water 
undertakers regarding implementation. 
Under the Water Act 2003, it is a statutory requirement for water companies to prepare, maintain and 
publish drought plans.1084 The drought plans are crucial to both water resources planning and to 
water security. The plans set out how the Environment Agency will manage water resources for the 
environment and people during drought periods, and how a water company will continue to meet its 
duties to supply water.To manage drought challenges, the Environment Agency takes measures 
necessary to limit these. Different schemes are used for dealing with drought situations: drought 
permits, ordinary drought orders and emergency drought orders.1085 The drought orders from the 
Secretary of State and drought permits from the (QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\ DIIHFW WKHZDWHUFRPSDQLHV¶
domestic water supplies differently from other abstractors.1086 The limitations on water abstraction 
focus on non-domestic water uses (hosepipe bans), and this suggests that primacy is given to the 
domestic water supply. Both the WRM and drought plans are key tools to secure the long-term 
UHVLOLHQFHRIZDWHUXQGHUWDNHUV¶VXSSO\V\VWHPV7KH\KHOSWKHZDWHUFRPSDQies to take steps for the 
purpose of enabling them to meet, in the long term, the need for the supply of water to consumers. As 
the plans accommodate a range of measures to manage water resources in sustainable ways ± and to 
increase efficiency in the use of water and reduce its demand in order to reduce pressure on water 
resources ± they are crucial tools for the implementation of RBMP ideals. This suggests that the 
WRM and drought plans are relevant to both water resources planning and to water security. As the 
water companies devise these plans, the water laws are how these companies are regulated in 
discharging their obligations. 
 
The review in this chapter demonstrates that the challenge in England is thus not only one of 
securing enough safe water, but also one of protecting the water and its ecosystem against polluting 
activities. Water security is also linked to the protection of water resources from sewage discharges 
and urban waste water, and point and diffuse source pollution. This chapter has also shown that water 
qualities are affected by waste from different sources. Particularly in England, water quality failures 
from sewage discharges and urban waste water are addressed by issuing standards and the 
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introduction of a permit system. Environmental Permits set out standards to minimize the adverse 
effects of waste water on the receiving environment. These permits aim to return much cleaner waste 
water to the environment, thereby protecting it and human health from the adverse effects of the 
discharge of waste water.1087 Through the permit system, the Environment Agency can control water 
quality failures due to waste water, with the English sewerage companies (the main waste water 
treatment service providers) responsible for waste water/sewage. The English water law reflects 
many substantive rules that are designed to control both point and diffuse source pollution. 
In England, the Environment Agency has a mandate to prevent water quality failure (pollution). 
Some of the measures which are used to control diffuse source pollution include establishing 
protected areas and the creation of awareness amongst farmers to use the defined best farming 
practices. Codes of best agricultural practices have also been developed and are used in the protected 
zones.  However, the examination in this chapter reveals that diffuse pollution remains a significant 
challenge, and the implementation of codes of practice for diffuse pollution control is weak. This 
suggests that the problems of diffuse pollution challenges are not simply due to the absence of law, 
but its implementation. 
This chapter has also demonstrated that, in principle, all water service users are expected to pay fair 
prices for the water services they obtain; also, cross-subsidy is used to allow special treatment for 
those customers who may not be able to afford to pay the full cost of water services. However, in 
England, less than a third of households are fitted with water meters and, except in those areas where 
resources are under stress, introducing metering is not a compulsory requirement for water 
companies. Because of this, it is difficult to say whether water users are paying a fair price for what 
they are using. However, this does not mean water abstraction is free; as major water abstractors, the 
water companies pay the price for the volume of water they abstract to the Environment Agency, as a 
licence condition. 
Developing responsive permit systems for water abstraction was sought to limit the over-use of water. 
To this end, the Water Act of 2003 introduced a time-limited permit system.1088The introduction of 
the new water abstraction system suggests that, despite permits giving property rights over the 
volumes of water, water permits need to be seen differently from other property rights to protect the 
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environment and public interests. The reform reflects the necessity to control water on the grounds of 
the environment. However, the Water Act of 2003 does not fully shape the old permit system 
automatically. 
In England and Wales, the voluntary Catchment Sensitive Farming Project seeks to tackle 
agricultural diffuse pollution.1089 In this project, the farmers gain advice and receive incentives. The 
evaluation in this chapter reflects how this project gives emphasis to actions taken at the farm level 
and integrates them with other catchment delivery mechanisms. For instance, the Wessex Catchment 
in England shows how the project has been conducted at a very local level within small areas to 
control the nitrate problem.1090This demonstrates the subsidiarity principle in the practices of WRM 
in terms of diffuse pollution. 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the Water Act 1973 was criticized for conferring a broad 
range of regulatory and operational functions. According to the Act, the regional water authorities 
ZHUH µDEVWUDFWRUV DQG GLVFKDUJHUV UHJXODWLRQ HQIRUFHUV DQG VHUvice providers, polluters and 
environmental guardians¶.1091Because of this, regional water authorities were characterized as being 
ERWK µSRDFKHU DQG JDPHNHHSHU¶ 6XEVHTXHQWO\ WKH RSHUDWLRQDO DQG UHJXODWRU\ IXQFWLRQV ZHUH
separated; regulatory functions remained under government organizations, whereas operational 
utility functions were transferred through privatization.1092 The reform has brought a clear separation 
between regulatory and operational functions. 
Providing water services requires an understanding of the diverse interests to enable a balance of the 
interests involved. 1093  Water services provision may not be performed by a single person or 
organization; it needs different stakeholders in its involvement. The Secretary of State gives policy 
guidance and issues directions to the regulators; while Ofwat is mandated as the principal economic 
regulator, although it must meet the requirements of the Environmental Agency when setting prices. 
Ofwat as an economic regulator controls the natural monopolies in the water services provisions. In 
addition to these regulatory bodies, the statutory body CCWater is concerned with price and service 
standards for customers; while the DWI controls the quality of drinking water, and measures it 
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against the directives and regulations, enforcing these rules wherever water companies provide 
drinking water. 
In England¶V water services provision, there are a number of stakeholders; for example, the WSRA is 
entrusted with economic regulation, while Defra provides policy JXLGDQFHWKDWGLUHFWVWKHUHJXODWRUV¶
functions. Although these regulatory functions differ in their nature, they have increasingly 
interrelated goals in ensuring water security. Through the Water Act 2003, the water regulators (the 
Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, the WSRA and the Environment Agency) have the statutory 
duty to exercise their functions to make arrangements for promoting cooperation and the exchange of 
information, as well as consistency of treatment of matters which affect them.1094 
As many institutions are involved in water services provision and regulation, effective water services 
management needs collaboration among stakeholders. The existence of clear statutory roles by itself 
may not guarantee the enhancement of the security of water resources; rather, it requires a clear 
system that creates a working relationship between diverse stakeholders. However, in practice, there 
is the suggestion that the WSRA works in isolation.  
While it is particularly important for the economic regulators to discharge their regulatory roles 
independently, there should be an appropriate mechanism to help the regulators and stakeholders to 
coordinate their functions in order to enhance the overall goal of water security. Similarly, in 2014 
Ofwat was reformed in order to address such security challenges. 7KH ZDWHU FRPSDQLHV¶ ZDWHU
security assessment has been shaped through regulators¶ participation in the planning process. The 
discussion in this chapter suggests that participatory development in WRMPs is therefore believed to 
enhance their implementation. 
Chapter Six: Water security management institutional arrangements in the AU 
6.1 Introduction 
Inharmonious institutional arrangements for WRM and disparities in implementation may affect a 
countr\¶V endeavours to ensure the sustainability of water. In water resource governance, bilateral 
and multilateral water treaties at river basin or regional level are often at the centre of cooperation-
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building, since they promote a bottom-up approach. The water treaties at the scale of the river basin 
may also play key roles in managing water resources. Noticeably, however, not all cooperation at 
river basin or regional level may ensure the sustainability of water; rather, the effectiveness may be 
measured by how the cooperative arrangements themselves are designed to make such arrangements 
more inclusive and more comprehensive for addressing the threats to water security.  
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the WRM institutional arrangements in the EU are 
considerably evolving towards a more integrated and harmonized approach, with implementation 
of the WFD CIS. The EU has strong legislative competence to intervene and manage water 
resources within its member states. Contemporary EU water policy and law favour an integrated 
river basin approach to avoid fragmented WRM. Based on these insights, it could be argued that 
the AU could increase sustainable water use by enhancing legislative competence to intervene in 
WRM within its own member states. 
The main objectives of the evaluation in this chapter are to understand how the AU intervenes in 
WRM within its member states and whether, as a supranational body, it has in place effective 
WRMPs for the sustainability of water resources. This chapter thus presents assessments of the 
development of water policies and laws within the AU, while also exploring some of the roles at 
regional and river basin level in managing water resources in terms of the effectiveness of their 
WRM institutional arrangements. To investigate the institutional arrangements for water security 
management in the AU, its remit in its institutional arrangements for WRM is reviewed, to 
understand whether the Union has significant legislative competence. 
Chapter Six is organized into six sections. The first introductory section is followed by one that 
discusses the availability of water resources (including shared resources) within the AU. The third 
section discusses some regional and river basin institutional arrangements which attempt to 
address water resources problems. The fourth section makes an assessment of the measures that 
have been taken by the AU member states to address water security challenges at national levels. 
The fifth section evaluates past and present legislative competences of the AU. The final section 
of the chapter draws a FRQFOXVLRQ ZLWK VXJJHVWHG SROLF\ RSWLRQV IRU WKH $8¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO





6.2 The context of water security in Africa 
6.2.1 Availability of water resources  
 
The Abuja Declaration on water states WKDW µ>H@ffective water resources management must be 
underpinned by knowledge and understanding of the availability of the resource itself, the uses to 
which water is put, and the challenge facing the managers at all relevant levels of 
administration¶.1095In terms of the status of the availability of water resources, at the regional level, 
the African continent is supposed to be relatively abundant.1096Africa is home to both the world¶s 
longest river, the Nile, and the second largest river by its water flow and basin size, the Congo. There 
are many other water bodies on the continent, and it is believed that Africa is endowed with abundant 
freshwater resources.1097 
 
Paradoxically, Africa is today exposed to numerous problems that leave the continent and its people 
continuing to live in trouble, decade in, decade out. There are many pressing issues to which Africa 
as a continent is vulnerable;1098 environmental, economic and social challenges, for instance, are 
becoming common within the continent.1099 Particularly, the distribution of the water resources is 
uneven across the continent. TKHUHJLRQ¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHV are exposed to intense spatial and temporal 
variability.1100 In many parts of Africa, the challenges to the security of water resources are expected 
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to become critical.1101The water scarcity threat in Africa is now becoming one of the serious threats 
that affects the stability and wellbeing of the continent.1102 
 
Many African countries are experiencing water scarcity.1103The total renewable water resource per 
capita of many countries demonstrates how many of the countries are categorized as being in a zone 
of water stress or scarcity.1104$OPRVW D TXDUWHURI WKH UHJLRQ¶V SRSXODWLRQ OLYHV LQ D ZDWHU-stressed 
country, and the threats will continue to rise unless proper measures are in place. 1105Very few 
African couQWULHV¶ZDWHUSHUFDSLWD is over 13,000cubic metresZKHUHDVPDQ\FRXQWULHV¶are below 
1,000, which is classified as being under water scarcity.1106It has been estimated that around three 
million people per year die due to the lack of safe drinking water and sanitation in Africa.1107The 
number of people in Africa without access to improved sanitation is growing. In 1990, the population 
that did not have access to sanitation was 430 million, but in 2006 this figure rose to 589 million.1108 
,Q $IULFD µ>H@very day more children die from dirty water than HIV/AIDS, Malaria, water and 
accidents put together¶. 1109  A single drought exposes millions of people to water-related 
problems.1110Particularly, the water security threats are likely to be higher in the sub-Saharan African 
countries,1111 with Ethiopia being one of those countries that is exposed to water scarcity threats.1112 
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In Africa, a considerable quantity of the water used is wasted due to an inefficient governance 
system, 1113 and water resources are exposed to human-induced pressures that affect their 
availability.1114Because of such human-induced pressures, many water bodies on the continent are 
exposed to unsustainable use and quality deterioration.1115 Water ecosystems are threatened to the 
extent that the availability of water resources is put at risk and their quality deteriorates, in terms of 
providing safe water for humans and other species dependent on it.1116 Many of the water bodies in 
the region are also exposed to water pollution, which further deteriorates their quality for a range of 
uses.1117 
These problems are a constraint on WKHFRQWLQHQW¶VVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWso Africa has a common 
interest in combating such challenges. ConsequentlyWKH$8¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLQUHJXODWLQJWKHIDFWRUV
hampering sustainable development at the member state level is invaluable for promoting the shared 
interests that the continent aspires to, since the isolated and fragmented endeavours of the Union¶V
member countries alone may not bring much reform in shared issues. However, despite the average 
water withdrawal in Africa being relatively low,1118 this opportunity has not been used to enhance 
water security. 
6.2.2 Transboundary water resources in Africa  
Globally, there are approximately 261 international water basins, and an unknown number of 
transboundary aquifers. 1119  From this figure, there are around 80 water bodies in Africa. 1120 
Moreover, over 38 aquifers are transboundary.1121 In addition, more than 50 major watersheds, river 
basins and lakes are shared by two or more countries.1122 Many of these water bodies are shared by 
more than two regional states.1123 Some river basins, like the Congo (Zaire), Nile, Zambezi and Niger, 
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are shared by more than nine states.1124 
 
On the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa for instance, the River Nile connects the 
$8¶VPHPEHUVWDWHV, which are considerably interlinked by their shared water bodies.1125 Naturally, 
shared water bodies cannot be managed effectively in isolation.1126 In addition to the shared nature of 
the water bodies, the impact of water insecurity is not limited to within the administrative boundary 
of each member state.1127 Rather, it may affect countries within the AU, whether the water bodies are 
shared or not. Water resources may be transboundary, or their impacts may reach beyond the national 
or river basin level, extending the effect on WKH$8¶VVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGD)RULQVWDQFH
in 2012, hundreds of thousands of people were affected in Somalia by a single drought, and migrated 
to neighbouring the countries of Ethiopia and Kenya.  
Inharmonious institutional arrangements for WRM and disparities in implementation may affect the 
FRXQWULHV¶HQGHDYRXUVWRHQVXUHWKHVXVWDLQDELOLW\RIZDWHU,QVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHVXVWDLQDELOLW\
of water resources may not be effectively achieved by the unilateral and isolated institutional 
arrangements that are introduced by single countries. Based on these insights, it could be argued that 
the AU member states may achieve sustainable water use by introducing cooperative arrangements 
that regulate riparLDQVWDWHV¶ZDWHUXVHDQGSURWHFWLRQ 
6.3 Regional and river basin institutional arrangements in Africa 
Globally, trends in the governance of shared water bodies are exemplified by thousands of treaties 
that have been made to enhance cooperation in water use and protection. Since the year805 and up to 
1984, for example, over 3,600 international water treaties were formulated; but most of these water 
treaties were related to navigational water uses.1128They are hardly comprehensive ± rather, they 
focus on specific issues, particularly water allocation.1129 
 
                                                             
11242UHJRQ6WDWH8QLYHUVLW\µTransboundary freshwater dispute database: AFRICA: international river basin register¶
<www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/> accessed 26 April 2013. 
1125AMCOW (n 1095) 10. 
1126
 Mark Giorano, µInternational river basin management: global principles and basin practices¶(Abstract from thesis 
for Doctor of Philosophy in Geography, Oregon State University 2002). 
1127AMCOW (n 1121) 3. 
1128




Coordinated management of transboundary basins is a better way to manage water 
resources,1130though it is not new in Africa. There have been some endeavours to manage water 
resources with the objective of coordinated management through regional agreement, which have 
focused on a particular region¶V WRM and river basin agreement ± that is, a treaty signed by the 
riparian states of specific transboundary rivers. For instance, the Niger Basin Agreement was signed 
in 1963, and subsequently, the Niger River Commission was established in 1964. In 1980, the 
Commission was replaced by the Niger River Authority. The member states of the Authority are 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. The objective of the Niger River Authority is to promote cooperation among the member 
countries and to ensure integrated development in the fields of water quality, hydropower, navigation, 
fishing, flood control, economic development, joint management, irrigation, infrastructure and 
technical cooperation. Another important transboundary River Basin Authority is the Lake Chad 
Basin Commission, which was established on 22 May 1964. The member states are Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The Commission is a regional government 
organization, which was designed to manage the basin water resources and resolve disputes that 
might arise over the lake water resources. The Commission initiates, promotes and coordinates water 
and other natural resources development and management in the basin. 
Similarly, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also implemented a WRM 
agreement. In August 1995, the SADC introduced the Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems to 
the region and this came into force in September 1998. The Protocol is a legally binding document 
on the SADC member states.1131 It provides the legal and broad policy framework for cooperation on 
WRM: to respect and apply the existing rules of general or customary international law relating to 
the utilization and management of the resources of shared watercourse systems and, in particular, to 
respect and abide by the principles of the community of interests in the equitable utilization of those 
systems and related resources. It promotes and facilitates sustainable, equitable and reasonable 
utilization of the transboundary watercourses, harmonization and monitoring of legislation and 
policies, and aims to ensure equitable sharing of water as well as efficient conservation of scarce 
resources.1132The Protocol was revised in 2000 and this version came into force in February 2003. 
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This revised Protocol recognized, as its sources, the rules of Agenda 21 from the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development regarding WRM; the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of 
the Waters of International Rivers; and the work of the International Law Commission on the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses.1133 However, this Protocol is not relevant to the 
Ethiopian WRM issues since the country is not a member of the SADC and neither does it lie within 
its region. 
Many treaties concerning African water resource uses do not comprehensively address their security 
challenges in a coordinated way.1134'HVSLWH WKH H[LVWHQFH RI PDQ\ ZDWHU ERGLHV µYHU\ IHZ VKDUHG
waters are jointly managed and in many respects, the issues of water rights and ownership of 
international waters remain unresolved, and national interests tend to prevail over shared 
LQWHUHVWV¶1135Noticeably, the regulation of water quality and quantity does require treaties for shared 
water bodies.1136In the African region, some river basin treaties are influenced in many ways by its 
colonial legacy. CRORQLDO JRYHUQPHQWV KDYH GHWHUPLQHG PDQ\ RI WKH $IULFDQ ZDWHU ERGLHV¶
governance systems and national boundaries. 1137  For example, the two major treaties which 
established the governance system for the Nile water resources were formulated in 1929 and 1959. 
The former treaty was agreed between Egypt and the British government during the colonial 
period,1138and has since been widely contested by many of the river basLQ¶VULSDULDQVWDWHV 
 
The arguments for and against the treaty are rooted indifferent perspectives. The opposition against 
the treaty primarily considers it as non-progressive and not comprehensive for ensuring long-term 
water availability. Its scope is limited to allocating shared water in a perpetual manner. Moreover, it 
lacks the involvement of all riparian states, since it was made between a colonial government and an 
independent African state.1139 The treaty has noticeably tended to serve the discrete interests of 
colonial governments with regard to water allocation, by deviating from equitable uses of water.1140 
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Through this treaty, Egypt was given a monopoly over control of the Nile water. One of the 
supportive arguments for this treaty focuses on its establishment of µKLVWRULFULJKWV¶SDUWLFXODUO\IRU
Egypt. This claim uses the water shortage scenario in Egypt as its argument, rather than that of any 
other riparian states. Moreover, it attaches the water security of Egypt to surface water allocation, 
and the treaty allows an inequitable water share. 
By focusing on surface water, these arguments fail to appreciate the options available for the security 
of water. The latter treaty was post-colonial by its time of formulation, and Egypt and Sudan agreed 
to extend the rights and obligations indicated in the former treaty. This rendered it a complementary 
treaty, which may not stand by itself. In particular, the countries agreed to control all the Nile water 
by the discourse of full utilization, and they extended the amount of the quotas that were established 
by the former treaty.1141 Similar to the former treaty, the 1959 treaty also did not involve the other 
riparian countries and, because of this lack of inclusiveness of the riparian countries, arguments for 
and DJDLQVWWKHVHWUHDWLHVDUHFRPPRQLQ$IULFD¶VSRVW-colonial water debates.1142 
The problems of these treaties in the African region, particularly in east Africa, are threefold. The 
existing water treaties are neither comprehensive nor do they promote equitable water use in some 
sub-regions. Instead, they are positioned towards specific priority concerns or inequitable water use.  
Firstly, the treaties focus on the allocation of specified amounts of water to the downstream countries: 
Egypt and Sudan. Both treaties exclude the riparian states, which are major contributors of water. 
The treaties also failed to establish equitability and fairness in the utilization and development of 
water resources, and focus instead on inequitable water sharing rather, than managing water 
resources.1143 They fixed the quantity of surface water in terms of the amounts that Egypt and Sudan 
are supposed to abstract from the River Nile. The problem of such a treaty is that it undermines 
possible variations in water quantity. 
Water resources within a given water body are unpredictable. As population growth demands more 
water to satisfy human needs and healthy ecosystems, sustaining these quantities of water may not be 
achievable, as water amounts will not rise proportionally with population growth. Rather, water 
levels may decrease considerably with such a phenomenon. Sensible water allocation policies and 
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laws may need to consider water flow and flexibility, as well as variations in the flow. When the 
water amount changes considerably, how can these treaties continue to deliver that same fixed 
amount of water to these countries? In addition, by focusing on surface water, the treaties failed to 
appreciate the groundwater resources. Each riparian state defines the amount of water needed based 
on surface water, rather than comprehensively analysing both surface and groundwater, as well as 
recycling and desalination options. In general, WRM options were not really considered. Through 
this failure, an overdependence on surface water has been created, and other options available to 
enhance water security are being undermined. These treaties were not shaped by the core principles 
that would enhance the security of water in the region. 
On 14 May 2010, four of the Nile riparian states (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) signed 
the Nile CFA(2010) in Entebbe, Uganda and, five days later, Kenya also joined.1144 On 28 February 
2011, Burundi joined these five states by signing the CFA. The CFA lays down some basic principles 
for the protection, use, conservation and development of the Nile basin. The CFA establishes the 
principle that each Nile basin state has the right to use, within its territory, the waters of the Nile river 
basin, and lays down a number of factors for determining equitable and reasonable utilization. The 
CFA incorporated many international water law principles such as equitable and reasonable use, no 
significant harm and issues of cooperation, at the forefront. Accordingly, the CFA endeavours to set 
up a WRM legal framework for its riparian states. The Framework is one of the key sub-regional 
initiatives aiming to manage shared Nile water resources in Africa. It aims to bring in more than ten 
African countries. The CFA is a good start for developing a bottom-up approach to WRM at a sub-
regional level. Many of the Nile riparian states have already signed the CFA; however, the scope of 
application of the CFA is limited to the management of the Nile water resources. Despite the many 
riparian states that have signed this agreement, the majority of them have yet to ratify the agreement. 
Moreover, Egypt and Sudan are unwilling to sign and ratify the CFA, thereby creating a deadlock; 
and ultimately, the CFA is not inclusive of all riparian states. 
Many African water bodies are, at present, without treaties regulating their use. 1145The lack of 
institutional arrangements for WRM WKDW HVWDEOLVKHV FRRSHUDWLYH DUUDQJHPHQWV FDQ µXQGHUPLQH WKH
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SRWHQWLDO EHQHILWV WR WKH FRQWLQHQW¶ XQOHVV VXFK DUUDQJHPHQWV DUH LQ SODFH DQG DUH LPSOHPHQWHG
effectively.1146 This means that riparian countries can exploit water resources in uncoordinated ways, 
which may exacerbate water security threats. Even if there are mechanisms to manage water 
resources within each administrative boundary level, such arrangements may lack a holistic approach 
WKDW FRQVLGHUV µIUHVKZDWHU DV D ILQLWH DQG YXOQHUDEOH UHVRXUFH¶ which demands integrated 
management.1147 The water management of a country may lean towards specific concerns for its own 
national policy prioritization, rather than equally promoting the common interests of all riparian 
VWDWHV)HZULYHUEDVLQVµKDYHHIIHFWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVIRUFRQVXOWDWLRQDQGFRRSHUDWLRQ¶
DQGSURFHGXUHVµIRUDYRLGLQJRUUHVROYLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOGLVSXWHVRYHUZDWHUDUHODUJHO\ODFNLQJ¶1148 In 
addition, introducing institutional arrangements that ensure the adequate quantity and quality of 
water resources for the environment and life-supporting ecosystems is a difficult task.1149 Similarly, 
it is challenging to bring reform to water resource institutions for national and transboundary water 
basins, as well as securing regional cooperation on water quantity and quality issues.1150 
6.4Disparities in water policies and laws  
 
In the AU member states, the introduction of water policies and laws has been growing over the last 
ten years. Many African countries have already introduced water policies and laws that encompass a 
range of water security management systems. However, the state of these developments varies 
considerably between countries. Experience shows that, once African countries formulate water 
policies, it takes years to adopt an integrated water law that translates policy into practice.1151 
Even if many African countries have formulated water policies and law, the comprehensiveness of 
these instruments is dependent on the priority given to them by each country, as well as the FRXQWU\¶V 
strength and commitment to introducing an effective WRM system. A recent empirical study of 
African WRM indicated that the introduction of water policies and laws is not coherent between 
countries, and that implementation outcomes are too mixed. 1152  For instance, at SUHVHQW µPRVW
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countries in Africa [are] developing new water policies with an Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) approach, which accommodates key features of an effective management 
system for water resources. However, these policies should require enacting law that accommodate 
these key features to implement. Some countries have managed to develop them while others are at 
different stages due to various reasons¶.1153 Many countries in Africa are still without an effective 
management system for water resources and, in most of the AU member states, the law is not yet 
fully implemented.1154 
6.5Legislative competence of the AU in WRM 
6.5.1 The traditional remit 
 
As an organized regional government structure, the African political administration commenced with 
the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963.1155 The establishment of the 
OAU set out the foundations for the African countries to work together for the common interest, 
beyond a too narrow, nationalistic agenda. Under the African Charter that established the OAU, the 
core objectives were to provide coordinated support to emancipate the African countries, which were 
under colonial domination, and to help resistance against racism.1156 Through the African Charter, 
the OAU was mandated to provide support for the African countries under colonial rule.1157 As a 
driving force, the OAU worked with the assumption that Africa could not be liberated unless the 
entire continent had gained independence and was free from any form of racism.1158 
In addition to these core objectives, the OAU aimed to raise the social, health, nutrition and 
sanitation standards of the African people; giving support to the United Nations and demanding an 
active share in world trade were also mentioned.1159 These objectives seem to cover too many issues 
to be appended to the OAU mandates. However, the OAU was criticized for its failure to address the 




 Organization of African Unity, Resolutions adopted by the first conference of independent African heads of state 
and government (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia22±25 May 1963). 
1156ibid, agenda item II. 
1157





many problems faced by African people.1160 Ihonvbere claims WKDW WKH µ$IULFDQ 8QLW\ ZDV JLYHQ D
weak and mediocre expression in the creation of a toothless clawless lion in a decorated cage in the 
name of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963¶.1161 Moreover, doubt over the 2$8¶V
DELOLW\WRPHHW LWVFRUHREMHFWLYHVKDVEHHQH[SUHVVHGLQWKDWWKHµ$IULFDQ8QLW\conceptualised and 
articulated as practical cooperation at political, social and cultural levels remains more of a dream 
WKDQ UHDOLW\¶1162 One of the constraints to realizing coordination in Africa was the fact that the 
African countries were defensive in surrendering to some of the considerable issues that demanded 
the 2$8¶s intervention for the common interests of the continent.1163 
Further frustration with the OAU was expressed thus:  
It is a shame that this has been the same theme for all the Pan-African Conferences since 
1990 and meetings and conferences organized by the OAU and other bodies. Yet Africa 
and Africans are very far from the goal in spite of thousands of pages in declarations and 
the adoptions of countless charters. Not only is Africa very far from unity on any front, it is 
today the most marginal, the most oppressed, the most exploited, the most debt-ridden, the 
most unstable, and the most denigrated continent in the world.1164 
 
6.5.2 Contemporary remit 
 
Decades after the establishment of the OAU, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was signed in 
2000, and the AU was established to replace the OAU.1165  Through this Act, many new ideas 
WUDQVIRUPLQJ WKH 2$8¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV KDYH EHHQ LQWURGXFHG ,Q SDUWLFXODU WKH $8¶V
mandates have been extended; amongst other things, the AU aims to achieve the following: 
x A greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa 
x To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent 
x To promote and defend common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its 
peoples 
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x To encourage international cooperation, and promote peace, security and stability on the 
continent 
x To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
governance 
x To promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels, as well as 
the integration of African economies  
x To promote cooperation in all fields of human activity; and to raise the living standards of 
African peoples and coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future 
regional economic communities, for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the AU.1166 
The above-mentioned list of functions entrusted to the AU suggests that the legislative competence 
of the Union is increasingly focused on non-water resources issues. Even in non-water issues, the 
mandate was limited to µSURPRWLRQ¶ of the member states, rather than direct intervention. Having this 
legislative competence may have its own positive impacts in shaping the member sWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUV
EXW LW LV DUJXHG WKDW D PHUH µSURPRWLRQ¶ competence may not be enough to regulate unsustainable 
water use within the AU. As noted by Hardin, µSURPRWLRQ¶ PD\ EHHTXDWHGZLWK µYHUEDO FODLP¶ WR
stop unwise resources exploitation, as opposed to introducing coercive regulatory arrangements.  
Through the Constitutive Act, different bodies and specialized agencies were established. These 
include the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Commission, the Pan-African Parliament and the 
Court of Justice was established to run the $8¶Vaffairs.1167 The Assembly was composed of heads of 
state and governments of African countries, and it has the mandate to impose sanctions on member 
states when they fail to comply with the obligations of the AU. 1168 Amongst other things, the 
Executive Council coordinates and makes decisions regarding water resources and irrigation 
policies.1169 In addition, there are a number of specialized technical committees that are conferred to 
run a range of functions in specific areas. 1170  Within its field of competence, each committee 
prepares projects and programmes for the AU and submits them to the Executive Council; it ensures 
the supervision, follow-up and evaluation of the implementation of decisions taken by the bodies of 
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the AU; it ensures the coordination and harmonization of projects and programmes of the AU; it 
submits to the Executive Council, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Executive 
Council, reports and recommendations on the implementation of the provisions of this Act; and it 
carries out any other functions assigned to it for the purpose of ensuring the implementation of the 
provisions of the Act.1171 
Subsequently, the AU adopted organizational structures that established the New Partnership for 
$IULFD¶V'HYHORSPHQW1(3$'ZKLFKDOVRUHFRJQL]Hd the extension of the mandates of the AU.1172 
NEPAD stressed that there were many pressing challenges that the people of the continent were 
facing and that needed to be addressed by the AU through coordinated efforts.1173 Overall, NEPAD 
reinforced WKH$8¶VPLVVLRQDPRQJVWRWKHUVIRUSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQDQGWKHSURPRWLRQRIVXVWDLQDEOH
development.1174 Since the establishment of the AU and the introduction of NEPAD, the principle of 
sustainable development has been one of the key guiding principles, in addition to regional 
integration, that the AU follows. 
(YHQWXDOO\ 1(3$' ZDV UHSODFHG E\ DQ DJHQF\ FDOOHG WKH 1HZ 3DUWQHUVKLS IRU $IULFD¶V
Development Agency (NEPAC), which handles cross-FXWWLQJLVVXHVWRDGGUHVV1(3$'¶VREMHFWLYHV
NEPAC works to address issues such as the food crisis that leads to social unrest, climate change and 
natural resources management, to ensure efficient policy responses within the continent.1175 In its 
institutional arrangements for natural resources management, NEPAC promotes adaptive 
management, participatory decision-making and an ecosystem-based approach.1176 In addition, the 
Agency envisages addressing incoherent natural resources¶ governance and promoting a system 
management approach that supports the prevention of loss of biodiversity, fragmented habitats and a 
decline in ecosystems.1177 
The above review of the Constitutive Act that established the AU and NEPAD demonstrates that the 
$8¶V legislative competences have been considerably expanded from the conventional ideas of the 
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OAU. However, the wordings of the legislative competences of the AU seem to be too weak, and 
focus more on promotion and facilitating rather than direct intervention. Addressing the drawbacks 
of natural resources management, including water resources, may need a significant legislative 
competence in WKH$8¶Vintervention, rather than its simply promoting the desire to bring reform. 
 
The African ministers responsible for water in 41 African countries met in Abuja, Nigeria, on 29±30 
April 2002 and established the African Ministerial Conference on Water (AMCOW).1178AMCOW 
was constituted through the collaboration and commitment of African governments, regional 
institutions, civil society groups, development cooperation partners and financial institutions, all 
working towards the Africa Water Vision 2025.1179 $0&2:¶V RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VHW-up consists of a 
Council of Ministers, responsible for water; an Executive Committee, constituted by three ministers 
IURPHDFKRI$0&2:¶VVXE-regions (West Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Africa, North Africa and 
Southern Africa); a Technical Advisory Committee; and sub-regional structures.1180The Executive 
Committee is advised by a Technical Advisory Committee; it ensures that decisions of the Council 
are implemented and is also responsible for the development of work programmes.1181 
AMCOW has the duty to provide political leadership, policy direction and advocacy for the 
SURWHFWLRQPDQDJHPHQWDQGZLVHXWLOL]DWLRQRIDOO$IULFD¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHV; to enhance the security 
of water for sustainable development; and to maintain $IULFD¶VHFRV\VWHPVWRPHHWthe goals of both 
Africa Water Vision for 2025and NEPAD.1182AMCOW has been conferred with responsibilities for 
facilitating sub-regional, regional and international cooperation, through the coordination of issues 
relating to water policies and actions among African countries; for providing assistance in the 
delivery of national, sub-regional and regional programmes to translate the Africa Water Vision 2025 
into action; for providing a mechanism for monitoring the progress of the implementation of major 
regional and global water resource, supply and sanitation initiatives; and for promoting sub-regional 
and basin and/or sub-basin cooperation. AMCOW also provides a forum for dialogue with UN 
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DJHQFLHV DQG RWKHU SDUWQHUV RQ ZDWHU LVVXHV FKDPSLRQV $IULFD¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ JOREDO DQG
continental studies about climate change and its impacts, and its development of regional observation 
networks; facilitates information exchange; and aims to develop policies and strategies for addressing 
the water issues in Africa.1183 
 
6.5.3 The current state of WRM institutional arrangements 
6.5.3.1 The African Water Vision 2025 
 
Enhancement of water security in the AU demands fundamental changes in the outdated institutional 
arrangements for WRM at both national and regional levels.1184Since the AU replaced the OAU, 
considerable endeavours have been undertaken to reform institutional arrangements for WRM 
through the $8¶Vintervention. At the AU level, WRM was mainly considered by adopting the Africa 
Water Vision for 2025,1185which provides a blueprint for institutional arrangements for WRM.  
$VWKHHVVHQFHRIWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVLWXQGHUOLQHVWKe need for 
µDQ $IULFDZKHUH WKHUH LVDQHTXLWDEOHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHXVHDQG PDQDJHPHQWRIZDWHU UHVRXUFHV IRU
poverty alleviation, socio-HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW UHJLRQDO FRRSHUDWLRQ DQG WKH HQYLURQPHQW¶1186 
Under this core vision statement, ten major issues have been defined to address water security 
challenges on the African continent. These include sustainable access to safe and adequate water 
supplies and sanitation to meet the basic needs of all; sufficient water for food and energy security; 
adequate water for sustaining ecosystems and biodiversity, both in terms of quantity and quality; 
reformation of institutions that deal with water resources to create an enabling environment for the 
effective and integrated management of water in national and transboundary water basins, including 
management at the lowest appropriate level; water basins that serve as a basis for regional 
cooperation and development, and are treated as natural assets for all within such basins; an adequate 
number of motivated and highly skilled water professionals; an effective and financially sustainable 
system for data collection and assessment; dissemination of national and transboundary water basins; 
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effective and sustainable strategies for addressing natural and man-made water resources problems, 
including climate variability and change; the finance and pricing of water to promote equity, 
efficiency and sustainability; and, above all, political will, public awareness and commitment for 
sustainable WRM.1187 As an implementation framework: 
[the] vision calls for a new way of thinking about water and a new form of regional 
cooperation. At the regional level, it calls for partnership and solidarity between countries 
that share common water basins. At the national level, it will require fundamental changes 
in policies, strategies and legal frameworks, as well as changes in institutional 
arrangements and management practices. It will necessitate the adoption of participatory 
approaches, management at the lowest appropriate level, and the mainstreaming of gender 
issues and the concerns of the youth. At the global level, it will call for assistance from 
$IULFD¶V GHYHORSPHQW SDUWQHUV LQ PRELOL]LQJ VHHG IXQGLQJ IRU SULPLQJ WKH XUJHQW
developments needed to underpin sustainable management of the region¶V ZDWHU
resources.1188 
The Africa Water Vision document reflects some key features as a management system for water 
resources. This vision document calls for member states to reflect in their water policies and laws the 
key features of an effective WRMP, such as: equitable and sustainable use; demand and supply 
management; water quality protection; integration; cooperation and collaboration; and participation 
and subsidiarity. The vision is comprehensive, in terms of encompassing water security as a central 
concern for sustainable development and in calling the AU member states to bring about a 
fundamental change in their WRM systems. Despite the Africa Water Vision recognizing that water 
security is at the heart of the $8¶V social and economic development and environmental 
sustainability, the status of the $8¶V legislative competence to intervene in shaping the water laws 
and policies of the member states and ensuring implementation is unclear. The AU¶V Water Vision is 
about calling the member states, rather than reflecting the key features into water policy and law; it 
leaves the reflection and implementation of the key features of an effective WRMP to the discretion 
of its member states. 
The above quote suggests that it should be member states at the national or river basin levels who 
manage water resources, by introducing new water policies and laws. The $8¶VWater Vision calls 
for its member states to transform their institutional arrangements for WRM, for both water bodies 
WKDW DUH FRQILQHG ZLWKLQ PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ QDWLRQDO DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ERXQGDULHV DQG WKRVH WKDW DUH
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transboundary, rather than calling for the AU itself to provide binding laws and common implication 
strategies that may be used as a general framework for WRM law, which would shape the water laws 
and practices of the continent in a coherent way. This suggests that the Africa Water Vision may 
remain an impractical dream unless the member states can incorporate the key features of an 
effective WRM system into their legislation and introduce proper institutional arrangements and 
organizational structures to implement them.  
6.5.3.2 Declarations 
 
After the adoption of the African Water Vision for 2025, the AU also adopted a dozen water 
declarations. Among them, the 2002 Abuja Declaration underlines the sustainability of water as key 
to the sustainable development of the continent.1189 The Declaration considers water resources as 
being at the centre of social and economic development, and the environmental sustainability of 
national, regional and international development. 1190  Moreover, the Declaration recognizes 
institutional arrangements for WRM as one of the challenges to water security within the continent, 
and encourages member states to manage shared water resources in a coordinated way.1191 
Similarly, the Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action on Employment and Poverty Alleviation 
expresses concerns about sustainable livelihoods for the African population.1192 The Ouagadougou 
Declaration calls for member states to introduce programmes and policies enhancing sustainable 
development.1193 Likewise, the 2008 AU Continental Social Policy Framework provides guidance to 
member states with regard to the promotion of rights and ensuring welfare. In 2008 alone, three 
declarations, which were directly related to WRM, were adopted ± the eThekwini Declaration on 
Sanitation, 1194  the Tunis Declaration on Accelerating Socio-Economic Growth Through Water 
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Security 1195 and the Sharm-el-Sheikh Declaration 1196  ± amongst other concerns with regard to 
meeting the MDGs in relation to water security.  
Moreover, LQ  $0&2: ZRXOG PDNH D GHFLVLRQ WKDW DLPHG DW µVWUHQJWKHQLQJ $IULFD¶V ZDWHU
management functions at a sub-UHJLRQDO OHYHO¶ ZKLFK KDV EHHn defined as a scale for cooperative 
arrangements. 1197  This decision aims for each sub-region to manage its own water resources. 
Markedly, this decision suggests that WRM systems through treaties between countries ± and at sub-
regional level ± may make their own contribution to the security of water if they are sufficiently 
comprehensive and can accommodate the pressures that threaten the sustainability of water resources.  
Recently, the Monrovia Water Declaration was adopted, which accommodates a range of issues in 
respect of institutional arrangements for WRM.1198Through this and many others, the AU heads of 
state and governments have entered into a range of commitments to enhance the security of water 
resources. These declarations set a hallmark start to implement the Africa Water Vision. As 
Hendricks states, µ[i]n fact as we stand here today we cannot, and should not, allow ourselves to just 
adopt yet another Ministerial Statement without making very firm and tangible commitments for a 
³FDOO WR DFWLRQ´ and ensuring that effective mechanisms are put in place to monitor 
implementation¶.1199 
Water sustainability threats are often on the agenda for AMCOW to bring into its discussions, but 
they do not go beyond the usual declarations that seek verbal demands for the AU member states or 
sub-regional levels to commit themselves to ensuring water sustainability. 1200  None of the 
declarations adopted made an attempt to introduce a comprehensive water law that provides binding 
water instruments for member states. The AU-level strong legislative intervention through water 
laws, within African WRM, remains an unaddressed concern, despite it potentially being at the heart 
RILQIOXHQFLQJWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVIRUWRM.  
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With these ineffective soft laws and soft approaches, AMCOW and the AU have put themselves 
outside of a practical water resources governance system, leaving each national government, or 
riparian countryWREULQJUHIRUPV3UDFWLFDOO\WKHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQWHUPVRIEULQJLQJ
reform with regard to water resources has mixed outcomes: some countries register progressive 
reform, although these reforms are not comprehensive in their nature, while many countries remain 
very far from bringing about considerable reform.1201 The implementation of the reforms is generally 
incoherent, fragmented and isolated, even in river basins that are shared between countries.1202 
Through such institutional arrangements and organizational remits, the AU might not alter its vision, 
which is currently just a dream of sustaining water resources. Nor will declaration after declaration 
bring genuine solutions for the contemporary threats to African water resources. If water security in 
Africa is to be enhanced, the AU must have legislative competence to adopt comprehensive water 
laws and ensure their implementation.  
Despite the pivotal role of the AU member states in ensuring water security in their administrative 
boundaries or river basins, the $8¶V intervention in ensuring that member states have coherent 
policies, laws and strategies to implement this is invaluable. The nature of such institutional 
arrangements for WRM may bring fundamental changes that transform the level of intervention by 
the AU. For this, the AU may need strong legislative competence that empowers the introduction of 
comprehensive water law. This approach allows a governance system that involves multiple levels± 
the AU should provide a WFD for member states and ensure implementation, whilst allowing each 
member state to adopt the water policies and laws that are context specific, but shaped to manage the 
water resources at river basin level, whether the water body ends within the national boundary levels 
or is transboundary by nature. Setting the water policy directions by themselves are not solutions for 
enhancing the water security of Africa.1203 The policies must be accompanied by proper institutional 
arrangements, and they need to be implemented. 
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6.6 Conclusion of chapter  
 
Water scarcity in Africa is a threat to WKH FRQWLQHQW¶V social, economic and environmental 
sustainability. 1204  Its impacts are not necessarily limited to the administrative boundaries within 
specific member states; they might transcend and affect the common interests of the river basin 
countries and the whole African continent. Therefore, the separate endeavours of a member state at 
its own administrative boundary may not significantly halt the threats to water security. This gives an 
insight into the fact that, at the river basin and regional scale, and as a supranational body, the AU 
has a critical role LQVKDSLQJLWVUHJLRQV¶WRMPs in order to enhance water security.  
This chapter reviewed the status of the management system for water resources within the AU, 
including some regional and river basin arrangements, in order to understand the extent to which the 
AU has implemented the key features of an effective WRM system. The review in this chapter 
indicated that on the national scale, some African countries have already developed integrated water 
policy and law.  However, the water policies and laws are not shaped by the AU-level laws but are, 
instead, fragmented and incoherent; their comprehensiveness to accommodate key features of an 
effective PDQDJHPHQW V\VWHP GHSHQGV RQ WKH FRXQWULHV¶ SULRULWLzed concerns and capacities, and 
other related factors. The introduction of an effective WRMP within national-level water law and 
policy is not bad as such, as long as it addresses water resources threats and is implemented; however, 
it is unlikely to accommodate interests beyond the local needs. The possibilities of disregarding the 
interests of the wider communities beyond their administrative boundary are likely to be high. Such 
policy and law may not be effective in addressing the interests of the AU or river basin countries. 
The reform processes also pass through different paths, and inclusiveness varies based on policy 
priority. Although some countries may share water bodies, they may not have the mechanisms for 
sustaining their water resources. 
IWRM at the regional or river basin level is a key to enhancing water security. 1205 This chapter 
suggests that the river, as a coordinated transboundary water resource, is not new in Africa. There 
have been some endeavours to manage water resources through regional agreement, which focused 
on a particular region¶V WRM and river basin agreement, such as a treaty that is signed by the 
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riparian states of a specific transboundary river. In water resources governance, bilateral and 
multilateral water treaties are often at the centre of cooperation-building. The investigation in this 
chapter indicated that not all cooperation ensures the sustainability of water; rather, the effectiveness 
may be measured by how the cooperative arrangements themselves are designed to make such 
arrangements more inclusive and more comprehensive for addressing the threats to water security. 
Many traditional water treaties may not sufficiently address contemporary threats to water security. 
In particular, they had been designed to regulate specific water resource issues, and some of them 
encourage inequitable water use, which is one of the threats to the security of water. Because of this, 
it is important to introduce regional and river basin arrangements that enhance water security. 
Similarly, it is also crucial to enhance the AU¶V intervention in WRM to promote its common 
interests. 
Traditionally, the major legislative competences of the OAU were limited to giving support in a 
coordinated manner in order to alleviate the colonization and racism threats to which many of the 
African countries were exposed. Its competence would therefore be fully different from the EU. 
During this period, the preferred approach upon implementing these objectives was non-
interventionist wLWKLQ LWV PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ LQWHUQDO DIIDLUV Introduction of an effective WRM system 
was not the mandate of the OAU, though each member state might separately introduce water policy 
and law that it assumed appropriate for the sustainability of water. 
However, post-colonial Africa has changed the $8¶V mandate in intervening in some issues that 
were previously the remit of individual member states. With the establishment of the AU and 
NEPAD, competences were extended to intervening in issues that affect the sustainable development 
of the continent. However, the wordings of the legislative mandates of the AU and NEPAD seem to 
be too weak and focus more on promotion and facilitation, rather than direct intervention. Addressing 
the drawbacks of natural resources management, including water resources, may need significant 
regional intervention, rather than simply promoting and expressing the desire to bring reform.  
To tackle water scarcity threats, the AU made some efforts in its aim WRUHIRUPWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VWRM 
systems. Notably, the AU adopted the Water Vision that accommodates some key features of an 
effective WRMP. Subsequently, AMCOW and the heads of government of African countries have 
formulated a range of declarations that call for the implementation of the Africa Water Vision. Since 
2000, the AU has adopted a dozen WRM declarations. 
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The AU has made some significant moves on water policy and law development following on from 
the establishment of the African Union. However, the extent of development in water policy and law 
remains weak at the regional scale, when one assesses the state of the AU¶Vwater law along with the 
insights drawn from the EU¶V water policy and law. The finding of this chapter is that, despite water 
resources in the African continent being under a frightening threat of scarcity, the AU does not have 
strong legislative competence law to intervene in WRM when compared with the EU. Too many 
years are spent in endless conferences that provide declaration after declaration, rather than 
introducing water legislation and formulating clear implementation action plans that accommodate 
features of an effective WRMP. Through such declarations, practically, it may not be possible for the 
AU to implement a water vision that incorporates such effective features of a WRM system that 
addresses the water security threats. The root problem for this weakness may emanate from the 
legislative mandate of the AU, which is highly restricted in developing water law. In order to 
enhance the sustainability of water resources in the Union, the legislative mandate of the AU may 
need to expand in a way that allows the Union to intervene strongly in developing a water framework 
that imposes a duty on the member states to transpose its water policy and law in a more harmonized 
fashion. 
This chapter argued that contemporary African water security issues PD\SDUWO\EHGXHWRWKH$8¶V
legislative competence problems in providing an effective WRM system, and not only due to the 
failure of its member states. To tackle the fragmentation and incoherence of the water policies and 
laws between member states, the AU needs to have a strong legislative competence. As water 
security is a regional threat and has regional implications, the AU should thus have strong legislative 
competence to intervene at that level. In particular, the AU should have the mandate to provide a 
comprehensive water law, which in turn provides a general framework for member states to reform 
their national laws, policy instruments and water treaties. Through such institutional arrangements, 
each member state may play its part; but all the water law and policy instruments of the $8¶V
member states should be harmonized, and the implementation of strategies should be introduced to 
hold accountable those member states that fail to act according to the $8¶Vlegislation. 
Such legislative competence to introduce model AU law may limit member states from giving their 
own concerns priority, rather than the long-term common interests of the AU. It also not only 
provides direction, but also avoids confusion in the understanding of why the given legislation is 
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issued.1206 It would help the evolution of laws that are directed to those problems that demand 
solutions.1207 The provision of a comprehensive water policy and law by the AU would be supportive 
of its integration endeavours, and can FKDQJHWKRVHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶ZDWHU ODZVDQGSROLFLHVWKDWDUH
now too fragmented, isolated and incoherent to be likely to enhance the security of water resources. 
Moreover, the introduction of a model law is likely to speed up the adoption and implementation of 
an effective WRM system throughout the AU. It would help to harmonize its PHPEHUVWDWHV¶ZDWHU
policies and laws, in order to enhance water security.  
However, this model water law would need to provide a water framework that is general enough to 
allow member states to shape within their local contexts. A model law is not something to be copied. 
Rather, it should be adapted to the contexts and the actual water resource pressures of each specific 
country; it should also accommodate the key features of an effective WRMP. Thus, the introduction 
of a model water law for of the AU countries does not mean that each of them should introduce a 
µRQH-size-fits-DOO¶ZDWHUOHJLVODWLRQEXWWKDWWKH$8¶Vmember states should integrate this legislation 
based on their responsiveness, and harmonize their national laws with the core principles of the $8¶V
water framework legislation. Such legislation should be complemented with the CIS of the AU to 
minimize the risk of inconsistencies upon implementations. 
Chapter Seven: Water resources and WRM systems in the context of Ethiopia 
7.1 Introduction 
The assessment undertaken in Chapters Four and Five of this study has demonstrated that there are 
new developments in the WRMPs of the EU and England. These water policy and law developments 
are partly attached to the growing water shortage, and the insights gained from their discussion 
suggest that ensuring the security of water requires, amongst other things, an effective management 
system for water resources. Likewise, Chapter Six reviewed the state of the AU¶Vwater policy and 
law in affecting the water security of its member states. 
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Ethiopia is one of the AU member states. This chapter reviews the availability of such water 
resources, and the rationale for the discussion in this context is primarily to evaluate whether water 
security is the main challenge in Ethiopia. The chapter investigates the features of WRMPs under 
water policy and law. It might be difficult to understand the effectiveness of existing WRM systems 
without having knowledge of the context of such water resources. In Ethiopia, agriculture is 
estimated to account for more than 90 percent of all water withdrawals.1208 Many communities are 
also served by direct abstraction from the resources. 
This chapter also examines past and present systems for WRM in Ethiopia in order to conduct an 
assessment and explore the extent to which the key features of an effective WRM are reflected in the 
current Ethiopian water policy and law that regulate water security challenges. For this purpose, 
Chapter Seven investigates developments in water resources policy and law within two distinct 
periods: the developments until the 1990s are categorized under the traditional model; while the 
contemporary category refers to the developments in policy and laws since the 1990s. 
Traditional water regimes are reviewed to evaluate the drives for their development, the extent to 
which water policy and law address challenges in water security, and the rationales for their change. 
Contemporary water law and policy developments are examined to understand the extent to which 
the Ethiopian water policy and law reflect the key features of an effective management system for 
water resources. The main themes in this chapter are organized into three sections. The first section 
reviews availability and factors affecting the security of water resources. The second section reviews 
the water regimes and mandates of different institutions. Finally, the chapter draws a conclusion. 
7.2 Availability of water resources and factors affecting the security of water resources in 
Ethiopia 
Relatively speaking, Ethiopia is endowed with abundant water resources and because of this; the 
country KDVPHWDSKRULFDOO\EHHQFDOOHGµWKHZDWHUWRZHURIHDVW$IULFD¶$PRQJVWWKHULYHUEDVLQV
that the country has, many of them cross national administrative boundaries and drain several east 
African countries.1209 The countr\¶V ULYHU EDVLQV SURYLGH D WRWDO RI an estimated 122 billion m3 of 
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water run-off annually, and an estimated 2.6±6.5 billion m3 of groundwater potential.1210In fact, an 
average of 1,575m3 of water per person per year is available.1211 
But paradoxically, the country faces continuous challenges of drought and food insecurity.1212One of 
the causes of these problems is that the country is unable to utilize its water resources.1213Moreover, 
tKHFRXQWU\¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHVDUHH[SRVHGWRDJUHDWGHDORIVSDWLDODQGWHPSRUDO variability.1214The 
variability of water resources extends from extreme drought with an acute shortage of water 
resources to high floods.1215Table 1 shows figures for the availability of water, indicating that water 
resources vary by basin.1216 
Table 1: Surface water resources of major river basins in Ethiopia1217 
 
No. Name of river basin Catchment area (km2) Annual run-off (billion 
m3) 
1 Abbay 199,912 52.6 
2 Awash 112,700 4.6 
3 Baro-Akobo 74,100 23.6 
4 Genale Dawa 171,050 5.80 
5 Mereb 5,700 0.26 
6 Omo-Ghibe 78,200 17.90 
7 Rift Valley Lakes 52,740 5.60 
8 Tekezze 89,000 7.63 
9 Wabe Shebelle 200,214 3.15 
10 Afar-Danakil 74,000 0.86 
11 Ogaden 77,100 0 
12 Aysha 2,200 0 
 Total 1,136,816 12,200 
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The detailed study made by the British Geological Survey suggests that the context of water security 
challenges in Ethiopia varies from place to place.1218  The study underlines the fact that, in the 
highland parts of the country:  
water security is generally higher however, as springs are more numerous and demand (from 
people and livestock) is relatively low. In lowland areas the aquifer is larger, but water 
security is undermined by limited (and poor quality) surface water, restricted access to the 
aquifer via boreholes, and greater demands. Boreholes are also subject to mechanical failure. 
Increase in demand can put stresses on individual groundwater sources, but are unlikely to 
affect the resources as a whole.1219 
Among the 12 river basins, eight water bodies are actual river basins; one is a lake basin; and the 
remaining three are dry basins with no or insignificant flow out of water.1220 Some river basins have 
little or no water run-off. For instance, the Awash River basin catchment area covers an area of 
110,000km2 and has a total length of 1,200km.1221 The majority of the Awash River basin, in the 
downstream areas, experiences hot and dry climatic conditions, which have a direct implication on 
the quality and quantity of the water resources. This basin district is amongst the driest river basins in 
Ethiopia.1222 
As can be observed from Map 3, the surface water run-off varies significantly within different parts 
of the river basin district. In the eastern catchment of the basin, there are no streams that contribute to 
surface run-off. On the other hand, the western highlands and parts of the middle valley and of the 
lower valley are concentrated with streams, compared to other segments of the Awash River basin 
district. The uplands and upper valley have medium stream coverage. In the lower plains, there are 
few streams running to Lake Abe. This map does not reveal the groundwater distribution in the 
catchments; the groundwater distribution of the country is under study.1223 
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Map 3: Awash River Basin District1224 
 
 
In this basin district, the highlands receive a rainfall of 1,000mm/year, which decreases to 
200mm/year in the lowlands.1225 7KH$ZDVK5LYHUEDVLQGLVWULFW¶VVXUIDFHZDWHUUXQ-off is relatively 
low compared with other basin water resources.1226 In this river basin district, there is often a scarcity 
of surface water during the dry season;1227therefore the downstream arid and semi-arid areas suffer 
continuously with drought.1228 
 
In addition to the natural unavailability of water resources, human-induced factors are the major 
evidential threats to water resources security in Ethiopia.1229 The level of human pressures varies 
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from basin to basin. For instance, the water resources of the Awash River basin district are relatively 
highly utilized for a range of development purposes in comparison to other basins in the country.1230 
Some of the human pressures that affect the scarcely available water resources make them unsuitable 
for human use and biodiversity.1231 
Available data indicates that the future challenges to water security in Ethiopia are increasingly 
terrifying when compared with some of its neighbouring countries. 1232  With a rapidly growing 
population, the per capita availability of water is rapidly diminishing more than ever before (see 
Table 2). 1233 With the growth of the population, the demand for water for basic human needs 
increases.1234 Drought and competing demands to supply water exacerbate water security.1235Kenfe 
+DLOHPDULDP¶V prediction of climate change has shown that it will bring major changes in the 
availability of water in the Awash River basin district.1236 He anticipated that the water run-off may 
decrease or increase with significant changes in the precipitation of water into the river basin.1237 

























Burundi 6.4 13.5 170  655 269 
DRC 43.9 104.6 160  359,803 139,309 
Egypt 62.9 97.3 1,090 7.6 1,123 630 
Ethiopia 55.1 126.9 100 33.8 2,207 842 
Kenya 28.8 63.4 320 50.2 636 235 
Rwanda 8 15.8 190 45.7 897 306 
Sudan 28.1 58.4   4,792 1,993 
Tanzania 29.7 62.9 170 16.4 2,924 1,025 
Uganda 21.3 48.1 300 50 3,759 1,437 
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7.3 WRMPs under Ethiopian policy and law  
7.3.1 Constitution  
7.3.1.1 Water resources management  
 
In the Ethiopian legal system, the Constitution is the supreme law that provides the general legal 
framework. All other legislation, practices and decisions must follow the rules and road-maps that 
DUHVHWRXWE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ$Q\µODZFXVWRPDU\SUDFWLFHVDQGGHFLVLRQVPDGHE\VWDWHRUJDQRU
public officials inconsistent with Constitution arHQXOODQGYRLG¶1239 The constitutional law is the key 
legislation for investigating and exploring the state of direction in the present water resources law. 
The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution was adopted with the intention of providing remedies tothe 
drawbacks of past regimes with respect to political, social and economic aspects.1240 In particular, 
this Constitution aspires to serve as a recipe to rectify past mistakes and to set the road-map that has 
been transforming the country. It determines the jurisdiction over WRM and defines the jurisdiction 
of the level of government that is responsible for ensuring the sustainable use of water resources.  
Through the 1995 FDRE Constitution, natural resources, including water resources, are entrusted to 
µWKH 6WDWH DQG WKH 3HRSOH RI (WKLRSLD¶ 1241  There are two entities that are mentioned under the 
Constitution as the owners of water resources: the first nation and the people of the country. 
Regarding land resources, the Constitution provides protection to land owners, peasants and 
pastoralists from the displacement of their land unless an advance payment of compensation is made 
in cases where land is disposed of for public purposes.1242But regarding other natural resources, there 
are no clear constitutional rules conferring such prerogatives for the possessors or persons with 
interests.  
7KHFRQFHSWRIRZQHUVKLSRIQDWXUDO UHVRXUFHVE\ µWKH6WDWHDQG WKHSHRSOHRI(WKLRSLD¶XQGHU WKH
Constitution remains unclear in terms of what this means in practical terms.1243 Damtie, the Ethiopian 
legal scholar, uses two strands of interpretation for these two terms. First, he argues that natural 
resources in Ethiopia cannot be owned through private ownership. Through this lens, he contends 
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that the conceptualization of the owQHUVKLSRIQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVE\µWKH6WDWHDQG3HRSOHRI(WKLRSLD¶
PD\EHFRQVLGHUHGDVµSXEOLFRZQHUVKLS¶ which considers putting water resources within the public 
domain. Public ownership right over the water resources is supportive of a qualified right in order to 
protect long-term public interest over the water resources.1244 
Local-level involvement could enhance a more effective natural resources management;1245the closer 
that natural resources management is to the lower level, the more it also enhances local people¶V 
participation. 1246  Participation favours a decentralized natural resources management that also 
enhances decentralization of power to the lowest appropriate level. 1247The second strand of the 
interpretation considers that the ownership of natural resources is vested in both the state and the 
people of Ethiopia as two distinct entities.  Damtie further argues WKDWWKHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHSKUDVHµWKH
SHRSOH RI (WKLRSLD¶ DV DQ RZQHU RI QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV PD\ EH LQWHQGHG WR recognize the rights of 
indigenous peoples. His second interpretation gives local people the powers and authority to have 
control over their respective natural resources. With this understanding, arguably, the FDRE 
Constitution entrusts the powers to control water resources to the federal, regional or local levels and 
to local people. This interpretation is supportive of the idea of an inclusive governance system, that is, 
nested systems that allow a range of stakeholders to manage water. It is justifiable to argue that 
responsive WRM may not materialize without introducing a more inclusive approach to water 
resources for stakeholders.1248 
Under the section of the Constitution that defines the powers and authorities of the levels of 
government, the federal government is entrusted with the power to enact laws for the utilization and 
FRQVHUYDWLRQRIODQGDQGRWKHUQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVLQFOXGLQJZDWHUUHVRXUFHVZKLOVWWKHUHJLRQDOVWDWHV¶
powers are limited to administering land and other natural resources in accordance with federal 
laws.1249 The Constitution does not give the power or discretion to the regional states and local 
people to determine the administration of natural resources upon formulating policy and enacting law. 
Exceptionally, in rural land administration, the regional states are entitled to enact laws that provide 
detailed rules for facilitating the implementation of the law enacted by the federal government. 
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However, the federal government may delegate the power to manage natural resources to the 
regional states. 1250  In natural resources management, the decentralization of powers in policy 
formulation and law enacting is considered only in exceptional situations, and with the discretion of 
federal government, to determine the matters being delegated.  
With regard to WRM WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQHQWUXVWVSRZHUWRWKH IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWWRµGHWHUPLQHDQG
DGPLQLVWHU¶ WKH XWLOL]DWLRQ RI WKH ZDWHUV ULYHUV RU ODNHV OLQNLQJ WZRRU PRUH VWDWHVRU FURVVLQJ WKH
boundaries of the national territorial jurisdiction. 1251  This provision implies that, in principle, 
interstate WRM is constitutionally centralized, unless the regional states obtain the mandate through 
delegation.1252In this way, the administration of natural resources, particularly water resources, may 
be seen as a positive measure for avoiding the localized water utilization that leads to the inequitable 
share of water resources, particularly of interstate water resources. 1253  The federal government 
decides upon such delegation and how it works. This authority may also be revoked if the lower level 
is not performing its functions effectively. By its own discretion, federal government transfers some 
of its responsibilities for WRM to the regional states. A strict reading of the FDRE Constitution 
could suggest that regional states may have the exclusive power to manage water resources that are 
confined within their respective administrative boundaries, according to the laws that are enacted by 
the federal government. Through this understanding, both federal government and respective 
regional states have the jurisdiction to manage non-interstate water; the federal government enacts 
the laws and the regional states implement them.   
Article 51 (11) of the Constitution states that federal government µshall determine and administer the 
utilization of waters or rivers and lakes linking two or more states or crossing the boundaries of the 
national territorial jurisdiction¶.1254  ,Q WKLV VWDWHPHQW WKH ZRUG µlinking¶ GRHV QRW KDYH a single 
interpretation. )URP D ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV SRLQW RI YLHZ µOLQNDJH¶ PD\ EH HVWDEOLVKHG ZKHQ D ZDWHU
course or water body crosses the administrative boundaries of two or more states, or crosses a 
QDWLRQDOERXQGDU\MXULVGLFWLRQ7KHµOLQNDJH¶PD\DOVREHestablished by the watershed or social and 
economic benefits that a river or water body provides, though the Constitution does not give any clue. 
7KHEURDGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHµZDWHUVULYHUVRUODNHV¶ link may encompass all water resources and 
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ecosystems in the country. For instance, one of the senior officials in the Ministry of Water and 
Energy Resources argued that the mandate to conduct the administration of all water resources in 
Ethiopia is entrusted to the federal government.1255 
Fekahmed Negash believes that this FRQFHSW RI µOLQNDJH¶ LQ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ GRHV QRW PHDQ WKDW
waters, rivers or lakes are left for the administration of regional states. He contends that all water 
resources in the country interlink two or more regional states or cross national administrative 
boundaries, either through surface water or groundwater or both. He suggests that regional states do 
not have a constitutional mandate to determine and administer water resources unless they obtain 
power from the federal government through delegation. Another senior government official, also 
from the MoWE, confirmed that constitutionally, WRM is centralized. 1256  He believes that the 
mandate to administer water resources in Ethiopia is conferred upon the national government, and 
the involvement of regional government in WRM is limited to circumstances in which the authority 
is delegated by the federal government. He contends that water resources are not the resources of 
specific groups. Rather, they are owned and administered for the interest of all the people in the 
nation. Federal government, therefore, conducts WRM on behalf of the people of the nation. This 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQPD\EHVHHQWRXQGHUPLQHORFDOSHRSOH¶VLQWHUHVW 
Practically, centralized WRM may not be responsive in addressing the interests of local water 
resource users.1257 Firstly, the federal government may not have its own sectors that handle the 
human pressures of water resources at a local level throughout the water bodies in the country. They 
are situated further away than the regional and local levels in terms of providing quicker solutions for 
water resource problems. Naturally, neither local nor central government alone is effective in 
handling water resource problems.1258 There must be a role for both central and local levels to engage 
in WRM.1259 
The solution for water security challenges is a multiple scale-oriented model that accommodates the 
interests of different levels. The success of WRM is dependent on the collaborative efforts of diverse 
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stakeholders.1260 Some water resource concerns may be handled at a higher level, whereas others 
could be handled at a lower level.1261 The regional states or levels and local people exert an influence 
on water resources development and protection, whether the water body is interstate or 
transboundary in its nature. The consideration of interstate or any shared WRM as the exclusive 
mandate of federal government ignores the existing facts. Even a river basin plan may not create a 
concrete picture without considering the needs and interests of local and national levels.  
A RBMP is composed of many separate projects, plans and needs, which are brought together by 
coordinating the functions of different sectors and levels of government.1262 The foundations for the 
RBMP are the plans for diverse projects and units, which bring together efforts for water utilization 
and protection. For instance, in the USA, Trelease noted that this was why shared water resources 
were not managed exclusively by the federal government.1263 Rather, the regional states and other 
administrative levels below them play their own role in WRM.1264 
7.3.1.2The right to clean water as a human right 
The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution states that µWKH 3HRSOH RI (WKLRSLD DV D ZKROH DQG 1DWLRQ
Nationality and People in Ethiopia in particular, have the right to improved living standards and the 
right to sustainable development¶.1265 The CRQVWLWXWLRQDOVRSOHGJHVWKDWµall international agreements 
and relations concluded, established or conducted by the State shall protect and ensure Ethiopia¶s 
right to sustainable development¶.1266  The CRQVWLWXWLRQ IXUWKHU XQGHUOLQHV WKDW µWKH EDVLF DLP RI
development activities shall be to enhance the capacity of citizens for development and to meet their 
basic needs¶.1267 As part of sustainable development and meeting basic needs, the Constitution places 
environmental and water issues at the centre. Under Article 44(1) the Constitution recognizes 
environmental rights: µDOO SHUVRQV KDYH WKH ULJKW WR D FOHDQ DQG KHDOWK\ HQYLURQPHQW¶1268It also 
imposes an REOLJDWLRQ WKDW WKH µGovernment shall endeavour to ensure that all Ethiopians live in a 
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clean and healthy environment¶.1269To this effect, the design and implementation of programmes and 
projects of development should not damage or destroy the environment. 1270  However, the 
environmental protection concerns may not be something that is left for the government alone to 
implement. It is the duty of both the government and citizens.1271 6WDNHKROGHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LVRQH
of the crucial tools; the involvement of citizens to protect and conserve their environment is 
paramount. In terms of their participation in decision-PDNLQJ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ VWDWHV WKDW µ3HRSOH
have the right to full consultation and to the expression of their views in the planning and 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQV RI HQYLURQPHQWDO SROLFLHV DQG SURMHFWV WKDW DIIHFW WKHP GLUHFWO\¶.1272 Participation 
enables people to realize their rights to a clean environment, clean water, to meeting basic needs and 
discharging their obligations. Participation is also a key tool to hold the government accountable for 
its failure to discharge its obligations.  
A small number of African countries do recognize the right to clean water as a human right. Ethiopia 
is amongst these countries. In Ethiopia, the right to clean water is enshrined in its1995 Constitution, 
which VWDWHV WKDW µ>W@R WKH H[WHQW WKH FRXQWU\¶V UHVRXUFHV SHUPLW SROLFLHV VKDOO DLP WR SURYLGH DOO
Ethiopians access to public hHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQFOHDQZDWHUKRXVLQJIRRGDQGVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶1273 
None of the previous versions of the Constitution explicitly mentioned this right. As the Constitution 
is a supreme law of the country, it is used as a legal foundation for policies, legal instruments, plans 
and developments in addressing such rights.  
It was nearly twenty years ago when Ethiopia gave recognition to the right to clean water, and 
imposed an obligation on both government and its citizens to protect their environment. Its inclusion 
under the national constitutional document signifies the JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLWLFDO FRPPLWPHQW WR
protect this right. The recognition of the right to clean water under the Constitution brought the issue 
of water as a priority matter to the forefront, and gives a legal foundation for its protection. It also 
forces the state to formulate policies, laws and plans that facilitate implementation of this right. 
Failure to do so would hold it accountable. However, what remains to be done is defining how the 
right would be implemented within the economic and technical limitations of the country. The 
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effective implementation of the right to clean water also depends on the will and capacity of the 
government and other stakeholders. 
7.3.2 Policies and strategy 
7.3.2.1 Policies  
(WKLRSLD¶V&onstitution imposes an obligation on its government to protect the environment.1274After 
the introduction of the Constitution, three central policy instruments ± the environmental and water 
policies and the national water sector strategy ± were adopted to introduce the policy directions for 
WRM. In 1997, an environmental policy was formulated to guide the environmental governance 
system in Ethiopia.1275 This first attempt to set out a comprehensive policy provides a road-map with 
respect to environmental concerns, including WRM. The policy¶V emphatic goal is on ensuring the 
sustainable use of natural resources.1276 It advocated that to ensure long-term use of resources means 
taking into account context-specific resources.1277 As a scheme to ensure the sustainability of water 
resources, the policy document incorporates WRM through quality and quantity regulation.1278 In 
1999, a WRM policy, which provides a general framework for a water regime, was 
formulated.1279This policy document underlined, inter alia, the past water sector problems, such as a 
lack of water strategy, the inefficient utilization of water and unrealistic water development plans.1280 
Prior to the adoption of the water policy, it seems that the prevailing perception in Ethiopia was that 
water resources in the country were abundant. The WRM policy, however, underlined the fact that 
water resources are uneven and exposed to variation by place and time.1281 Through this policy, it is 
now understood that the water resources in the country are scarce and finite.1282 One of the key 
features of this policy is that it underlines the importance of adhering to IWRM for the development 
DQGSURWHFWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHV1283 The policy document outlined the context of the 
country¶VGULQNLQJZDWHUDQGFRYHUDJHDVEHLQJQRPLQDODQGQHHGLQJDJJUHVVLYHPHDVXUHVWRHQVXUH
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an adequate, reliable and clean water supply.1284 As the driving model, water demand and supply 
management was introduced with diverse accompanying schemes. 1285 The policy favours water 
demand management through introducing approaches that allow efficient utilization of water 
resources.1286 In particular, when there is a risk of water scarcity and where there are competing 
demands, the minimum amount of water resources is reserved for human consumption, livestock and 
the environment.1287When abstracting groundwater, a quantity of the water is regulated through 
developing rules and standards to determine the limit of water resources exploitation.1288 
Moreover, water pricing has been introduced to recognize water in both economic and social 
terms.1289 The policy favours the need to use the full cost-recovery and µwillingness to pay¶ models, 
for drinking water cost internalization for the water users living in towns, whereas it suggests cost-
recovery for the maintenance of facilities for the rural communities.1290 The internalization of costs 
aims to achieve the protection, conservation and efficient use of water resources.1291 As part of a 
social concern, affordability to pay is incorporated within the water pricing for rural communities to 
enhance their access to improved water.1292 The policy assumes that rural people are unable to pay 
the full cost, which is more than the cost of the maintenance of facilities.  
However, the policy document does not seem to recognize the urban poor, whose access to clean 
water may be constrained if the full cost-recovery principle is applied in practice. Neither does the 
policy consider cross-subsidy to address access to water for the urban poor. In settingup the water 
tariff, the local circumstances of the communities are taken into account;1293however, the income 
situation of each individual customer does not affect the pricing. In the case of non-drinking water, 
for instance (such as industrial water use), the prLFLQJ SROLF\ LV WKDW WKH µXVHU SD\V¶ 1294  This 
classification suggests that the users will be expected to pay the full cost of the amount of water used.   
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In addition to demand management, supply management has been considered for the purpose of 
ensuring water supplies. Adequate water supplies are sought through developing new water 
infrastructures or water transferring,1295and the basin boundary is seen as guidance for this WRM 
approach.1296The policy favours creating interconnections within a basin. Furthermore, within water 
security management, developing an appropriate long-term plan is important.1297 For this purpose 
then, the WRM policy suggests WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµthe appropriate water supply planning parameters, 
design criteria and standards along with acceptable, desirable and permissible ranges and limits¶.1298 
Another means through which the sustaining of water resources has been considered is the 
prevention of water pollution. 
 
Traditionally, the organizational remits of WRMPs in Ethiopia were centralized, following the top-
down approach. 1299 Central government was responsible for the overall management of water 
resources. The current water policy calls for the underpinning of the overall development of water 
resources through such ideas as a rural-centred, decentralized and participatory approach, as well as 
an integrated framework that promotes the participation of all stakeholders and user communities in 
the relevant aspects of WRM.1300 
This WRM in Ethiopia involves both national and local levels. To this end, IWRM, which involves 
diverse levels from federal to local, is recognized.1301 In particular, the policy document declares the 
establishment of relationships between the different levels and sectors through defining the 
responsibilities of each stakeholder within WRM.1302 
Watershed management is not a new practice in Ethiopia. It was started by the Ethiopian government, 
with the support of the World Food Programme, after the 1970s drought shocks.1303During this 
                                                             
1295ibid, sections 2.3.1.3, 1.2.3, 2.1.1. 
1296
 ibid, section 2.1.1. 6. 
1297ibid, section 2.2.5. 
1298
 ibid, section 3.3.1.4;see also section 2.3.1.3. 
1299Rahmato (n 1257). 
1300FDRE (n 1279) section 1.3.4. 
1301ibid, section 4.1. 
1302
 ibid, sections 2.2.13 and 4.1. 
1303
 Hankan Tongul and Matt Hobson, µScaling up an integrated watershed management approach through social 
protection programmes in Ethiopia: the MERET and PSNP schemes¶, 15±16 April 2013, Dublin, Ireland. Case 




period, watershed management activities were carried out in exchange for food aid relief. However, 
this period of watershed management did not succeed. The main causes for its failures were that µWKH
adopted watersheds proved too large to monitor and manage, while the top-down planning 
methodology lacked community input and the restoration was less effective than had been hoped¶.1304 
Now the traditional WRM approach has been replaced by a community-based approach.1305 The 
FRXQWU\¶V:50policy that was formulated after the adoption of the 1995 Constitution declares that 
water resources development shall be underpinned on a rural-centred, decentralized and participatory 
management approach. 1306  The policy also promotes community participation in WRM through 
LQYROYHPHQW RI DOO VWDNHKROGHUV DQG ZDWHU XVHUV¶ FRPPXQLWLHV; that is, community-based WRM is 
one of WKH SROLF\¶V guiding principles. The community-based participatory approach encourages 
those at grassroots level to take initiatives and to raise their sense of ownership regarding natural 
resources management.1307 
Now across the country, community-based participatory management activities are underway to 
rehabilitate degraded land and watersheds through different programmes.1308 Some community-based 
watershed management developments in Ethiopia include Managing Environmental Resources to 
Enable Transitions to more sustainable livelihoods (MERET) and the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP). In the late 1990s, the Tigray Bureau of Agriculture and Natural Resources, in 
one of the regional states of Ethiopia, drew some insights from an integrated community-based 
approach on successful participatory watershed management projects from India.1309 By using the 
insights gathered, community-based watershed management programmes were piloted in the region. 
In 2012, AgWater conducted an assessment on community-based participatory watershed 
management activities within three regional states of Ethiopia (Oromia, Tigray and Amhara), taking 
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two watersheds from each regional state. 1310  The assessment aimed to evaluate the impacts of 
community-based participatory watershed management in the country. The study findings revealed 
that there were variations in the success rates within watersheds. However, they underlined that 
improvement was observed on groundwater; degraded watersheds were rehabilitated; and water 
availability increased in all watersheds. In the upstream areas of each watershed, insitu water 
conservation was achieved and farmers in the downstream areas increased irrigation from 
groundwater. The study also found that the increase in availability and access to water enhanced the 
economic and social wellbeing of the local communities. The study also suggests that community-
based watershed management should take into account variations within each watershed. It 
highlights how community-EDVHG ZDWHUVKHG PDQDJHPHQW µUHTXLUHV FRRSHUDWLRQ DPRQJ YDULRXV
stakeholders to build and strengthen institutions, social norms and regulations, and to develop 
V\VWHPV RI VKDULQJ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG EHQHILFLDULHV 7KH FRXQWU\¶V ZDWHUVKHG PDQDJHPHQW SROLF\
needs revision to land tenure and community right issues¶.1311 
Similarly, in 2013 Tongul and Hobson conducted a case study on the µLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQGLPSDFWV¶RI
pilot community-based watershed management programmes.1312 The study demonstrated that the 
interventions and impacts included: rehabilitation of the catchment areas of watersheds; increased 
recharge of upstream catchments into the lower catchments; and rain-fed agriculture production was 
transformed into micro-irrigation. In view of the successes of initial pilots, the community-based 
participatory planning developed into the MERET programme in 2003.1313 The programme was 
widely expanded within five regional states and the Dire Dawa City administration, covering 450 
watersheds. At the UN Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen, Durban and Cancun, the 
approach was heralded as a model for building resilience.1314 Since its commencement, 400,000 
hectares of degraded watersheds have been rehabilitated.  
Since 2005, the Ethiopian government, with its development partners, has been further developing 
another programme, PSNP.1315 The programme aims to build assets by public work schemes. The 
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scheme focuses on tackling food insecurity and asset building, in comparison with MERET, which is 
fully focused RQ ZDWHUVKHG PDQDJHPHQW +RZHYHU 3613¶V DFWLYLWLHV DUH KLJKO\ VXSSRUWLYH RI
community-based watershed managing.1316 Nearly 60 percent of PSNP¶s public works sub-projects 
are in soil and water conservation. 1317 Through PSNP, thousands of watersheds are under 
rehabilitation within 319 districts and two urban administration areas. Both MERET and PSNP 
programmes use community-based, with participatory watershed management as the leading 
principle. The recent impact assessment conducted on PSNP (amongst others) demonstrated its 
benefits, such as: increased water availability and quality; increased groundwater recharge and 
increased downstream base flow of streams; enhanced downstream crop production, through soil and 
water conservation; and increased biodiversity.1318 However, there are some criticisms suggesting the 
programmes are not inclusive and fair: local officials have a greater power than community 
participants, and lack the capacity to manage the programme. There is also a lack of adequate 
linkages between programme activities.1319 The programme is also criticized for being oriented to the 
short term.1320 
Recently, the Ethiopian government has developed national guidelines for community-based 
participatory watershed development planning, and has introduced a new programme called 
Sustainable Land Development (SLM).1321 SLM also uses participatory community-based watershed 
management as its guiding principle.  It is believed that sustained successes of these programmes 
depend on understanding the contexts, and on the continuous and coordinated engagement of 
stakeholders at different scales and their commitments.1322 
7.3.2.2 Strategy  
 
The subsequent development, after the introduction of the WRM policy and water law adoption, was 
of (WKLRSLD¶V water sector strategy. Formulated in 2001, this aims to ensure water supply as an 
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integral part of sustainable development. 1323  The VWUDWHJ\ HQYLVLRQHG µHxtending water supply 
FRYHUDJHWRODUJHVHJPHQWVRI WKHVRFLHW\¶1324Another goal is µWR enhance and promote all national 
efforts towards the efficient, equitable and optimum utilization of the available water resources of 
Ethiopia for significant socio-economic development on a sustainable basis¶ 1325  The strategy 
declared the necessity of developing and enforcing standards and guidelines for water resources for 
different uses, such as for drinking, industry and other uses. 1326Under this strategy, the involvement 
of higher-level institutions within WRM is underlined in the formulation and enforcement of policies, 
strategies, regulations and legislation, as well as in the development and implementation of 
information management systems and capacity building programmes.1327Furthermore, the local-level 
institutions hold responsibilities concerning the implementation, management, monitoring and 
supervision of water supply facilities, and ensure inter-sectoral coordination.1328 
According to the water sector strategy document, the ownership of the water supply and sanitation 
facilities in urban areas lies with autonomous municipal institutions and, in the rural areas, the local 
communities, who own and manage them through the establishment of community-based structures, 
thereby facilitating these communities in developing an interface with the local administrative 
structures and defining the rules of engagement for service providers.1329 The water sector strategy 
indicates that the implementation of the water supply mandate is principally the function of 
respective regional states, although the facilities are owned and managed at the local level by 
municipalities or rural communities within their administrative boundaries. However, this strategic 
document does not have a binding effect, although it may play as soft law.  
7.3.3Statutory law 
7.3.3.1 Traditional laws 
 
Historically, WRM in Ethiopia was limited to the regulation of water and sanitation, with the drive 
towards public health protection; there were no comprehensive law designated to control 
                                                             










pollution.1330 From 1908, there were attempts to regulate the water and sanitation problems that led 
to communicable diseases.1331 For instance, the Ministry of Interior was empowered to handle water 
and sanitation issues in 1908 and subsequently, in 1942, the Directorate of Medicine took over this 
task.1332 However, the regulation of water quality was limited to big towns, and failed to cover other 
parts of the country.1333 
Following the issuance of 3XEOLF+HDOWK3URFODPDWLRQ1R WKH0LQLVWU\RI3XEOLF+HDOWK¶V
Hygiene and Environmental Health Unit was entrusted with sanitary regulation functions. Such 
activities included providing sanitary training and conducting inspections of latrines and drinking 
water constructions in both urban and rural areas.1334 The implementation of these sanitary rules was 
carried out through municipal or provincial public health services. However, there has been criticism 
that the rules were not updated, the enforcement lacked transparency and few were fined for 
violations and water sanitation failures.1335 
In 1962, Ethiopia enacted the first ever water legislation, which provided a regulatory framework for 
water resources. 1336  Through this legislation, the Awash Valley Authority was established to 
facilitate large-scale irrigation development.1337 The powers and authorities entrusted to the Awash 
Valley Authority included: administering water uses and rights; coordinating the activities of all the 
government bodies; allocating water for irrigation and other purposes; constructing and 
administering dams and canals; and fixing fees and collections for the use of water and other 
facilities in the valley.1338 
The main drive for the establishment of this water regulator was large-scale irrigation development. 
This suggests that the water law was more focused on water and economic development than 
managing water resources for their sustainable use and development. Moreover, the regulatory 
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authority mandates ranged from water abstraction, price setting and water allocation, to large-scale 
agricultural irrigation farms to water resources usage regulation. The mandates entrusted to the 
authority indicate that the utilization of water resources for non-irrigation purposes was ignored. In 
particular, the law failed to accommodate comprehensive rules to manage water resource utilization.  
For centuries, the indigenous people at the lower segment of the Awash River basin district were 
dependent on the Awash River water resources.1339 Socially, these local people depended on the river 
water resources to obtain their livelihood. Introduction of the water legislation did not effectively 
control the human-induced pressures on the Awash Valley water resources. Areas of the valley that 
were used as a source of grazing land for livestock, particularly in dry seasons or when the rains 
failed, were changed and transformed to large-scale irrigation projects.1340 Following this, grazing 
lands were rapidly lost and replaced by large-scale agricultural projects.1341 For instance, it was noted 
that in 1970±72, drought and the mismanagement of water resources exposed the indigenous people 
to severe disaster.1342 
In 1974, with the overthrowing of the imperial government in Ethiopia, the original objectives of the 
Awash Valley Authority were extended. At this stage, the Awash Valley Development Agency 
replaced the Authority.1343 The Agency was given exclusive power over the water resources of the 
country, to facilitate agri-business development and administer state-owned agricultural 
enterprises.1344It was entrusted with authority over the allocation of water resources, administration 
of water rights and agri-business development. Further conflicting responsibilities were given to the 
Agency in terms of competing with other water users. With the ambitious development agenda that 
the law was expected to achieve throughout the valley, this water legislation also failed to 
accommodate competing water demands.1345 Consequently, the water resource endeavours failed to 
deliver the expected outcome.1346 
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Among the factors for the failure of this legislation, lack of inclusiveness was noted as a primary 
cause. For instance, Dessalegn Rahmato describes the conventional WRM as follows: 
Policy planning and implementation at the time was guided by a strong top-down approach. 
There were few occasions when stakeholders were involved in any aspect of water 
resource development. Neither the direct beneficiaries nor concerned institutions at the 
local level were consulted in the planning and implementation of water projects. Moreover, 
the management of the projects themselves were in the hands of party or government 
functionaries, and not in the hands of the beneficiaries themselves.1347 
He further added that past water policies in Ethiopia were made, and plans were executed, by 
professionals without involving the communities concerned.1348 
The subsequent water law development has shown that the 1971 water management legislation, 
which was introduced by the imperial government, encompassed both water quality and quantity 
regulation.1349 The legislation sought the establishment of a Commission with diverse responsibilities, 
such as: the protection of water resources; the introduction of efficient water resources utilization; 
and the management of all the water resources in the country.1350 The Commission was entrusted 
with responsibilities for water supply and other related operational functions.  However, with the 
overthrow of the imperial regime, the organizational setting up was aborted before it materialized.1351 
Subsequently, in 1981, the National Water Resources Commission was established as the sole 
national government institution responsible for both regulatory and operational functions of 
WRM. 1352  The responsibility to manage water resources rested upon the Water Resources 
Development Authority.1353 
The 1987 Ethiopian water management legislation introduced the necessity to properly use natural 
resources; to LQWHJUDWH XWLOL]DWLRQ RI QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV LQ WKH QDWLRQ¶V YDlleys; and to coordinate 
optimal allocation of water resources to development, irrigation and other uses, by favouring a 
centralized management.1354This legislation established the Ethiopian Valleys Development Studies 
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Authority and defined its remit: it was mandated to delimit the boundaries of the FRXQWU\¶VYDOOH\V; to 
conduct studies and research; to assist preparations of master plans; to prepare master plans for 
valleys; to identify and prepare development projects and prioritize them; to conduct feasibility 
studies of irrigation projects; to initiate policy and directives pertaining to utilization of 
transboundary rivers; and, upon approval, to conduct follow-ups of their implementation.1355 It was 
also entrusted to conduct research on improving irrigation and on environmental controlling means, 
such as dilution and pollution, and to initiate policy devices to control the problems. Upon approval, 
it supervised their implementation and prepared and submitted to the government the optimum 
allocation of the valley¶s water resources for irrigation and other various uses.1356 
Generally, the traditional water laws and institutional framework developments were considered 
ineffective for enhancing the sustainability of water resources in the country. Girma Hailu notes that 
the water resources governance system was weak.1357 He further adds that WRM institutions were 
fragmented, and there was no scheme to coordinate functions.1358 A single institution was entrusted 
with responsibilities that were inherently conflicting in nature, such as natural resources development 
and protection.1359 The laws were not comprehensive in controlling the diverse human pressures.1360 
7.3.3.2 Contemporary laws 
7.3.3.2.1The Water Resources Management Proclamation 
In 2000, the Water Resources Management Proclamation was enacted in Ethiopia; this was the first 
water legislation to be introduced since the previously mentioned water policy.1361 The Proclamation 
is the key legislation for defining the use and protection of water resources and, through it, the 
MoWR and the MoWE have been given exclusive power over the management of the water 
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resources of the country, including the power to issue directives.1362The MoWE is also entrusted with 
further responsibilities such as those listed in Box 1 below.1363 
While WKH 0R:( LV GHVLJQDWHG DV WKH µVXSHUYLVLQJ ERG\¶ WKDW KROGV WKH River Basin Authorities 
accountable,1364the powers entrusted to the Ministry suggest that this single government institution is 
charged with regulatory and operational functions that are inherently conflicting.  
The MoWE is the principal government institution that engages in water abstraction, developing 
large-scale water supplies and large-scale irrigation, regulating water quality and quantity concerns, 
and setting conditions for water utilization. The statutory roles designated to the Ministry do not 
accommodate the robust measures that the WRM policy is aiming for to manage supply and demand. 
Rather, it seems to be a watered down form of a regulatory agenda, in failing to provide statutory 
obligations by which the water utilities are expected to abide. In addition, there is no single provision 
that sets out long-term security management schemes.  
Five years after the adoption of the Ethiopian Water Resources Proclamation, the Ethiopian Water 
Resources Management Regulation was issued. 1365 The reading of the Regulation gives the 
impression that it is a mere repetition of what is already incorporated under the Proclamation with 
regard to WRM. While the Regulation includes the possibility of delegating powers to other bodies, 
it does not declare when and what types of functions should be delegated, or to whom the powers are 
GHOHJDWHG$WSUHVHQWWKHµVXSHUYLVLQJERG\¶ WKH0R:(LV VLWXDWHGLQWKHFDSLWDOFLW\ and located 
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Neither the WRM Proclamation nor the subsequent regulations have addressed the definition of the 
statutory obligations of water facilities. Instead, the authority for WRM is concentrated within the 
MoWE, to the extent that water supply and regulatory functions are conflicting, which affects 
balanced decision-making. There are many examples to suggest that the prevailing conflicting 
responsibilities affect the impartiality of the MoWE when discharging its responsibilities to enhance 
the security of water resources. For instance, the water abstraction regulations and water supply 
development, the management of effluent discharge, price setting and the development of irrigation 
projects concentrate the responsibilities upon the single institution. The nature of these mandates 
implies that the role of the environmental authorities in water resource security management is 
blurred. In particular, the functions of WRM lack a division between water resources development 
and protection. 
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x Establishes an inventory of water resources and registry of actions 
x Issues permits of professional competence, as well as for water use and 
construction 
x Allocates water resources 
x Establishes the required standards for the design and construction of waterworks 
and their monitoring 
x Issues guidelines and directives for the prevention of the pollution of water 
resources, as well as for water quality and health standards in consultation with 
other concerned public bodies 
x Promotes the development of water resources 
x Conducts basin studies regarding potential quality and quantity  
x Facilitates utilization, determining conditions and methods for optimum and 
equitable utilization of water flow across regional states  
x Carries out the construction of medium- and large-scale irrigation dams, 
administering water structures constructed by the federal government budget 
x Sets water quality standards for water resources 
x Supports the expansion of potable water coverage and following up and 
coordinating the implementation of projects financed by foreign assistance. 
x Handles all big water supplies fully and issues permits and regulates the 




7.3.3.2.2Regulation of self-supply facilities 
 
Access to public water supplies and facilities, particularly in rural areas, is minimal in Ethiopia and is 
unable to significantly cover the needs of all people. Most of those in rural areas depend on rain-fed, 
streams and other natural and artificial water bodies for diverse domestic and agricultural uses. The 
majority of (WKLRSLD¶V population lives in a scattered manner in rural areas and owing to the nature of 
this settlement DQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VFDSDFLW\, developing adequate communal water supply facilities is 
complex. At present, in addition to publicly owned water supply facilities, self-supply facilities are 
increasingly being developed. These IDFLOLWLHV SURYLGH ZDWHU IRU D KRXVHKROG¶V QHHGV GULQNLQJ
small-scale irrigation and other forms of domestic consumption. These social institutions are not well 
organized; rather, they are scattered by their nature. A family would develop a water supply for itself 
without the financial support of the government or donors.1367The facilities are privately owned by 
families ± and are QRWDVXEVWLWXWHIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VREOLJDWLRQWRHQVXUHDFFHVVWRZDWHUUHVRXUFHV  
Individual families use wells and harvest rainwater for supporting their water needs. At present, this 
self-supply approach is often seen as a low-cost way to enhance access to water for the scattered 
rural communities. Self-supply is often seen as a supplementary means to increase water supply 
coverage.1368However, because of their considerable benefits, this approach is now finding favour 
with the government for its cost-eIIHFWLYH RSWLRQV IRU SURYLGLQJ ZDWHU IRU IDPLOLHV IRU µWUDGLWLRQDO
LUULJDWLRQ¶DQGGRPHVWLFXVHV For instance, the national five-year Growth and Transformation Plan 
increasingly supports these social institutions.1369This plan gives recognition to the traditional water 
usage system for a family to own its water supply facility and control the water resources abstracted 
from its well. However, it is likely to be difficult to coordinate these facilities at the river basin level, 
since they are too scattered to organize at a watershed level.  
Under the WRM Proclamation, these traditional water supply facilities are exempt from 
regulation.1370 The water law does not quantify the amount of water per day that traditional water 
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facilities are likely to abstract.1371The law has a tendency to allow self-supply facilities to freely 
abstract the amount of water necessary for domestic needs from surface and underground aquifers. 
The implication is that more focus has been given to enhancing access to water than sustainable 
water use; it is up to each traditional facility to determine its levels of abstraction. Although it is 
believed that these water supply facilities are cost-effective, they may not be sustainable unless a 
mechanism is developed to regulate the quantity of this water resources utilization.1372Nor has there 
been a mechanism developed to register them in order to make their water usage sustainable. Setting 
up an appropriate regulating scheme and creating awareness in the owners of self-supply water 
facilities of how to enhance their water-saving behaviour is critical ± but the concern remains 
unaddressed. Too many unregulated self-supply facilities may abstract water resources in an 
unsustainable manner. Eventually, this may lead to the tragedy of the commons. 
7.3.3.2.3 Regulating the irrigation of water 
In Ethiopia, irrigation development for large-scale agriculture was a drive for the introduction of 
conventional water law.1373 Thus, one may consider that the early water law development in Ethiopia 
ZDV DWWDFKHG WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DVSLUDWLRQV IRU LUULJDWLRQ GHYHORSPHQW 8QGHU WKH FRQYHQWLRQDO
water law, the responsibility for managing water resources was conferred upon the national 
government authority. 1374  However, the WRM that was driven by irrigation development failed 
partly because of its failure to accommodate the interests of local people.1375 
Under present WRM law, the responsibility for developing large-scale irrigation falls to the 
MoWE.1376 The regional states or cities may be involved in water management if they obtain the 
delegated authority from the national government. Within water resources, at the time at which the 
information for this study was collected, the lower levels were delegated to the management of 
cooperative water usage. However, this mandate is limited only to registering the society of 
cooperative irrigation water users.1377 The lower levels of management do not have the power to 
conduct follow-ups or register self-supply irrigation facilities owned by families or large-scale 
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irrigation facilities. Practically, the regional states are developing irrigation projects within their 
respective boundaries, and different levels of government may be involved in the development of 
irrigation projects. In the past, it was believed that uncoordinated irrigation development was, in part, 
the cause of the failure of conventional water development projects in Ethiopia. 1378  Sustainable 
irrigation developments require coordinated water resource utilization throughout the basin. 1379 
Integrated water development would be an answer if uncoordinated water use for irrigation were a 
problem. 
The present irrigation practice has shown that there is a tendency to use the water resources in an 
uncoordinated way in some project developments. For instance, one of the upstream regional states 
undertook the Fantale and Tibila Irrigation Project, which was expected to develop more than 30,000 
hectares to irrigate agricultural land.1380 For this project development, the regional state diverted 
massive quantities of water resources from the Awash River.1381 The project aimed to transform the 
pastoralist communities living in the area into farming practitioners. Upon this diversion, however, 
the regional state did not obtain a permit from the Awash River Basin Authority, which is in charge 
of managing the water resources in the basin district.1382 It is believed that the water resources in the 
Awash River are too scarce during dry seasons to satisfy diverse needs.1383 This uncoordinated water 
development may set a precedent for other states or users to engage in a similar fashion, which 
increases the uncoordinated and unregulated pressures on water resources. 
7.3.3.2.4 Water facilities regulation    
 
For both urban and rural water facilities, regulation is a key aspect for the sustainability of water 
resources.1384 :DWHU UHVRXUFHVDUH UHJXODWHG µWRSURWHFWKXPDQKHDOWKDQGHQVXUH WKHHFRQRPLFDQG
HQYLURQPHQWDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\¶;1385uSRQZDWHUVHUYLFHVUHJXODWLRQµWKHRYHUDOOREMHFWLYHV of regulation 
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are that water services are provided in an efficient, fair and sustainable manner, while balancing 
priorities set out by government at national and local levels¶.1386 Commonly, regulation1387 balances 
different needs of stakeholders, enables the public sector to carry out its long-term policy objectives 
in expanding services, protects against environmental damage and protects consumers.  
 
Concerning water supply, the Ethiopian WRM policy and strategy aim to introduce a more 
decentralized decision-making system that promotes the involvement of different stakeholders. For 
instance, in Amhara National Regional State, the office administers the urban water supply and is led 
by the water board.1388 Likewise, in the Oromia National Regional State, drinking water services are 
provided by the urban water supply and sanitation service enterprise, which is led by the water 
board.1389 The water boards are selected by the town administration from different stakeholders, 
including water users, as a means of enhancing participatory decision-making.1390 The board is part 
of the water enterprise; it is not an independent regulator. 
In many of the regional states, water laws place emphasis on provision of adequate clean water for 
customers. For instance, the responsibilities of the water board and water office in the urban areas of 
Amhara National Regional State focus on: constructing water works, providing water services, 
collecting revenue and preparing proposals for water tariffs. 1391  Likewise, in Oromia National 
Regional State, the water board and water enterprise responsibilities focus on water supply 
management.1392And similarly, the Tigray National State urban and rural water supply and sewerage 
service proclamation entrusted water supply management mandates to water boards and offices.1393 
The responsibilities of the water utilities in the regional states do not encompass many important 
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aspects of water sustainability; water wastage management, pollution protection and water system 
rehabilitation are not the obligation of water utilities.1394 
Sustainable water supply services in urban areas may depend, inter alia, on the effectiveness of 
economic regulation. The Amhara National Regional State water law encourages urban water 
facilities to recover their service costs with a fair return from the investment.1395 Likewise, the 
Oromia National State water law obligates the urban water utilities to use cost-recovery as a guiding 
principle upon setting water tariffs.1396 Often, water tariffs are set out by the water board and need 
approval from the water bureau of each regional state for their implementation. However, the water 
laws in these regional states do not provide rules that obligate the utilities to install and use water 
metering to implement the water cost-recovery principle. 
Because mRUH WKDQ  SHU FHQW RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V SRSXODWLRQ LV OLYLQJ LQ UXUDO DUHDV LW LV FUXFLDO WR
investigate the state of rural water supply facilities in order to enhance the sustainability of water. In 
rural parts of the country, the water supply utilities are administrated by the Community Water and 
Sanitation Executive Committee of Associations, 1397 the Water Committee 1398 and Sanitation 
Committee,1399 which are commonly known as the community Water and Sanitation Committees 
(WASHCos). The WASHCos¶ PHPEHUVDUHHOHFWHGDQGGUDZQ IURPHDFKZDWHUXVHU¶VFRPPXQLW\
through public gatherings.1400 2QFHDZDWHU IDFLOLW\¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQ LV ILQLVKHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWRU
non-governmental organizations, its handover to the WASHCos takes place.1401 Then a water utility 
is owned and managed by the communities through the WASHCos.1402 
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This community-led rural water service provision is a practical shift from the top-down government-
led water utility model;1403it is a response to the idea that µGHFLVLRQ-making needs to occur with or 
close to end users to ensure that services fully meet local needs and are sustainable¶. 1404  The 
approach brings the voice of users to the centre of decision-making. The drive for this new model 
introduction is that µWKH FRPPXQLW\ will contribute towards capital costs in cash or in kind, and 
DVVXPHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUPDLQWHQDQFH¶14057KHZDWHUXVHUV¶community thus owns and is involved in 
the water utility1406 
WASHCos are responsible for collecting revenue from water users, distributing water and 
undertaking minor maintenance of the utilities.1407 Despite WASHCos being basic institutions, which 
PDQDJHZDWHUVXSSO\DQGOHDGWKHZDWHUXVHUV¶FRPPXQLW\DWJUassroots level, they are not yet used 
as a platform for non-water supply issues, which are supportive for the sustainability water. 
WASHCos do not have responsibilities to control water demand, water pollution, leakage control or 
water system protection. The mandates are focused on water supply rather than water sustainability. 
They do not have an obligation towards enhancing the long-term interests of the community or to 
environmental and economic sustainability. This demonstrates that the remits of WASHCos may 
need expansion, to accommodate water demand management and environmental protection. 
WASHCos also lack clear linkage with other programmes that are in place, such as MERET, PSNP 
and SLM, which are widely in use to sustain water resources.  
 
Commonly, water tariffs are used as an economic regulatory tool for WRM. Practically, though, in 
rural areas water tariffs are determined by water beneficiaries themselves.1408 The roles of tariffs are 
limited to recover the costs of water operation and maintenance. 1409 They focus on affordability 
rather than water cost-recovery. In rural areas, the guidelines for economic regulation are developed 
by local governments; however, the problem lies in the capacity of local government to introduce 
such frameworks.1410 The capacity of the local level is limited to setting out a framework for water 
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tariffs.1411 Once tariffs are defined, long-term sustainable water supply services depend on the extent 
of enforcement of the economic regulation tools ± 1412but it is difficult to implement economic 
regulation tools for the water facilities in rural areas and small towns.1413 Sometimes, the rural water 
IDFLOLWLHVµDUHRSHUDWLQJLQIRUPDOO\LQVRPHZKDWDOHJDOYDFXXP¶.1414 
 
WASHCOs are important community-based water supply institutional structures at most 
decentralized levels in the rural areas. However, their impact depends on the capacity of each rural 
water utility having a legal personality, rules conferring proper responsibilities and regulation of their 
functions and their effective implementation. A study has been recently conducted on a rural, 
community-based water supply services provision model, and demonstrates that the approach is 
prone to too many limitations, leaving doubts about sustainably managing water supply services.1415 
It was noted that: µV\VWHPVFRQWLQXHWRIDLOFRPPXQLWLHVVWUXJJOH with financing and practicalities of 
operation and maintenance, and word a (district) water offices often lack the capacity to provide  
HIIHFWLYH VXSSRUW¶1416 They are unable to discharge their responsibilities because of the capacity 
problem;1417 rural areas¶ water supply facilities are hence fully scattered within the local level.  
 
Butterworth et al. QRWHGWKDWµLPSURYHGFRPPXQLW\-based sources (run usually by a locally selected 
water, Sanitation and Hygiene Committee (WASHCos)) are, in contrast, widely considered to 
provide safe water, despite the fact that often they do not, and in practice quality is not monitored 
either systematically and regularly¶.1418 7KH\DOVRFRQWHQGWKDWµFRPPXQDOV\VWHPVDUHDOVRSURQHWR
breakdowns and seldom provide for all domestic needs¶.1419 WASHCos depend on local government 
(the district water office), which itself is facing a capacity problem.1420 District offices, which are 
responsible for regulating WASHCos, are not familiar with the basic rules of water sustainability 
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when regulating the committees. 1421 District officers are not capable of providing support and 
regulatory functions, and the offices are chronically under-staffed.1422 
 
,QEXLOGLQJUHVLOLHQWZDWHUXVHUV¶FRPPXQLWies, registration of rural water utilities may have its own 
contribution since it confers a legal personality that allows them to discharge their obligations and be 
used as a tool in holding the utilities accountable. In Ethiopia, there are some initiatives to register 
the rural water facilities and to confer legal personality. Many regional states have already 
formulated regulations that legalize rural water utilities.1423 However, the regional and zonal bureaus 
do not prepare detailed guidelines to carry out their registration.1424 In general, WASHCos are not 
legally recognized and even in areas where they have received legal acknowledgement, delays in 
registration are posLQJSUREOHPVIRUWKHIDFLOLWLHV¶PDQDJHPHQWIXQFWLRQV.1425 Many of the rural water 
utilities and WASHCos remain unregistered and unaccountable facilities. 
7.3.3.2.5 Regulation of water abstraction and effluent discharge 
The security of water resources requires the management of their abstraction and the regulation of 
effluent discharges that affect water quality. As discussed elsewhere, the exclusive mandates to 
regulate water abstraction and effluent discharges are conferred upon the MoWE.1426With regard to 
the management of water abstraction and effluent discharges, the Proclamation incorporated a permit 
system as a device.1427To this end, the Federal Ministry of Water and Energy Resources, called the 
µVXSHUYLVLQJERG\¶ is entrusted with the mandate to issue water use and effluent discharge permits 
and to conduct the monitoring of their implementation. 1428  Through the regulation of pollutant 
discharges, it engages in environmental protection.1429The mandates of the MoWE suggest that the 
Ministry may provide bulk services and regulate access to the resources. 
                                                             
1421
 Tesfaye Woldemicheal and Fikadu Debalike, µGlobal water initiative ± east Africa secure water for small holder 
agriculture: Review of functionality as well as developing system for GWI WASH facilities¶2013)Legalisation of 
WASHCos and O&M Guidelines, 18±19. 
1422
 Galow et al. (n 1414) 10. 
1423
 Woldemicheal and Debalike (n 1421) 18±20. 
1424ibid. 
1425
 Chaka et al.(n 1401) 3. 
1426Proclamation No. 691/2010 (n 1362) article 26. 
1427
 Proclamation No. 197/2000 (n 1361) article 11. 
1428
 ibid, article 8; see also article 11. 
1429
 ibid, article 13.  
243 
 
The permit system underlines that water abstractors and effluent dischargers should obtain permits 
from the Ministry before becoming involved in water resource development.1430 However, these rules 
do not provide possible limits on the abstraction of groundwater or surface water, although permits 
may be suspended if the water resources are depleting or if the licence holders fail to meet the 
conditions set out under the permits.1431 The Ministry may suspend, terminate or revoke licences if 
the water abstraction is damaging the environment.1432 With regard to waste water discharge permits, 
the holder of the licence is expected to renew the licence within a two-year period.1433 
There is no clear provision that specifies the roles that regional states and local levels should play 
within WRM. Moreover, this law does not specify the possible relationship that the federal and 
regional states establish in planning, developing and protecting water resources. The only possible 
option to enable the regional levels to be involved in the management of water abstraction and 
effluent discharges is through delegation. The Ministry of Water and Energy Resources may delegate 
its role(s) in WRM to any organization that it thinks appropriate.1434Through this power of delegation, 
the Ministry first ensures that delegation is necessary, and that the agent is an appropriate body to 
implement the functions that it obtains through delegation. This means that the delegation of power 
must be rationally articulated so as to make implementation effective. Water law reform does not 
seem to devolve authority to regional levels. Up to the point at which this research was carried out, 
the Ministry did not delegate any of its functions or the permit system regarding WRM to any other 
bodies, except to the River Basin Authorities recently established for two basins. Both the Water 
Proclamation and regulations suffer from the same shortcomings from centralizing WRM and lack 
comprehensive rules to manage water resources.  
7.3.3.2.6 Environmental protection  
The FDRE Environment Authority and the regional environmental agencies were established in 
2002.1435 At the federal level, the Environment Authority was accountable to the Prime Minister.1436 
At the regional levels, the environmental protection institutions were accountable to a body that was 
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determined by the respective regional state. Each regional state would designate or establish an 
institution responsible for protecting the environment. 1437  The objective for establishing these 
organizational structures was to separate environmental development functions from protection 
functions, as they are by nature conflicting if they are conferred upon a single institution. 1438 
Remarkably, the law defines µSURWHFWLRQ¶ DV µVXVWDLQLQJ WKH HVVHQWLDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI QDWXUH DQG
enhancing the capacity of the natural resources base with a view to safeguarding the interests of the 
present generations without compromising the opportunities for the future¶. 1439  The concept of 
protection in this Proclamation encompasses both present needs and the interests of future 
generations, whilst safeguarding nature. In addition to the Federal Environmental Authority and 
regional environmental agencies, the federal government may assign a competent authority for 
environmental protection.1440 
The Federal Environment Authority has the mandates; it formulates policies, strategies, laws and 
standards, and ensures the effectiveness of the process of implementation.1441 It also has mandates to 
prepare updates, review environmental policies and coordinate measures at a national level. 1442 
Unless the projects were licensed by the federal government, the compliance to environmental 
standards is regulated through regional environmental agencies. 1443  Despite the matter being 
interstate in its nature, it might be handled by the regional states within their administrative boundary 
demarcation.1444 The nature of this environmental protection mandate allocation raises the issue of 
how this institutional arrangement is effective in regulating human pressures that are interstate in 
their nature. In 2011, Ethiopia adopted the Climate Resilience Green Economy Strategy which 
accommodates comprehensive measures to enhance sustainable use of natural resources, including 
water resources. 1445 With the aim of renewing the organizational arrangement of the Environment 
Authority, the Ministry of Environment and Forest was established in 2013.1446 The mandates of the 
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Environment Authority were transferred to this new Ministry, 1447which was conferred with the 
regulatory functions of both protecting the environment and policy making. 1448 In addition to 
environmental issues, the Ministry of Environment and Forest is mandated to coordinate climate 
actions across the sectors. 1449 
The Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation is remarkable in being the first in the history of 
the Ethiopian WRM law development to introduce comprehensive rules regulating point source 
pollution.1450 The legislation suggests the need to formulate standards to assist in the regulation of 
pollutant discharges that affect the environment.1451 However, the law introduced a saving provision 
that limits the scope of application to those factors that were established before the introduction of 
the legislation. It freed pre-existing industries to discharge whatever pollutants they wanted until that 
suspension terminated.1452 More astonishingly, the legislation did not set out when the suspension of 
the rules for these industries would end. The environmental and societal interests were sacrificed to 
protect the economic interests of pre-existing industries. The reluctance to introduce immediate 
applicable rules implies that there were dilemmas in regulating the industries¶ discharge of effluents 
as a matter of immediate concern, despite the effect on the quality of water, potentially causing 
irreversible damage to water resources, human health and lives and the environment.  
Half a decade after the promulgation of the Pollution Control Proclamation, the Prevention of 
Industrial Pollution Regulation was enacted to give detailed rules facilitating implementation of the 
Pollution Control Proclamation.1453 This Regulation incorporates key substantive rules to regulate 
point source pollution.1454 It obliges specified industries to minimize their generation of pollutants to 
the limit of the relevant environmental standard and dispose of the pollutants in an environmentally 
friendly way. The Regulation declares that every factory should handle equipment, inputs and 
products in a manner that prevents damage to the environment and human health. When a factory 
loses potentially dangerous pollutants, inputs or products, it is obliged to notify the competent 
                                                             
1447
 ibid, article 2(6). 
1448




 FDRE Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation No. 300/2002. 
1451
 ibid, article 6. 
1452ibid, article 18. 
1453
 FDRE, Prevention of Industrial Pollution, Council of Ministers Regulation, No. 159/2008. 
1454ibid, article 4. 
246 
 
environmental authority. Moreover, every factory should notify the competent environmental 
authority if it has any potentially dangerous pollutant, input or product under its possession. 
There are ranges of criteria to determine the scope of application under the Regulation. First, the 
Regulation only applied to the industries listed by the subsequently formulated directive.1455 Second, 
the industries were allowed to discharge pollutants until the standards were formulated, and those 
industries being regulated by the legislation would be determined by the subsequent directive. In a 
strict legal sense, this law allowed those industries out of the listing to discharge effluents into the 
environment without regulation. The Regulation did not provide rules for taking precautionary 
measures to regulate the impacts of effluent discharges, unless it required the industries that 
possessed pollutants to notify the competent environmental body.1456 Moreover, the Regulation did 
not apply to the pre-existing industries. 1457  An existing factory is defined as one that is under 
operation or a project for which an application to obtain a licence to establish a factory has been 
submitted before or on the date of entry into force of the Regulation.1458 It gave further exemption of 
the pollution regulatory rules to pre-existing industries for nearly half a decade.1459 Until then, the 
existing firms had the privilege of continuing to pollute water resources. This left water resources 
being used by humans, and the protection of a healthy ecosystem, unregulated.  
For instance, LQ0DUFK$FWLRQ3URIHVVLRQDOV¶$VVRFLDWLRQIRUWKH3HRSOHEURXJKWDOHJDODFWLRQ
against the FDRE Environmental Protection Authority in the Federal First Instance Court of Ethiopia. 
The claim was against the immense pollutant discharges into the water resources of the Awash River 
and two of its tributaries, which cross many regional states.1460 This case was the first ever legal 
dispute in Ethiopia that was brought against a government regulator for its failure to protect the water 
resources. In this case, the plaintiff strongly claimed that unregulated effluent discharge was 
degrading the water resources to the extent of harming human and non-human beings. The case was 
supported by scientific study and expert witnesses. After investigating the case, the Court rendered a 
decision in favour of the defendant, and similar decisions were rendered by the Federal High and 
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Supreme Courts at the appellate levels.1461 The central statement of the courts¶ decisions was that the 
defendant, the Environmental Authority, was not responsible for the failure to act.  
The reading of the story in this case indicates that some legal and organizational remit problems were 
prevailing in the management of interstate water pollution regulation in Ethiopia. The material facts 
of the claim implied that unregulated and untreated effluent discharges were affecting the tributaries 
of the Awash River, which caused damage to the riveU¶V ZDWHU UHVRXUFHV WR SHRSOH DQG WR
biodiversity. The plaintiff sought that the defendant should take administrative and legislative 
measures to stop ongoing water pollution and clean up the streams. It also asked the Court to 
introduce inspectors to conduct a follow-up of the implementation process and measures decided by 
the defendant.1462 The reading of the court case absolves the defendant, and stresses two main issues 
that meant that it should not be held accountable for the allegation of the plaintiff. The first claim 
indicated substantive law problems. In particular, the defendant argued that the majority of the 
industries polluting the Awash River tributaries were pre-existing. These industries were exempt 
from the pollution control legislation.  
Within existing law, the authority did not have a statutory mandate unless the legal suspension of 
pollution regulation on the pre-existing industries was terminated.1463 This claim confirmed that pre-
existing industries were free and unregulated, even if their activities were damaging water resources. 
Especially in rural areas, where the majority of people do not have access to clean water, suspending 
the regulatory rules regarding pollution and leaving pre-existing industries to pollute water resources 
might not be seen as a mere legislative failure, but could be equated to giving the industries the 
licence to devastate biodiversity and human health, particularly for those people who have no access 
to clean water. The pollution control regime, which was sought to protect the security of water, has 
thus been compromised.   
The second NH\DUJXPHQWEURXJKWE\ WKHGHIHQGDQWZDV WKDW WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSRZHUZDV OLPLWHG WR
conducting follow-ups of the implementation of pollution regulation laws by the regional states, 
rather than being directly involved in the implementation of environmental protection laws and 
policies. This claim indicated that the responsibility for the regulation of pollution was decentralized 
                                                             





to the regional states. The legal foundation for this claim was the Proclamation Establishing the 
Organs of Environmental Protection in the country. According to this legislation, the main 
responsibilities of the national Environmental Protection Authority are preparing policies, laws, 
regulations and strategies, and conducting the follow-up review of their implementation. 1464The 
central role in implementing water pollution control law goes to the respective regional states and 
local levels.1465Such power allocation may not be wrong in itself. However, the problem is the 
UHJLPH¶VIDLOXUHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHQDWXUHRILQWHUVWDWHSROOXWLRQSUREOHPV.  
Decentralization may be seen as giving the opportunity to local people to participate; however, its 
significance in interstate pollution control may be doubted. The implementation of the decentralized 
mandates was dependent on the strength of the respective regional states concerned.1466 At present, 
the capacity of the regional states to implement decentralized mandates is increasingly varied.1467 
Some regional states are, by far, too weak to discharge their legal mandates. With interstate water 
pollution issues, the strength of one regional state or local level may not guarantee the regulation of 
water quality challenges unless stakeholders engage jointly.  
In circumstances in which water pollution is unregulated, it is common for one regional state to 
benefit at the cost of another, since regional states may not be equally affected by the impacts of 
pollution spill-over. With regard to interstate pollution regulation, what is more complicated is 
deciding which regional state is appropriate for regulating this pollution problem. It may be argued 
that the regional state that is obliged to regulate is the state from where the pollution emanates; or the 
one where the firms discharging the effluents are based; or all the states that share the water 
resources where the effluent discharges pass. However, such administrative boundary-oriented and 
fragmented pollution management may not bring about effective solutions for the challenges to water 
resource security through interstate pollution. 
Moreover, the defendant in the above-mentioned case claimed that its authority was limited to 
conducting a follow-up of the implementation by the regional states, but that it did not have the 
influential power to take measures to regulate pollution. The regional states have autonomous power 
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for determination in matters in which they have the authority to handle and implement. 1468 
Constitutionally, the regional states and their institutions are not accountable to the federal 
institutions; rather, they are accountable to the people of the region. 1469  This suggests that the 
mandate of the Federal Environmental Authority to conduct follow-ups is unclear regarding the 
nature of the practical role it plays. In the absence of clear roles to take measures against the regional 
VWDWHVWKHFUHGLELOLW\RIWKH(QYLURQPHQWDO$XWKRULW\¶VIROORZ-up mandate is questionable. This legal 
dispute indicated that the FDRE Environmental Protection Authority needs decisive powers 
regarding the regulation of interstate water resource pollution. The mandate to follow-up alone may 
not be helpful in regulating water pollution problems of this nature.1470 
The other concern is directly related with drinking water quality regulation. In 1990, Ethiopia 
introduced the drinking water quality standards that ensured safe water quality for drinking purposes, 
and this was subsequently revised in 2001.1471 This standard was designed with due consideration of 
the WHO guidelines for drinking water quality specifications. 1472  The compliance with these 
standards varies by the types of chemicals, specifications of water sources and regional states.1473 
There are no laws setting out statutory obligations regarding drinking water; the implementation of 
the standards is dependent on the willingness of the water supply facilities. A significant number of 
populations in developing countries, including Ethiopia, depend on diverse water sources, including 
streams, vendors, unprotected wells and springs to obtain drinking water.1474 Yet, in Ethiopia, water 
pollution from nitrate concentration is unregulated.1475 There has been algal blooming in the water 
resources of some water bodies, indicating nitrate pollution.1476 
Over the next five years, the agricultural sector is expected to grow steadily. The drives for this 
growth are ensuring food security for the growing population, providing raw materials for domestic 
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industries, and the provision of goods for domestic and foreign markets. 1477  The Growth and 
Transformation Plan considers the intensification of commercial farms to meet the objectives 
expected from the agricuOWXUDOVHFWRU7KLVVHFWRU¶VGHYHORSPHQW LV LQFUHDVLQJO\FRQQHFWHGZLWKWKH
intensive use of chemicals and other related inputs that may have impacts on the quality of water 
resources, unless effective measures are taken to protect diffuse water pollution. At present, there are 
no indications that diffuse pollution will be managed in the near future.1478 
7.3.3.2.3 River basin-based WRM 
 
To implement water security management institutional arrangements, establishing proper 
organizations with defined remits is imperative. In 2007, a law designed to establish river basin 
organizations was introduced.1479 Amongst the objectives of the law, promoting and monitoring the 
implementation of IWRM processes and facilitating an equitable and participatory management were 
underlined. 1480  This legislation provided a general framework for establishing river basin 
organizations through the subsequent enabling of the regulation issued by the Council of Ministers 
on a phase-by-phase basis.  
However, this legislation did not give a specific time for when these organizations would be 
established; rather, it gave discretion to the Council of Ministers to choose the appropriate times and 
for the selection and prioritization of the river basins that needed the establishment of River Basin 
Authorities. No specific parameters were given for such selection and the phase-by-phase 
establishment of river basin institutions. Generally speaking, the Proclamation calls for the 
establishment of an organization for each river basin. The legislation suggests the possibility of one 
river basin institution managing two or more river basins until the establishment of the other basins¶ 
own respective institutions.1481 
Under the River Basin Councils and Authorities Proclamation, two bodies are responsible for 
running river basin management: the River Basin High Councils (BHCs) and Authorities.1482 The 
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Basin Authority is entrusted with powers and responsibilities such as: initiating policy measures for 
the implementation of IWRM in respective river basins; submitting them for approval to the BHC; 
conducting a follow-up of the implementation; preparing and submitting the basin plan to the BHC; 
PRQLWRULQJLWVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQXSRQDSSURYDOLVVXLQJSHUPLWVDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHEDVLQ¶VZDWHUXVHDQG
water works; and ensuring that the terms of the permits are complied with.1483 
 
Generally, the functions of the Basin Authority may be divided into two categories. The first strand 
of functions relates to the initiation of policies and plans for the respective river basin. These are then 
submitted to the BHC for approval, and implemented once approval is received. The second category 
of powers relates to the issuing of permits and related activities for water resource utilization, for 
which the Basin Authority implements WRM and follow-ups. For the first category of functions, the 
Basin Authority is primarily accountable to the BHC; whereas for the second category, it is 
accountable to the MoWE,1484which conducts supervision of the functioning of the River Basin 
Authorities.1485 
 
As discussed elsewhere, the MoWE is the principal organization that regulates water use and engages 
in the provision of water resources. 1486 It provides bulk services and regulates access to these 
resources. It also engages in development activities. As a principal water user, as well as the 
supervisor for water regulation, the MoWE also has the potential to neglect its management of water 
resources regulation, particularly in those water development projects that it directly handles. It may 
be difficult for the River Basin Authority to hold the Ministry accountable for any misuse, for the 
Authority is not in a position to regulate the behaviour of the MoWE. Moreover, owing to its lower 
VWDWXV WKH %DVLQ $XWKRULW\¶V FRPSHWHQFH LQ FRRUGLQDWLQJ WKH IHGHUDO PLQLVWHULDO OHYHOV RI WKH
institutions is doubtful. More importantly, the Authority may not be in a position to interfere with the 
functions of the regional states, although these functions may directly or indirectly affect water 
resources. This creates doubt in creating a practical, integrated river basin management in the current 
arrangement through the River Basin Authority.  
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In a strict legal sense, for instance, land administration is given fully to the regional states under the 
current Ethiopian Constitution. This means that the River Basin Authority does not intervene in this 
power in any way, unless it is managing water resources at the river basin level. Although the 
Proclamation establishing river basin institutions provides that all persons and institutions should 
cooperate with the Basin Authority for the implementation of its mandates, the duty of cooperation is 
limited to those functions that are entrusted to the River Basin Authority, and the Proclamation is 
silent as to how regional states are expected to be coordinated on the matters that are delegated to 
them by law. 1487  More importantly, there is no specific liability that will apply if persons or 
institutions fail to cooperate with the Authority. This means that the statutory cooperation is 
voluntary in its nature, and is implemented by the willingness of regional states as the stakeholders. 
Therefore, to make the implementation effective, the duty to cooperate under this legislation needs 
the identification of areas of cooperation and the roles and functions of different stakeholders. 
Liabilities for non-compliant stakeholders then need to be stipulated, and mechanisms should be set 
up for dispute settlement.  
 
In addition, the Basin Authority collects, compiles, analyses and disseminates information for proper 
planning, administration and management of water resources in the basin. It also develops and uses a 
river basin model in order to guide and support the strategic planning and water administration 
functions of its basin water resources; gives advice and technical support to the BHC and the MoWE 
on dispute resolution in relation to the allocation and use of the water resources of the basin; sets up a 
forum for effective networking among stakeholders; collects water charges from users; and, on the 
basis of instructions from the BHC, prepares and provides the necessary information for the 
concerned body in charge of negotiations with other countries regarding transboundary river 
basins.1488 All these mandates are the primary functions of the MoWE.  
 
Under the Water Resources Proclamation, the possible types of charge for water uses are a water use 
charge, payable annually, and charges for the discharge of treated waste as allowed by permit.1489 To 
implement this authority, the water charge for each river basin is expected to be adopted by the 
Council of Ministers. This Proclamation does not provide rules about pricing schemes for water 
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utilities. It is unclear how the cost internalization is materialized within the water resources for 
domestic water use.  
 
The BHC is the highest body that is responsible for conducting respective river basin WRM.1490 The 
members of this Council are designated by the national government,1491 and are expected to come 
from both federal government and regional states. However, the law does not provide the parameters 
that are used to select these members. It is left to the discretion of federal government to designate 
them.1492Potentially, there will be a BHC for every river basin; hence there is the possibility of 
having too many BHCs, whether a river basin is interstate or not.  
 
In practice, the members of each BHC are appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation 
of the MoWE.1493 At the point at which this information was researched, no specific guidelines had 
been developed that could be used to determine where the members of the BHC come from. 
However, it is believed that the members, or those persons appointed and chaired by the Prime 
Minster, are all expected to come from regional states that share river basins, with stakeholders that 
are drawn from businesses and the private sector.1494 These might include the presidents of the 
regional states sharing the basin with the members designated by federal government.1495 Regional 
states that do not share river basins cannot participate in the BHC. The problem with the nature of 
this designation is that water security management may not always find solutions at the basin level 
alone; rather, it may require water transfer from outside the river basin zone.1496 
 
The regional state bureaus participate, although they are voiceless in decision-making.1497 In addition 
to members of government bodies, designated private and business sectors participate in the BHC 
decision-making forum, but they do not have voting power.1498 7KH QDWXUH RI WKH %+&¶V SRZHU
FUHDWHVGRXEWDVWRKRZSULYDWHVHFWRUV¶DQGFRQVXPHUV¶LQterests are incorporated into shaping WRM.  
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The BHC has been conferred with a range of functions. It provides policy guidance for the River 
Basin Authority and conducts the overseeing of planning to ensure a high level of coordination 
among stakeholders in implementing IWRM in the respective river basins. It also: directs the 
preparation of the RBMPs and submits them for approval to the government; proposes to the 
government the rate of water charges to be paid by water users in the river basin;1499 examines and 
decides on the appropriateness and prioritization of constructing major water works in the basin; and 
examines and decides on water allocation rules and principles that are dynamic within the context of 
the river basin.1500 
 
Moreover, the BHC is also mandated with powers to manage water use disputes between regional 
states in the river basin; it provides information and advisory support to the body in charge of 
negotiating with neighbouring countries, with respect to the transboundary basins for which the BHC 
is responsible; and it establishes the standing of ad-hoc committees that are necessary to discharge 
specific functions.1501 The functions entrusted to the BHC indicate that it is the ultimate authority for 
providing the guidance for the integration of water resources implemented by the River Basin 
Authorities. However, the body is an ad-hoc institution, and mostly comprises busy government 
officials from federal and regional states. This may leave them with insufficient time and effort to 
engage in WRM. When this research information was collected, there were no BHCs except for the 
Abbay River Basin Authority. The river basins, like the Awash River basin district, in which the 
River Basin Authority has already been established, might not be able to effectively discharge their 















7.4 Implementation of WRMPs 
Precise and clear legislative mandates are indispensable for implementation; 1503  they can affect 
considerably the level of implementation. 1504  Clarity is important for two reasons: µ,W KHOSV WR
determine how well implementers and target groups understand what is expected from them. More 
subtly, ambiguity provides a means for negatively inclined judges or bureaucrats to evade the intent 
of policies through deliberate misinterpretatioQ¶1505 No matter how clear and precise a statute, it 
requires strong organizations mandated to implement and realize its objectives.1506 
When the information for this study was collected, out of twelve river basins, there were only two 
River Basin Authorities established ± for the Abbay and the Awash River basins. As an example, the 
Awash River Basin Authority was established in 2008. 1507  The practice of the Awash River 
Authority gives the impression that it continues to engage in its traditional functions, like water 
training, water allocation for large-scale water users and constructing irrigation channels.1508 Even 
these traditional functions do not extend to encompass the whole river basin; rather, they are limited 
to a small segment of the Awash River basin.1509 
The suggested causes for this are that few staff members are equipped with the knowledge of IWRM, 
or the conceptual complexity of the idea of an integrated river basin management.1510 Frewe Abebe, 
one of the senior officials in the Awash River Basin Authority, was optimistic that reform of the 
traditional ways of WRM in the Awash River basin district would soon commence. However, there 
is no indication of when this reform is going to happen, for this is left not only to the readiness to 
reform, but to the willingness of the institution to accommodate the upcoming changes, and the 
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introduction of an effective BHC, which is responsible for direct WRM in the basin. As has been 
discussed, the process of establishing the BHC has been too slow.1511 The Awash River Basin High 
Council is yet to be established. Unless this institutional problem finds a solution soon, the 
implementation of the coordinated management of water resources, which might help to enhance 
water security, may not effectively materialize. 
The recent Ethiopian Growth Transformation Plan addresses WRM by encompassing all water 
resource utilization, such as irrigation, power and integration of WKHQDWLRQ¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHV1512 As 
part of its strategic directions, its plans include: 
creating interconnection among different sectors and users, ensuring fair and equitable 
utilization of the resources taking into consideration the demand and benefit of the future 
generation, contributing to fast and sustainable social and economic development of the nation 
through sound development strategies, and mitigating the impacts of runoff, drought and other 
natural hazards [which] stand amongst the priorities of Ethiopian water resources management 
policies.1513 
 
7.5 Case law  
 
The regulated use of natural resources is a key to ensuring their long-term availability.1514 In Ethiopia, 
unwise water abstraction remains one of the challenges to water security. Since the 1960s, for 
instance, Lake Haramya was used as a source of water to supply the city of Harar, and for both rural 
and urban dwellers.1515 This lake water resource was used for domestic support, fishing, irrigating 
lands for crops, industrial use, supplies and many other uses. Now, however, this lake is extinct; it is 
DµGHDGODNH¶$\HQHZGHVFULEHVWKHUXLQRIWKLVODNHDVDµVKRFNLQJH[WLQFWLRQ¶1516 There is no water, 
WKH OLYLQJ WKLQJV DUH GHYDVWDWHG DQG µWKH /DNH EHG LV FRQYHUWHG WR blowing sand plain¶.1517 The 
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extinction of this lake is very a recent phenomenon, as the pumping of its water for urban needs 
terminated in 2004.1518 
One of the main causes of the ruin of this lake was unregulated water abstraction.1519 The local 
farmers irrigated their land without any limitations by using their own facilities, and industries used 
to supply the demanded amount of water without any restrictions. Until the lake became extinct in 
2004, little attention had been given to sustaining the use of its water.1520 Instead, it was assumed that 
the lake¶V water resources were free for all users to exploit. Its extinction has become a constraint for 
the economic sector.1521 Similarly, in some water bodies, over-abstraction, diversion and pollution 
DUHFRQVLGHUDEOHWKUHDWV WKDWWKHFRXQWU\¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHVDUHVWLOO IDFLQJ1522 The security of water 
resources is at a very low level and water resources utilization remains unsustainable.1523 
When water resources are scarce, the pollutants that are discharged cause the acceptable quality of 
water for various uses to deteriorate.1524 Through pollution, water security challenges in the country 
may intensify. In Ethiopia, some water bodies have been used as a sink for the discharge of factory 
pollutants.1525 In particular, the upstream catchments of the Awash River basin, which cross through 
the city of Addis Ababa, were used as a sink for industrial effluent discharge. 1526  Most of the 
factories in Addis Ababa did not have effluent treatment plants; they discharged effluents into the 
water bodies without any treatment.1527 
Even the factories that had treatment plants did not use these to treat the effluents before they 
discharged them into the water bodies.1528 The sewage from urban areas and leakage from septic 
tanks affect the quality of water available for a range of uses.1529 Water pollution also threatens the 
security of water through increasing the cost of water treatment.1530 But in Ethiopia, the implication 
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of water pollution goes beyond the increase of water costs, since the majority of the rural population 
depends on natural water bodies to find drinking water; its cost extends to human life.  
As one of the developing countries, Ethiopia considers its industrial sector role as critical for helping 
WKH FRXQWU\¶V JURVV domestic product. 1531  This sector directly and indirectly depends on water 
resources to sustain its production. In the past, the utilization of water resources for the purposes of 
economic development was insignificant. 1532  However, now the state of water utilization is 
increasing, with the intent of ensuring food security and sustaining economic development.1533The 
Ethiopian Growth and Transformation Plan, which was designed for implementation in 2010±2015, 
emphasizes fast development in the country,1534and also recognizes water resources as invaluable 
resources for meeting the economic and social development that the Plan aspires to.1535 It aims for an 
intensification of commercial farms and irrigation developments to meet the objectives expected 
from the agricultural sector.1536In the agricultural sector, the Plan considers ensuring food security 
for the growing population, providing raw materials for domestic industries and providing goods for 
domestic and foreign markets.1537The evidence suggests that there will be a possible increase of 
human pressures on the water bodies in the country, which may exacerbate water security threats 
unless proper institutional arrangements are put in place. However, the Plan does not consider the 
development of water resources plan to enhance the security of water in the country.  
7.6 Conclusion of chapter 
 
This chapter has evaluated the state of the water resources, as well as the contemporary and projected 
water security challenges, in Ethiopia. The study has shown that although Ethiopia had been 
considered as relatively water abundant, the country is now experiencing challenges to its water 
security, and these challenges may continue to affect social and economic development unless an 
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effective system is designed, in particular to regulate the human pressures that affect the 
sustainability of WKHFRXQWU\¶Vwater resources. It is projected that the water scarcity problem will rise 
with the fast-growing population and climate change in the country. 
 
The examination in this chapter has also shown that the usages in some water bodies are 
unsustainable; their existing scarce resources are exposed to over-abstraction, to the brink of ruin, 
and to pollution, which damages the quality of water. Pollution exacerbates the challenges to water 
security by rendering the available water unsafe for its required needs. In the current context, the 
majority of rural communities and a significant number of the urban population have no access to 
safe water. The rural populations depend more on the natural water bodies than on water facilities to 
meet their domestic drinking water demands.  
 
Moreover, the security of water in Ethiopia is cross-GLPHQVLRQDO DQG PD\ GHOD\ WKH FRXQWU\¶V
aspirations for fast socio-economic development. The challenges to water security raise the question 
of how, and to what extent, key management systems for water resources are reflected in the 
FRXQWU\¶V FRQWHPSRUDU\ ZDWHU SROLF\ DQG ODZ The early development of water law was related to 
WRM for large-scale irrigation. It began with the drive towards agricultural modernization, by 
facilitating water resources for large-scale farming in the Awash Valley areas. The long-term 
sustainable use of water, comprehensive WRM and accommodation of a range of needs were 
unlikely to be appropriately addressed. Subsequently, the development of WRM law was observed, 
but it assigned a single organization to water resource regulation and agricultural enterprises 
development. By their nature, these functions were conflicting within WRM, rather than enhancing 
the security of water resources. It was unlikely that the water developer itself would regulate its 
behaviour. This could open up the water resources to the tragedy of the commons, as noted by 
Hardin.1538 
Under contemporary water law, the permit system is assumed to be a tool to allocate and regulate 
water resources. Water abstractors and effluent dischargers are required to obtain permits before 
becoming involved in water resource development.1539 However, these rules do not provide possible 
limits on the abstraction of water from groundwater or surface water, although permits may be 
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suspended if the water resources are being depleted or the licence holders fail to meet the conditions 
set out under the permits.1540 The examination of present irrigation practice within the chapter has 
shown that there is a tendency to divert water without obtaining any permit. Similarly, traditional 
water supply facilities are exempt from any regulation. 1541 The water law does not quantify the 
amount of water per day that traditional water facilities are likely to abstract.1542The implication is 
that more focus has been given to enhancing access to water than to sustainable water use. The rights 
are unregistered, the rates of abstraction are undefined, and facilities are scattered within rural areas 
and communities. The amount of abstraction is left to the capacity of the user.   
Water pollution affects water quality and exacerbates problems of access to and availability of water 
resources. The investigation in this chapter has shown that after the introduction of the WRM Policy, 
two major proclamations and two regulations have also been enacted to provide substantive rules for 
WRM. The first legislation concentrates on pollution control in terms of point source water pollution. 
It is crucial because a significant proportion of the population remains dependent on direct 
abstraction or untreated water. However, this Pollution Control Proclamation was curtailed from 
being implemented on pre-existing industries. Secondly, any existing water laws, including pollution 
control, do not incorporate statutory obligations on the water suppliers regarding water quality 
perspectives. Moreover, the pollution control system tends more towards an administrative 
boundary-oriented model. Regarding the protection of water resources from pollution, industrial 
pollution control is handled by the Environmental Authority. However, the regional states are 
principal implementers of industrial regulations, regardless of whether the nature of the pollution is 
interstate or confined within their regional state. The review has indicated that effective 
implementation, particularly in interstate pollution, is doubtful without the significant involvement of 
a national environmental authority. An administrative boundary-oriented WRMP may not 
sufficiently curb interstate water pollution, since the impacts transcend administrative boundaries, 
and effective control of such pollution depends on the capacity of respective states.1543Because of 
these factors, the implementation of point source pollution control remains weak in the country. 
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Finally, despite some water bodies being under threat from diffuse water pollution, there are no rules 
that set out diffuse pollution control from sewage or the utilization of agricultural chemicals. 
The analysis in this chapter has also revealed that current water policy considers using a µWZLQ-WUDFN¶
approach. It considers demand and supply management as schemes to ensure access to and 
availability of water. Adequate water supplies are sought through developing new water 
infrastructures, with water transferring from one basin to another, or by creating interconnections 
within a basin. 1544  In principle, the basin boundary is seen as a guidance for its WRM. 1545 
Furthermore, within water security management, developing an appropriate long-term plan is 
important.1546 For this purpose, the WRM policy suggests WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµthe appropriate water 
supply planning parameters, design criteria and standards along with acceptable, desirable and 
permissible ranges and limits¶. 1547  However, the policy ideals have not developed into binding 
legislation.  
The evaluation in Chapter Seven also indicates that contemporary Ethiopian water policy favours 
regulation of water resources through cost internalization.1548 The policy sets out the need to use the 
µfull cost-recovery¶ DQGµZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\¶PRGHOV5HJDUGLQJSHRSOHOLYLQJLQWRZQVLWIDYRXUVIXOO
cost-recovery, whereas it suggests cost-recovery for the maintenance of facilities for the rural 
communities. 1549  The internalization of costs aims to achieve the protection, conservation and 
efficient use of water resources.1550  However, the policy document has not been translated into 
binding legislation; nor are there clear guidelines that are supportive in setting out the rules that 
facilitate implementation. The practical significance of the policy therefore remains unclear.  
The assessment in this chapter thus indicates that the comprehensive water policy that was 
formulated remains far from becoming a binding water law. In particular, although the mandate of 
the lead institution (the MoWE) is clearly defined,1551 the statutory obligations of water suppliers 
UHPDLQ XQFOHDU ,Q VXFK FLUFXPVWDQFHV WKH DJHQFLHV¶ DFFRXQWDELOLW\ IRU WKHLU SHUIRUPDQFH LV ZHDN
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and enhancing water security is unlikely to be possible.1552 There is a range of institutions involved 
in WRM. For example, the MoWE is conferred with water supply and regulatory functions, 
particularly in large-scale irrigation projects and water supply development. These mandates are 
conflicting by their very nature. Although the implementation of WRM is principally carried out by 
two bodies ± the BHC and River Basin Authority ± the MoWE supervises the Authority in 
conducting these functions. Practically, the nature of this mandate (i.e. the MoWE conferring the 
allocation of water abstraction) means that use of water resources by the Ministry may be 
unregulated, since the Authority may not have the capacity to control the functions of its super-
regulator. There is the impression that the water resources regulator itself is a major water resources 
developer ± and the Environmental Authority does not have the mandate to regulate its water 
abstraction or effluent discharges. 7KH $XWKRULW\¶V mandate is limited to point source pollution 
regulation, in particular from industries that have obtained licences from the federal government, 
although it has a mandate to supervise the lower levels. 
One of the aims of the national water sector policy is reorganizing WRM within the basin 
district. 1553 The assessment in this chapter demonstrates that Ethiopian water policy favours 
IWRM.1554The watershed boundary-based WRMP has been introduced as a recipe to reform the 
management system of water resources.1555When the information for this study was collected, only 
two River Basin Authorities were established out of the twelve river basins ± for the Abbay and the 
Awash River basins. The latter was established in 2008,1556and its practice gives the impression that 
it is continuing to engage in traditional functions, like water training, water allocation for large-scale 
water users and constructing irrigation channels.1557 Even these traditional functions do not extend to 
encompass the whole river basin; rather, they are limited to within a small segment of the Awash 
River basin. 
 
The water policy calls for the overall development of water resources through the use of ideas such 
as a rural-centred, decentralized and participatory approach, as well as an integrated framework that 
promotes the participation of all stakeholders and user communities in the relevant aspects of 
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WRM.1558 The WRM Policy suggests that diverse institutions and levels are assumed to be involved 
in the management of water resources.1559This management involves both national and local levels. 
In particular, the policy document declares the establishment of relationships between the different 
levels and sectors by defining the responsibilities of each stakeholder within WRM.1560 This is a 
noble idea, which requires the defining of the statutory WRM obligations of the diverse levels and 
institutions involved. Naturally, the implementation of this idea is unlikely, unless their 
responsibilities are first defined as statutory roles, and schemes are set up to sort out how 
coordination is to happen. It has been over a decade since the water policy was issued, but there is no 
law to implement its ideals. Paradoxically, the MoWE was given exclusive power over the 
management of the water resources of the country, including the power to issue directives.1561 Whilst 
the Ethiopian WRM Regulation includes the possibility of delegating powers to other bodies, it does 
not declare when and what types of functions should be delegated, or to whom such powers should 
be delegated.1562 
 
The BHC is the highest body that provides guidance for its respective River Basin Authority.1563 The 
members of each Council are designated by the national government,1564 and are expected to come 
from both federal government and regional states. However, the law does not provide the parameters 
that are used to select these members. It is left to the discretion of federal government to designate 
them.1565 These might include the presidents of the regional states sharing the basin and the members 
designated by federal government;1566and while the regional states¶ bureaus participate, they are 
voiceless in decision-making.1567 In addition to members of government bodies, designated private 
and business sectors participate in the BHC decision-making forum, but they do not have voting 
power.1568 7KH QDWXUH RI WKH %+&¶V SRZer therefore FUHDWHV GRXEW DV WR KRZ SULYDWH VHFWRUV¶ DQG
FRQVXPHUV¶LQWHUHVWVDUHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRVKDSLQJWRM.  
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Chapter Eight: Reflection and Conclusion 
8.1 Water security contexts and key qualities of effective WRMPs in the case study countries  
Traditionally, the challenges facing sustainability of water resources have been understood from the 
perspectives of semi-arid and arid countries. This thesis demonstrates that there are water security 
problems that include both the humid and semi-arid parts of the globe. Many of the European 
member states have already been categorized as lying within the water security threat regions. The 
discussion in this thesis also covers how almost a quarter of $IULFD¶V population lives in water-
stressed regions. Despite the exposure of the AU and the EU to water security threats, a considerable 
quantity of their water resources are wasted, polluted and over-abstracted. In such regions, the study 
suggests that the threats would continue to rise unless proper measures are introduced and put in 
place. 
The review in this study also shows that England is one of the more humid countries compared with 
many other EU member states. However, water security challenges are becoming recurrent threats in 
the country. In south-eastern parts of England, there is less water per person than in arid and semi-
arid countries in the world;1569and the threats are expected to extend to other parts of the country. 
Despite these growing water security problems, there is also a considerable degree of human pressure 
on freshwater, both from over-abstraction and pollution.1570 
 
Compared to England, Ethiopia is a relatively semi-arid country. Its water resources are exposed to a 
great deal of spatial and temporal variability. In addition to natural scarcity, it is projected that water 
security problems will rise with the fast-growing demand to meet (WKLRSLD¶V economic and social 
development.1571 The study also indicates that, in both case study countries, availability of water 
resources would worsen in the future due to unsustainable water usage and pollution.  
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How can water law and policy help to achieve water security in the case study countries? To 
establish an analytical framework, the study evaluated the tragedy of the commons and the integrated 
river basin management approach, and has mapped out the following as salient features of an 
effective WRM system:  
x A need to take into account the context of water resources  
x Supply and demand management 
x Water cost internalization 
x Long-term WRMP 
x Responsive water allocation 
x Reasonable and equitable use of shared water  
x No significant harm  
x Water quality protection  
x Subsidiarity 
x Participation  
x Collaboration  
x Integration  
x Separation of regulatory and water service provision remits  
x Clear implementation strategies 
 
After mapping out these main qualities, the study made an evaluation in order to understand the 
extent to which key features of an effective WRMP are reflected in English and Ethiopian water 
policies and laws. The findings indicate that, in both countries, there are some initiatives being 
implemented in their respective WRM policies and laws which do reflect these key qualities of an 
effective management system. From the overall water policies review, it may be argued that the 
contemporary policies generally accommodate some key features of an effective WRM system, but 
only if they are accompanied by proper water laws, implementation strategies and organizational 
remits that are designed to enhance water security.  However, the initiatives which have been taken 
are limited and varied. Particularly, in Ethiopia¶V water management system, the progress made to 
insert such key features into binding law have been slow. Even if some features are reflected within 
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the water laws of both jurisdictions, they are limited and incomprehensive. Moreover, their 
implementation too has been weak and incomprehensive in both countries and, because of this, 
traditional WRM systems still have a big impact; as a result, there has not been much deviation from 
WKHµWUDGLWLRQDO¶ZD\RIPDQDJLQJZDWHUUHVRXUFHV 
The study reveals that the effectiveness of a WRMP may not depend solely on the introduction of 
water policy and law. Primarily, it depends on identifying the key qualities of an effective system, 
which are then required to been acted into water policy and law. However, a reflection of such 
qualities may not enhance the sustainability of water. Rather, water security as a goal may be 
achieved when these key qualities are reflected in water policy and law comprehensively. However, 
this is not an end in itself for the realization of water security, as the effectiveness of a WRM system 
depends on its successful implementation in order to address water security challenges. Moreover, 
identification of the key qualities and their implementation in water policy and law are continuous 
processes in WRM, since water resource challenges are constantly changing with time and place. The 
study also suggests that these key qualities should be reflected at different scales ± from the 
international to the local (national) levels.  
8.2 International level   
 
Water resources often do not respect administrative boundaries. Owing to this special nature, 
international water policy and law play a critical role in providing a general framework which 
controls the behaviours of states. The early international water laws were focused on coordinated 
development of transboundary water for specific uses.1572 Nowadays, there are many laws and policy 
instruments that manage international water resources, including its non-navigational uses. The Mar 
del Plata Conference introduced the coordinated management of all water resources, while the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 recognized again the necessity of an 
integrated and coordinated WRM. Agenda 21 further emphasizes an IWRM µEDVHGRQWKHSHUFHSWLRQ
of water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource and a social and economic good, 
whose quantity and quality determines the nature of utilisation¶.1573 
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The 1992 Dublin Conference also emphasized a holistic approach ± that is, an IWRM that favours 
managing land and water resources across a catchment area. Subsequent international water law 
development, such as the Helsinki Rules, also recognizes management of all waters, both 
navigational and non-navigational, in the entire international basin in a way that enhances the 
equitable and reasonable use of water and follows the obligation not to cause significant harm. The 
Stockholm Action Plan identified environmental issues that required international cooperation and 
recognized the government¶V right in shared natural resources as a qualified right. Regarding shared 
resources, states are expected to cooperate through establishing multilateral or bilateral 
arrangements, or other appropriate means. Similarly, the 1979 UN General Assembly Resolution 
promotes effective cooperation among states in order to sustain shared resources.  
The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
embodied the principles of equitable and reasonable use and WKH µQRVLJQLILFDQWKDUP¶ UXOH ,W DOVR
accommodated water system conservation and sustainable development. These principles may be 
seen as customary of international law, which provides norms that could be implemented into 
regional and national water law.  
 
At international level, the 1978 UNEP developed its µDraft principles of conduct in the field of the 
environment for the guidance of states in the conservation and harmonious utilisation of natural 
resources shared by two or more states¶. Accordingly, states cooperate with a view to control, 
prevent, reduce or eliminate adverse environmental effects. At the regional level, OECD in Europe 
has adopted a number of non-binding recommendations: water resources should be managed on the 
basis of long-term plans, and all relevant aspects of water quantity and quality should be addressed, 
such as abstraction and discharge, supply and protection. The OECD recommends a river basin-
oriented WRM.  
The assessment of the 1957 arbitration tribunal¶V decision, about the Lac Lanoux transboundary 
water dispute between France and Spain, has shown that riparian states are entitled to use water, but 
ZLWKRXW LJQRULQJRWKHUULSDULDQVWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV In the most recent transboundary water dispute, the 
Gabþíkovo±Nagymaros case, the Court in its decision noted that there were developments in 
international environmental law which are supportive of environmental protection and the equitable 
and reasonable utilization of international watercourses. The reviewed case studies inform us that 
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there has been a basic change in traditional water law and practices; in particular, the right to use 
shared water resources is conditional, in order to avoid unsustainable water exploitation. In this 
development, the philosophical foundation is environmental concern. 
On 28 July 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 64/292, which explicitly recognizes 
µWKHULJKWWRVDIHDQGFOHDQGULQNLQJZDWHUDQGVDQLWDWLRQDVDKXPDQULJKWWKDWLVHVVHQWLDOIRUWKHIXOO
enjoyment of life and all human rights¶. The MDGs also set out the role of water in human 
development under Target 7C. The United Nations World Water Development Report of 2012 
underlined how human use and pollution are threatening the sustainability of water resources, and 
suggested that unsustainable practices should not be ignored if access to clean water and sanitation is 
to be achieved. In the SDG drafting process, UN(6&2¶V ,+3 UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW Ln addition to 
fulfilling the human needs of clean water and sanitation, countries to address issues of 
overexploitation of freshwater resources, the growing water pollution problems in order to reach 
global sustainable development.1574 The draft SDGs brought a development into water policy and law 
that advocates increased access to safe water and sanitation; a reduction in water demand and 
controlled pollution; that water resources should be efficiently used; and that WRM should be taken 
to the appropriate level by following an integrated approach.  
The examination of international law and practice indicates that many key features of an effective 
WRM system are reflected in the international water instruments. Many of these key features aim to 
regulate the behaviours of states. While some of the main qualities of effective WRMPs that are 
present within international law and policies do support the enhancement of water sustainability, 
their practical importance has been limited to ensure that this does occur. However, their 
implementation may not be effective enough to ensure the sustainability of water resources without 
effective WRM systems at regional and national levels, since these are the principal actors compared 
to the international level. In particular, it is important that states adopt these norms in their regional 
and national water policies and laws.   
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8.3 Regional level  
  
The AU has a broad mission to shape LWV PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ water policies and laws. Similarly, as a 
supranational body, the EU has the legal competence to introduce water policies and laws that shape 
LWVRZQPHPEHUV¶EHKDYLRXUV and, indeed, over the last three decades the EU has adopted a range of 
these in order to reform its WRM systems. Many of WKH(8¶V traditional water policies and laws had 
focused on non-water security issues, and were characterized as instruments providing standards for 
different types of water use. The main objectives of such policies and laws were to protect against 
market distortion and to ensure public health. To meet these objectives, the new standards have been 
set to regulate quality of water and point source pollution. 
The regulation of diffuse pollution was introduced at similar time to protect water from nitrate 
pollution arising from agricultural purposes. The analysis of this stage of water law has shown that 
sustainability of water resources might not be achieved by using regulatory schemes alone. In the 
case of diffuse pollution, water polluters may not be the water users themselves, and such pressures 
on water resources may result from legal activities such as agricultural practices. The protection of 
water resource quality from failures has been approached from land-use management practices. At 
the early stages, while the EU provided binding water legislation concerned with regulation of 
specific issues, the level of the (8¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WRM was not significant enough to address 
water resource sustainability challenges. The state of the (8¶V legislative intervention was too 
narrow to manage water security challenges. A range of key features of an effective management 
system for water resources were not reflected within its water policies and laws. However, it might 
be up to each member state to introduce its own measures to sustain its water resource.   
A VLJQLILFDQWVKLIW LQWKH(8¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDOwater arrangements was introduced with its adoption of 
the WFD within the Union. 1575 The Framework, introduced in 2000, is more progressive and 
comprehensive than its predecessors.1576 The legislation aims to protect the interests of humans, 
healthy water ecosystems and sustainability of water resources. It intends to control human impacts 
on water and its ecosystem. Through this, the integration of land and water resources is perceived as 
one of the key features of an effective WRM system within the EU.  
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The WFD provides a framework in which the member states can introduce more specific water 
resources policy and law. Through this legislation, the role of the national level is clearly recognized 
in WRM. The WFD was transposed into the member states¶ legislation: each EU member state is 
obliged to implement the WFD, and such implementation can be ensured by the Commission of the 
European Communities. 1577  The failure to transpose and implement the legislation entails legal 
consequences. For instance, the Water and Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and 
Wales) 2003 legislation transposed the EU WFD. This means that the key features of an effective 
WRM system at the EU level would also need to be reflected at the national level (i.e. in the English 
WRM policies.  
 
The importance of the (8¶Vlegislative intervention in shaping WRM is twofold. First, across the EU, 
water laws are being harmonized to enhance the sustainability of water, and the behaviours of the 
governments of member states are also being shaped accordingly. This demonstrates that water 
resource security concerns are not only the affairs of individual member states; the EU is 
considerably engaged in protecting its overall interests. The impression is that enhancing water 
security may not be achieved through isolated, fragmented and incoherent WRM within political 
boundaries ± although, upon designing the institutional arrangements, the context of the country or 
region in which such institutional arrangements are introduced may need to be taken into account. 
Second, achieving water security may demand a more coordinated and inclusive approach that 
addresses water resource threats, while providing responsive solutions for the conflicting demands 
between countries. The WFD is a particularly invaluable legal instrument for harmonizing the WRM 
institutional arrangements of the member states. This suggests that, in tackling the fragmentation and 
incoherence of the water policies DQG ODZV EHWZHHQ PHPEHU VWDWHV WKH (8¶V VWURQJ OHJLVODWLYH
competence has played a crucial role. 
At the EU level, more awareness of water politics has been observed since the 2003 drought; this can 
be seen from the introduction of water policy options for drought and water scarcity. In 2007, the 
European Commission adopted the Communication on water scarcity and droughts, which 
accommodated water policy options, setting the priorities for managing water scarcity and drought 
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challenges.1578In 2012, the European Commission expensively analysed the WFD implementation 
and evaluated DµbOXHSULQW¶IRU(8ZDWHUODZUHIRUP7KHVHGHYHORSPHQWVLQZDWHUSROLF\VXJJHVWed 
that WRM should be reshaped and implemented according to changing contexts. Notwithstanding 
these developments, in the EU significant water resources vulnerability remains. Although the 
Communication has not been adopted into binding legislation, WRMPs should have some 
responsiveness or sensitivity to the extent of the growing water scarcity threats. 
 
The WFD incorporated a rule that regulates the off-take of quantities of groundwater. The rule 
demands that member states must take into account a long-term average water recharge level for 
groundwater, in order to control over-abstraction, and imposes limitations on the level of water 
abstraction. Practice indicates that water abstraction for agriculture accounts for 24 per cent of water 
use within Europe, but that water abstraction regulation is inefficient.1579 There is an over-estimation 
problem in existing water bodies, which opens the way for over-abstraction.1580 This makes the water 
allocation permit system patchy, which can be decided at the discretion of each member state. At the 
EU level, there should be the introduction of strong regulation regarding water abstraction for 
agricultural purposes.  
The WFD¶s remit principally affects water quality, although quantity is also affected. Primarily, the 
(8¶VUROHLQWRM is limited to water quality management, unless the member states decide against 
this unanimously. Such unanimity may allow member states to control any move by the EU to adopt 
legal measures principally related to water quantity management. Certainly, it empowers the member 
states to play more roles, and permits states to resist measures that affect their national interests. This 
issue may give rise to doubt about the competence of the EU in introducing water quantity 
management rules, although it may be argued that the TFEU does not limit water quantity 
management to those measures that do not affect the availability of water resources, since it allows 
all measures that protect and improve the availability of water resources to follow qualified majority 
voting. The impression is that there may be a fear among member states of fully passing their power 
regarding water quantity determination to the EU. With growing water shortage challenges, the EU 
should place emphasis on both water quality and quantity regulation.  
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Additionally, the WFD brought further development to the rules controlling water pollution for 
pollution point source regulation, through to emission regulation and the use of Best Available 
Technology; diffuse pollution awareness creation schemes; chemical use control; and expanding best 
agricultural practices. Another innovation in pollution control is the introduction of a new scheme 
that obligates member states to designate protected areas of water resources that are used for 
particular purposes. Nevertheless, in terms of the key features in FRQWUROOLQJ ZDWHU SROOXWLRQ µIXOO
FRPSOLDQFH¶WRWKH:)'KDVQRWEHHQDFKLHYHG; even though there are significant pollution pressures 
within the EU, implementation is often a key factor or challenge in many water bodies.1581This 
suggests that the EU needs to strengthen its enforcement of water legislation.  
The WFD introduced a rule for water pricing as a market instrument ± that is, member states are 
under an obligation to develop water pricing as a requirement.1582 7KH\DUHREOLJHGWRµWDNHDFFRXQW
RI¶ WKHSULQFLSOHRI UHFRYHU\RIFRVWVRIZDWHU VHUYLFHV, and to ensure the adequate contribution of 
ZDWHUXVHUVWRWKHFRVWRIZDWHUDVDQHFRQRPLF UHJXODWRU\ WRRO7KH PHPEHU VWDWHV¶GXW\ LVQRW WR
implement cost-recovery; rather, it is limited to taking into account the principle, meaning that its 
implementation is dependent on the willingness of each member state to act. Each state has discretion 
with regard to its water pricing, so some progressive states may use effective water pricing, whereas 
others may not, and implementation of cost internalization varies within shared river basins. 
Moreover, each EU member, within its national boundary demarcation, conducts an economic 
analysis by using technical specifications.1583 The WFD favours water cost internalization within the 
political boundary demarcation of each member state. Shared water bodies still lack coherent 
mechanisms to set water pricing in a coordinated way. Patchy water pricing may not bring changes to 
all parts of a shared water body and compliance with cost-recovery water pricing remains a problem. 
This suggests that the EU should strengthen its compliance mechanism. In practice, within the water 
bodies of the EU, cost internalization has not materialized effectively.1584 Moreover, the WFD lacks 
clarity in the scope of the application of water pricing± which has again left the implementation of 
water pricing patchy and ineffective within the EU member states. In terms of water cost 
internalization, the scope of water services is often limited to drinking water and waste water 
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treatment; this excludes regulation of major water consuming sectors, including water abstraction for 
agriculture. At the Union level, the EU should introduce comprehensive guidelines for cost 
internalization. 
Local participation is one of the key features of an effective WRM system. The WFD favours 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ the development of RBMPs. However, the scope of participation is 
limited to written comments and opinions on the draft RBMP and plan update documents.1585The 
:)'¶VCIS document also extends the scope of consultation to the provision of written comments, 
possibly including dialogues with the public in workshops and a wide range of meetings.1586 The CIS 
suggests public participation to allow people to influence the outcome of plans and the working 
process; however, it is unclear whether potential participants are involved in the implementation 
processes. Thus the EU should introduce clear laws to enhance participation during the 
implementation stage of RBMPs.  
Generally, in early water policy, environmental problems were seen within administrative boundaries. 
Environmental policies favoured decision-making at the lowest appropriate level unless the mandate 
was exclusively given to the EU level. The focus that was given to the lowest appropriate level 
demonstrates the demand for local participation in such environmental decision-making. While the 
idea of subsidiarity is recognized as a key element of environmental law, in principle, decision-
making is determined on a case-by-case basis. The EU discharges the mandates that are exclusively 
given, and follow the same approach to management of water as a medium of the environment. In 
most cases, determining the level that was best suited for water resources decision-making was left to 
the respective member state, unless specific WRM aspects were left for regional-level intervention. 
One of the fundamental shifts brought by the WFD was that, within the EU, water resources should 
no longer be controlled along political or administrative boundaries; rather, the WRMPs are now set 
out and implemented according to the boundaries of river basins. This new development in water 
governance systems has certainly changed a traditionally administrative boundary-oriented and 
fragmented WRM.  
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The WFD obligates member states to manage water resources at the river basin level in a coordinated 
fashion, in both transboundary and non-transboundary water bodies, although different levels are 
involved in WRM. River basin management assumes cooperation as a tool in coordinating WRM. 
However, cooperation with a non-EU member state that shares water resources with a member state 
is increasingly dependent on the willingness of the former, unless there is a treaty forcing it to 
cooperate. Often, regions and countries may have their own priorities and agendas. 
By comparison, in the AU, the major mandates of the OAU were traditionally limited to giving 
support, in a coordinated manner, to alleviating the colonization and racism threats to which many of 
the African countries were exposed. The legislative competence of the OAU was fully different from 
the EU. During the colonial period, the preferred approach to implementing these objectives was 
non-interventionist within the PHPEHUVWDWHV¶ LQWHUQDODIIDLUV,QKHUHQWO\ the OAU did not have the 
legislative competence to introduce an effective management system for water resources. Each 
member state might separately introduce a water policy and law that it would consider appropriate 
for the sustainability of water. However, post-colonial Africa has changed the mandate of the AU in 
order to intervene in some issues that were previously the remit of member states. With the 
establishment of the AU and NEPAD, the IRUPHU¶V legislative competence was extended to 
intervening in issues that affect the sustainable development of the entire continent. However, the 
wordings of the mandates of the AU and NEPAD seem to be too weak, and focus more on promotion 
and facilitation, rather than on direct intervention within member states¶ affairs.  
To tackle water scarcity threats, the AU has made some efforts aiming to reform the continent¶V 
WRM. Notably, the AU has adopted the comprehensive African Water Vision for 2025 that 
accommodates some key features of an effective management system for water resources. The 
document calls for member states to engage in such key features as: equitable and sustainable use; 
demand and supply management; water quality protection; integration; cooperation and collaboration; 
and participation and subsidiarity. The study demonstrated that in Africa there are some regional 
water treaties which may provide a better platform for WRM, as they are supportive of subsidiarity. 
However, such arrangements may not be a substitute for the AU¶V role in providing water law, and 
the sustainability of African water may also need international, AU and regional treaties. The Africa 
Water Vision is comprehensive, in terms of encompassing water security concerns at the centre of 
sustainable development and in FDOOLQJWKH$8¶Vmember states to bring about fundamental changes 
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in their WRMPs. Despite the Africa Water Vision¶V recognition that water security is at the heart of 
WKH$8¶VVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\WKHVWDWXVRIWKH$8¶V
legislative competence to intervene in shaping WRMPs LVZHDN7KH$8¶VWater VLVLRQLVµFDOOLQJ¶
the member states, rather WKDQµUHIOHFWLQJ¶NH\IHDWXUHVLQWRZDWHUSROLF\DQGODZ; it leaves reflection 
and implementation to the discretion of each member state.  
AMCOW and the heads of government of certain African countries have subsequently formulated a 
range of declarations that facilitate the implementation of the Africa Water Vision. Since 2000, the 
AU has adopted a dozen WRM GHFODUDWLRQV7KHLPSUHVVLRQLVWKDWWKHVWDWHRIWKH$8¶V legislative 
intervention in WRM does not seem strong. The continent does not have a comprehensive water law 
WKDWKDUPRQL]HV PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ZDWHU ODZVDQGSROLFLHV7KH LQIOXHQFH WKDW WKH$8 KDV EURXJKW LV
insignificant in changing the status quo of its member states and, because of this, water security 
challenges are addressed by fragmented, incoherent and incomprehensive water laws that were 
introduced by each AU member state, even in instances of shared water bodies. To tackle the 
fragmentation and incoherence of the water policies and laws between member states, the AU needs 
to have a strong legislative competence. In particular, as water security is a regional threat and has 
regional implications, the AU should have strong legislative competence to intervene at that level. 
8.4 National level  
8.4.1 Controlling water demand and supply  
 
In the case study countries, there is an objective to address pressing water shortages with the growing 
recognition of the importance of water security for human needs. The right to water and sanitation 
has been widely recognized in both national and international policy instruments. The importance of 
this development is arguably to enhance the sustainability of water, to protect human needs and to 
ensure access to, and availability of, water. Particularly, a country is expected to take a distinct 
measure to address human needs when water is in deficit. However, the right to water is not an 
absolute right, such as an ordinary property right. Water is one special resource; the idea is that the 
right to water should also address the sustainability of water concerns in an integrated manner.  
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The study suggests that water is a public resource. Hence, in order to protect public needs, the control 
of water as a matter of public interest is unquestionable. Any water policy and law should embed the 
PTD in the utilization of water resources. 
Recent national policy and legal developments inform us that there is an important shift in water 
rights. When water scarcity or stress is growing, public needs are protected by introducing coercive 
UXOHV7UDGLWLRQDOO\(QJODQG¶VZDWHUSHUPLW V\VWHPZDVFRQFHLYHG WRSURYLGH a perpetual right for 
the licence owner or possessor. This may not protect the public interest, since the purpose of water 
permits has tended to protect private interests. However, in recent years, there have been significant 
changes to water law in England. The modern permit system that was introduced in 2003 is both 
regulatory and time-bound; the permits will not create lasting property rights. 
Under contemporary Ethiopian water law, the permit system is assumed to be a tool to allocate and 
regulate water resources. The water abstractors and effluent dischargers are expected to obtain 
permits before becoming involved in water resource development. The permits may be suspended if 
the water resources are being depleted or the licence holders fail to meet the conditions set out under 
the permits.1587 In Ethiopia, examination of present irrigation practice has shown that there is a 
tendency to divert water without obtaining any permit. The study shows that traditional water supply 
facilities are also exempt from any regulation. The water law does not quantify the amount of water 
that traditional water facilities abstract; the implication is that more focus is given to enhancing 
access to water. In order for Ethiopia to enhance the sustainability of water, the country needs to 
regulate the use of water for different purposes by introducing a comprehensive water law.  
Ethiopia¶V 1995 Constitution declares explicitly that water is a public resource. The FDRE has also 
given recognition to the right to clean water, and has imposed an obligation on both government and 
its citizens to protect the environment. The adoption of the regulations under the national 
constitutional document informs the JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLWLFDOFRPPLWPHQWWRSURWHFWWKHULJKW to clean 
water and environment. This legal evolution may be entrenched with the increasing recognition of 
controlling water consumption to protect the environment. This legal development suggests the right 
to water tries to protect human needs, but is subject to control in order to regulate unsustainable 
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water exploitation which damages the water environment. However, what is yet an unfinished task is 
the introduction of clear legislation that facilitates implementation of this constitutional right. 
Another key issue in WRM is the nature of control. Achieving water security requires a significant 
reduction in water demand. The study suggests more could be done in controlling water demand. 
Because demand management requires effective water consumption reduction measures, depending 
on the context of a country in question, WRM alone may not solve water security problems. Rather, 
control of what service providers are doing may enhance the sustainable availability of water. In 
England, a high percentage of total water consumption is by the water companies. In Ethiopia, by 
comparison, there is a high level of irrigation water and many communities are served by direct 
abstraction from the resources. Thus, it is important that each country should take responsive 
measures for its specific water security problems.  
In England, it is now a legal requirement for the water companies to prepare WRMPs,1588which 
provide what water companies are doing to sustain water. As a high percentage of water services are 
delivered by these water companies, the plans are an important tool to regulate their behaviour. The 
WRMPs accommodate options that improve the sustainable provision of water through reducing 
demand and enhancing supply. The water companies have an obligation to conserve water and 
prepare long-term WRMPs which assist in forecasting the availability of water, evaluate water 
security challenges and discuss options as to how to manage such challenges. Each company has a 
statutory requirement to prepare and publicize its WRMP, and declare how it will µbe able, and 
FRQWLQXH WR EH DEOH WR PHHW LWV VWDWXWRU\ REOLJDWLRQ¶ RI providing drinking water.1589 The water 
companies¶ WRMPs help them to make sure that they can respond flexibly to future uncertainties.1590 
The plans are made through long-term assessments of specific water resource zones and availability 
to meet a range of demands.1591 
WRMPs may play a key role in balancing demand and supply. This implies that WRM policy and 
law are considerably evolving towards preparedness and resilience building. While preparation of 
WRMPs may not be an end to securing water resources availability, however, achieving water 
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security is increasingly dependent upon the implementation of these plans. The WRMP in England is 
central to the enhancement of water security, as well as being a procedural requirement. The water 
law does not set out a clear rule that imposes an obligation on water undertakers regarding its 
implementation. Moreover, the :503V¶ scope of application is limited to drinking water resources. 
The study suggests that implementation of WRMPs remains weak in England. This suggests that it is 
also important that effective water demand and supply management requires not only the 
introduction of WRMPs, but also a comprehensive implementation system. The degree effectiveness 
of WRMPs depends on the strength of enforcement of any action that enhances compliance.  
At the national level in Ethiopia, arguably, the early development of water law was related to the 
protection of water resources for large-scale irrigation. It began with the drive towards agricultural 
modernization, in order to facilitate water resources for large-scale farming in the Awash Valley 
areas. The long-term sustainable use of water was unlikely to be addressed within traditional WRM 
policy and law. Subsequently, the development of WRM law was observed to be assigned to a single 
organization with regard to water resource regulation and agricultural enterprise development in the 
Awash River Valley areas. These functions were conflicting within WRM, rather than enhancing the 
security of water resources. In Ethiopia, the recent water policy favours preparing long-term plans 
and considers using a µWZLQ-WUDFN¶DSSURDFK, regarding demand and supply management as schemes 
to ensure access and availability of water services. However, the policy ideas have not changed into 
binding legislation; the country does not have a comprehensive water law. It should thus be a crucial 
aim for the country to introduce a comprehensive water law which accommodates long-term 
WRMPs.  
In England, all water service users pay fair prices for the water services they obtain; also cross-
subsidy is used to allow special treatment for those water customers who may not be able to afford to 
pay. On the other hand, only 30 per cent RI KRXVHKROGV¶ZDWHU VHUYLFHVDUH ILWWHGZLWh meters and, 
except in those areas where resources are under stress, introducing metering is not a compulsory 
requirement for water companies. Owing to this fact, it is difficult to say whether water users are 
paying a fair price for what they are using. However, this does not necessarily mean that water 
abstraction in the country is free.  For instance, the water companies, as one of the major water 
abstractors, pay the costs for the volume of water they abstract to the Environment Agency, as per 
their licensing conditions. 
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Contemporary Ethiopian water policy promotes regulation of water resources through cost 
internalization. The policy suggests those people living in towns; it favours full cost-recovery, 
whereas it suggests cost-recovery for the maintenance of facilities for the rural communities.1592 The 
internalization of costs aims to attain the protection, conservation and efficient use of water 
resources.1593 However, the policy text has not yet been translated into binding legislation. Thus, the 
country should need to introduce a water law that accommodates water cost internalization.  
8.4.2 Water quality protection 
 
The study suggests that the challenge in the FDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV¶ZDWHUVHFXULW\ is thus not only one 
of securing enough safe water. Water security is also linked to the protection of water resources from 
sewage discharges and urban waste water, and point and diffuse source pollution. In England, water 
quality failures from sewage discharges and urban waste water are addressed by the issuance of 
standards and the introduction of a permit system. The discharge authorizations or Environmental 
Permits set out standards to minimize the adverse effects of waste water on the receiving 
environment. Through the permit system, the Environment Agency can control water quality failures 
caused by waste water. The sewerage companies are responsible for waste water treatment from 
sewage, since the companies are the main waste water treatment service providers. 
The Environment Agency is also entrusted with the responsibility to regulate water quality 
deterioration through pollution.1594One measure to manage diffuse source pollution is by establishing 
protected areas and creating awareness amongst farmers to use the identified best farming 
practices.1595Such codes of best agricultural practice have been developed and used in the protected 
zones.1596 The Environment Agency may ask the Secretary of State to designate areas as water 
protection zones. 1597  In practice, diffuse pollution remains a significant challenge, and the 
implementation of the codes of best agricultural practice for diffuse pollution control remains weak. 
This suggests more efforts should be made to enhance the effectiveness of water law implementation.   
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Evaluation of the Ethiopian water law has shown that it reflects the rules controlling water quality 
failure from point source pollution. However, the Pollution Control Proclamation was curtailed from 
being implemented on the pre-existing industries. There is thus a need ±for the sake of further water 
security ±to remove this particular exemption. Moreover, the pollution control system tends towards 
an administrative boundary-oriented model. Control of water resources from industrial pollution is 
handled by the Ministry of Environment and Forest, but only if the firm concerned has been 
registered by the federal government. In all other cases, the regional states are the principal 
implementers of industrial pollutant regulations, regardless of whether the nature of the pollution is 
interstate or confined within the regional state. This review has indicated that the effectiveness of 
such a model of pollution control is doubtful without the significant involvement of a national 
environmental authority, particularly in cases of interstate pollution. An administrative boundary-
oriented WRM may not sufficiently curb interstate water pollution, since the impacts transcend 
administrative boundaries, and effective control of such pollution depends on the capacity of the 
respective state. Because of these factors, the implementation of point source pollution control 
remains weak in the country. Lastly, despite some water bodies being under threat from diffuse water 
pollution, there are no rules that set out the control of diffuse pollution from the utilization of 
agricultural chemicals and sewage. This again suggests the need to introduce a comprehensive water 
pollution control system. 
8.4.3 Integration 
 
Water security problems require responsive solutions for the entire water system ±and for all 
major human pressures across a river basin district. Integration needs to move along a spectrum 
that is able to consider all water uses and types of water challenges and sets out measures that curb 
those identified problems. The management o f the water resources within the case study countries 
needs to focus more on IWRM. Sustainable, long-term water resource availability may not 
become a reality without introducing and effectively implementing this IWRM approach; fo r  
such integration is more than just a traditional coordinated WRM approach.  
 
The study suggests that IWRM means manag ing water  resources  at all levels± from local 
to global. To this end, actions at each level need to be defined, and the measures on one 
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level need to be linked with the other. In cases of shared water, regional and international 
agreements should be developed and enforced to establish coordination. As water security 
challenges need context-specific solutions, they mainly require key roles to be played at national, 
river basin district and catchment levels. Given that water security challenges are not single-level 
problems, they need integration among these levels.  
 
5HJDUGLQJWKHQDWXUHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDOUHPLWVWKHUHYLHZRI(QJODQG¶VZDWHUODZhas shown that the 
water services facilities are administrative boundary-oriented, decentralized and scattered at the local 
level. The analysis indicated that more decentralized WRM could facilitate local participation. 
However, it demonstrates that fragmented water services provision is not a recipe for the security of 
water, although local participation in WRM is still crucial. In particular, when water resources are 
scarce, the fragmented water services provision may expose water resources to unbalanced utilization. 
Moreover, in fragmented and localized water services provision, those water resources zones that are 
abundant with water continue to utilizHPRUHZDWHUZKHUHDVWKHµVWUHVV¶RUµVFDUFH¶]RQHVFRQWLQXHWR
suffer unless there are schemes for a coordinated management. Since 1963, England has been 
introducing regionally based water services provisions.  
The RBMPs provide a process through which water resource pressures are understood and managed 
in an integrated manner.1598 In 2009, the RBMPs were published for the river basin districts in 
England.  For each river basin district, the RBMP has been formulated with the aim of ensuring an 
IWRM that could avoid fragmentation. IWRM integrates both quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
water pressures and uses. The recent 2015 implementation of RBMPs in England shows that in terms 
of surface waters, some water bodies are yet subject to significant pressures. These pressures include 
pollution from point and diffuse sources, and abstraction and hydromorphological alterations. This 
informs us that more should be done to implement these RBMPs. 
At present, in Ethiopia¶V rural areas, the WASHCos are responsible for administering water facilities.   
They collect revenue from water users, distribute water and undertake minor maintenance of the 
utilities. WASHCos are basic institutions that administer the water VXSSO\DQGOHDGWKHZDWHUXVHUV¶
community at grassroots level; they are not yet used as a platform for non-water supply issues. The 
WASHCos¶ institutional arrangements favour a bottom-up approach that empowers local 
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communities; however, they do not have responsibilities to control water demand and pollution, 
leakage control or water system protection. They do not have an obligation towards enhancing the 
long-term interests of the community, or environmental and economic sustainability. This 
demonstrates that the remits of WASHCos need mandate expansion; accommodating both water 
demand management and environmental protection. Moreover, only a small number of the 
WASHCos are legalized to discharge water services provisions. It should be important to legalize 
and coordinate the functions of WASHCos to enable them to provide sustainable water services.  
In addition, water security requires an integrated land and water management in order to protect the 
sustainability of water resources. While the Ethiopian water policy favours an IWRM and ecosystem 
approach, the policy has not been changed into water law. There are no comprehensive binding rules 
to protect the ecosystems of water resources, which is crucial in protecting them. Thus, the country 
should introduce a water law that enhances IWRM.  
In England, water law has accommodated clear, substantive rules that are designed to control land 
development. To control diffuse source pollution, the schemes that have been introduced range from 
regulation to awareness creation. Practice in England suggests that an attempt to control diffuse 
pollution is carried out through a voluntary mechanism or awareness creation, by targeting groups ± 
particularly farmers, since agricultural land-use practices are the main source of the challenges. 
Moreover, there are rules to establish protected areas to safeguard water resources against pollution. 
Land use of protected areas must follow the codes of practice that are set out. This demonstrates that 
effective WRM demands an integrated management of land use in the water resources zone.  
8.4.4 Collaboration  
 
Water security issues are often interconnected, locally and internationally. Water security as a challenge therefore 
requires working together. The existence of clear statutory roles by itself may not guarantee the 
enhancement of the security of water resources. Effective WRM needs collaboration; particularly, it 
needs to establish how different stakeholders can work together. Effective collaboration needs both a 
setting out of a defined remit and creation of a relationship between stakeholders. ,Q (QJODQG¶V
WRM, there are a number of stakeholders (government, regulators, water companies and consumer 
representatives). The WSRA is entrusted with economic regulation, and the DWI and the 
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Environment Agency are entrusted with the responsibility of drinking water and environmental 
quality, respectively. 
Defra (the government department) provides policy JXLGDQFH WKDW GLUHFWV WKH UHJXODWRUV¶ functions. 
Although these regulatory functions differ in their nature, they have increasingly interrelated goals in 
ensuring water sustainability. In practice, there was a suggestion that the WSRA works in isolation. 
Similar criticisms observed that Ofwat provided decisions without sufficient justification. The study 
indicates that the Water Act 2014 has brought a scheme that rectifies this drawback, and increases 
coordinated water services regulation.  
Similarly, in Ethiopia, the 1999 WRM Policy suggests that diverse organizations and levels are 
assumed to be involved in the management of water resources.1599 The policy also pledges the need 
to have coordination between stakeholders. However, the policy ideals remain unchanged to binding 
legislation, since the country has not developed a comprehensive WRM law. Ethiopia needs to 
develop a water law that defines the roles of different water services regulators and WRM bodies, 
and establish collaboration among regulatory institutions.   
8.4.5 Subsidiarity 
 
Traditionally, as discussed previously, (QJODQG¶Vwater services provisions have not been integrated 
and comprehensive. However, this model has been replaced by a river basin-based services provision 
model. Practically, though, all WRM or service provision challenges may not find solutions from a 
single level. They may require bottom-up and/or top-down approaches; some issues are best handled 
at the local level while others may be better managed at national or supranational levels. Depending 
on the nature of the problem, regional or local levels play crucial roles in WRM or water services 
provision. In England, practice indicates that some issues are being handled at the local level. For 
instance, in England and Wales, the Catchment Sensitive Farming Project, which is voluntary in 
nature, seeks to tackle agricultural diffuse pollution. 1600  In this project, the farmers voluntarily 
engage by gaining advice and receiving incentives, and it gives emphasis to actions taken at the 
grassroots level and integrates these with other catchment delivery mechanisms. The example of the 
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Wessex Catchment in England shows how the Catchment Sensitive Farming Project has been 
conducted at a very local level within small areas to control the nitrate problem.1601While the lower 
level (catchment or below) is seen as appropriate to manage diffuse pollution problems, to date, there 
is no clear rule within English water law that defines the roles that each level has to play. In 2014, the 
government issued statutory guidance on the practical implementation of the WFD.1602 The guidance 
places increased emphasis on the catchment-based approach to WRM.1603Because this approach 
ensures the understanding of water security pressures of specific catchments, this policy guidance 
should therefore be changed into English law. 
 
In Ethiopia, the watershed boundary-based water resources planning or management has been 
introduced as a recipe to reform the management system of water resources.1604 To this end, the 
policy calls for the overall development of water resources through certain ideas, such as a rural-
centred, decentralized and participatory approach, as well as an integrated framework that promotes 
the participation of all stakeholders and user communities in the relevant aspects of WRM.1605At 
present, Ethiopia practises community-based participatory watershed management activities across 
the country. The study demonstrates that there have been variations in the success rates of different 
community-based management in different localities. This community-based participatory watershed 
management requires cooperation among various stakeholders to build and strengthen institutions. 
Some programmes are also being criticized on particular grounds, such as lack of inclusiveness or 
fairness and short-termism. This suggests that these participatory watershed management 
programmes should address contemporary weaknesses and, in particular, that they require 
legalization. 
 
It is clear that WRM involves both national and local levels. The Ethiopian water policy document 
declares the establishment of relationships between the different levels and sectors through defining 
the responsibilities of each stakeholder within WRM.1606 This is a noble idea, which requires the 
defining of the statutory obligations of the diverse levels and institutions involved in WRM.  
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In water resources protection and development, there is a range of interests that need taking into 
account when decision-making. The study shows that participation is an instrumental tool for 
enhancing the sustainability of water resources. The EU¶V WFD considers public and 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQDVGHFLVLYHLQULYHUEDVLQSODQGHYHORSPHQW7KHSDUWLFLSDWRU\WRM 
approach in this law aims to harmonize the needs and interests of water users at the river basin 
level. The WFD requires the member states to WDNHPHDVXUHVWRSURPRWHµDFWLYHLQYROYHPHQWRI
DOO SDUWLHV¶ LQ SODQQLQJ SURFHVVes.1607In England, the Water Environment (Water Framework 
Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations require public participation when preparing 
RBMPs,1608 during which the Environment Agency carries out the consultations with a diverse 
range of stakeholders. Amongst these, the water, energy and industrial companies, charities, 
local government, non-governmental organizations, wildlife groups and the public are 
mentionable.1609Similarly, in England and Wales, public participation has been ensured through 
setting up river basin district liaison panels at the regional and national levels.1610 
 
In the development of English WRMPs by the water companies, the regulators and government 
bodies participate so as to ensure long-term water security. The development of participatory 
WRMPs is assumed to enhance implementation of each SODQ¶V REMHFWLYH RI ZDWHU VHFXULW\. 
Access to valid information is a prerequisite for genuine participation in WRM.1611In England, 
there have been some challenges in implementing real participation in environmental 
concerns.1612 Despite the Aarhus Convention strongly emphasizing the need to have genuine 
participatory environmental protection, there are no common perspectives or common 
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understandings, or unified enforcement of access to information. 1613 The study suggests the 
necessity of developing schemes that enhance access to accurate information. 
 
,Q (QJODQG FRQVXPHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV LQ GULQNLQJ ZDWHU service provisions have been addressed by 
setting up a platform that enables the consumerV¶ µYRLFH¶ to be heard.  The CCWater protects 
consumers, but this may not necessarily be considered as participation. In its Price Review 2014, 
Ofwat introduced a new system of CCGs, the aim of which was to enhance the engagement 
between customers and water companies. Membership of the groups accommodates different 
stakeholders. 7KLV QHZ VFKHPH HQKDQFHV WKH FXVWRPHUV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV DQG VWDNHKROGHUV WR
challenge and shape the water companies¶ overall business plans. 
 
,Q(WKLRSLDQZDWHUSROLF\ VWDNHKROGHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LVHPSKasized. The BHC is the highest body 
that is responsible for conducting respective river basin WRM.1614 The members of this Council are 
designated by the national government,1615 and are expected to come from both federal government 
and regional states. However, the law does not provide the parameters that are used to select these 
members; no specific guidelines have been developed that could be used to determine where the 
members of the BHC come from. Practice indicates that the Prime Minister, or those persons 
appointed and chaired by him or her, participate in BHC. In particular, the members are expected to 
come from regional states that share river basins.1616 In addition to members of government bodies, 
designated private and business sectors participate in the BHC decision-making forum, but they do 
not have voting power.1617Lack of specific guidelines to define stakeholders leaves the definition of 
stakeholders to the discretion of the government; thus, the government needs to introduce guidelines 
on how to define people who participate in BHCs. Similarly, in water services provisions, the 
WASHCos provide key water service utilities at grassroots level that involve local communities; yet 
only a small number of the WASHCos are legalized. It should therefore be important to legalize 
these utilities to enable them to discharge their functions properly. 
                                                             
1613ibid. 
1614
 The River Basin Councils and Authorities Proclamation No. 534/2007. 
, article 2. 
1615






8.4.7 Clear policy guidance  
  
Managing water resources regulation needs provision of clear policy guidance by an impartial body. 
In England, the objectives of the regulators are mixed±for instance, the economic regulator Ofwat 
has an obligation to ensure that its decision-making takes sustainable development into account. 
Defining the appropriate legal responsibility for regulators alone may not bring the expected 
solutions for the water security challenges, as water regulators handle a whole range of objectives.  
Because of this, while each regulator is expected to exercise its functions within its legal remit, 
uncoordinated water resources regulation may constrain the overall objectives of WRM. In order to 
avoid such implementation difficulty, the Secretary of State provides the policy guidance for water 
regulators. This implies that the policy guidance is used as a scheme of policy integration. The water 
regulators function under the scrutiny of the Secretary of State to achieve government policy 
aspirations in WRM. 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, the MoWE is mandated to issue policy guidance. The problem in the 
Ethiopian case is impartiality; the MoWE provides such policy guidance, yet the Ministry is one of 
the major users of the water resources. This suggests that Ethiopia should introduce an institutional 
arrangement that provides impartial policy guidance to water users. Ethiopia also needs to refine the 
mandate of the Ministry in a manner that addresses its impartiality problems.  
8.4.8 Separation of regulatory and service provision mandates  
 
In England, the Water Act 1973 established ten regional water authorities and entrusted them with 
diverse regulatory and operational functions.1618 The legislation was criticized for conferring such a 
broad range of regulatory and operational functions. Traditionally, the regional water authorities 
ZHUH µDEVWUDFWRUV DQG GLVFKDUJHUV UHJXODWLRQ HQIRUFHUV DQG VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV SROOXWHUV DQG
environmental guardians¶.1619Because of this, regional water authorities were characterized as being 
ERWK D µSRDFKHU DQG JDPHNHHSHU¶ :DWHU UHVRXUFHV UHJXODWRU\ IXQFWLRQV ODFNHG LPSDUWLDOLW\ WR WKH
extent that there was a conflict of interests.1620 Subsequently, the operational and regulatory functions 
                                                             
1618Howarth and McGillivray(n 774). 
1619
 Johnson and Handmer(n 750)349. 
1620
 Howarth and McGillivray (n 774) 94. 
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were separated,1621and WRM functions were divided into two parts: the water supply and sewerage 
services on the one hand, and regulatory and law enforcement functions on the other.1622This reform 
of mandate has brought a clear separation between regulatory and operational functions. 
 
In Ethiopia, the MoWE is conferred with water supply and regulatory functions, particularly 
regarding large-scale irrigation projects and water supply development. Moreover, although the 
implementation of WRM is principally carried out by the River Basin Authority, the MoWE 
supervises the Authority in conducting these functions. Practically, conferring the allocation of water 
abstraction tothe MoWE means that water resources exploitation by the Ministry may be left 
unregulated, since the River Basin Authority may not have the capacity to control the functions of its 
super-regulator. The mandate conferred to the MoWE suggests that the water resources regulator 
itself is a major water resources developer. To avoid this problem, the country must therefore review 
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